Questions about the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Archive

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a dramatic announcement about a daring Israeli intelligence operation to steal over 100,000 documents from a secret Iranian nuclear weapons archive. The documents confirm what we have known for years, and what the IAEA has known since 2011 - that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu did not provide a straight answer on whether Iran continues to have an active nuclear weapons program—something that would clearly violate the JCPOA—or if Iran paused the program at some time. The IAEA has said that Iran's program is not active.

The reaction to Netanyahu's press conference was predictable. Once again, I find myself disappointed as the good questions, the PMD agreement questions, remain an afterthought.

The IAEA, in their report about Iran's PMDs, stated that "all the activities contained in the "Road-map" were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule". The organization effectively gave a thumbs up to Iran, saying that things are ok from the past, and that we can move forward. The new documents raise questions about what the IAEA okayed, what they knew about Iran's nuclear weapons research, and what the separate agreements referenced in the Road-map include. Did the IAEA agree to let Iran store its previous work? Was the IAEA aware that work had been saved? Did the IAEA order Iran to destroy their research? The PMD report, released in 2015, is very detailed, but without the original documents (from both the IAEA and Iran), it is nearly impossible to compare the report to what Netanyahu revealed yesterday.

While the focus of the JCPOA critics rancor about PMDs has mostly revolved around the Parchin agreement, all of these issues are important, and any obfuscation by Iran and/or the IAEA would be of interest. As I noted in 2015, the IAEA is facing a crisis of confidence; if they cannot be trusted to do their job, what is their utility?

It does not help that many critics are either lazy or deceitful. Then Representative and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with Senator Tom Cotton, claimed that they had not heard about side deals when they met with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano days after the accord was signed. The "Road-map" containing the reference to these side deals is noted explicitly in the text of the JCPOA, and they were all announced and made public on days before this meeting.

There are real and serious questions to ask, but instead, superficial questions, gross insinuations, politicking, and deceptive bombast are all the critics seem able to come up with.

The Side Deal No One Is Talking About

Just when we thought the Iran Deal debate couldn't possibly become more partisan and hyperbolic, a bit of poor journalism from the Associated Press' Vienna bureau chief has added unnecessary fuel to the fire.

Despite this outrage over a misunderstood and possibly fraudulent document (though I think it is more likely a series of translation errors and poor reporting), critics are ignoring an important fact; there is another agreement dealing with the possible military dimensions (PMDs, or 'outstanding issues' as the IAEA prefers to call them). In the IAEA's 'Road Map for Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program' there are two agreements referenced between Iran and the IAEA.

The details of these deals are secret as is standard procedure when involving such sensitive matters. This is further complicated by the fact that Parchin is a military base. There is a separate agreement relating especially to Parchin because of this fact. If all of the sites that the IAEA wanted to investigate were civilian, there would likely be one agreement in the road map, not two.

JCPOA critics are so obsessed with Parchin because it is believed that illegal activities were undertaken at the site, but they seem so much less concerned with the other outstanding issues; issues that are also about PMDs of Iran's nuclear program. In fact, in the AP article, there is no mention of the other agreement also dealing with PMDs.

Parchin's potential nuclear connections are a problem, but aren't ALL PMDs important for Iran to explain to the IAEA? Shouldn't people be just as worried about the other agreement? It is important that all outstanding issues are resolved by Iran and the IAEA, in fact the JCPOA (and all of the sanctions relief) is contingent upon the road map being fully implemented. For all the talk about 'precedent' and establishing a baseline of inspections and behavior, why is it that the 'regular' roadmap agreement is getting so little attention? Isn't the approach of the IAEA dealing with PMDs at non-military sites also important?

It is baffling that the critics are only worried about one agreement in the road map, while the agreement, which involves around a dozen more outstanding issues, is ignored. The reporting is also shockingly bad, the existence of these agreements has been known since the JCPOA was signed over a month ago; this should have given them plenty of time to at least read this short document and note that the document regarding Parchin isn't the only thing that matters.


