Monday, September 30, 2013

Urban and Rural Voting: 2000 Presidential Election Case Study

This is a paper I wrote in early 2008. At the time it was original research, a topic that was hinted at and understood to be true, but without any real published work. A few months later, Bill Bishop's excellent 'The Big Sort' was published. This book dealt with some similar topics, but did not have the same level of detailed methodology that my paper did, and it was not as scientific in nature. 

The reason why I am posting this now is as a response to this article on the Atlantic (Cities sub-magazine). This article misstates the differences in voting as 'Democrat' vs. 'Republican', rather than a simple preference of presidential candidates. People do not vote exclusively based upon party lines, this is abundantly clear. Anyway its not worth my time to go through it line by line so just read my work.

Do Urban Voters Favor Democrats? 
A Case Study of the 2000 United States Presidential Election

The purpose of this project was to determine if voters living in urban areas in the 2000 United States Presidential Election were more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate Al Gore, rather than the Republican candidate, George Bush. It is a popular belief that people in the urban areas are significantly more liberal and therefore vote for the Democratic candidate rather than the Republican. 

Election results and levels of urbanization from 639 counties in 15 states were correlated. Data from the 2000 United States Census Summary File 3 were used to assess urbanization. Urbanization was defined as a ratio of the number of urban residents in a county divided by the total number of residents of the county. The resultant ratio could then range from 0-1. The election results were manually entered from the results posted on Third party candidate data were removed to create a two variable system. Counties with a third party candidate earning 10% or more of the vote were excluded from this analysis. Then a ratio of votes for a particular candidate divided by the total number of votes for the county was calculated to create another column with calculated values from 0-1. These numbers were then correlated to derive a Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient.

The definition of an “Urban Area” or “Urban Cluster”, which together make up Urban Population, is a census block or block group that has a density of 1000 people per square mile with surrounding blocks or block groups of similar density. The difference between them is the population size, where “Urban Area” is larger than “Urban Cluster”. 
I felt that aggregating data at a countywide level would provide the most accurate measure of urbanization, and election results would correspond to this. Any aggregation level smaller than this would be either excessively time-consuming or limited in scope. Using state data would be problematic because states are physically large, populous, and varied in urbanization. Generalizing by state would be an ecological fallacy. 
For the voting data I used These data were mostly reported on a county-by-county basis, although in some cases such as Connecticut, the reporting system differed. It was important to use voting data which matched the geographic break down of the census data.
I decided the most effective way to measure the correlation is to create a two-variable system, one being urbanization level, and the other, candidate selection. To compare the two principle candidates necessitated eliminating data from other candidates. In most cases the percentage of the population that voted for the third party was small, but in five to ten counties this exceeded 10%. These counties were excluded to avoid skewing the results. Other counties that were excluded included counties with fewer than 4000 voters. 
There were other data management difficulties to deal with in this analysis. There are 3119 counties in the United States and so performing an analysis on that scale with would have been excessively time-consuming for this project. Additionally, in several cases the election data reported by were on a different scale in some states than the rest of the United States. The data for several Midwestern states such as Illinois were reported by county, but also by city which created complications. 
I felt that it would be most appropriate to select states that all together had a mean level of urbanization similar to that of the entire US. Also I selected states that had a ratio of Gore to Bush votes similar to nationwide election results. Several of the states selected such as Idaho, Utah and Wyoming heavily favored George Bush, while others like California, Delaware and Maryland strongly favored Al Gore.  New Mexico and Oregon with were split almost exactly between the two candidates. The final sample included 639 counties with the number per state ranging from 3 to 109. The mean was 42.6, the median was 29 and the standard deviation was 30.98. 
Microsoft Excel was used to create a spreadsheet with columns for votes for the two candidates and calculated columns for the percent of these total votes for each of the two major candidates respectively. The urban population of each county was calculated. 
The null hypothesis was that urban voters did not differ in candidate selection from rural voters. The alternate hypothesis was that urban voters did differ in candidate selection from rural voters. Pearson’s correlation test was used to test these hypotheses

For the 639 counties there was an r-value of .22. There was a 1% chance of making a type I error. The null hypothesis was rejected with very little chance of being incorrect. To compare states to each other, r-values were calculated for these smaller data sets. The states that had significantly significant correlations were California, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Oregon, and Wyoming. They were all positive correlations ranging from .23-.67. 

