tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4216448432883490902024-03-05T16:05:33.348-05:00The Map Is Not The TerritoryThis phrase is taken from a favorite philosopher of mine, Alfred Korzybski. As the URL of the blog implies, I am a Persophile and much of what I write will likely pertain to Iran and the Persian people. My interests are diverse however, and I will also be writing about anything and everything else that inspires me. The photo is of Azadi Tower in Tehran, Iran, built in 1971. Azadi means 'freedom' or 'liberty' in Persian (Farsi)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.comBlogger103125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-67937814081009190802018-05-05T18:24:00.000-04:002018-05-07T12:12:12.481-04:00JCPOA's Uncertainty Exacerbates Iran's Worsening Economic Problems<div dir="ltr" style="background-color: white; line-height: 1.38; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was, at the time, widely believed to be </span><a href="http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/07/investing/iran-nuclear-deal-sanctions-investment/index.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">a turning point</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> for the Iranian economy, </span><a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/impact-iran-nuclear-agreement#chapter-title-0-6" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">but this has not borne out</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. Even though it is just one piece of a complex iranian economic situation, the JCPOA is so significant that uncertainty over the fate of the deal has </span><a href="https://asiasociety.org/new-york/how-uncertainty-over-nuclear-deal-strangling-irans-economy" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">curtailed potential progress</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">. With the shale oil boom keeping the price of petroleum significantly below previous highs, and even minimum budgetary breakeven expectations, Iran’s leading industry is on unsteady ground. The French oil company Total signed </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-total-southpars-idUSKBN19O1IO" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">a significant oil deal</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> with Iran, but many other firms in the oil industry, and in other sectors, remain hesitant. </span><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/13/boeings-8-billion-aircraft-sale-to-iran-air-still-safe-for-now.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Boeing</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> and </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/world/middleeast/airbus-boeing-trump-iran-jobs.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Airbus</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> have committed to major deals, but despite this, Iran’s economic outlook has not improved as expected. Much was made of the stream of </span><a href="http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/412018/Post-sanction-Iran-hosts-200-foreign-trade-delegations" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">foreign trade delegations</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> in Iran following the implementation of the JCPOA, but there has not been a rush to invest in Iran. Substantial geopolitical risks, in addition to pre-existing issues, remain unaddressed, in large part due to uncertainty over the fate of the JCPOA, which faces a considerable test next month. </span></div>
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<span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">In May, President Trump will decide whether he wishes to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA under the </span><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1191/text" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">, or to refuse to certify, and to withdraw the United States from the accord. He has attempted to be the “anti-Obama” whenever possible - at least rhetorically - but is often hamstrung by either a failure to act decisively, or by the various distractions and domestic and foreign political dilemmas. With pressure on Trump building as the Mueller investigation continues, he will feel increasingly cornered and is likely to lash out in some manner. This is just as likely to be in the form of an angry Twitter rant as in anything substantive, but leaving the Iran Deal remains a realistic possibility. Trump has demonstrated a stubborn persistence on several issues, and the relative ease of an executive decision means there are fewer barriers between him and nullifying the United States’ involvement in the JCPOA, as much for domestic appeasement as over legitimate grievances with the deal.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">The Iranian economy has faced a series of hardships in recent years; many self-made. Iran’s ongoing economic mismanagement has led to significant protests - most recently this past winter when </span><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/09/middleeast/iran-protests-3700-arrested-intl/index.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">nationwide demonstrations</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> rocked the country - but so far such events have lacked any momentum and do not present a serious threat to the government. On April 9th, the Iranian government took a bold - and perhaps desperate - </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-currency-hits-new-lows-against-the-dollar-1523306508" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">step to halt the slide</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> of the Iranian rial by setting a new “official” exchange rate with the American dollar. At the same time, the government also outlawed the use of any other (black market) rate. Following the </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/world/middleeast/currency-iran-economy.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">35% drop</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> in value in a week, any further instability would be dangerous for a regime facing an already restive populace. </span></div>
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<span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">While alluring as a potentially large and lucrative market, Iran remains as risky, if not more so, than other developing countries. Much of this is due to the uncertainty as to what President Trump may do in May, but other domestic and regional issues, including the </span><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10743580" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">IRGC’s influence</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> in important commercial sectors, and the ongoing conflict in Syria, are also important. For firms wishing to invest in Iran’s potentially lucrative modernization, the decision over the JCPOA’s fate will signal either a cautious yellow light, if the deal is upheld, or a steadier red light, if President Trump yet again refuses </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #1155cc; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">to certify</span></a><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #222222; font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 12pt; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"> the accord. Refusal to certify the deal for a third time makes not only American firms, but also European and Asian ones, much more wary of doing business in a country that exposes them to American censure. Congress would be likely to further sanction Iran, increasing barriers to trade and business. Further prolonged uncertainty over the fate of the deal and the implications for the Iranian economy and populace puts additional pressure on an already strained Iranian financial system. </span></div>
<span id="docs-internal-guid-531cf43b-3266-19af-2d5f-ad0f072438b0"></span><br class="Apple-interchange-newline" />Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-39003860752594745802018-05-01T18:00:00.000-04:002018-05-01T23:09:38.126-04:00Questions about the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Archive<div dir="ltr">
Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a dramatic announcement about a daring Israeli intelligence operation to steal over 100,000 documents from a secret Iranian nuclear weapons archive. The documents confirm what we have known for years, and what the IAEA has known <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2011/11/08/world/meast/iran-nuclear/index.html">since 2011</a> - that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu did not provide a straight answer on whether Iran continues to have an active nuclear weapons program—something that would clearly violate the JCPOA—or if Iran paused the program at some time. The IAEA has said that Iran's program is not active.</div>
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The reaction to Netanyahu's press conference was predictable. Once again, I find myself <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/08/the-side-deal-no-one-is-talking-about.html">disappointed</a> as the good questions, the PMD agreement questions, remain an afterthought.</div>
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The IAEA, in their report about Iran's PMDs, stated that "all the activities contained in the "<a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-for-the-clarification-of-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-programme">Road-map</a>" were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule". The organization effectively gave a thumbs up to Iran, saying that things are ok from the past, and that we can move forward. The new documents raise questions about what the IAEA okayed, what they knew about Iran's nuclear weapons research, and what the separate agreements referenced in the Road-map include. Did the IAEA agree to let Iran store its previous work? Was the IAEA aware that work had been saved? Did the IAEA order Iran to destroy their research? The <a href="https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf">PMD report</a>, released in 2015, is very detailed, but without the original documents (from both the IAEA and Iran), it is nearly impossible to compare the report to what Netanyahu revealed yesterday.</div>
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While the focus of the JCPOA critics rancor about PMDs has mostly revolved around the Parchin agreement, all of these issues are important, and any obfuscation by Iran and/or the IAEA would be of interest. As I noted <a href="https://twitter.com/MorganCarlston/status/634463567815802880">in 2015</a>, the IAEA is facing a crisis of confidence; if they cannot be trusted to do their job, what is their utility?</div>
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It does not help that many critics are either lazy or deceitful. <u>Then</u> Representative and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with Senator Tom Cotton, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-secret-iran-deals-exposed/2015/07/27/26d14dbc-3460-11e5-8e66-07b4603ec92a_story.html?utm_term=.2525c072c71f">claimed</a> that they had not heard about side deals when they met with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano days after the accord was signed. The "Road-map" containing the reference to these side deals is noted explicitly in the text of the JCPOA, and they were all announced and made public on days before this meeting.</div>
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There are real and serious questions to ask, but instead, superficial questions, gross insinuations, politicking, and deceptive bombast are all the critics seem able to come up with.</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-35404025550859892812018-03-24T17:22:00.001-04:002018-03-24T17:23:43.757-04:00IRGC and Other Iranian Cyber ActivitiesEarlier this week the US government publicly went after the IRGC. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-nowruz/">President Trump's Nowruz statement</a> on Monday was mainly about the evils of the IRGC rather than the holiday itself. On Friday Deputy AG Rod Rosenstein <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-announcing-nine-iranians-charged">announced indictments</a> for a number of Iranians with the IRGC for hacking.<br />
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A third incident, the <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/976948306927607810">naming of John Bolton</a> as the new national security adviser to President Trump can also be seen as an anti-IRGC move, given Bolton's belligerence towards the regime and his <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43509695">affinity for the Marxist cult the MeK</a>.<br />
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Whether this is coincidental or not is hard to discern, given the chaotic and disjointed nature of the administration and so it is the hacking announcement that interests me most.<br />
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A few years back <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/03/the-ayatollahs-spam-bots.html">I'd noticed a series of pro-Iranian bots tweeting</a> about the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei's "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_the_Youth_in_Europe_and_North_America">Letter to the Youth in Europe and North America</a>". I wrote about this in detail noting how the bots and message evolved. It was not particularly sophisticated, did not gain much traction, but polluted trending and other hashtags on various social media. Another followup campaign titled "Powerful_Iran" was <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-35778645">covered by the BBC</a>.<br />
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The hacks and bots seem connected, and are clearly linked to the regime in some manner, but the details are unclear. The distinction between the more skilled hackers and the Twitter bots makes me curious about the Iranian cyber programs, how they are set up, who runs them, and if there are multiple organizations or factions running them. I would be surprised if the recently indicted hackers are directly responsible for the older bot networks, but I'd also not rule it out.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-32742591831800702452017-12-27T18:23:00.001-05:002018-04-11T17:17:34.259-04:00Obama Appeasing Iran? <div dir="ltr">
The Iran Deal has been litigated to death; mostly on social media, but also in the media. Recently, <a href="http://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-investigation/">Politico published a new article by Josh Meyer</a> with new allegations about the Obama administration appeasing Iran via lenience towards Hezbollah. The article is long, but can be summed up as such: the DEA had a task force targeting Hezbollah's drug trafficking operation and related activities and there was an unwritten order from the top down (the author insinuates from the very top) to let Hezbollah off the hook as the possibility of a deal with Iran was of greater concern.<br />
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As expected, this has led to the usual suspects re-litigating the Iran Deal, and, per usual, the ratio of substantive commentary to ad hominem attacks is unfavorable. This is not worth spending much time on, as the quality of arguments from both sides tend to be limited, though it should be noted that the allegedly mighty "echo chamber" has chimed in vociferously against their usual opponents.<br />
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<a href="https://twitter.com/MorganCarlston/status/734836963866476545">As I noted in the past</a>, the "echo chamber", portrayed by the right as a well-oiled and effective machine, was most active during a period when support for the Iran Deal dropped by 50%. The focus, unfortunately, has been based on the usual tired tropes rather than anything substantive. <br />
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One argument worth mentioning is from Ilan Goldenberg. A former Obama official and pro-JCPOA intellectual, <a href="https://twitter.com/ilangoldenberg/status/945768823692644352">he asked Meyer a simple question</a>: 'do you have any proof that any of this is explicitly because of the Iran Deal'. Goldenberg acknowledges flaws in the Obama approach to Iran, and that Meyer's background investigative work is great, but points to this failure to produce anything explicitly linking the two. Meyer has not yet responded. <br />
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There is in fact evidence that Obama's administration <a href="https://history.state.gov/about/hac/september-2014">appeased Iran specifically because of the Iran Deal</a> <u>negotiations</u>. We have it <a href="https://history.state.gov/about/hac/June-2017">on the record that Secretary of State John Kerry</a> and/or President Obama himself blocked the release of the updated Iran 1951-1954 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) up until the inauguration of President Trump in January 2017 (it was then discreetly released in the summer) <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.mx/2016/06/why-is-state-delaying-release-of.html?m=1">The belief is that the ongoing nuclear negotiations were sensitive</a> and releasing more information on the 1953 coup in Iran which the United States, Britain, and various Iranians were involved in, would be a literal deal breaker. For whatever reason this appeasement continued years after the deal was signed. <br />