UPDATE 1:
I have asked a variety of sources (including ISIS Nuclear, and Ken Dilanian, one of the reporters with the byline) about why the AP failed to mention the other PMD document. All have ignored my question as of yet. They keep going on and on about folks insisting the document is a fake, while ignoring valid and important questions which undermines the reporting of the entire exclusive. I suppose I should not be surprised that folks are unwilling to consider another view and that they would ignore a point that proves they are most likely wrong.

UPDATE 2:
Still no answers from those I've asked before. What is most bizarre is that the original story (http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a9f4e40803924a8ab4c61cb65b2b2bb3/ap-exclusive-un-let-iran-inspect-alleged-nuke-work-site) seemed to have completely disappeared for a while. There is now a story on the 20th of August which refers back to the first story, but the first story is somehow gone from the original URL and a correction is on the page instead. The correction takes up a mere 132 words, and the rest of the story is gone. Additionally, many of the original flaws in the story remain. I find it most interesting that the author calls this secret agreement 'unusual' without any proof that this is in fact unusual. Has Mr. Jahn read a lot of secret agreements from the IAEA?

The AP did something sneaky by deleting the original story and replacing it with a 'correction' which states that the original story is below. This in fact is not true and there is no original story below. However, they also created a new URL with the correction AND the story which is not tagged to Jahn so it doesn't show up when searching the AP site for his articles. Either way the points about the correction are still valid and important.

—————

Following is a short breakdown of the AP exclusive and its fallout

On August 19th, the AP published an exclusive stating that Iran would be able to inspect itself at Parchin, a military site also allegedly involved in nuclear weapons testing. This new information was based upon the reporter copying a draft text agreement between the IAEA and Iran over testing at Parchin from an anonymous source.

Critics of the deal responded as predicted, while supporters were mostly quiet. Over the next few hours the AP inexplicably removed key parts of the article containing alleged specifics of the IAEA's testing procedures while adding quotes from politicians critiquing the specifics. Jeffrey Lewis caught the changes and shared a screenshot showing this.

https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/634096807413481477

Later, some of these details were added back to the article, and a copied version of the draft agreement was published by the AP. There are a number of reasons why the information contained in the text provided by the AP is problematic; not only are there are a lack of technical details (which is what matters anyway), the terminology used seems to be wrong. A breakdown of the problems is available here: http://www.vox.com/2015/8/21/9187457/iran-iaea-agreement-text

Pre-Iran Deal Text Thoughts

After days of anticipation, anonymous diplomats on both sides (Western and Iranian) have told reporters that there is a deal between the P5+1 and Iran potentially resolving the nuclear dispute.

While the text of the deal is not available yet, and they've yet to even announce the deal, what we've seen so far includes bits about IAEA access to military sites, and the arms and ballistic missile embargoes. It was also reported that all of the airplane related restrictions will be lifted, giving a much needed reprieve to Iran's dilapidated domestic air travel industry.

A big worry from the West is that the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program will remain unaddressed in the deal. To ensure that Iran doesn't cheat and create a nuclear weapon, the West wants the IAEA to have unfettered access to Iranian military sites, especially Parchin. Reuters seems to think that Iran will have the right to refuse access to the IAEA, though this refusal would mean that the P5+1 and Iran would convene and 'arbitration board' to discuss the reasons why the IAEA wants access and why Iran does not wish to give it.

Of course the West would want complete access to everything, but this is unrealistic. If Iran decides to cheat this could be a problem as the implementation, the timetable and the resolution process in a situation like this can be sensitive.

The arms and ballistic missile embargoes are a bit tricky because of how the White House's fact sheet claimed that these would continue. It was not stated that these would be phased out over time, so my primary concerns of an immediate lifting of the embargoes are alleviated for the time being. We also do not know exactly when the 5 and 8 year periods begin, and what the terms are.

A major concern for me, even though I've been fairly supportive of the entire process under Obama (including outreach, sanctions and negotiations) is the inclusion of non-nuclear issues into the agreement. Iran has many problems including human rights and terrorism, but there have been efforts to keep these, and other regional concerns such as Yemen, Syria and ISIS (not to mention the Israel/Palestine conflict) out of the nuclear negotiations.