Table 1

% Gore
% Urban
Statistically Significant
New Mexico
NOTE: The Pearson’s r for “TOTAL” is from a correlation of the states not the counties

Table 2

Total US
Bush Votes
Gore Votes
% Population Urban

Figure 1

There was a statistically significant difference between the likelihood of urban voters to favor Al Gore over George Bush.  This was consistent across 8 of 15 states.  While the difference was not large, the study data provide sufficient power to say with confidence that these findings are meaningful
This study would have been improved with the inclusion of all 50 states and countywide election results. Alaska does not report their election results by county so this may be difficult. I decided that 4000 voters was a good cut off point for inclusion because of the way in which this could have skewed election results. There may be a more appropriate number to use as a cutoff point to get better results. 
The states used for this study are mainly in the West, South and Southwest. This regionally skewed data set should not be a big factor however because the ratio of voters who picked Gore and Bush in this study was very consistent with the overall national ratio. Likewise, if the level of urbanization in the states used for this study was different from the urbanization in the US, there could have been some problem. 
The data were entered manually and there so is a chance of human error. Automating the data transfer would have reduced this source of error.
There were a few instances of apparent errors in CNN’s posted data. The county voting totals in some instances did not add up to equal the totals for the state. Results for California and Georgia showed statewide totals for the winning candidate that were lower than the totals of the counties added together would indicate. This error puts the reliability of data from those states into question.
Third party candidates were not included in this study to simplify the data analysis. Ralph Nader has been blamed for giving the election to George Bush because of the high likelihood that many of those who voted for him would have voted for Al Gore instead if the election had only two candidates. These voters would have been enough to give the presidency to Al Gore. Excluding the data from this candidate may have skewed the results slightly. It is unclear if those who voted for Ralph Nader were concentrated in urban or in rural counties so the effect on the correlation between voters for Gore and an urban area is uncertain. 
The biggest possible flaw with the data used is the urbanization data. Some counties had very few residents yet had a significant number of “urban” residents. Most people would not count a county with less than 30,000 people as urban at all. The common perception of “Urban” is likely to be a little more exclusive than this. In some ways having a broader definition is good because it allows for a greater variation between the data points instead of having a lot of counties that have no urban residents. In one case there was a county with around 13,000 residents, and 15 people that lived in an “urban cluster”. 

There was a statistically significant correlation between the proportion of urban voters in a county and the proportion of voters who voted for Al Gore in the 2000 Presidential election. It is not a strong correlation but it is clear and definitive. The correlation was clear and statistically significant as well in more than half of the states using a smaller data set.  The strength of these data suggests that the findings would not be changed by an analysis less limited by the possible errors identified.

  HYPERLINK "" Data Accessed: 04/25/08-04/30/08
 Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont reported by township and city
 80.6% is the percent of urbanization in the United States. My sample has an urbanization percent of 83.2
 The overall percent of voters in the United States who selected George Bush in the adjusted (3rd party candidates removed) voting percent was 49.73%. The overall percent of voters who selected Al Gore was 50.26%. In my sample the percent of voters who selected George Bush was 49.84%. The percent who selected Al Gore was 50.16%.  
 The states selected were Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming

Thursday, September 26, 2013

Iran and Nuclear Safety (or lack thereof)

Belarus, Cuba, India, Israel, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria. Most would think that being on this list is a bad thing, however, in this particular instance, it is not. These countries have all signed (and most have also acceded to or ratified) the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Notably missing, Iran and North Korea. While I've written on why Iran and North Korea should not be compared, in this one case I feel as though showing that both of these countries are absent from a certain international treaty is important.

The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994 after several years of work. 'Its aim is to legally commit participating States operating land-based nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks to which States would subscribe.' As this clearly describes, the treaty is intended to ensure that nuclear power plants are kept at a reasonable safety level. Nuclear accidents can affect many (see Chernobyl and Fukushima, not to mention 3 Mile Island), and regulating and ensuring the safety of these facilities is in the interests of all. 