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While it is unclear how far the administration went to facilitate the deal, how much leeway they gave Iran, Hezbollah, and Iran's other proxies, there is at the moment, little substantial and attributable evidence of appeasement aside from the FRUS incident. </div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-74031858207091856572017-06-25T12:39:00.001-04:002017-06-25T12:59:00.509-04:00New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 7)<i>This is part 7 of my series on the new CIA and State Department docs on the 1953 Iran Coup. </i><br />
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So many questions still remain about the successful and unsuccessful Iranian coups in August, 1953. Many of them may never be answered, including the curious question why John Kerry's State Department delayed the release of the updated FRUS collection.<br />
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It has been established that Kerry himself, heavily involved in the Iran nuclear talks, was vehemently opposed to the release, even up to the inauguration of President Trump. President Obama may have also been involved, but this isn't clear from the record.<br />
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In 2014 the delay was credited to the sensitivity of the ongoing nuclear talks, yet through 2017, almost two years after the nuclear agreement was finalized, they still worked to keep it from being released. What were they concerned about?<br />
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<a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/its-time-to-release-the-real-history-of-the-1953-iran-coup-214353">Others have theorized that this was because of the hidden British role in the 1953 coup attempts, or perhaps details over the United States role</a>. <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/10/no-frus-doesnt-have-all-answers.html">I have argued that this doesn't make sense</a> as (despite the reporting on this release) the role of the United States, and the UK has been well-known for decades. Two different American presidencies admitted a role (<a href="http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0004/19/i_ins.00.html">Clinton</a>, and <a href="http://www.iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17917:obama-admits-us-involvement-in-1953-iran-coup&catid=4:iran-general&Itemid=109">Obama</a>), and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup">CIA formally acknowledged its role in 2013</a>.<br />
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I asked:<br />
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<i style="background-color: #999999;">What would be more infuriating for the regime, to show that the US was involved (which is what they are already furious about), or that major regime figures, or their direct influences played a role in fomenting the coup?</i></blockquote>
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As the evidence shows, the role of Ayatollah Kashani, <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173">was exactly as I theorized</a>, and perhaps even more damning than I expected. His work <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d191">collaborating with key coup figures like Zahedi</a>, <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d193">encouraging quietist clerics to back the Shah</a>, <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d120">working to make his own coup as early as September 1952</a>, hints that this is what Kerry (and Obama?) hoped to keep hidden from the Iranian public. There was backlash on Twitter especially from Iranian reformists who tweeted about the "Kashani Coup", demanding removing his name from a Tehrani street.<br />
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Others may still argue that the details of role of the United States and Britain are the reason why Kerry was so concerned about the release. <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2017/06/new-ciastate-department-docs-on-1953_22.html">However, the documents are still classified in key points, so these details are obscured</a>. <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/preface">Additionally, the declassification review was completed in 2014</a>, so there were no changes made to this latest edition. It would not have been the case that Kerry personally went in and classified British or American involvement in the coup.<br />
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Did Kerry not know what was in the documents? Was he mistaken in thinking parts that remain classified were to be released? Or was he protecting the Iranian regime, trying to keep them from being insulted by proving a direct connection to the coup which the regime and its apologists point to as the source of Iranian/American animosity?<br />
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<i>There will be a part 8 and probably 9, but they won't happen until I thoroughly read sections 1, 2 and 4. </i>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-28723481907432217872017-06-22T22:24:00.000-04:002017-06-25T12:39:37.354-04:00New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 6)<i>This is part 6 of my series on the new CIA and State Department docs on the 1953 Iran Coup. </i><br />
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One of the problems I noticed when I was writing a term paper on Mossadeq and relations with the United States during my MA was how incomplete the record was. There were massive gaps at key moments, leaving so many questions unanswered. There were times when the FRUS collection skipped hundreds of cables, for example 3898 (April 4, 1953), to 4027 (April 15, 1953). It would be inconceivable for there to have been zero communications for 11 days, and the gap of 127 in the cable order seems to indicate that there were in fact a ton missing. </div>
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When I visited the National Archives I was able to find a few important ones, yet still many gaps were left. The release fills more of the gaps, yet most of the relevant documents I found at the Archives are not included in the new release. There is one exception, cable #348, dated August 16. <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-1.html">I wrote about it at the time</a>, identifying it as the most interesting cable of those that I had found at Archives that weren't in FRUS. </div>
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The number of documents withheld makes it nearly impossible to determine the precise nature of the events leading up to the coup. While we have a rough estimate, we do not know why the decision was made, how they did it, what else happened between the 16th and 19th of August, which third parties were involved and how involved they were.</div>
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The decision to overthrow Mossadeq appears to have been made April 2, 1953. Unfortunately there is no record of the meeting between Roosevelt and Dulles of this, yet an <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d184">April 4th memo</a> references the meeting. </div>
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Moving forward, there are documents "released" yet entirely classified, namely those detailing the coup plans. <a href="http://cshp/">The June 1st "Summary of Operational Plan"</a> for example is completely classified, and no details are provided other than the date, location, classification, and where the copy of the file is located.</div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d213">Other documents like monthly reports</a> are also mostly redacted, 64 years after the fact.</div>
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Important files from the CIA have been published, yet we know there are also important pieces missing. The best example is as follows. Document 285, and 286, both dated 19 August, 1953. The file number for 285 is TEHE 737.1 and 286 is TEHE 742.1. The order again is sequential so TEHE 738-741 are not public. What is striking here is that the first one is almost despondent and scrambling to salvage the situation. The second is short and victorious. What happened between the two telegrams? </div>
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Even <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d306">the rundown of what happened after the coup</a> is littered with classified material that hasn't been released. </div>
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These details are vitally important, and yet still the full truth is withheld. The likelihood that the relevant parties are alive today is slim, why do they still wish to keep this information secret?</div>
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(I also highlighted the line about Communism. The Foreign Policy piece tried to make a big deal about the oil angle, yet as this document clearly shows, the Americans WERE interested in ideology. Whether what Roosevelt said is true or not, it is clear that Dulles/Roosevelt/etc wanted to hear about how this saved Iran from Communism.)</div>
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<i><a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2017/06/new-ciastate-department-docs-on-1953_25.html">Part 7 will be about Kerry and Obama's decision to delay publication of this volume.</a></i></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-27061303936935524732017-06-20T20:26:00.002-04:002017-06-22T22:25:02.187-04:00New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 5)<i>This is part 5 of my series on the new CIA and State Department docs on the 1953 Iran Coup. </i><br />
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The role of clerics in the 1953 Iranian coup is both difficult to determine, and a sensitive topic. The regime has ties back to the Iranian clerics, and one of the myths they work to perpetuate is that foreigners meddled in Iranian affairs. This is helped by American (read CIA) incentives to claim omnipotence and competence in masterminding a coup. Both parties have reasons to minimize clerical involvement. While the events between 15 and 19 of August 1953 are difficult to determine for reasons I will discuss later, there are several important events involving clerics that bear mentioning.</div>
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Of the clerical elements, Ayatollah Kashani is the most relevant. He was the speaker of the Iranian Majles (parliament), and for a time an ally of Mohammad Mossadeq, before becoming a bitter enemy. His worldview bears striking similarities to Ayatollah Khomeini as I pointed out in <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2017/06/new-ciastate-department-docs-on-1953_18.html">part 3 of my series</a>.</div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d120">A CIA source reported in September 1952 that Kashani was planning a coup to remove Mossadeq</a>. This was before their big falling out in December 1952.</div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d187">In early April 1953 Kashani supported the idea of a Zahedi-led coup, but at the same time didn't want to appear as though he was overly supportive in case things didn't work out</a>.</div>
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Kashani did not give up his hopes for a coup. <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d191">In mid April 1953 he was approached by another representative of the Shah about collaborating on a coup, and rather than turning them down, he made his own suggestions on how to best do it</a>.</div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d192">Another mid April memo from Waller of the CIA to Roosevelt notes the nature of the relationship between Kashani and Zahedi, and Kashani and two major clerics in Iran, Ayatollahs Boroujerdi and </a></div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d192">Behbehani</a>. Boroujerdi was Ayatollah Khomeini's teacher, and forbade him or any others from political activities. This memo notes an "understanding" that they would "bolster the shah". While this sounds overtly political in nature, the difference is that historically the clergy had supported the monarchy, and in turn received protection. While it is a bit of a departure from the normal, it is more of an affirmation of the perceived threat to the Shah that Mossadeq posed.</div>
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Interestingly the documents leading up to the coup after April make less mention of Kashani. At the same time, key pieces are redacted or not included so there is no way to know how involved he would have been in the plans. It is entirely possible that he was a key piece, or that he was uninvolved.</div>
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<i><a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2017/06/new-ciastate-department-docs-on-1953_22.html">Part 6 will be about the events leading up to the coup in August, and the problems resulting from incomplete records from both the State Department and CIA.</a></i></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-41809646502530977292017-06-19T19:19:00.001-04:002017-06-20T20:30:30.476-04:00New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 4)<i>This is part 4 of my series on the new CIA and State Department docs on the 1953 Iran Coup. </i><br />
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One of the most curious and difficult aspects of the Iran coup of 1953 is determining which parties were involved in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq, and to what extent they bear responsibility. The roles of the United States and Britain are undeniable, yet there are still inconsistencies and unknowns; primarily what happened between the first and second coup attempts, and when exactly they decided to try a coup. The following documents shed some light, but still many questions remain.</div>
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<a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173?page=2">As I have previously noted</a> (Myth 6), there were multiple contacts by IRANIANS in the months before the coup, trying to gauge the American interest in a coup. We know of at least two contacts made during March 1953, and perhaps as many as four.<a href="https://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm#I"> One referenced by Donald Wilber in his "Wilber Report" </a>notes a General (name redacted), had contacted the "assistant military attache" and <i>"requested Ambassador Henderson's views as to whether or nor the US government was interested in covertly supporting an Iranian military effort to oust Premier Mossadeq"</i>.<br />
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This is quite significant, as it establishes a precedent of Iranians approaching the United States to ask about a coup BEFORE the United States had decided to overthrow Mossadeq.</div>
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A previously released document (<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d322">cable 3853 from Amb Henderson to Dulles dated March 31 and referring to a conversation from March 30th</a>) has a record of former prime minister Hossein Ala' inquiring about the possibility of an American coup. Ala' was never a general so it is not possible that this request is from the same person. Henderson makes it quite clear to Ala' that the United States will not take a regime change policy, and will accept as head of the government whomever has the <i>firman</i> (edict) from the Shah establishing the individual as prime minister. </div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d182">A new CIA document dated March 31</a> indicates that Majles Deputy Haerizadeh, General Batmangelitch, and retired Generals Garzan, Bahadori, and Zahedi were planning a coup to take place within a few weeks. It also says that they claim that the US embassy approves (the footnote indicates that this appears to be "wishful thinking"). </div>
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There may be overlap here, but it is quite clear that there were at least 3 instances in March 1953 of Iranians contacting United States officials about a coup. </div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d184">One of the next new documents is dated April 4th</a>, and references an April 2nd conversation between Roosevelt and Dulles about initial plans to start TPAJAX (the code name of the coup attempt). It is unclear if these multiple attempts by Iranians to get the Americans on board for a coup had an effect, but given the proximity it seems as though there must be a connection of some sort. Also of note is the fact that TP AJAX was hand-written, as if it was either forgotten, or this is when they decided to name it. </div>
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These documents are significant in establishing an Iranian interest in a coup before the United States had seriously considered regime change, and perhaps helps understand how the various American figures came to decide that a coup was worth exploring. Unfortunately there is not record of the April 2nd conversation, which would be much more useful in determining what motivated the change in policy. Kermit Roosevelt's "memoir" <i>Countercoup—</i>which is just as helpful as it is harmful—makes no note of this conversation, yet he mentions an additional meeting with an Iranian general who also wished to collaborate with the Americans on a coup. Again, because the name is redacted and other information is missing, we cannot be sure who exactly this was and if it was another Iranian who wished to overthrow Mossadeq, or the same one asking two different Americans the same thing.</div>
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<i><a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2017/06/new-ciastate-department-docs-on-1953_20.html">Part 5 will be about Kashani's appearances in new documents over the next few months</a></i></div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-90435169104327395492017-06-18T13:28:00.002-04:002017-06-20T18:54:00.258-04:00New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 3)<i>This is part 3 of my series on the new CIA and State Department docs on the 1953 Iran Coup. </i><br />