The aircraft industry restrictions pre-date the nuclear dispute and therefore one would think that this is not a part of the negotiations. While I personally think this should obviously be removed because it appears to be a civilian matter (there may be military or other reasons for these restrictions that I am unaware of), I find it troubling that they have been included along with the arms and missile embargoes. Even if these sanctions were motivated by the nuclear dispute, it is disturbing that even though White House explicitly stated that these non-nuclear issues would remain as is, they have somehow been included. It does not give much confidence in the PR abilities of the administration.

More to come (probably in a different blog)

*'Snap-back' sanctions are not addressed because they are too complicated and impossible to gauge without the actual text

Iran Deal Framework Thoughts

While the framework of the Iran nuclear deal is by no means "perfectly reassuring" (Iran won't abandon all nuclear enrichment and R&D, and probably won't join the Convention on Nuclear Safety), there are many very good clauses included, that hawks and doves alike should be pleased about.

Key points from the JCPOA:

• Centrifuges reduced to 6104, with 5060 able to enrich uranium and all of them are IR-1, Iran's first generation and least capable centrifuge
• A major reduction (97%) in Iran's LEU (low-enriched uranium). While it remains unclear how exactly this will happen, it is believed that this will be due to a mixture of dilution and shipping extra stocks out of country (probably to Russia)
• All excess centrifuges will be put into IAEA monitored storage
• Fordow will be converted and heavily restricted from nuclear activities for 15 years
• Iran's later generations of centrifuges will not be used for 10 years
• IAEA will have 'regular' access to all of Iran's nuclear facilities (including Natanz and what will be a formerly nuclear site, Fordow)
• IAEA will have access to the supply chain and will also have access to and surveillance of uranium mines and mills for 25 years
• Iran will sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT
• Arak will be redesigned, and made incapable of producing weapons-grade plutonium and its core will be either destroyed or taken out of country
• Iran will receive sanctions relief IFF it abides by the terms (IAEA will address enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency)
• IAEA has to VERIFY Iran has taken the right steps before sanctions are removed 
• US Sanctions on Iran for human rights, terrorism, and ballistic missiles remain in place

A common refrain from hawks is that Iran has refused to address PMD (possible military dimensions), and has worked on developing its ballistic missile program. These concerns are valid. They've also worried about IAEA access to sensitive sites, and centrifuge R&D.

There are clauses in the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) which address all of these. If this is in fact accurate, the deal looks to be quite good.

There are a few drawbacks included, such as the continuation of enrichment at Natanz, though limiting the enrichment to a relatively low number of first generation centrifuges strictly limits Iran's enrichment capabilities. Jeffrey Lewis wrote here about the type of centrifuges used and how the number of total centrifuges operational is less important than how modern the centrifuges are.

Another possible downside to the JCPOA is the removal of sanctions. It remains unclear exactly under what circumstances the sanctions would be removed, how they would be removed, and if the conditions of removal are violated, how and how quickly the sanctions would be reimplemented. It seems as though only nuclear related sanctions are to be removed, which leaves quite a few sanctions left over.

One of the key components in the JCPOA is that the IAEA has to VERIFY and CONFIRM. Previously the IAEA has been unable to do this, so for this to be the case, Iran has to give MORE than it has in the past. This is a clear victory for the West. Also understated is the access to the supply chain granted under the JCPOA. If Iran were to secretly stash some nuclear materials and create a new nuclear site it would be much easier to take from an earlier stage in the process rather than from a facility that is already monitored by the IAEA.

Overall the deal looks very good for the West, though it is still not signed and completed so terms may change. If this framework is in fact accurate, Iran has conceded a lot (with the exception of Natanz which in my opinion looks like this is what the P5+1 'gave up' in exchange for other concessions). It is quite telling that the conservative editor of Iran's Kayhan newspaper Shariatmadari said Iranian nuclear negotiators: "We've given them a horse with saddle and received back its corpse."

Hardline Iranian editor Shariatmadari on the Lausanne understanding: "We've given them a horse with saddle and received back its corpse."
— Saeed Kamali Dehghan (@SaeedKD) April 2, 2015

If the most anti-American factions of the Iranian elite are upset with the deal thinking they gave up too much, then it is a good deal for the West.

Syrian Nuclear Aspirations?