Of all the states with nuclear power plants, Iran is the ONLY one that has not signed the CNS (they have also not signed other important nuclear treaties including 'the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.'). Why is it that a country whose expressed reason for developing nuclear technologies is only power and medical uses, has refused to sign this incentive-based treaty, which ONLY concerns safety and the protection of civilians? 

Iran keeps yammering on and on about how Israel has not signed the NPT (and yes they are right in this case). However after President Rouhani's speech criticizing the double standards of the West in being anti-terrorism yet conducting drone strikes which have killed innocents, doesn't this affair itself also demonstrate an incredibly disheartening example of double standards? 

Iran may claim that the West is imposing an agenda upon them, and that they are trying to force Iran to bend to the will of the West, but this argument is a problematic one. If Iran is so worried about the will of the West, why bother with the UN, or why be a member of any international treaty at all? Even more troubling is the fact that the CNS is purely incentive-based; it applies to safety at nuclear power plants so that nuclear accidents are less likely to occur. It has nothing to do with stopping or limiting enrichment (one of Iran's primary concerns and arguments with both the IAEA and the P5+1), or preventing countries from operating nuclear facilities.

This section of the preamble of the CNS provides important context: 
'…this Convention entails a commitment to the application of fundamental safety principles for nuclear installations rather than of detailed safety standards and that there are internationally formulated safety guidelines which are updated from time to time and so can provide guidance on contemporary means of achieving a high level of safety;'

If I had the ear of Iran (or any environmentalist groups anywhere) I would strongly urge them to commit the government of Iran to this important legislation. It could be an important confidence boosting step for both the P5+1 and Iran. The P5+1 would be encouraged by the fact that Iran is agreeing to an important civilian safety regulation, while Iran would be protecting its own citizens and scientists, and also those of the states near to earthquake-prone Bushehr, the site of Iran's nuclear power station. 

NOTE: I've written about this in the past as well. The blog can be accessed here: 

Ali Vaez has written about Iran and nuclear safety, this publication with Charles Ferguson I find particularly compelling.

Mark Fitzpatrick, the director of the IISS's Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme also has an important paper on non-proliferation and nuclear safety which mentions Iran and the CNS. Access here:

Saturday, September 21, 2013

The Complexities of the Iranian Government and Nuclear Negotiations

With the impending annual UN General Assembly slated for this coming week, and the anticipation of important political developments, a common story in the news is the potentiality of a diplomatic breakthrough regarding Iran's nuclear program. Much has been made of Iran's new President Hassan Rouhani's increasingly friendly tone towards America and the West and his stated desire for dialogue. From what many have written, it seems an almost foregone conclusion that for the first time in what seems like an eternity, the heads of government for the United States and Iran may meet face to face. For now, this is nothing but blind speculation; no matter how friendly the words of both sides are, no real 'progress' has been made as of yet. 

Iran is one of the most misunderstood places in the world for most Westerners. Beyond the obvious misconceptions about language, culture and ethnicity, there is also a mistaken desire to frame their entire existence within a Western paradigm. As many have pointed out, this is a problem (I would suggest reading Michael Axworthy on this). One of the significant ways in which Westerners fail to understand Iran, and in particular the Islamic Republic, is the governmental structure. The United States has a fairly simple system that many are familiar with. It has clearly delineated Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches, where each one of these three acts in a way to compliment and also to prevent the others from becoming too powerful. Iran as well has these three branches but they function in a very different way. 

Available at:

As the preceding chart from shows, Iran's government is a convoluted and contradictory organizational mess. Not only is it the only state in the world where the head of government (President Rouhani in this case) does not control the armed forces (this includes the IRGC which is loyal to the revolution, and effectively the Supreme Leader), but also the Judicial is subject to the whims of the indirectly 'elected' Supreme Leader. The fact that certain 'elected' bodies (the President for example) have to be 'approved' by unelected groups, certainly doesn't help make the system any more straight-forward to outsiders.