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One of the most interesting and substantial documents newly released is <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d181">an analysis of the nature of a potential Ayatollah Kashani run Iranian government</a> by the Office of Intelligence and Research.<br />
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Kashani had been an ally of Mossadeq, before breaking with him and his National Front in early 1953. Kashani's role in Mossadeq's ouster has been downplayed in the traditional narrative of the events (which places most of the blame on the Americans), yet revisionists have noticed the extent of Kashani's influence, and how important he was in fomenting unrest against Mossadeq in the months leading up to the coup.<br />
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What is most striking about the document is how Kashani is described. If you took out his name, and other identifying information one might think that the authors are describing Ayatollah Khomeini or Khamenei. Kashani's sees "contemporary problems from a narrowly Moslem outlook, severely warped by many years of bitter conflict with British authority".<br />
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Mossadeq at the time had significant support and the authors deemed it unlikely that he would be replaced by Kashani, but they also note Kashani's influence, as the second largest bloc in the Majles (Iranian parliament). </div>
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The authors point to a handful of negative characteristics of Kashani, ranging from conceit and ambition, to unscrupulousness and support of bigoted practices, and a lack of business and executive experience. </div>
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Kashani was vehemently anti-British based upon his past experiences, he had experienced foreign meddling. This he shared with Mossadeq, though their motivations and approaches to addressing foreign interference was very different. </div>
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The authors blame Kashani (like Mossadeq) for taking credit of others work to forward his own ambitions. He is likened to a "ward boss" and "gangster". His supporters are considered to be from a similar social class as Mossadeq (most appropriately described as middle-class), though with a distinct religious inclination.</div>
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Kashani, had disagreements with the Shah, the army, and starting in early 1953 Mossadeq as well. Shia clergy in Iran had historically been quietist, subservient to the monarchy. Kashani was outspoken, a break from tradition. He disapproved of the late Shah's work to sideline the clergy, and to uphold the mantle of Shiism, when the Shah wasn't even a theologian. This is virtually identical to Khomeini's approach years later. </div>
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The authors noted that Kashani's relatively lower popularity and all of the enemies he had limited the prospects for a theocratic state. That they were considering it as a possibility is still quite telling.</div>
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Again the parallels to Khomeini, and even Khamenei here are striking. They believe that the West is engaging in plots to control weaker nations. He also is credited with having a disparaging attitude towards oil, and wanted to diversify the economy to create self-sufficiency and limit dependence.</div>
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The last section is also eerily reminiscent of Khomeini. It is acknowledged that Kashani wouldn't want to accept foreign funds because it would undermine him. The authors note that this makes cooperation with Kashani difficult, but they didn't rule it out. The last paragraph is also interesting as it directly points to a policy of neutrality from the Iranian government. The Dulles brothers in particular speak repetitively about the dangers of communism taking over, yet this memo, just months ahead of the coup explicitly notes neutrality as the Iranian government policy.</div>
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This analysis of Kashani is fascinating and apt and as I mentioned throughout, the similarities to Khomeini are significant.</div>
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<i><a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2017/06/new-ciastate-department-docs-on-1953_19.html">Part 4 will discuss another March 31 document, and the April 4 memo from Roosevelt to Dulles about beginning plans to commence TPAJAX</a></i></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-77454385022945601682017-06-17T13:03:00.001-04:002017-06-20T19:05:38.943-04:00New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 2)<br />
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<i>This is part 2 of my series on the new CIA and State Department docs on the 1953 Iran Coup. </i></div>
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The third section of the new documents "<a class="highlight" href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/ch3" id="toc-ch3" style="background-color: #dddde8; box-sizing: border-box; color: #205493; font-family: inherit; font-size: 13px; text-decoration: none; transition: 0.5s ease 0s;">Planning and Implementation of Operation TPAJAX, March–August 1953</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: inherit; font-size: 13px;"> (Documents 169-308)" </span>and starts with a doozy; <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d169">a CIA memo for the president dated March 1, 1953</a>. While it is in fact an old document that was included in the 1989 original Iran FRUS, there are some additional sentences and clauses that are included as demonstrated in this screenshot of the two side by side.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkBUqgwRAbOiZ_b2cn5l4YZp1hCZ9YJ6fIESsWnoplZEwktk6hQ3wPklj_7H46GD_-tKkoLsdfLFGtgVyZ2e13kvc-wggZ4Lhn5_mku65tl1vbxtC3752NAVfZ3SF945ZNpoucIx0RGpM/s1600/Screen+Shot+2017-06-17+at+11.08.26+AM.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1123" height="384" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkBUqgwRAbOiZ_b2cn5l4YZp1hCZ9YJ6fIESsWnoplZEwktk6hQ3wPklj_7H46GD_-tKkoLsdfLFGtgVyZ2e13kvc-wggZ4Lhn5_mku65tl1vbxtC3752NAVfZ3SF945ZNpoucIx0RGpM/s640/Screen+Shot+2017-06-17+at+11.08.26+AM.png" title="Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower" width="640" /></a></div>
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Again as I've indicated in the past, the role of Ayatollah Kashani is dismissed by apologists and clerics alike. These documents make it quite clear that he had an immensely important role in the build up to the coup. </div>
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The next document is also new to the FRUS collection and concerns the "<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d170">Capabilities of the CIA Clandestine Services in Iran</a>"</div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvXPmdzyAVT9y3Ew3bGdAA2UAvQTHiS9rT7En4PMkX_xrGLotGgHF0ALBB6N399EQPDl1Pe4SD31uFPMEdKXwoEwfOX1tRJevsHQ_i2DZGTfVlTyaN-K2-_8iUl2oj9IL9uFfNkpa-I5E/s1600/Screen+Shot+2017-06-17+at+11.19.02+AM.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="637" data-original-width="461" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvXPmdzyAVT9y3Ew3bGdAA2UAvQTHiS9rT7En4PMkX_xrGLotGgHF0ALBB6N399EQPDl1Pe4SD31uFPMEdKXwoEwfOX1tRJevsHQ_i2DZGTfVlTyaN-K2-_8iUl2oj9IL9uFfNkpa-I5E/s640/Screen+Shot+2017-06-17+at+11.19.02+AM.png" width="462" /></a></div>
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This is another very important document. It indicates that the propaganda outlets the CIA controlled were NOT capable of spreading anti-Mossadeq propaganda a mere five months before the coup.</div>
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Later parts of the memo include this damning passage: the CIA didn't have the capability of creating riots against Mossadeq.</div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgb33w1JGbSc82l8GGuT577OvYtaN-ylkUQkIO57Ap199R-yJdXMm4u3GYWpuocceuN3sfWDbm0lPMQilwu8PAX80nQjO_a9zo0atanbNXsacH_E4k12VVp8qyEzZr-PQujMLBGi_DI_QM/s1600/Screen+Shot+2017-06-17+at+11.32.08+AM.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="95" data-original-width="421" height="144" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgb33w1JGbSc82l8GGuT577OvYtaN-ylkUQkIO57Ap199R-yJdXMm4u3GYWpuocceuN3sfWDbm0lPMQilwu8PAX80nQjO_a9zo0atanbNXsacH_E4k12VVp8qyEzZr-PQujMLBGi_DI_QM/s640/Screen+Shot+2017-06-17+at+11.32.08+AM.png" width="640" /></a></div>
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Again there are still redactions in the new documents, a very frustrating reality for historians trying to better understand the events of and leading up to the coup.</div>
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Interestingly enough the Top Secret cable (2266, March 2, 1953) from John Foster Dulles to the Iran embassy is not included in the new FRUS, despite its undeniable relevance and importance. Perhaps they are only including ones with changes?</div>
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The next document is from <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d171">the famous NSC 135.</a> One can see the ellipses on the left document indicating a redaction, and the new version which has additional information. </div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d172">There is an editorial note</a> following NSC 135 which discusses Foreign Minister Eden's trip to the United States from March 4-7, 1953. As I've previously noted, the CIA's chronology in Zendebad Shah! made a mistake in characterizing the nature of Eden's discussions, implying that negotiations broke down before the trip, when in fact they were, at the time, ongoing and were not dissolved until after Eden returned to the UK.</div>
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d174">Three documents later, my work is confirmed</a>. On March 10th, A memo from Byroade to JF Dulles references the potential breakdown of oil negotiations, and a recommendation (from Henderson) to not buy Iranian oil, to not encourage or discourage American firms from engaging in business, and to withhold some financial assistance from Iran. </div>
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A <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d177">March 11th CIA memo</a> is helpful in outlining the situation as it was. It covers the various opposition groups, starting with Kashani. </div>
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Even after big demonstrations in February and unrest, despite instability with the oil negotiations, the CIA thought Mossadeq had a lot going for him.<br />
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The analysis of what Mossadeq's choices were is very good and did a good job predicting what Mossadeq would do.</div>
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<i><a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2017/06/new-ciastate-department-docs-on-1953_18.html">In Part 3 I will discuss the previously unreleased March 31, 1953 memo describing a British assessment of what a Kashani led Iran would look like. </a></i></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-54178548401896969902017-06-16T18:38:00.001-04:002017-06-22T22:27:18.793-04:00New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 1)<i>This is Part 1. In Part 2 I will discuss a few of the more interesting documents</i><br />
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran">Finally, after years of delays, the State Department released an update to the 1951-1954 Iran FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States)</a>. The purpose of the series is to provide a better record of diplomatic events in the past. <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10">The previous edition, released in 1989</a>, was widely criticized for failing to note the depth of US involvement in the 1953 Iran coup, and for leaving many documents classified despite the decades that had past since this time.<br />
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Generally FRUS does not contain everything, and there are many documents, some historically pertinent, that are stored at the National Archives in Maryland. I have annotated a few from this time: <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-1.html">Part 1</a> <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-2.html">Part 2</a>. I have noted in the past how the record is incomplete; in some instances there are hundreds of cables in a row that are not in FRUS, and in many places there are missing documents. They could be completely mundane (as so many are), or they could be very revealing.<br />
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The release was also interesting because of how hard President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry had worked to keep them from being released. <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2017/06/iran-frus-release/">It was reported that up to the last hours of Obama's presidency they were trying to keep them secret</a>.<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="background-color: #cccccc; color: #07262e; font-family: "open sans" , "helvetica neue" , "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><i>“As it expressed in last year’s annual report, the HAC was repeatedly frustrated–and disappointed–by Secretary Kerry’s refusal to allow the volume’s publication,” Prof. Immerman said yesterday. “In this regard the change in State’s perspective from the Obama to Trump administration is dramatic.”</i></span></blockquote>
This bothered State Department officials as noted here:<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiYSXvL-99v_q9AvRQlwX5lDHx7rpAhFEgBU1XQTDnXz9E4HcB5d5vNNqWi6l_wexd0a2qDWr-ejz-BuQf38KFRFongAlZgyxyOpvp5T2VZyOLPsIxbeMB8eCghC1FmivXeTvJuzB78lLw/s1600/Screen+Shot+2017-06-16+at+6.03.26+PM.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="393" data-original-width="557" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiYSXvL-99v_q9AvRQlwX5lDHx7rpAhFEgBU1XQTDnXz9E4HcB5d5vNNqWi6l_wexd0a2qDWr-ejz-BuQf38KFRFongAlZgyxyOpvp5T2VZyOLPsIxbeMB8eCghC1FmivXeTvJuzB78lLw/s320/Screen+Shot+2017-06-16+at+6.03.26+PM.png" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="font-size: 12.800000190734863px;">https://history.state.gov/about/hac/june-2016</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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I have speculated about the motivations for the two not wanting the documents to become public: <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/06/why-is-state-delaying-release-of.html">http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/06/why-is-state-delaying-release-of.html</a>, <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/10/no-frus-doesnt-have-all-answers.html">http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/10/no-frus-doesnt-have-all-answers.html</a>.<br />
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Obama and Kerry were worried about the reaction of the Iranians to the releases. I postulated that this would be due to revealing the nature of the participation of clerical elements. It is clear to the world that the United States and the UK tried to overthrow Mossadeq on the 16th of August 1953; no one denies this. What happened next, between then and the successful August 19th coup, and who was involved in addition to the United States is what could potentially be so inflammatory. Ayatollah Kashani, an inspiration for Ayatollah Khomeini and many other important clerics to come later, was a key player.<br />
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The release yesterday was particularly important because it also contains CIA documents. It was claimed that these documents were lost, yet they have reproduced some of them. There are also copies of old documents that have been public for over 25 years. They are mostly quite important, but their exact purpose in this collection is unclear. At the same time, many CIA documents are NOT included. The best example is here: <br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
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there are STILL 4 documents missing. In LESS THAN one day it goes from “oh no everything is terrible” to “the coup succeeded" <a href="https://t.co/figd0kQPtu">pic.twitter.com/figd0kQPtu</a></div>
— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) <a href="https://twitter.com/MorganCarlston/status/875476875413512193">June 15, 2017</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script><br />
Sequentially there is document TEHE 737.1 and the next document is TEHE 742.1. Both have the same date, yet are clearly from different points in the day. In the first (737), there is almost a despair about the failure of the coup, and further efforts to commence damage control. In the second (742), there is a brief message of success. Did nothing happen in between these two moments? How did they go from potentially cancelling military aid, to a successful coup and an urgent need for 5 million dollars?! What do the four documents between 737 and 742 say?<br />
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While I have yet to read through the entire set of documents (there are over 500, and over 900 pages), I read the whole section on the coup (section 3, 272 pages), and the events leading up to the coup. My theories are almost uniformly supported, though there are still holes in the documentation.<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li> CIA documentation is still contradictory (I've noted problems in the narrative and chronology <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173">http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173</a>, <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/11/relations-between-mossadeq-and-united.html">http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/11/relations-between-mossadeq-and-united.html</a>)</li>