Der Spiegel this week alleged that Syria is attempting to work towards a nuclear weapon, with varying types of assistance from Iran, Hezbollah and North Korea. If true, this would be a massive story, with significant geopolitical ramifications. Syria has denied the allegations.

Syria is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as is Iran, while North Korea is not. Under this treaty, states are prohibited from developing nuclear weapons and from helping others develop these technologies.

In 2006, the IAEA ruled that Iran is in "non-compliance" with the NPT, namely, Iran's safeguards agreement. If these new allegations are true, Iran would be in blatant violation of this treaty. Given the attempted rapprochement between Iran and the West, primarily regarding its nuclear program, a discovery of this nature would almost certainly cause irreparable damage to ongoing nuclear negotiations. Iran would also face new, harsh sanctions.

The report from Der Spiegel however, is poorly sourced, and experts have claimed that the information contained in the report is in fact, incorrect. The report cites "Western intelligence agencies" as the source for this information, and indicates that Der Spiegel has documents from these sources showing that Syria is working to build a nuclear weapon.

As is the case with any anonymous source, a proper vetting of the information is necessary, yet in this instance near impossible. It would be very difficult to have two separate sources able to confirm this information. Information regarding Iran's nuclear program is notoriously hard to come by. While there have been cases when new and valid information was revealed, there are also many instances of false and misleading information released by the same sources.

It is best to take this report with a grain of salt. It is unclear if the documents held by Der Spiegel are legitimate, or an attempt by the hawkish members of the Western coalition who wish to avoid any reconciliation between Iran and the West, to falsify documents to push their agenda.

Iran and the Convention on Nuclear Safety

CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

ARTICLE 1. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this Convention are:

1. to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation
2. to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such installations; 
3. to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such consequences should they occur.

After the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986, it became clear that there needed to be better international cooperation in establishing safety standards for nuclear facilities, especially power plants. A series of international treaties aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear accident were established following this catastrophe. One of the most significant of these is the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994, and like many other nuclear treaties is governed by the IAEA. There are 76 parties to the convention, including Belarus, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Unlike many other international treaties, the CNS is set up as an incentive-based program. This convention is aimed at sharing safety techniques and protocols among the international community so that the risk of a nuclear accident decreases, and in the event of an accident, the effects are mitigated by increased awareness and preparedness. This treaty has been signed or ratified by every country with a nuclear power plant (there are 34 countries with nuclear power plants), with one exception.

Iran, despite it's insistence that its nuclear program is civilian, and entirely without military capability, has not signed or ratified the CNS. Even though in early 2013 the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations indicated that his country has been working to join the treaty, this has still not happened. While Chernobyl is now a distant memory for many, the Fukushima nuclear accident is a recent reminder of the importance of proper nuclear safety standards, and international cooperation to prevent catastrophic damage to the environment and to civilization.

Iran is one of the more prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and does not always fully embrace the international community, especially the Western-dominated institutions. However, with others in a similar situation being a part of the CNS (Belarus and Syria are perhaps the best examples), Iran’s absence is even more curious. If Iran is trying to make a point and not conform to Western hegemony, why have these other countries acquiesced?

Iran may be concerned with spies taking information shared through a treaty such as the CNS, especially relating to the facilities at Arak, Fordow, and Natanz (some believe that the IAEA serves Western intelligence). However, the CNS is ONLY applicable to land-based civilian nuclear power plants, which does not include enrichment facilities, or other sensitive nuclear installations. Additionally, the CNS has clauses included in the text protecting information including: “personal data; information protected by intellectual property rights or by industrial or commercial confidentiality; and information relating to national security or to the physical protection of nuclear materials or nuclear installations”. 

The only reason that I can imagine why Iran would not want to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety has to do with Article 6, which is as follows: '…the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact.' From this, one can see the potential problem for Iran if the plant at Bushehr would have to be shut-down (temporarily or permanently). This would be both a significant blow to the prestige of the country and its scientists, and would also severely undermine the state’s PR campaign trying to assert it’s right to peaceful nuclear technologies. 