While the former president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nezhad was in power, many on the right in Israel and America would take his words (whether they were translated well or not) at face-value. They made a sport of raving about how this fanatical and powerful leader was a menace to the world and that he must be stopped etc. Those who spoke to me during this time are probably familiar with the way in which I was sharply dismissive of this idea. President Rouhani does not have the same legal authority as the Supreme Leader, or as much as fear-mongers incorrectly claimed Ahmadi-Nezhad had. However, dismissing him as powerless is just as foolish. It remains to be seen if genuine negotiations can happen on his watch. 

Given the amount of possible disinformation and denials coming from the Iranian side, it is unclear if the hardline backbone of the Iranian government will support any sort of concession on their part. They have created a culture of resistance against the West and its allies (against the Americans, the Iraqis, the Israelis, the Shah and leftist movements such as the Communists and the MEK), and while still on this track, it may be increasingly difficult for them to disengage themselves. This same singularity of thought is also true of the conservative American Congress, and much of the Israeli political establishment. The nervous one-track hive-mind is certainly not helped by it's inability to understand the Iranian government's decision making process and power structure. Speculation can, on occasion, be beneficial, but uneducated speculation based upon a simplified understanding of a very complicated Iranian governmental apparatus helps no one. 

Saturday, September 14, 2013

Mossadeq and the US: an Introduction

The following is the introduction to a paper I wrote on Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and his relations with the US Administrations of Truman and Eisenhower:

The overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in August 1953 has long been a sore point for Iranians; the inspiration for many conspiracy theories and the source of much ill will directed towards the US government by the average Iranian citizen.[i] The extensive writings on this subject are predictably voluminous. While the perpetrators of the coup included foreign and domestic agents, as well as Iranians from all parts of the political spectrum, the Americans, particularly the CIA, are often singled out as the primary antagonists.
            The reasons for this are many, but important amongst them are the claims made by Kermit Roosevelt Jr. in his book, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. Roosevelt writes about his own role as a CIA agent in fomenting the civil unrest and pressuring the Shah into issuing Firmans removing Mossadeq.[ii] CIA documents corroborate some of his claims, while others contradict them.
            The British, in fact, had a significant role in the coup, but because diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Iran were severed prior to the coup, the British Embassy had been closed, and therefore the British had less of a direct role in the actual execution of the events of 16 and 19 August, 1953.[iii] The British foreign intelligence service, the MI6, which had been based out of the embassy, was restricted by the degradation in relations, but still managed to assist the CIA and the locals who acted to overthrow the Iranian government.[iv]
            Reinforcing the beliefs of American involvement were statements by Secretary of State Madeline Albright apologizing for the United States' "significant role" in the 1953 coup[v], and President Barack Obama with a similar apology in 2009.[vi] Despite the claims of responsibility by a variety of different groups, and innumerable theories on the events of August 19th, 1953, what actually happened remains difficult to determine.
            What makes this question all the more interesting is that the United States initially had been very supportive of Prime Minister Mossadeq, but then in 1953 made an attempt to overthrow Mossadeq. What caused this change?
            During and immediately following the Second World War, the foreign policy of the United States underwent significant changes. Up to this time, the state's foreign policy had been primarily isolationist with a few exceptions (Cuba, Philippines etc.), but with the perceived threat of rampant communism, the focus expanded and the state became more predisposed to intervene globally. This change in priorities coincided with a greater demand for natural resources (in particular petroleum) following World War II. In December 1943 a memo from the Petroleum Division stated that the US preferred “Middle Eastern oil to be developed to the maximum” while American and Caribbean oil was conserved because it would be easier to defend in war.[vii]
            Iran became a natural focal point for the building tensions to manifest themselves as it has one of the largest reserves of both natural gas as well as petroleum.[viii] Adding to this, there were tens of thousands of American troops occupying the country to ensure delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union.[ix] Even before the discovery of oil, Iran has long been important geopolitically to Western powers, with innumerable examples from history dating back to pre-Roman times.
            Perhaps the best pre-modern depiction of how the West saw this part of the world is British political geographer Halford Mackinder's 'Heartland Theory'.[x] The 'Heartland Theory' claims that a state that wishes to dominate the world must physically control the Central Asian Plateau, the Caucasus and what is today Russia.[xi] Iran is a part of this central "pivot area" which Mackinder's theory is concerned with. With the Russian Empire and then the USSR controlling the majority of the "Heartland", fears that Iran, one of the few places of the "Heartland" not under Russian/Soviet control, could fall, led to a British interest in maintaining a footprint in the region. The Great Game between Russia and Britain, where they competed over Central Asia and Iran, is an example of the struggles between global powers over this part of the world and provides the background for American political sentiments towards Iran. Though Mackinder was an academic, during the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia he was appointed "British High Commissioner in Southern Russia".[xii] Even if his theory was not wholeheartedly embraced by the British government, his presence in this part of the world as a representative of the British implies that Mackinder held some measure of influence in the British government. While Mackinder's theory was not published until 1904, the British had long seen this part of the world as essential to their geopolitical aspirations.
            The election of Republican Dwight Eisenhower as the President of the United States in 1952 changed American policy towards Iran. Eisenhower's beliefs were more in line with the British who (whether they believed it themselves or not), argued vociferously that the threat of communism was increasingly dangerous in Iran.[xiii] Initially Eisenhower's administration attempted to keep Mossadeq in power as they believed that the alternatives to him would lead to Soviet control of Iran and subsequently the rest of the Middle East. As late as March 1953, Eisenhower is on record stating that he wished for Mohammad Mossadeq to continue be the Prime Minister of Iran for he was seen as a moderating voice between the right-wing military, royalist and religious parties, and the left-wing Communist Tudeh party.
            It was the beginning of the Cold War, and the Republican President Eisenhower was fearful of the possibility that the Communists might take over the Middle East. Mossadeq was not necessarily friendly towards the Tudeh Party, but he also did not suppress them as forcefully as the Americans would have preferred. He even allowed front organizations and publishing houses of political opponents to operate.[xiv] In the dichotic view of the Western powers, the lack of a consistent, strict crackdown on Communist sympathizers by Mossadeq's government was seen as evidence of an anti-Western bias.
            The CIA’s internal history written in 1998, claims that “Even the most bitter anti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the Iranian Prime Minister was a Communist or sympathizer”.[xv] The evidence suggests that this however, is not the case. A French newspaper said the following about Mossadeq: “The opposition called him an Anglophile, The Russians entitled him the servant of American imperialism. The British labeled him a Communist”.[xvi] Mossadeq, (apparently in a bid to gain Western sympathies) overemphasized the power of the Tudeh to the West.[xvii] Despite the fact that the Tudeh (Communist) party of Iran was officially outlawed, many in the American government and some in the CIA were fearful that Prime Minister Mossadeq was sympathetic towards communism. Mossadeq’s attempt to play the sides against each other by the concept of “negative equilibrium” evidently backfired, as the Americans then saw him as weak and replaceable, rather than weak, but still worthy of support.
            The United States was stuck in a position where they had already committed resources to the Iranian government (before and during Mossadeq's tenure), and wished to resolve the oil dispute as soon as possible to reduce tensions in the unstable Middle East. At the same time the risks of harming American business interests and potentially also long-term geopolitical interests were ever-present in the minds of the Eisenhower Administration.
            The Truman administration had spent millions of dollars trying to support the Iranian economy through loans and grants.[xviii] This was intended to keep the Iranian government as stable as possible and prevent a Communist takeover. There were also American officials who were sympathetic to Iran's Mossadeq-inspired drive for oil nationalization which complicated the US-Iran relationship even further.[xix] Other Americans were worried for the potential of nationalization happening in American areas of influence and oil production such as Saudi Arabia.[xx] That the oil agreement with Saudi Arabia had recently been renegotiated to a still profitable 50/50 split may have alleviated some of these fears. However, the Anglo Iranian Oil Company’s (AIOC) 'concessionary' deal with Iran was far more exploitative (to the benefit of the British) than the Saudi Aramco agreement and the Iranians were well-aware of this fact.[xxi]
            Mossadeq, in his idealism, believed that the United States with its principles of democracy and justice, was likely to side with him in his struggles against the British. Iran and the US had been enjoying closer relations at the expense of Britain and the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War, which reinforced Mossadeq’s beliefs.[xxii] He evidently did not anticipate that political expediencies and historical alliances would play such strong roles in the American decision making process. The good relations which Mossadeq had with several key American officials and negotiators, likely have convinced him that the rest of the government was also sympathetic to his situation. As time passed and an agreement was not reached, Mossadeq's relations with the Americans soured. One reason for this was apparently the perceived mutability of Mossadeq in his oil negotiations. The United States while relatively neutral in the process, wanted the matter settled, as the dispute was a destabilizing factor in an unstable, potentially volatile, geopolitically important region.
            Mossadeq was named Time Magazine's Man of the Year for 1951 for his work in nationalizing Iran's oil and other achievements.[xxiii] Despite this honor, the description of his physical and personal characteristics was overwhelmingly negative and used marginally racist words.[xxiv] These sentiments can be described as representative of American public perception, and if not, that fact that these words came from a leading national magazine publication, understandably had a significant influence on people. The New York Times often described Mossadeq as a ‘dictator’, although the paper never bestowed this disparaging title upon the Shah who ruled for 25 years after Mossadeq fell from power.[xxv] Iran was not a wealthy country, and was seen as backwards by many in the West. Disparaging or patronizing attitudes from the West towards the developing countries and their people was commonplace and impacted interactions between the states and individuals, certainly including those between Mossadeq and the West.