<li>Roosevelt is unreliable (A lot of what he's said reads as though he is covering for his mistakes)</li>
<li>Religious elements were KEY to the coup (They make this quite clear throughout)</li>
<li>The "spontaneity" of the events of August 19 is emphasized throughout</li>
</ol>
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While none of this exonerates the United States and the UK of course, the documents make quite clear that domestic actors must accept a not insignificant share of the blame.<br />
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<a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173?page=2">I have noted multiple Iranian officials approached the United States asking about a coup in the months prior (last paragraph in myth #6).</a> It was evident that while <a href="https://www.quora.com/Iranian-History-Was-Mohammad-Mosaddegh-a-good-guy">Mossadeq was undoubtedly a noble, well-intentioned individual</a>, he was not capable of bringing Iran out of the crisis alone, and he made too many enemies, both foreign and domestic.<br />
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<i><a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2017/06/new-ciastate-department-docs-on-1953_17.html">Part 2 will have more on specific documents</a></i>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-44865086961239745132017-05-21T12:46:00.003-04:002018-04-11T17:20:56.837-04:00Iranian Military SpendingThe relationship between Saudi Arabia's and Iran's military spending is interesting, often cited, yet almost <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/the-myth-of-the-iranian-military-giant/">always misrepresented</a>. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/irans-proxy-wars-are-a-figment-of-americas-imagination/">Lobbyists and pundits like to point to this as an indicator of foreign policy and aggression</a>, but the reality is that it is far more complex.<br />
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Saudi Arabia spends a significant amount money on conventional arms; President Trump during his trip to the kingdom <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-gets-elaborate-welcome-in-saudi-arabia-embarking-on-first-foreign-trip/2017/05/20/679f2766-3d1d-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html?utm_term=.f2318d39cd36">sealed a massive $110 billion dollar arms deal</a>. Iran on the other hand, spends much less. This is taken by many to indicate that Saudi Arabia is the aggressor, while Iran is defensive or even docile in nature. This does not take into account strategies or the structure of the defense apparatuses or funding of terror groups, which both do, despite very different military spending numbers.<br />
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Saudi Arabia has emphasized conventional weapons and arms deals, buying the latest gadgets from the US. Iran, on the other hand, focuses on its missile program, and other asymmetrical aspects. It <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/04/iran-breaking-tehrans-warships-longer-heading-us-coast/">bombastically threatens to create a blue-water navy</a>, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2016/11/iran-navy-atlantic-ocean-durban-sayyari-first-time.html">but this is empty talk</a>. Iran is restricted by geography, a smaller economy, and sanctions. Iran also has the experience of the Iran-Iraq War to draw upon; a bloody war where hundreds of thousands died.<br />
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After the revolution, Iran intended to exert influence by "exporting" their revolution. Given Iran's weakness relative to the rest of the region—they are incapable of using force to conquer Iraq to Morocco and everywhere in between— they realized they needed to project soft power, and when using violence, to use it asymmetrically. Hezbollah, Amal, and various Palestinian groups benefited from this.<br />
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The most significant beneficiary of this approach is the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-air-force-overshadowed-by-the-irgc">In 2016-17 only 5.3 MILLION was allocated to "refurbishing the fleet" of the regular Iranian Air Force</a>. They operate <a href="https://www.aei.org/publication/eternal-rivals-the-artesh-and-the-irgc/">what is essentially a parallel military</a> (with some overlap) to the regulars (<i>Artesh</i>). This moves them into a grey area, with a completely different command structure (while still ultimately answering to the Supreme Leader).<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html">Asymmetric warfare is by its very nature less cost-intensive</a>. It isn't about overpowering the enemy, but about exploiting the stronger enemy's weak points and utilizing this to the advantage of the conventionally weaker party. Comparing the simple raw military spending numbers of Saudi Arabia and Iran does not fully capture the intricacies and nuances of strategically dissimilar entities.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-8897407550154914862017-02-08T20:48:00.000-05:002018-04-11T17:22:48.850-04:00Iran and Trump<div style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal;">
Iran is one of the most interesting geopolitical threats facing President Trump. The new president has expressed <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/07/donald-trump-white-house-warns-iran-new-president-town/">strong distaste for Iran</a>, mostly relating to the <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/04/iran-deal-framework-thoughts.html?m=0">nuclear deal reached between the P5+1 and Iran during President Obama’s term</a>. At the same time, <a href="https://www.blogger.com/"><span id="goog_2064681690"></span>Trump has expressed a strong preference for Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin<span id="goog_2064681691"></span></a>. Russia and Iran have complementary interests in the Middle East, especially regarding Syria, while Russia has habitually nominally supported Iran in an effort to undermine the United States’ hegemony. </div>
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Trump appears to believe that a better deal can be reached with Iran, one abrogating the previous one. For this to be possible, the United States would need to reach a superior bargaining position. Whether the current position is weak or strong, at least one party (Iran) does not wish to give up more. Therefore they would need to be convinced that they are worse off than they believe, or to change the situation to the advantage of the United States. </div>
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Iran, as always, has its own domestic concerns, mostly relating to keeping the population docile, and solidifying regime control over the economy and political system. At the same time, they are active in Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf. Their goal is to establish regional clout, and like Russia, to undermine the United States.</div>
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Iran has been making deals with European, and Asian countries since the nuclear accord was finalized. Countries like <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-trade-greece-oil-idUSKCN0V01KY">Greece</a> and <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/energy/2016/12/19/Iran-starts-selling-crude-oil-to-Italy-s-Eni.html">Italy</a>, who already have massive financial troubles, benefit from Iranian crude. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-oil-idUSKBN14P15W">China always demands more</a>, and other major purchasers like <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-crude-iran-idUSKCN11K2YD">South Korea</a> and <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/iran-overtakes-saudi-to-becomes-indias-top-crude-oil-supplier/articleshow/55481064.cms">India</a> are also interested. </div>
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Trump is faced with a situation where everyone except the United States (and Israel) is happy with the deal, or doesn’t care enough to make a fuss. The United States has virtually no leverage. The only path forward would be to enact coercive measures, forcibly preventing other countries from doing business with Iran. It would the United States versus the world. </div>
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Iran knows this, and they have made a point of pushing in various ways. They ramped up their antagonist actions, especially in the Gulf after the nuclear deal was signed, and continue to act out. General Michael Flynn (Ret.), put Iran “on notice” recently after they test fired a ballistic missile. While not technically a violation of UNSC Resolution 2231 (the text is very poorly worded and unspecific), this test certainly “violated the spirit” of the nuclear agreement and the resolution. </div>
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<a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/02/08/iran-fires-another-missile-from-launch-pad-us-official-says.html">Today Iran fired another (short range air-defense missile) from the same location</a>. This clearly is not a violation, as it is not ballistic, but it is provocative. While this is much less antagonizing than the previous launch, it is still a clear message to the Trump administration. Iran knows that the United States does not have the same global coalition Obama managed to wrangle, and they are betting that Trump, despite his erratic behavior, won’t be able to do anything to substantive. </div>
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I expect limited provocations to continue, namely in the Gulf as I mentioned a week ago (<a href="https://twitter.com/MorganCarlston/status/827160413414506496">https://twitter.com/MorganCarlston/status/827160413414506496</a>), but is possible they try to find another dual-citizen hostage, or harass US navy vessels or commercial shipping. They realize how bad Trump looks globally with his inability to control his emotions, and how hypocritical some of his policies are. They are betting that he will be hamstrung by his inability to create a coalition, and to conduct effective diplomacy, while bogged down with domestic concerns.</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-85727473110488162292016-10-17T19:43:00.000-04:002016-10-17T19:46:07.456-04:00No, FRUS doesn't have all the answers<a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/its-time-to-release-the-real-history-of-the-1953-iran-coup-214353">A recent article in Politico on the 1953 Iran Coup</a>, while well intentioned, is unfortunately fundamentally flawed. Malcolm Byrne, who collaborated with Mark Gasiorowski to provide one of the most important academic books on the coup, writes in support of releasing the updated FRUS (Foreign Relations of the US). <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/06/why-is-state-delaying-release-of.html">I too have argued for the same thing</a>, but our reasons are very different.<br />
<br />
Mr. Byrne makes a variety of mistakes in his assessment of the situation, ones that someone with his experience with archival documents, and with this episode in history should not make.<br />
<br />
First he neglects to mention that the first coup attempt failed miserably, leading to the arrest of dozens of high-ranking officers and conspirators. There was no backup plan. Mr. Byrne does not state how one man, with zero knowledge of Persian managed to create a 2nd coup a mere three days later after his entire plan collapsed.<br />
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He also fails to account for competing interests, including Iranians who despised the Iranian Prime Minister, who wished to remove Mr. Mossadeq from power. He ends his introductory paragraph blaming the coup for feelings of anti-Americanism that endure to this day, ignoring once again, that clerics, including the direct spiritual predecessor of Ayatollah Khomeini (Ayatollah Kashani), was key in the attempts to remove Mossadeq from power.<br />
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His argument is based upon the core principle that the US, and the US alone (well including the UK), is guilty of overthrowing Mossadeq, rejecting the possibility of domestic (or other foreign) collaboration.<br />
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Mr. Byrne goes on to claim that the American public does not have full-access to the full historical record. This is partially true, as the CIA "lost" all of its files from the time in a suspicious fire, and some of the documents from the State Department remain classified. At the same time, the vast majority of these documents ARE available at the National Archives in Maryland.<br />
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Mr. Byrne also seems to not understand the point of the FRUS system. These are not complete records containing every single cable to and from an embassy or consulate. There are a small fraction that are included in FRUS collections. They are selected to be pertinent, not a complete data dump. There are many more documents from and to Tehran and other places that are in the National Archives, I have seen them myself. Most of them are mundane, but some are quite interesting. It would be nice to include these in a massive digital archive including every single document, but this is not how the FRUS system is set up.<br />
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Mr. Byrne claims that the US and UK role in the coup is covered up, and the documents the State Department refuses to release will prove the two parties guilty. In the Archives, the additional documents I have read myself, indicate otherwise as I have demonstrated <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-1.html">here</a> and <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-2.html">here</a>.<br />
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Mr. Byrne believes that US and UK guilt over the coup is the major reason to not release the documents, but his analysis falls far short. He does not account for the local efforts to remove the Shah, and their ties to the current regime. He additionally fails to mention the saga (<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1979/11/07/the-coup-snafu/3857d04a-3a32-43ec-9ed3-7c52e753ea3f/">covered by David Ignatius of the Washington Post</a>), where BP (formerly AIOC) forced Kermit Roosevelt and his publishing company to pull the entire run, though <a href="http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB468/#_ednref1">he has written about it in the past</a>.<br />
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What would be more infuriating for the regime, to show that the US was involved (which is what they are already furious about), or that major regime figures, or their direct influences played a role in fomenting the coup?<br />
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Given the sensitivity of the Iran nuclear talks which have been ongoing, this delay makes sense in that they do not want to upset the Iranians so that they completely withdraw, and years of diplomatic efforts are lost.<br />
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While I agree with Mr. Byrne that the updated FRUS should be released, I strongly disagree with his analysis and I am very disappointed with his failure to mention the most likely scenario: that documents will show involvement from the Iranian clergy.<br />
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There are classified documents out there, documents which have not undergone their 50 year declassification review. Why hasn't Mr. Byrne filed MDRs (Mandatory Declassification Review) for these documents? He spends his time working on archives, yet in his article he ignores this potentiality.<br />
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His argument does not stand up. It does not make any sense for him to claim that the documents are not available when they mostly are. For the few that are classified, he simply has to go to the Archives and find the sheet that says how there is a classified document missing and then file an MDR. Yet he refuses to mention this aspect in his article, instead making it about some conspiracy to hide the truth from the American people.<br />
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It is also quite disheartening that he is convinced that there are going to be documents giving us a definitive answer as to what happened, and who the guilty parties are. <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173">I have demonstrated how even the CIA's latest (known) internal history has at least one glaring mistake</a> (see #5). If the CIA doesn't have the story straight, how would the State Department?<br />
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There may be documents proving Mr. Byrne right, yet his shoddy work, and misleading, baseless claims do not help shed a light on a complicated historical event.<br />
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In conclusion, this quote from Donald Wilber, the author of the CIA's first internal history of the coup sums up the entire situation: <span style="font-family: inherit;">"<span style="background-color: white;">The </span>early accounts of various participants differed widely enough to make it impossible<span style="background-color: white;"> to follow the slender thread of truth through the dark night"</span></span>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-31802079294831508942016-08-07T14:10:00.001-04:002016-08-14T15:49:43.855-04:00Iran and the TalibanA core principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to export the revolution, their system of Twelver Shi'a inspired Islamic governance. This is most prevalent in Lebanon, where Hezbollah acts as a proxy. Iran also spends money funding ideological enemies for strategic purposes, namely Sudan (less so now), Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and recently, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan and almost certainly in a limited sense in Iran as well.<br />
