'Excerpt' from a paper I wrote. Bear with me, it is quite lengthy:
Relations Between Mossadeq and the United
States
While
there are many questions about the events of and leading up to the August 19,
1953 coup of Mohammad Mossadeq, the relationship between the Prime Minister and
the United States provides some of the most interesting topics of discussion.
Why did the US attitude towards Mossadeq change? How strongly did the
Eisenhower administration feel that they wanted Mossadeq removed from power?
Were the CIA, State Department and the White House in agreement on these
issues? Was there a lack of communication between them? While many of the key
figures have been dead for a long time now, there remain many primary documents
which can be used to gain a better understanding of the Mossadeq coup.
First
and foremost among these are the documents in the Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS) series, published by the Office of the Historian in the
United States Department of State. These archival works document the inner
workings of the White House and the Department of State (including the National
Security Council), and include Top Secret documents. These are typically more
accurate and reliable than contemporary public accounts because they are not
intended for a global audience. US Government records remain classified for a
minimum of 25 years, with exceptions being made to reclassify for an additional
25 years.[i] After
50 years since the even there are only a handful of situations where the
documents will stay classified and they include information regarding designs
for weapons of mass destruction, identities human intelligence sources or ‘special
permission’.[ii]
After 75 years, special permission is required to keep documents classified.[iii]
With the assurance of secrecy for the minimum of 25 years, it is unlikely that
the people who are being recorded would censor themselves due to concern over
contemporary public perception. The documents are, more reliable than public
statements, even by individuals intimately involved in the situation. They may
not always be factually accurate, but there is little incentive to purposefully
provide a false record for future administrations.
While
the FRUS papers do not answer all of the questions on what exactly led the
Eisenhower administration to attempt a coup of Mossadeq, they include many
important documents which are indicative the thoughts and attitudes of the
parties involved. The FRUS papers include; telegrams to and from the American
Ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson; telegrams to and from the American Embassy
in the UK; and (NSC) National Security Council memos. A significant problem
with the FRUS papers is that they are incomplete; not every telegram to and
from the US Embassy in Iran is in the public domain. Officially all of the
documents are available at the National Archives, but an index of these
documents is only available on site. It is more than possible that many
documents of significance are still classified by the State Department, but
unfortunately I was unable to visit the archives myself.
The
FRUS papers on Iran for the years 1952-1954 (Volume X) released by the State
Department includes an important undated memo from the staff of the NSC on the
position of the United States towards Iran towards the end of the Truman
administration (1951)[iv]. In
this brief memo, titled “The Position of the United States With Respect to
Iran”, the basic principles of containing and preventing Soviet influence from
spreading are enumerated. The authors envision the Soviets as a potential
threat to both geopolitical and economic interests of the United States. They
believe that most dangerous scenarios include an interruption in the vital
supply of petroleum products, the potential for the Soviets to build military
bases even closer to the American allies' "lines of defense" and
perhaps most importantly, serious harm to the global image of the United States
if their sphere of influence were undermined in this manner. While the authors
of these memos are clearly not the same officials as those which Mossadeq had
relations with, it is important to note what is prioritized in the writings.
There are mentions of freedom and liberty being important to American
geopolitics, but the emphasis clearly is on countering and combating the Soviet
Union in every way possible. The idea of Iranians willingly adopting communism
or acquiescing to Soviet "domination" appears to be unfathomable for
the authors. This gives the impression that they did not see American interference
as undemocratic, even if a despotic regime were to be supported. Perhaps the
most telling bit of information in this memo is section 26, where the following
is stated: "In the event Iran assumes an attitude of neutrality in the
"cold war", political steps by the United States and United Kingdom
to restore Iranian alignment with the free world would be required."
Mossadeq was probably not privy to this sentiment, as he would likely have
acted differently towards the United States government with this knowledge in
hand.
Another national
security document, NSC 136/1 illustrates the commitment of US to prevent Iran
from falling under Communist control.[v] It
makes absolutely no mention of overthrowing Mossadeq, but hints at the
possibility of instability in Iran, and the need for a backup-plan if the situation
were to become untenable. This memorandum was written at the very end of
President Truman’s term. The Truman's
administration attitude towards the AIOC/Iran oil dispute can be best
characterized by the following:
"While in general [the] United States does
not favor nationalization, [the] US recognizes [the] right of sovereign states
to nationalize provided prompt payment [of] just compensation [is] made.