[i] In the executive system of the time Iran, Prime Minister was elected by the Parliament (Majles). Mossadeq was voted in by a 79-12 margin. See Foran, John. "Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution., 1993. 285.
[ii] Bayandor claims that the removal process is technically legal, but because of the duress it was an illegal act. Bayandor, Darioush. Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited. 2010..
[iii] Keddie, Nikki R., Yann Richard, and Nikki R. Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution., 2003. 129
[iv] Katouzian, Homa. "Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Musaddiq's Memoirs. By Mohammad Mosaddeq. Trans. Homa Katouzian. London: 1988. 55
[v] Albright, M. (2000, March 17). American-Iranian Relations. Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, Washington, D.C.
[vi] "Obama Admits US Involvement in 1953 Iran Coup." AFP. Google, 04 June 2009. Web. 10 Mar. 2013.
[vii] 1 December 1943, folder: ‘Petroleum Reserves Corporation Activities. 7/3/43-1/1/44’ box 1, Records of the Petroleum Division, RG 59 via Anderson, Irvine H. "The American Oil Industry and the Fifty-Fifty Agreement of 1950." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 151
[viii] It was known that Iran possessed vast reserves of oil-based fuels, and the discovery and understanding of how much Iran has is not a recent development.
[ix] Foran 271
[x] O'Hara, Sarah, and Michael Heffernan. "From Geo-Strategy to Geo-Economics: The ‘Heartland’ and British Imperialism Before and After MacKinder." (2006): 54
[xi] O’Hara and Heffernan 67
[xii] O’Hara and Heffernan 66
[xiii] Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and after. 2003. 121; Azimi, Fakhreddin. Iran: The Crisis of Democracy. 1989. 295; Ferrier, Ronald W. "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 186; Louis, Wm. Roger. "Musaddiq and the Dilemmas of British Imperialism." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 242
[xiv] Foran 290; Cottam, Richard W. Nationalism in Iran. 1964. 215
[xv] Koch, Scott A., "Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953," Top Secret Draft History, History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1998., 79
[xvi] Bill, James A. Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 265
[xvii] Bill 277
[xviii] Truman’s Point Four program was intended to help develop Iran, and was responsible for investing tens of millions of US dollars in Iran.
[xix] In particular George McGhee, and Dr. Henry F. Grady, US Ambassador to Iran from 1950-1951
[xx] Bill 273; Siavoshi, Sussan. "The Oil Nationalization Movement, 1949-1953." A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran. By John Foran. 1994. 128
[xxi] Bill 273
[xxii] Foran 271
[xxiii] "Man of the Year: Challenge of the East." Time 7 Jan. 1952: n. pag. Time Magazine. Web.
[xxiv] Bill 265; "Man of the Year: Challenge of the East." Time 7 Jan. 1952: n. pag. Time Magazine. Web.
[xxv] Bill 265