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Two major articles in the past year, <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/26/exclusive-iran-teams-with-taliban-to-fight-islamic-state-in-afghanistan/">one from Foreign Policy in May 2016</a>, and <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-backs-taliban-with-cash-and-arms-1434065528">another from the Wall Street Journal in June 2015</a>, claim that Iran is actively funding and arming the Taliban in hopes of curtailing potential advances from ISIS. This "ISIS" is not the same group of terrorists as those in Syria and Iraq, though there is some affiliation. <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/taliban-vs-isis-the-islamic-state-doomed-afghanistan-13153">It is believed that many of these "ISIS" terrorists are in fact disaffected Taliban</a>. <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/incoming/taliban-special-forces-fighting-isis-7038671">The two have fought each other</a>, and both still actively work to perpetrate terror attacks.<br />
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Iran has a vested interest in aligning with the Taliban for a number of reasons:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>The Taliban are fighting Western and Western-backed forces. Countering American attempts at stability helps Iran's anti-hegemonic, disruptive strategy. </li>
<li><a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/how-irans-mafia-like-revolutionary-guard-rules-the-countrys-black-market-2015-12">The Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) are known to be heavily involved in the drug trafficking industry in Eastern Iran, Western Afghanistan and Western Pakistan</a>. Establishing relationships could lead to greater efficiency in these smuggling routes, also potentially reducing the amount of violence involving non-Pasdaran security forces.</li>
<li>ISIS is a threat to Iran's interests in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, the last thing Iran wants is a second "front" in the East to deal with.</li>
</ol>
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Iran's decision to not just tolerate, but also support the Taliban is perhaps best demonstrated by the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-tracked-taliban-leader-before-drone-strike-1464109562">previous leader of the Taliban visiting Iran hours before he was killed in an American drone strike</a>. If Iran was serious about preventing this type of violent group they would take steps to make sure that such an important figure was not able to enter the country.<br />
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ISIS was able to conduct their first major terror attack in Afghanistan recently when <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/07/23/witnesses-deadly-blast-strikes-demonstration-kabul/87472562/">they targeted the Shi'ite Hazara ethnic group killing dozens</a>. This <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iran-sending-thousands-afghans-fight-syria">same ethnic group has been known to be used by the Iranian government to fight in Syria</a>. Interestingly enough, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state-idUSKBN0MI03N20150322">it was claimed that the Sunni Taliban, no matter how radically xenophobic they are, agreed to protect the Hazara from ISIS last year</a>. Here too, Iran has an interest in working with the Taliban.<br />
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Iran's actions in Afghanistan are not surprising, yet they do not seem to get much attention because of other ongoing conflicts. I expect this to change soon, especially if ISIS is able to conduct another serious attack. Unfortunately, I suspect that given the attention given the ISIS brand, more will be made of their involvement than Iran's.<br />
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The Obama administration has a duty to investigate the connections between Iran and this known terror group. Even if they are fighting our enemies, they are still terrorists, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/dozens-afghan-police-feared-dead-taliban-attack-160630082922396.html">who have attacked</a>, and <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/05/asia/tourists-injured-afghanistan-taliban/">will continue to attack Western and Afghan government targets</a>. I realize that the success of the Iranian nuclear deal is important to the administration, but ignoring a state actively funding and directly supporting terrorists is not an acceptable position.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-81201786384401216882016-06-08T22:55:00.002-04:002017-03-07T18:09:48.533-05:00Why is State Delaying the Release of the Updated 1952-1954 Iran FRUS?<i>UPDATE #1 (March 7, 2017): Nate Jones from the <a href="http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/">National Security Archive</a> tweeted a few cryptic tweets about the delay:</i><br />
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<i>+Finally <a href="https://twitter.com/HistoryAtState">@HistoryAtState</a> rpted that they +undersecretaries backing them fought "until final day"of <a href="https://twitter.com/POTUS44">@POTUS44</a> admin to rls FRUS Iran Vol...1/3</i></div>
<i>— NSA Nate (@NSANate) <a href="https://twitter.com/NSANate/status/839155947683594240">March 7, 2017</a></i></blockquote>
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<i>But were rebuffed "at the highest levels" (<a href="https://twitter.com/POTUS44">@POTUS44</a>? <a href="https://twitter.com/JohnKerry">@JohnKerry</a>?) bc of fear of harm of releasing history of Iran Coup. <a href="https://twitter.com/HistoryAtState">@HistoryAtState</a> 2/3.</i></div>
<i>— NSA Nate (@NSANate) <a href="https://twitter.com/NSANate/status/839156477965254656">March 7, 2017</a></i></blockquote>
<i>The initial reason for the delay was to keep the negotiations going, yet "until the final day" of Obama's term they fought to delay the FRUS edition. It is now delayed until 2018 or later. </i><br />
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<i>I tweeted the following about this: </i><br />
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<i>We already admitted involvement<br />Details of OUR involvement wouldn't do much<br />Details of THEIR involvement would infuriate them<br />Simple logic</i></div>
<i>— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) <a href="https://twitter.com/MorganCarlston/status/839158682499878914">March 7, 2017</a></i></blockquote>
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<i>What doesn't the Obama admin want the public (US, or Iran), or the Iran regime, or the world to know?? This is very suspicious and illogical.</i><br />
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For all the strange and unprofessional behavior by the State Department over the last few years, something curiously ignored is the persistent delays in the scheduled re-release of the 1952-1954 Iran Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) collection.<br />
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FRUS is an invaluable tool for academics and researchers as it contains primary archival material hosted online by the University of Wisconsin in an organized and easily accessible form. All of this and much more is also available in the National Archives II in College Park Maryland, but the documents are not in any particular order, are not sorted and accessing them is inconvenient.<br />
<br />
The 1953 Iran coup is fascinating for a number of reasons, and sensitive to many parties because of the injustice of overthrowing a legally appointed premier. As <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173">I've noted in the past</a>, the full story is not evident from the documents that we have; there are too many inconsistencies and holes in the timeline. This has not stopped academics and pseudo-academics from pontificating and making grandiose judgements based upon such shoddy work as the "memoirs" of Kermit Roosevelt; a work that is known to have been <a href="http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB468/">at least partially edited by the CIA</a> at the behest of BP and perhaps other unknown parties. It is unclear how the edits changed the story, but a cursory glance through the text shows how it is barely more than a dime novel.<br />
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FRUS, as the primary collection of archival documents from the Department of State, has a certain authority to it. Even though significant pieces of the archive are missing from the current edition of the Iran as I noted <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-1.html">here</a> and <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-2.html">here</a>, and an unknown number of cables and documents remain classified (well beyond the legally justified time period), there is a lot there.<br />
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At least a few of the top books on the coup were written by authors who apparently had never even been to the archives; the only State Department cables cited by them are also included in the existing FRUS. Given my personal experience digging through the boxes at Archives II, I know there are other cables there that have academic value to the study of this important event.<br />
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The Department of State announced years ago that there would be an updated version of the collection updated, yet in <a href="https://history.state.gov/about/hac/september-2014">September 2014</a> announced that "the Department had decided to delay publication because of ongoing negotiations with Iran". It has now been almost a year since the nuclear deal was signed, yet the updated FRUS has not been released.<br />
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<a href="https://history.state.gov/about/hac/december-2015">In December of 2015</a>, the Office of the Historian held a meeting where the release of the collection was discussed. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Valerie Fowler indicated that "the timeline was to release the volume at the earliest possible moment, but that external developments and considerations were important too".<br />
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What could these "external developments and considerations" entail? The <a href="http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/">National Security Archive believes</a> that there could be documents confirming a British hand in the events. While in theory this should be plausible, it would not explain the early decision to release the updated version, before an abrupt about-face and decision to withhold the documents. The other problem with this theory is that the British had been kicked out of the country months earlier and so their intelligence apparatus was knee-capped by a closed embassy and limited access. This is partially why the US took the lead in conducting the first (planned) coup attempt.<br />
<br />
Personally I think that the most likely possibility is that there are documents tying Iranians, potentially clerics associated with Ayatollah Kashani (or perhaps even Khomeini), to the coup and that this would infuriate the Iranians so much that they would have pulled out of negotiations. It is also possible that this could contain further details of United States involvement, but as the US is already blamed as the primary instigator and actor by Iran, it isn't like things could get much worse, is it?<br />
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Given the strange and inept way in which the State Department and the administration have handled public diplomacy regarding Iran (see Rhodes, Ben) I am deeply curious why they are not releasing the updated version. What are they trying to keep hidden?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-83902416073612545742016-05-29T21:26:00.001-04:002016-05-30T13:25:29.781-04:00Hardline Assembly of Experts Chair and Conservative Majles Speaker SelectedAs expected, <a href="http://www.iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30510:ahmad-jannati-new-head-of-iran-s-assembly-of-experts&catid=4:iran-general&Itemid=109">a hardliner and a conservative were selected </a>to head <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/iran-larijani-reelected-parliament-speaker/27763751.html">both Iranian governmental bodies</a> "elected" a few months back.<br />
<br />
The leading vote getters in both elections ended up not being selected to head either the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/iran-assembly-of-experts-internal-election-chairmanship.html">Assembly of Experts (Rafsanjani)</a> or the <a href="http://financialtribune.com/articles/national/41773/reformists-back-aref-majlis-speakership">Majles (Aref)</a>. The individual who was selected to lead the Assembly of Experts for the next 2 years (of the 8 year term) was in fact the last place finisher in Tehran.<br />
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The "loss" by the "moderates" in both of these decisions was not surprising for a many reasons. The elections were rigged from the beginning, with <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/02/24-iran-elections-candidates-rejected-borden-maloney">thousands of candidates disqualified</a>, in particular those with views less in line with the regime. Additionally, <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/03/iran-elections-2016-early-thoughts.html">as I and others have noted,</a> the "moderate" list was in fact not as moderate as the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trita-parsi/quick-thoughts-on-the-ira_b_9343540.html">pro-Iran lobby,</a> and portions of the left in the United States trying to sell the Iran Deal have claimed.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://twitter.com/iranwonk/status/705067297392631808">With significant overlap between the "Principalists" and this "moderate" "List of Hope"</a>, it was only natural for the more hardline members of the "moderate" list to vote for the hardliners.<br />
<br />
This complexity has gone way over many pundits heads here in the West. As the usual suspects point to the hardline victory as proof that there are no moderates (and of course no liberals) in Iran, the reality remains more complex. Again, they miss the greater point, that the elections had to be fixed to undermine genuine attempts from the population to move towards the West and the rest of the international community. The scale of this ideological schism may not be large, and many of the people pushing for change may approve of Iran's unending support for terror groups throughout the region, but the attempts to move away from the anti-Western ideologues must not be ignored.<br />
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Each time there is a political event where the hardliners do not win outright, the system, the regime, the deep state is put under pressure. This pressure forces a decision out of the regime; to allow an opening, <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/05/03/476511439/springtime-in-iran-means-the-morality-police-are-out-in-force">or to crack down, and repress the population</a>. Either way resources are expended, and the system becomes more unstable. However limited it may be, this instability at home undermines Iran's ability to conduct operations abroad; more attention must be given to preventing civil unrest.<br />
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Iran has a choice: to fully embrace autocracy like China, or to reform. <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/irans-next-step-in-building-a-halal-internet/2672948.html">They had previously mentioned attempts to create a "halal" internet</a>, so that only sites that were deemed appropriate would be available in Iran. This failed. The real question is how far apart the Iranian public and the regime will drift, and how, when and if this will happen.<br />
<br />
It is very difficult to measure the ideological bent of the population. The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_legislative_election,_2012">previous election for the Majles (2012)</a> was boycott by the Reformist bloc so they only received a few seats. The election prior <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_legislative_election,_2008">(2008) the "Reformists" had under 20% of the vote</a>. Principalists have controlled the Majles <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_legislative_election,_2004">since the 2004 election</a> when they forced the heavily disqualified Reformist majority to the sidelines.<br />
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That there are so many members who are not Principalists is encouraging, but doesn't mean too much in the grand scheme of things. The greater system of control by the regime and deep state remains intact, and the Majles will continue to be more or less powerless as it has been for decades. The wins by hardline candidates are important in showing that anti-Westernism is still a fundamental value of the state, but the turnout for those with a different point of view should be encouraging to the West. The situation continues to be multi-faceted and fluid.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-50928335164373065862016-04-05T12:59:00.003-04:002017-01-30T18:59:21.080-05:00EXCLUSIVE: Key Source in Hersh's Ghouta Claims Investigated by FBI and ICE<div style="line-height: normal;">