However, this policy [is] not publicized abroad as it might encourage [foreign]
states to nationalize. [State Department is] not at present opposing AIOC
nationalization because of (1), and because such opposition [would] in present
circumstances jeopardize politically US and West in Iran and might result in
loss of Iran to [Soviets]."[vi]
When Democrat Harry Truman was succeeded by
Republican Dwight Eisenhower, the American policy towards Iran was bound to
change. With a new Secretary of State coming to power, and a more conservative
government in place, it was only a matter of time before this happened. Despite
the fact that Eisenhower's presidency initially supported the Iranians by
continuing aid and also attempted to mediate between the colonial-minded
British and Prime Minister Mossadeq, within a few months it became clear that
negotiations were not going well. The President and his Cabinet, in addition to
US Ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson quickly grew disillusioned with Mossadeq
and his efforts to work towards a resolution in the oil dispute. Ambassador
Henderson wrote to the Secretary of State about how he had prepared proposals
for Mossadeq which he felt are fair, but Mossadeq continuously changed his mind
about what he wanted, and spent a significant effort trying to change the
language of the potential agreement. At one point in January 1953, Henderson
wrote back to Washington exasperated at Mossadeq for changing his mind and the
terms of the agreement.[vii]
Ambassador Henderson wrote that; '[Mossadeq] has been talking for many months
[regarding] international arbitration; now he says he prefers
"adjudication" to "arbitration"'. What makes this more
difficult for Henderson and the United States is that these are often
translations from English to Persian and different words carry different
connotations. The words may or may not be perfectly synonymous, and there was likely
a fear from Mossadeq of his government and the Iranian people being taken
advantage of in the future if the language was not precise. However, the
Iranian economy was struggling at this point, and with petroleum being the
major export product, any sort of agreement would have alleviated some of the
financial troubles of Iran.[viii]
President Eisenhower was aware of the problems facing the Iranian economy, when
he stated in a March 1953 National Security Council meeting: "If I had
$500,000,000 of money to spend in secret, I would get $100,00,000 of it to Iran
right now."[ix]
Compounding
economic woes and the change in the American administration from liberal to
conservative, the British government as well had just transitioned from liberal
to conservative leadership in their own elections. Despite the change in
government of both states, the record shows that the Americans at least did not
immediately move towards overthrowing Mossadeq. In fact, they seem to want to
keep him in power due to fears of Iran becoming unstable if Mossadeq were to
fall from power. This, in their mind, would without a doubt lead to a Communist
takeover of Iran, followed by a domino effect where the entire region would
eventually fall to the Soviets.
Henderson's
telegrams back to Washington, indicate that he was either unfamiliar with the
role of the CIA, or that the agency had less of a hand in the events of 19
August, 1953 than Kermit Roosevelt, and innumerable academics have claimed. In
fact Henderson himself stated in an interview 20 years later than he had no
knowledge of the second coup attempt.[x] The
CIA's Wilber Report, corroborates the idea that Henderson was not intimately
involved in the alleged plot for the second coup attempt, while indicating that
Henderson had at least some basic knowledge of the plans.[xi]
While Henderson was not directly involved in the "war room" of
Roosevelt with the Zahedis, the Rashidian brothers and CIA officer George A.
Carroll, he was present at the location where it took place.[xii]
That night Henderson went to meet Mossadeq to discuss several concerns,
including the problem of American citizens in Iran being harassed by the Tudeh.[xiii] Countercoup
contends that Roosevelt coached Henderson on how to act towards Mossadeq.
However, the State Department cable of this meeting bears no mention of the
alleged threats, and Mossadeq is portrayed in the cable as being friendly
towards Henderson, while also implying that he knew that the US had had some
role in the attempted coup of August 16th.[xiv]
As
the plans for the CIA coup were apparently drawn up in the middle of March
1953, the change in perspective of the United States must have occurred in the
course of the few days between the March 5th National Security Council meeting
where Eisenhower expressed support for Mossadeq and the plans.[xv]
Unfortunately the FRUS documents for this time period are sparse at best and bear no
mention of the change. In fact, up until August of 1953, telegrams from
Ambassador Henderson show evidence that there were attempts to revive the oil
dispute negotiations. The shift in United States policy is unfortunately
currently not evident from the FRUS documents. There may be additional cables
that have yet to been declassified, but this is unclear. What is certain is
that there are large gaps in what is contained within the FRUS Iran documents
and what actually exists or existed. Cables are numbered sequentially and there
are gaps of over 200 digits in the sequence at points in 1953. There are
hundreds or even thousands of cables to and from the US Embassy in Iran which
are not included in the FRUS report. These files may be available at the
National Archives, but for whatever reason they are not included in the FRUS
Iran collection.