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><a href="http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/melrose/2010/10/federal_agents_search_home_of_5.html">On the morning of October 25th, 2010 Federal Agents from the FBI and ICE (Immigrations and Customs Enforcement) raided a home in Melrose, Massachusetts, just outside of Boston</a>. At the same time, an interview was conducted by FBI agents at JFK International Airport. The subject, a warhead expert affiliated with defense industry giant Raytheon, had recently returned from India on business.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">The late Mr. Richard Lloyd was regarded as one of the top experts in his field, with decades of experience, and at least two books on conventional and nuclear warheads according to Amazon listings. In recent years he, along with Theodore Postol, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/middleeast/israels-iron-dome-system-is-at-center-of-debate.html?_r=0">received some attention</a> for his work attempting to refute the efficacy of the Iron Dome, and to prove that Assad’s forces were not responsible for the August 2013 Ghouta Massacre. <a href="http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/spokesman/obituary.aspx?pid=173027692">He died in October 2014 of an unspecified cancer</a>.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">As the article on Boston.com notes, Lloyd was no longer employed by Raytheon on October 26th, 2010, but the spokesman 'declined to say when or under what circumstances Lloyd left the company.". It is unclear if the raid and interview led to Mr. Lloyd's termination, or if not, how long before this happened did he no longer work for the company.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Because Mr. Lloyd is deceased, it is possible to submit Freedom of Information Act requests about him and receive information. I submitted parallel requests about the arrest and interview to the FBI and ICE. ICE refused to comply, citing “ongoing criminal investigations” despite Mr Lloyd having been deceased for 5 months, while the FBI delayed for nearly a year before providing partially redacted documents. Following are the documents (annotated by me) which undermine the integrity and reliability of Mr. Lloyd. </span></div>
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It is unclear if Lloyd lied because he was panicking. It is evident that the first priority of the special agents was to ensure that he was not trafficking information on nuclear weaponry, but the consistent lies are deeply concerning. Was Lloyd was terminated from his employment at Raytheon before he went to India or afterwards? Was he fired because he violated security protocols? If he had been fired before this why would he still have sensitive computers from Raytheon in his possession? There are many questions which remain unanswered.<br />
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Richard Lloyd, for all his valuable work in the past, seems to have made some major mistakes in his Iron Dome work as I've pointed out <a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=421644843288349090#editor/target=post;postID=3366195335325793638;onPublishedMenu=posts;onClosedMenu=posts;postNum=3;src=postname">here</a>, <a href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=421644843288349090#editor/target=post;postID=2008260607914223046;onPublishedMenu=posts;onClosedMenu=posts;postNum=1;src=postname">here</a> and <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2016/02/18/dont-doubt-the-iron-dome/">here</a>, and as <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2014/08/20/attempts-to-blame-the-syrian-opposition-for-the-august-21st-sarin-attacks-continue-one-year-on/">Eliot Higgins and Dan Kaszeta have pointed out</a>, also appears to have made some mistakes in his work on Ghouta. Despite this, he was still <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n24/seymour-m-hersh/whose-sarin">cited as a source</a> by Seymour Hersh in his work attempting to prove Assad's innocence. The information which I have obtained, partnered with the shoddy work on these two major cases demonstrates that Lloyd has serious credibility issues and should not be taken at face value.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-83016844921936611882016-03-01T20:01:00.003-05:002016-05-29T20:16:47.116-04:00Iran Elections 2016 Early ThoughtsWith many seats remaining unselected until the run-off election, a large number of independents with uncertain affiliations, and overlapping elections lists, there is much left unresolved by the dual Iranian elections. Despite this obvious truth, <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-02-29/iran-s-elections-are-magic">partisans on both sides in the West</a> have rushed to <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/reza-marashi/iranian-votes-moderate_b_9347954.html">claim that the results</a> fit their pre-conceived notions of what would happen, and what this means in a larger sense. This is not helped by the <a href="https://twitter.com/ebtekarm/status/703247708451110913">spin from Iranian politicians and media</a>. I have seen a bit of both positive and negative; a more complicated scenario which seems too difficult for the hacks to comprehend or accept.<br />
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There are a few interesting and undeniable facts about the election.<br />
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1) <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/rouhani-allies-win-30-seats-tehran-state-tv-063122884.html">The leading vote-getter was a reformist</a>. Mohammad Reza Aref, was a vice president under Mohammad Khatami, and continues to be a reformist. His revolutionary credentials are without question, yet he managed to pass the Guardian Council's vetting in both the 2013 presidential election (<a href="http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/06/2272/will-iran-have-reformist-vice-president/">before withdrawing and throwing his support behind eventual winner Rouhani</a>), and this election. He ran in Tehran, the most cosmopolitan and therefore potentially "liberal" part of the country, but the fact that he was able to receive the most votes says a lot.<br />
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2) Rafsanjani was able to receive a lot of votes. <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/05/rafsanjani-and-religious-titles-in-iran.html">I've written a lot on Hashemi Rafsanjani in the past </a>and <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/04/the-enemy-of-my-enemy.html">for good reason</a>; he is one of the most interesting remaining revolutionary leaders. <a href="https://en.iranwire.com/features/6211/">He conspired with Khamenei to remove Ayatollah Montazeri as Deputy Supreme Leader</a>, yet since 2009 has aligned himself with the moderates and reformists. He has been wildly unpopular for his perceived corruption, as well as his political positions, but he seems have to changed this. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/rafsanjani-green-movement-mehdi-hashemi-children.html">The state-sponsored persecution of his family may have something to do with reformists and moderates accepting him</a>.<br />
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3) The overlapping lists don't help in understanding the political bent of the Majles and Assembly of Experts. The wonderful folks at <a href="http://iranpolitik.com/">IranPolitik.com</a> have posted this great graphic illustrating the complexity of the lists and how the actual results are hard to understand at this point<br />
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Our summary of <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/IranElections2016?src=hash">#IranElections2016</a> Assembly of Experts results <a href="https://t.co/6lCGp8WzUC">pic.twitter.com/6lCGp8WzUC</a></div>
— IranPolitik (@IranPolitik) <a href="https://twitter.com/IranPolitik/status/704589153741082624">March 1, 2016</a></blockquote>
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The "List of Hope", billed by <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-elections-20160228-story.html">US media</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35681250">others</a> as a reformist-moderate coalition, is actually more socially conservative and likely hostile to the US than it would seem.</div>
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Here is the corresponding graphic for the Majles:</div>
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Our summary of <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/IranElections2016?src=hash">#IranElections2016</a> Parliament results. As with our AoE graphic this is based on analysis of lists. <a href="https://t.co/PfqU58XOxT">pic.twitter.com/PfqU58XOxT</a></div>
— IranPolitik (@IranPolitik) <a href="https://twitter.com/IranPolitik/status/704903200948752385">March 2, 2016</a></blockquote>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9yYflmHCXTxitYcJVJ3t_26uaIkINS-8ufUiGubGtjcqjpFvj07O_SMFK6QWA1WwedBO91XEwcw1tBeCaySK6Y7f47Lwf-cJl3QnEIxE8YnmI1w0HVm6KNgiTq8C8TfUseUgx6hlwTSQ/s1600/CchRudbWIAETxOy.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="236" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9yYflmHCXTxitYcJVJ3t_26uaIkINS-8ufUiGubGtjcqjpFvj07O_SMFK6QWA1WwedBO91XEwcw1tBeCaySK6Y7f47Lwf-cJl3QnEIxE8YnmI1w0HVm6KNgiTq8C8TfUseUgx6hlwTSQ/s320/CchRudbWIAETxOy.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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This is hard to bill as a "reformist" victory, as the List of Hope is a mixture of reformists, moderates and conservative pragmatists. Additionally, a 27.5% share, while currently the largest, is not so significant. </div>
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This is understandable as Iranian politics are notoriously faction-based, and personal issues can cause individuals to switch alliances. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/iran-prisoner-release-green-movement-leaders-political.html">Ali Motahari, a conservative with somewhat pragmatic inclinations is a prime example of this. He was on the List of Hope, but no one in their right mind would categorize him as a reformist</a>.</div>
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4) The List of Hope did very well in Tehran, but less so in other parts of the country. This shows that Tehran isn't necessarily Iran, but also that there is a concentration of like-minded individuals in this area. </div>
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5) Results outside Tehran really cut into the List of Hope's success in the capital. While Aref has a slight chance to become the speaker of the Majles, there are still plenty of conservative voices that will strongly oppose this. </div>
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6) The positive feelings about the Iran Deal in the less anti-Western population are clearly evident in Tehran. Despite obvious tampering, and some ridiculous rulings from the Guardian Council (<a href="https://twitter.com/RZimmt/status/697446382311968768">approving a 24 year old to run for the clerical body, the Assembly of Experts, is laughable</a>), the Iranian public seems to have accepted the regime for at least this election.</div>
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7) The Majles does not have much power to change the law no matter (<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ValentineMoghadamFinal.pdf">see the "changed" child marriage law under Khatami</a> on the top of page 5), but it is a symbolic victory of sorts, and that a clear reformist ended up with the most votes should deeply frighten the hardliners.</div>
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8) The Assembly of Experts results could come back to haunt the hardliners. There appears to be a sizable block of reformists/moderates/pragmatists that are capable of preventing a hardline Supreme Leader or Supreme Council if Khamenei dies this term. Additionally, two of the most hardline candidates lost their seats, <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/irans-voters-sent-a-message-to-the-hard-liners">Ayatollahs Yazdi, and Mesbah Yazdi</a>. Hardliner Gholam-ali Haddad-Adel also lost his seat in the Majles</div>
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9) The incredibly low incumbency rate (30%) makes the situation even more unclear. As many of the individuals are new, it is uncertain how they may be as members of parliament. </div>
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I still support the JCPOA. Frankly, there was no chance of continuing the level of sanctions necessary to force the regime change we desperately want, especially given the unwillingness of European partners, not to mention the much less friendly Russian and Chinese interests. It is unrealistic to argue that other states would have gotten on board with unending sanctions. <a href="https://twitter.com/MorganCarlston/status/692109816546856962">Italy and Greece</a> have been highly dependent on Iranian oil, as has India, South Korea and South Africa, all countries that otherwise may have accepted a US political position. The result was not ideal, but given the number of disqualifications, a very strong showing in Tehran for a clearly defined reformist is encouraging. The hardliners are threatened by the results, and while their ability to control the population through their standard nefarious methods remains mostly unchecked, the ideological threat of a reform-minded populace has to be of concern for them. </div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-50910306108110354712016-02-04T16:18:00.002-05:002016-02-27T10:17:46.384-05:00Leading up to the Iranian Elections<span style="background-color: white; font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;">Iranian domestic affairs are notoriously difficult to predict. This is especially true at such an important moment in the Islamic Republic when the stakes are as high as they have ever been. Rumors, unreliable polling and opaqueness in the approval and electoral process have made this election (like most previous ones), very interesting.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">I have a few expectations and predictions to share, based upon what has happened so far. Here is how I have come to these conclusions:</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">As I have made quite clear, I supported the Iran nuclear negotiations/JPOA/JCPOA because of the potential to influence this coming set of elections, as well as the Iranian youth in general. </span><span style="background-color: white;">Empowered reformists and pragmatists/moderates, leads to more pressure for Iran domestically. This (at least temporarily) reduces its ability to be disruptive regionally and internationally (especially in Syria and the Gulf). This election is vital for hardliners as they are on the defensive from the implications of a negotiated settlement with the West. Any sort of agreement with the West goes against their core ideology, and the </span><a href="http://www.vox.com/2015/8/13/9147289/gary-samore-iran" style="background-color: white;">violation of nearly all of Khamenei's 'red lines' is indisputable</a><span style="background-color: white;">.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;"><a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-moderate-iranian-purge-1453855466">Western hardliners have argued that the backlash against moderates and reformists</a> by Khamenei and Iranian hardliners is from a position of strength, but this couldn't be further from the truth. This election is a chance for hardliners to take back the momentum, and the <a href="https://en.iranwire.com/features/7034/">actions of the Guardian Council in rejecting various candidates</a>, the refusal of Khamenei to overrule them, and the assorted hostile acts by the IRGC-Navy in the Gulf are all part of a larger strategy to distance Iran from the West. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">I was surprised by the numbers of reformists excluded from elections. I knew there would be a massive number of rejections, but I did not anticipate that the number would be so high. This more than anything shows the insecurity of the establishment. Rejections of moderates in addition to the previously mentioned reformists reinforces this. </span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white;">The exclusion of Hassan Khomeini, a cleric and grandson of the Islamic Republic's first Supreme Leader, is particularly troubling for democracy and reform in Iran, but I would not count him, or the reform movement out yet. </span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white;">One reason for these massive disqualifications (which is coupled with an unprecedented number of applications for these electoral races) is the complexity of rigging municipal elections on a nation-wide scale. The 2009 stolen election was much easier to manipulate because it was an election for only one position with only 2 serious candidates (4 total). The Majles has nearly 300 seats and the Assembly of Experts has 88. Because so many candidates were excluded, some of these seats have no competition (for example the provinces of <span style="white-space: pre-wrap;">Ardabil, Azerbaijan West, Bushehr, Hormuzgan, Khorasan North and Semnan)</span>, and hardliners will automatically win the seat(s) in these locations. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">While hardliners have the natural advantage as they control the bodies concerned with oversight, I would not count out the Iranian people. I expect large numbers to turn out and vote, especially for reformists and moderates. Sanctions have just been removed, and there is optimism. The challenge here is that Rouhani's efforts to repair the extensive damage of the past administration have not been entirely successful, and Iran is still struggling with inflation and budgetary issues.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">The actions from the Iranian government before the elections are important. Will they cave and allow more reformists and moderates to run? <a href="https://twitter.com/Hassanvand/status/692808089112739841">There were rumors of this happening, but as of yet, it has not been confirmed</a>. The more pragmatists are allowed to run, the further the election can swing in their favor. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">Rouhani seems to have aspirations to be the next Supreme Leader, and he knows that he will never gain this position if the hardliners handily win this election.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">If there are additional plans to fix the elections I would suspect the Assembly of Experts to be around 75-80% hardliners, perhaps even more, and at least 60% of the Parliament (Majles) to be this way. I think the establishment is aware that if they go much higher, there are serious risks for another mass protest like 2009. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">The unknown for me is how badly the election has to be stolen for the Iranian public to protest en masse. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "georgia" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white;">As long as the reformist/moderate/pragmatist groups vote and expect the result to reflect their voting preferences, I would be cautiously optimistic for either a result or resulting protests. In either case, the current attitude of the Iranian state is unsustainable, and unacceptable and I see this election as key for moving towards making necessary changes.</span></span><br />
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UPDATE #1 (02/05/16):</b> It appears as though an undetermined number of Majles candidates will now be allowed to run as the Guardian Council has reversed their decision in approximately 20-25% of cases:<br />
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Iran Guardian Council Spox Nejatollah Ebrahimian: 20-25% of previously disqualified parliamentary election candidates now qualified to run.</div>
— Hanif Zarrabi-K. (@hanifzk) <a href="https://twitter.com/hanifzk/status/695703872296214529">February 5, 2016</a></blockquote>
Again because of the absurd opaqueness of the system it is unclear where this decision was made and why it was made. It is believed that various high-level figures were upset with the decision to bar so many candidates. At this time however, the identities and political affiliations of the candidates are unknown, so it is just as likely that hardliners, or even moderates were approved ahead of reformists.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-79990655507032177272016-01-02T16:43:00.002-05:002016-01-03T17:30:12.543-05:00Implications of al-Nimr's Execution<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-executes-47-sheikh-nimr-shiite-cleric.html">Today Saudi Arabia executed 47 individuals, 46 of whom appear to be Sunni</a> (there are rumors that 3 of them were Shi'a) and allegedly linked to Al Qaeda, and one, a prominent Shi'a cleric. Iran, as the self-proclaimed protectors of Shi'ism and Shi'ites has expressed its discontent in a variety of ways; Iranians protesting at the Saudi consulate in Mashhad who seem to have caused a fire, and a large demonstration is expected at the Saudi embassy in Tehran tomorrow (there are now breaking reports that the Saudi embassy in Tehran has been at least partially burned as well from molotov cocktails).<br />
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The inclusion of Nimr in with the 46 accused terrorists/political prisoners is interesting as his case has been very high profile. Rumors of his impending execution in the past few months outraged Iranian officials and the general public. Even the relatively quietist Marja Ali Sistani, based in Najaf, Iraq, involved himself <a href="http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81862808/">by writing to Saudi officials</a> asking for Nimr to be pardoned.<br />
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Signs of attempts at rapprochement between Saudi and Iran appeared throughout the first years of Rouhani's administration, despite ongoing proxy conflicts in Syria and Yemen as well as Iraq to a lesser extent. They have not been exclusively positive statements, as Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the more pragmatic Iranian political figures, has also <a href="http://en.apa.az/xeber_iran_s_rafsanjani_condemns_saudi-led_air_224867.html">strongly condemned Saudi actions in Yemen</a>.<br />
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Despite Iran's own status as a major human rights abuser, despite its disproportionate use of capital punishment, and despite its lack of due process and an independent judiciary, the Iranian government is objecting to another state's use of this tactic. This is an opportune time however, as Saudi is stuck in the quagmire of Yemen while Iran appears to be at least nominally withdrawing from its own in Syria, as Russia takes the lead there. Nationalism and sectarianism are important, and I expect Iran to exploit this while heavily criticizing Saudi Arabia's human rights abuses (and ignoring their own).<br />
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If it is true that there are additional hundreds of Saudi Arabian executions pending, and especially if any of the individuals sentenced to death are Shi'ite, there may be further diplomatic tension between the two states. I am less familiar with Saudi politics, but this would appear to be some sort of statement from the interior ministry, or from the new king as to what their approach to other religions and to local international politics will be. An embrace of hardline ideologies at an increasingly volatile time in the region is worrisome.<br />
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Because the reports of the attack on the Saudi embassy are true I expect there to be significant diplomatic problems, though I am not sure either side is eager to engage in full-on conflict. The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34031615">UK embassy was stormed and damaged a few years ago</a>, but there is not the same level of animosity (or proximity) involved. Saudi Arabia will probably expel the Iranian ambassador (<a href="http://news.yahoo.com/saudi-arabia-summons-iranian-ambassador-over-hostile-remarks-192606175.html">he already was summoned over "hostile remarks" earlier today</a>), and potentially file complaints with the UN. If Saudi Arabians attack the Iranian embassy in Riyadh or consulate in Jeddah, a response from the IRGC-N in the Gulf is not out of the question.<br />
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If things spiral out of control, I expect this is how it would happen. For now, until we see what happens in Saudi Arabia it doesn't seem that things will be too bad. The more damage done to Saudi facilities in Iran, the worse it could get.<br />
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UPDATE #1 (1/3/16): KSA did end up expelling diplomatic staff, and additionally withdrew its own staff and broke ties with Iran. They broke ties in 1988 before restoring them in 1991. Iran has the initiative now. It remains to be seen if they will retaliate through their militant proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi or Yemen, or with the IRGC Navy. They could also give the green light for Hezbollah to attack in a Central Asian or North African country. At this point I don't think they would do this outside the region.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-34519857070695031032015-11-29T15:29:00.001-05:002015-12-01T01:00:27.849-05:00More 1953 Coup Cables (part 2)<div style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal;">
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">This is part 2 of 2 (though I expect to return to National Archives in the near future and find some more documents). <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-1.html">Part 1</a></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">All of these documents are NOT included in the FRUS, yet are declassified. This is very interesting considering the second coup happened on the 19th and there are zero cables from this day in the collection. There may be more classified documents from this day, but the contents of the boxes at National Archives are horribly mixed up so it is very difficult to get an accurate account of what is there.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">This may all change when the long-delayed revision is finally released. This was initially scheduled for Summer 2014, but was delayed due to the Iranian nuclear talks. This has been delayed once again and is now not expected until sometime in 2016.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "helvetica"; font-size: x-small;">Again format is Cable #, Month, Day, Time sent (Tehran time unless it is noted as rcvd which means DC time)</span><br />
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<b>388 Aug 19 644 am</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Street unrest Tehran continued through 18 August.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">In morning Pan-Iranist HQ near Majlis wrecked by Tudehists. Small groups Pan-Islamists roamed city throughout day, taking revenge on all Tudehists encountered. Approximately 7:30 p.m. larger groups Pan-Iranists and Tudehists, some armed with clubs, clashed bringing total injured during day to estimated 15. Clash halted by police and army using night sticks and rifle butts. Numerous arrests made.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Pro-Shah army officers and men also active on small scale, attacking individuals who posted anti-Shah slogans.</span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "helvetica";"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Unrest CONTINUED as in there had been unrest on previous days. I believe the 'Pan-Islamists' is a typo of mine or possibly an autocorrect. This unrest seems to be not have been limited to one ideological conflict. Additionally the last sentence provides support to the theory that there were multiple distinct groups of coup plotters (as I have postulated in the past). After the first coup failed, scores of officers were arrested as is acknowledged by the various accounts, how could they possibly have captured so many and interrogated them yet still enough remained to conduct a second coup? This is a huge hole in the narrative from the groups who blame the US exclusively. </span></span></i><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: x-small;">390 Aug 19 609 am</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Pro-Shah demonstrators in vicinity Majlis being reinforced by bazaar elements of type identified with Kashani and lesser religious leaders. Major pro-Shah crowd just reported heading toward bazaar.</span></div>
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<i><span style="font-size: x-small;">More evidence of Kashani and Islamist involvement in the coup. It is unclear how 'major' the pro-Shah crowd is, and what this means exactly. Are they army officers? The 'party' type? The paid thugs?</span></i><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: x-small;">392 Aug 19 1 pm</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Embassy believes key to eventual Mosadeq control of pro-Shah elements armed only with sticks and stones at time public made restless by uncertainty situation remains in hands general staff which headed by loyal Mosadeq lieutenant.</span></div>
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<i><span style="font-size: x-small;">General staff headed by a man loyal to Mossadeq. If this man is loyal, why did he not uncover the other disloyal officers? It was known that there was an attempted coup, and various press had insisted there would be a coup in the days weeks and months leading up to the events. Incompetence or what?</span></i><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: x-small;">400 Aug 19 4 pm</span></b></div>
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<i><span style="font-size: x-small;">Unclear who was sending the telegrams, and to whom. Did they mean for everyone to come to Tehran? Or to protest in the streets? And to what extent? Roosevelt had claimed to convinced a colonel in Kermanshah to come to Tehran with his troops, though given the distance (400 miles) and the relatively slow speed of transit, the logistics seem near impossible. Additionally it was claimed by Roosevelt that Hamedan was a Tudeh stronghold and was located halfway between Kermanshah and Tehran so how would the colonel and his troops traverse this?</span></i><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: x-small;">404 Aug 19 5 pm</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">According various reports including Embassy and American officials, holiday atmosphere prevails in city. All vehicles have lights on as symbol Shah victory. Pedestrians applaud truckloads pro-Shah soldiers and civilians passing by.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;"><i style="font-family: helvetica; font-size: 12px;">'Holiday atmosphere' isn't exactly what one would expect for an unpopular coup. It is unclear where the '</i><span style="font-family: "helvetica";"><i><span style="font-size: 12px;">truckloads' of soldiers came from, were they from a local garrison or from other cities?</span></i></span></span><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: x-small;">408 Aug 19 (rcvd 1132 am)</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">No attacks on foreigners any nationality reported Embassy so far, with exception burning shop identified as Russian seen by Embassy Officer. Pro-Shah demonstrators ignore or friendly toward obviously foreign passersby</span></div>
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<i><span style="font-size: x-small;">One of the major complaints of Ambassador Henderson when he met with Mossadeq on the 18th, was that Americans had been attacked by Iranians. The apathy towards foreigners is interesting.</span></i><br />
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<b><span style="font-size: x-small;">409 Aug 19 7 pm</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Pro-Shah demonstrations spread throughout Tehran during day with truckloads Shah partisans touring streets to applause bystanders. Apparent overwhelming Royalist majority seems have silenced Leftists groups in evidence early in day. Non-Tudeh pro-Government papers wrecked or burned by mob. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Attitude security forces initially ambiguous with increasing numbers individual soldiers, officers, policemen taking part pro-Shah demonstrations. Numerous truckloads soldiers at least 6 tanks touring streets sheering Shah in afternoon.</span></div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "helvetica";"><span style="font-size: x-small;">The Leftists groups were out earlier in the day but the Royalists silenced them. Earlier cables refer to Royalists without much mention of Leftists. The 'ambiguous' attitude of security forces is also of note as is the presence of tanks. Tanks move quite slowly, where did they come from? </span></span></i></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-32143673974663238112015-11-26T15:28:00.000-05:002015-12-01T02:58:50.435-05:00More 1953 Coup Cables (part 1)<div style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; min-height: 14px;">
Recently I went to the National Archives to go through some of the State Department documents relating to the 1953 Iran coup. There are still quite a few classified documents (Which is illegal as they should have been declassified in 2003, but were last reviewed in the 1990s), but there were also many interesting documents not contained in the FRUS account of the coup. Additionally personal correspondences, letters, and photographs were included. I have collected some here and have annotated them (italics). This is part 1 of 2 (<a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2015/11/more-1953-coup-cables-part-2.html">part 2</a>).<br />
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With a few exceptions, format is Cable #, Month, Day, Time sent (Tehran time unless it is noted as rcvd which means DC time)</div>
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Dulles (week before July 17 1953)</div>
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“Any Iranian government, other than a Communist one, would be better for us than the present government. We have found it impossible to deal with Mossadegh” </div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "helvetica";"><span style="font-size: 12px;">In the March 1953 National Security Council meeting (NSC 135) Dulles <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/04/us-officials-on-mossadeq-and-british-in.html">expressed a fear that removing Mossadeq would make a communist takeover probable</a>. It is unclear what changed in these 4 months. </span></span></i></div>
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<b>109 July 16 3 pm</b></div>
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Newspaper editors tell Embassy that under title “State Department Preparing Coup d’etat in Iran” Soviet Embassy July 15 issued as special news release pinned to its daily bulletin a Tass Agency dispatch quoting purported NEW YORK POST story effect Mosadeq Government to fall this year in army coup and this army equipped trained by US advisers.</div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><i style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px;">I have been unable to locate this article. The NY Post's online archives do not go back this far. The author of this article is a very interesting individual who spied for th</i><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px;">e Soviets in 1933, but turned very conservative and was a syndicated columnist for decades. An earlier article of his claimed </i><span style="font-family: "helvetica";"><span style="font-size: 12px;"><i>that Mossadeq was controlled by Kashani and Kashani was planning to use Mossadeq to kick out the Shah.</i></span></span></span></span></div>
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<b>Air Pouch Aug 15 Desp No 107</b></div>