The
next place to look for a change in US policy would be the CIA's documents. As
the executors of the coup of August 16th, they would have been tasked with the
planning aspect. Despite the secrecy involved with this organization, there are
some files which have either been made available or leaked. There is also
speculation that the CIA may have been acting independently from the Truman
administration and the State Department,[xvi] and
that this possibly could have continued in Eisenhower’s administration. The
head of the CIA under President Eisenhower, Allen Dulles, along with his
brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, were both senior partners in
the law firm which represented the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.[xvii] If
anything, the connections between the CIA and the AIOC raises the possibility
that there was some coordinated effort between the two organizations against
Mossadeq.
A
CIA internal history written in 1998 and partially released (though heavily
redacted), indicates that the breakdown of the oil negotiations was the reason
for the Americans change in attitude towards Iran.[xviii]
The problem with this assertion is that there is very little support within the
document (due to the redaction), and many of the documents which might
contradict or support this are also unavailable. According to this document, in
March 1953, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met with US State Department
officials to discuss the oil crisis and:
"found the Americans much more receptive
to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson. The
collapse of the Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations had changed the Americans'
attitude; Washington now considered Mossadeq a source of instability, and
feared that his continued tenure invited a Tudeh coup."[xix]
The problem with this passage, is that
Eden's meetings with the State Department was between the 4th and 7th of March[xx],
before Mossadeq had withdrawn from oil negotiations on the 9th of March[xxi].
Why was Eden operating under the assumption that the negotiations (that he was
not even involved in as they were between the US and Mossadeq) had already
collapsed when in fact they officially did not collapse until Mossadeq
withdrew?
The
account of the meeting from the State Department cables indicates at least
nominal support from the US for Mossadeq. Secretary of State Dulles is
paraphrased saying that:
“The probable consequences of the events of the
last few days would be a dictatorship in Iran under Mossadegh. As long as the
latter lives there was but little danger, but if he were to be assassinated or
otherwise to disappear from power, a political vacuum would occur in Iran and
the Communist might easily take over”[xxii]
Dulles is often blamed for pushing the US and
President Eisenhower towards overthrowing Mossadeq, but from this account of
the National Security Council (NSC), he does not seem interested in a coup, but
rather in keeping Mossadeq in power. It is possible that Dulles was
purposefully misleading the NSC, but it does seems strange that Dulles would
appear to be so strongly committed to a certain belief, and then change his
mind so quickly, and also inexplicably. In either case, the documentation again
is contradictory.
Another
cable from Secretary Dulles to the US Embassy in the UK following his meetings
with Minister Eden on the 4th-7th, warns that the recent events
of civil unrest may lead to more influence for the Tudeh Party in Iran,
Mossadeq was expected to remain in power, and that the US should attempt
"to keep Mosadeq barely afloat and thus attempt [to] avoid [the]
disastrous possibility of Communists replacing him".[xxiii]
The failure of the oil negotiations may in fact have had the exact impact on
the Americans' attitude as the CIA file claims, but the evidence given as
proof, does not fit chronologically.
According
to the CIA internal history, and Eisenhower’s biographer, the President had to
have given the approval for TP/AJAX, although he preferred to keep his distance
as to insulate himself from any allegations of him supporting a coup attempt on
a foreign leader.[xxiv]
These documents also state that he did NOT discuss this with his NSC or with
his Cabinet, so there would not have been a record of when exactly he gave the
order, and why he decided to do so. This, coupled with the fact that many CIA
documents were allegedly destroyed from this time period could explain why
there is no evidence of the switch in US policy vis-a-vis Iran.
Another
important document from the CIA, the Wilber Report, was written in 1954 by
Donald Wilber (and leaked in 2000 to the New York Times), a CIA officer
involved in the planning and execution of TP/AJAX. This file provides a
relatively frank inside look from the CIA's perspective. Because this was all
classified as secret or higher, it, like the State Department cables, was
intended for internal use only. It was not meant to be publicly disseminated.
The
Wilbert Report makes the assertion that in March of 1953 a General (name
redacted) had contacted the CIA and requested an assessment from Ambassador
Henderson "whether or not the US Government was interested in covertly
supporting an Iranian military effort to oust Premier Mossadeq".[xxv]
While it does not state whether the Ambassador received this request, this
implies cooperation between the State Department and the CIA, or at least the
CIA and Ambassador Henderson. Katouzian also implies that Henderson was working
with the CIA, and that the rest of “the American government was not yet fully
aware of these activities of its own departments”.[xxvi] State
Department files indicate a telegram from Ambassador Henderson to the
Department of State relating a similar type of request from Hossein Ala, the
previous Prime Minister.[xxvii]
According to this telegram, Ala asked Henderson if the United States still
supported Mossadeq as there was a group of military officers who were looking
to overthrow him.[xxviii]
Ala then said that if Henderson believed that "there was still [a] good
chance Mossadeq would be able to effect settlement [of the] oil problem, [they]
might decide [to] postpone taking action." Henderson wrote that he
"expressed surprised Ala would put such a question. I had already informed
him several times [that] the US [was] not supporting Mossadeq or anyone else as
Prime Minister.
Hossein
Ala was not a general, and though these events both occurred during the month
of March 1953, it is uncertain if both documents are referring to the same
instance or a different one. If Henderson had previously been contacted by the
CIA or the Iranian general, wouldn't it make sense that the Ambassador would
have mentioned this other request in the telegram? It may be possible that
Henderson was acting outside the scope of his position and beyond the reach of
the State Department and sending false or misleading information back to John
Foster Dulles, but this seems illogical. If Ambassador Henderson was in the
know regarding the coup the CIA and MI6 had been planning since the middle of
March this request for information from Ala would likely have been troubling to
him.
The
other important question on the Wilber Report is why this incident was not
included. Where there two separate groups in Iran planning for Mossadeq’s
overthrow? The military was more or less pro-Shah, and Ala had strong ties to
the Shah as well it would seem as though these two groups would be unlikely to
operate independently. Overall the Wilber Report and the FRUS documents do not
go well together, and again the role of various participants is questioned.
Henderson seems to be portrayed as both an active part of the coup plan, and an
innocent bystander. These contradictory descriptions make it even more
difficult to determine when the US position towards Iran actually changed. Was
Henderson feigning innocence so the State Department was unaware of the
imminent coup plans?
[i] The White House
"Executive Order 13526." Office of the Press Secretary. December 29,
2009. Web. May 29, 2013. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information>
[ii] Ibid
[iii] Ibid
[iv] Study Prepared by
the Staff of the National Security Council, "The Position of the United
States With Respect to Iran", (undated), FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. X:Iran,
p. 11-21 (the documents before and after this one are from the middle of March
1951)
[v] Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council,
"NSC 136: United States Policy Regarding the Present Situation in
Iran", (Washington, November 20, 1952), FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. X, p.
529-534
[vi] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran, (Washington, March 17,
1951), FRUS, 1953-1954, Vol. X, p. 25
[vii] Telegram 2763,
from the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, January 17,
1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. X: Iran, p.634
[ix] Memorandum of
discussion at the 135th meeting of the National Security Council, March 4,
1953, FRUS, 1953-1954, Vol. X:Iran, p. 691-701
[x] Bayandor, Darioush.
Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited. Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010167
[xi] Wilber, Donald
(2000), Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,
November 1952-August 1953.
[xii] Ibid 57
[xiii] Telegram 384, from
the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, August 18, 1953,
FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. X: Iran, p.748-752
[xiv] Telegram 384, from
the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, August 18, 1953,
FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. X: Iran, p.748-752
[xv] Memorandum of
discussion at the 135th meeting of the National Security Council, March 4,
1953, FRUS, 1953-1954, Vol. X:Iran, p. 691-701
[xvi] Foran, John.
"Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Fragile
Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution. Boulder
[u.a.: Westview, 1993 293
[xvii] Ibid
[xviii] Koch, Scott A., "Zendebad, Shah!": The Central
Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq,
August 1953," Top Secret Draft History, History Staff, Central
Intelligence Agency, June 1998.
[xix] Ibid 16
[xx] Memorandum of
discussion at the 135th meeting of the National Security Council, March 4,
1953, FRUS, 1953-1954, Vol. X:Iran, p. 694
[xxi] Telegram 3605, from
the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, March 9, 1953, FRUS,
1952-1954, Vol. X: Iran, p.703
[xxii] Memorandum of
discussion at the 135th meeting of the National Security Council, March 4,
1953, FRUS, 1953-1954, Vol. X:Iran, p. 693
[xxiii] Telegram 5959, from
the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, March 7, 1953, FRUS,
1952-1954, Vol. X: Iran, p.702
[xxiv] Koch 20
[xxvi] Katouzian, Homa.
"Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Musaddiq's
Memoirs. By Mohammad Mosaddeq. Trans. Homa Katouzian. London: 1988. 55
[xxvii] Telegram 3853, from
the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, March 31, 1953, FRUS,
1952-1954, Vol. X: Iran, p. 719-721