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Evidence continued during the past week to pile up in support of the theory that slowly the Mosadeq Government was making headway in controlling information media. Radio is already Government-owned now newspapers are being told to get into step.</div>
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The police, acting under Article Five of the Martial Law Act— instigation of public disturbance— in a raid a week ago confiscated the equipment of ATESH, a strongly anti-Mosadeq daily. More recently agents of the Prime Minister have made threats toward unfriendly editors and given orders to the friendly.</div>
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<i>The narrative is that Mossadeq was a liberal populist, yet he did have some autocratic tendencies, especially in times of great pressure. This shows how he was willing to act in a repressive manner when he felt threatened.</i></div>
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<b>325 Aug 15 (rcvd 828 am)</b></div>
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With two distractions Baluchistan unreported official figures referendum vote give 2043389 for dissolution; against 1207.</div>
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<i>Mossadeq had called an illegal referendum to dissolve the parliament just weeks before the coup. He had previously tampered with the Majles when in 1952 he stopped voting after enough MPs were selected to form a quorum. The referendum on dissolution passed in a landslide. It is unclear if there was tampering with the results as they were so one sided, but it is feasible.</i></div>
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<b>339 Aug 16 (rcvd 641 am)</b></div>
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Radio Tehran made following announcement Noon today: “According to will of Iranian people, expressed by the referendum, dissolution of 17th Majlis declared. Elections for 18th Majlis will be announced after amendments to electoral law effected and after reallocation electoral districts. Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq”<b> </b></div>
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<i>It is unclear what changes were to be made, or if Mossadeq was planning on tampering with the election as he had done 2 years prior.</i></div>
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<b>348 Aug 16 8 pm</b></div>
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Flight by Shah and uncertainty Zahedi actions presumably leave Mosadeq victor in protracted and Persian-mannered campaign eliminate Shah as political force in country. Embassy considered quite possible Mosadeq may establish regency to provide needed interim before eventual proclamation Iranian republic. </div>
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<i>I think this is probably the most interesting short cable that is not in the FRUS collection. The regency followed by a republic sounds fantastic in hindsight, though this is probably an optimistic view. </i></div>
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<b>355 Aug 17 8 am</b></div>
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Government clearly in control situation this morning. Suggest you proceed immediately. Would appreciate quickest possible advice ETA as Prime Minister on several occasions has specifically requested earliest possible notification time your arrival.</div>
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<i>Ambassador Henderson had been out of country.</i></div>
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<b>367 Aug 17 (rcvd 1143 am)</b></div>
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14 army officers arrested in plot</div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "helvetica";"><span style="font-size: 12px;">One part of the narrative that has never made sense is the claim that the second coup was conducted by army officers. It is known that many officers of all different ranks from lowest lieutenant to generals were arrested. If there was only one plot, how is it that these officers did not break under interrogation and reveal the identities of the other officers? In my estimation it seems most likely that there were two (possibly completely separate from each other) factions that wished to overthrow Mossadeq and the second took advantage of the civil unrest to create a second coup. </span></span></i></div>
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<b>387 Aug 17 11 am</b></div>
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Reported religious societies planning petition Mosadeq for Shah’s return.</div>
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<i><span style="font-family: "helvetica";"><span style="font-size: 12px;">More evidence of Kashani and his followers being involved in the two coup attempts. It is important to remember that the State Department was NOT intimately involved with the coup and they would be unaware of potential collaboration between Kashani, the Shah and the CIA/MI6 etc. Also important to remember that Kashani was an inspiration if not much more than this for Khomeini and those who followed. Iranian clergy was almost exclusively quietist with Kashani as an exception. Khomeini followed in Kashani's footsteps. </span></span></i></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-85570075019381978012015-11-09T17:22:00.000-05:002015-11-10T11:49:08.474-05:00US Admiral: Iranian behavior hasn't changed in the GulfYesterday the <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/c5fdf5b87f84443b9f3d6d7f891c8fdb/ap-interview-us-admiral-sees-no-change-iranian-behavior">AP published an interview with Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan</a>, the commander of the US Navy's 5th Fleet (based in Bahrain), in which the admiral stated that Iran's behavior around the Persian Gulf has remained unchanged since the nuclear deal was agreed earlier this year.<br />
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While it would seem natural to point to this as proof that Iran cannot and will not change its destructive behavior, this in fact is a limited reading of the situation, one that does not take into account the relatively short time between the deal and now, and additionally the identity of the various interests commanding the military endeavors of the Iranian Navy and IRGC-Navy.<br />
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Iran has been a rogue state for years; any change from this will undoubtedly take time and should not be expected to happen over night. For now, the conservative and reactionary institutions of the Iranian regime remain intact, and while they remain in power, they are expected to continue their disruptive practices. These parts of the Iranian ruling class are threatened by a potential opening to the West. It makes sense for them to want to strike out and try to regain the upper hand. I would not be surprised if there are more incidents (like <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/28/obama-iran-white-house-ship-marshall-island-nuclear/26507995/">this</a> and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/14/gulf-iran-ship-idUSL1N0Y51AG20150514">this</a>) involving the IRGCN and the maritime industry in the Persian Gulf in the coming months.<br />
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Lastly, while this seems quite obvious, it is important to remember that a state is more than its government, and the government itself may be much more diverse than ruling party or coalition. The Iranian people are not of one mind, and must not be stereotyped in this fashion. The IRGC does not speak for every Iranian, and the behavior of certain elements doesn't necessarily reflect the attitude of the people.<br />
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I expect change to happen following the next set of elections (early 2016). There is a high probability that many reformist and pragmatist candidates will be banned from running. If this happens I expect there to be a great deal of unhappiness from the Western-inclined portions of society, especially given the perceived success of the Rouhani government in opening towards the West. How this unhappiness is expressed remains to be seen.<br />
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A potential pitfall here is that this isn't an election for one position like there was in the 2009 presidential election. It could be much more difficult to organize any sort of civil disobedience without a single shared issue, and a general protest against the handling of elections may not be as appealing for the greater Iranian public. On the other hand it is much easier to fix an election for one race than to fix hundreds of races, so if enough reformist and pragmatist candidates are allowed to run, I would expect there to be a significant chance for Iran's government to change dramatically.<br />
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The Iran Deal should not be counted as a failure because of unchanged behavior by the Iranian armed forces. It must be given time, at least until the next elections. If the hardliners win these elections handily AND there is no public backlash then the argument could be made that the deal has failed to provide enough space for reformists to change Iran from within. Until then, we must wait.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-421644843288349090.post-73183169419142295092015-10-15T14:19:00.001-04:002016-08-14T15:48:53.756-04:00GCC to buy Iron Dome?Two days ago<a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/10/14/gulf-states-in-talks-to-buy-israeli-anti-missile-system-for-defense-against/"> Sky News reported that the GCC has plans to buy the Israeli defense system the Iron Dome</a> in addition to other missile defense systems including David's Sling and Arrow to protect against Iran. These reports are interesting, yet misleading; Iron Dome protects against a very narrow band of threats, and Iran (not including proxies) does not provide this type of threat towards any Gulf state except perhaps Kuwait.<br />
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The story emphasizes the Iron Dome (in the headline as well as the text), while downplaying the other systems potentially for sale. This is probably due to a multitude of reasons including the name recognition; Iron Dome is widely credited with successfully intercepting hundreds of rockets from Gaza and maintaining a high success rate while doing so. There are those who doubt the efficacy, but as I've pointed out <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/03/why-criticism-of-iron-dome-may-be.html">here</a> and <a href="http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2014/08/a-successful-operation-for-iron-dome.html">here</a> (and have another piece in the works), these accusations are baseless and fraudulent. The other systems are known to be less successful, but given the higher degree of difficulty in intercepting a much faster moving threat this is logical.<br />
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<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/16/us-palestinians-israel-arms-irondome-idUSBRE8AF1AM20121116">The Iron Dome's maximum range was initially stated to be around 70 kilometers</a> (just about the distance from Gaza to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), though this is believed to be a slight underestimate and it may be as high as 100 km. Iran (with a few exceptions) is more than 70 km away from the GCC states, therefore Iron Dome would not be tasked with intercepting any potential Iranian rockets and missiles. The only locations that are within 70 km are the very tip of the UAE, and parts of Kuwait.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhJKNP9fS83XphHbzt8UBkhOLfNK2QkoDoNe80W73qa6DYzwXHG-wPSalFTnnJkNr4xo-PmbLn_vmLoXtvShe_Tjsvixu5XbKk0LJY4TJfzCbnOosoBgyD8bf32nPrZtaHPqcgWrfImGaU/s1600/Screen+Shot+2015-10-15+at+1.39.13+PM.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="255" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhJKNP9fS83XphHbzt8UBkhOLfNK2QkoDoNe80W73qa6DYzwXHG-wPSalFTnnJkNr4xo-PmbLn_vmLoXtvShe_Tjsvixu5XbKk0LJY4TJfzCbnOosoBgyD8bf32nPrZtaHPqcgWrfImGaU/s320/Screen+Shot+2015-10-15+at+1.39.13+PM.png" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Light blue=70 km buffer<br />
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It is clear that the Iron Dome with a few exceptions has absolutely not business defending against Iranian weapons; even if Iran attacked from the coast of Iran, almost all GCC territory is far beyond 70 or even 100 km. The only way for 'Iran' to attack from inside a defensible range would be for them to attack from the sea, or for them to have somehow infiltrated borders elsewhere. </div>
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<a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/un-iran-arming-houthi-rebels-in-yemen-since-2009/">Weapons have been provided to the Houthis</a>, and these weapons have been used to attack Saudi Arabia, but as the map below shows, the range factor makes the possible locations which 'Iran' could attack from quite limited. Additionally, <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2015/06/07/saudi-says-intercepted-scud-missile-fired-yemen/28646373/">Saudi already has the Patriot missile defense system which it has used against Houthi SCUDs</a>. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/14/usa-saudi-lockheed-idUSL1N12E20K20151014">A deal to upgrade the system from PAC-2 to PAC-3 was just finalized</a>. Iron Dome interceptors are cheaper than Patriot missiles by approximately a factor of 10, but when considering the number of batteries needed to defend the entire border area this is infeasible.</div>
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhYiMYAjTmAryE_K1_qOtU_FaP7MaTfRspdfgdyqZL12dfEUzTzdCozoLVsHlAgTqchKCKyC9auutXkFoRPYcgjock2ZvQ_DJ7ETg0M5urAnbMEDpbZALPbCDVJ1MGQvyuy5A9hsDpf_4/s1600/Screen+Shot+2015-10-15+at+1.50.06+PM.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="201" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhYiMYAjTmAryE_K1_qOtU_FaP7MaTfRspdfgdyqZL12dfEUzTzdCozoLVsHlAgTqchKCKyC9auutXkFoRPYcgjock2ZvQ_DJ7ETg0M5urAnbMEDpbZALPbCDVJ1MGQvyuy5A9hsDpf_4/s320/Screen+Shot+2015-10-15+at+1.50.06+PM.png" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Light blue=70 km buffer<br />
Purple=100 km buffer</td></tr>
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The other way that Iran could attack a GCC country with extremely short-range rockets or missiles would be for them to launch these from the Persian Gulf. This is unrealistic because <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-doctrine-of-asymmetric-naval-warfare">Iran's navy is set up to be asymmetrical</a> and the 'asymmetrical' method of attacking with rockets would be to set up a rocket on a small speedboat; something which isn't going to happen for a number of reasons. Lastly even if 'Iran' was able to infiltrate a country and attack from within, the Iron Dome has had trouble with smaller mortars and wouldn't be able to defend against them. Larger rockets would be incredibly difficult to smuggle in to a country, though Iran could potentially arm terror groups this way. This wouldn't technically be an 'Iranian' attack. It is unclear if by 'Iran', Sky's source was also including proxies. </div>
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Israel spent a lot of money on the development and production of this system, and they would love to recoup some of the expenditures. Potential sales to Asian countries (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/06/arms-israel-irondome-idUSL6N0RX05E20141006">India, South Korea</a> and <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/was-iron-dome-defense-system-actually-built-for-singapore-1.266629">Singapore</a>) have fallen through or been false rumors. There remain a handful of countries that could use the system, though they are few and far between. These include Poland, Ukraine, Taiwan, Afghanistan, Iraq and the 3 countries previously mentioned. Iraq and Afghanistan would be under <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Defense/US-may-buy-Iron-Dome-to-defend-ME-bases">US supervision</a> and both parties are hesitant to place the sensitive system in a location so vulnerable.</div>
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The United States gives a lot of aid to various countries, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-01/egypt-s-1-5-billion-u-s-aid-questioned-amid-crackdown">often with the stipulation that this money MUST be spent with US defense manufacturers</a>. <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-firm-raytheon-wins-149m-iron-dome-contract/">Raytheon is now producing Iron Dome missiles</a> in this fashion. It is possible that the money spent on Iron Dome by GCC states would be from the US. A more likely scenario would be that the Iron Dome was included as some sort of package deal with the longer range and therefore more useful defense systems (David's Sling and Arrow).</div>
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I myself believe that this is not an accurate story and that this is disinformation spread for a political or economic agenda. It makes almost no sense for the GCC to buy the Iron Dome, even for the psychological purpose of making their citizens feel more safe. It is possible that this will be sold no matter, but I find it highly doubtful. </div>
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Bilal Saab from the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center agrees with me, the reports of GCC attempting to buy Iron Dome are 'total BS' </div>
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Gulf states buying Israeli Iron Dome? I call total BS in my interview with <a href="https://twitter.com/Annahar">@Annahar</a> <a href="http://t.co/Xzk6F4fQ6i">http://t.co/Xzk6F4fQ6i</a></div>
— Bilal Y. Saab (@BilalYSaab) <a href="https://twitter.com/BilalYSaab/status/655059120807129088">October 16, 2015</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17635343818697312279noreply@blogger.com0