So why exactly has Iran not signed the CNS? What possible reasons do they have for not joining this treaty? Or on the other hand, what reasons does Iran have to join the treaty? Politics is about perception, why isn’t Iran taking advantage of a situation where they could get an easy win, deflecting criticism of their nuclear program? Are they saving this as an option for later?

The reasoning behind Iran’s refusal to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety remain unclear. The simple act of joining this treaty would allay fears that Iran’s stated desire for a civilian nuclear program is not genuine. It would also increase the possibilities for Iran to reintegrate itself into the international community. There are plenty of issues to argue over in the United Nations General Assembly, disaster prevention and relief should be a given. 

Iran and the 'Right to Enrichment'

Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 have apparently progressed well, but have left a few key points of contention. Apparently Iran wishes the West to acknowledge its 'right to enrich'. However, Iran's belief that every country has this right is not something the West appears willing to recognize. 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) bears NO explicit mention of enrichment. It does contain some parts such as Article IV which declare an 'inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this treaty.' What is clear from this is that nuclear energy is considered to be a universal right. However 'conformity' with other articles is also demanded (Article III is NOT listed in Article IV, although according to Mark Fitzpatrick of IISS, 'The 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document affirmed that this conditionality also applies to Article III, which sets out the obligation to accept safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'). 

The IAEA is designated as the controller of safeguards and the one ultimately responsible for regulating this treaty. Iran was found in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement (designated in Article III of the NPT) on 24 September 2005, and continues to be, although the most recent IAEA statement is optimistic and hints that the IAEA's worries may soon be addressed fully. 

So why does Iran insist on the West recognizing its 'right to enrichment'? If enrichment was something clearly designated in the text of the NPT, this demand would be unnecessary and redundant. It is also not necessary for countries with nuclear power plants to also have domestic enrichment (there are 19 countries that have nuclear power plants yet do not have domestic enrichment). It makes sense for Iran to be suspicious of the West and its motives; the prejudices and ill-will are long documented. So is a recognition of Iran's 'right to enrichment' necessary, and in what circumstances is this right valid or invalid?

In my opinion, Iran's demand is stubborn and unnecessary. They are asking for something additional, while the IAEA, (the ultimate nuclear authority) has continually ruled that Iran has still yet to prove beyond a doubt that its nuclear program is purely peaceful (the IAEA has also not found any solid evidence that the nuclear program has military dimensions, so Iran has not 'violated' the NPT). Even if Iran were to return to full compliance with the IAEA, which would confirm their 'inalienable right', what is the purpose of the West stating that Iran has a 'right to enrich'? This would create a precedent where the words of the West may carry just as much if not more weight than the IAEA. This undermines the authority of the IAEA and potentially limits its mandate. It would make sense for the United States and the West to state that any state found in compliance with their IAEA safeguards agreement has the right to enrichment, but at this point it is redundant and possibly detrimental. 

I would urge Iran to drop this unnecessary demand, and instead focus on returning to compliance with the IAEA so that they would have a legal case against the West if efforts are made to prevent Iran from accessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At this point Iran is not in a good position legally because of the past 8 years of non-compliance. If the worries of the IAEA are assuaged, then Iran's access to nuclear energy can continue unimpeded, following the statute of the NPT. If Iran really wishes there to be an explicitly recognized 'right to enrichment', Article VIII of the NPT allows any signatory to propose amendments. Why not just do this? This is acting completely within the legal limits of the treaty, not going around it or trying to exploit a loophole.

P.S. Some lawyers argue that the IAEA is given more power than it should have, or that its actions are excessive or inappropriate in some way. However, the fact remains, Iran has signed the NPT which designates the IAEA as the authority, so they are subject to these laws. Also the IAEA's demand to prove that Iran's nuclear program is not weapons-related is a bit of a problem because it is very difficult to prove something like this without surrendering sovereignty, but again Iran signed the NPT so they are subject to its rules.

IISS's (International Institute for Strategic Studies) Mark Fitzpatrick has a comprehensive detailing of the NPT and Iran's 'right to enrichment' here: http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2013-1e35/november-2013-1d99/iran-enrichment-6342

What to Expect from Netanyahu's UNGA Speech

What to expect from Netanyahu's speech tomorrow:

More of the same. His political situation at home is not very good, his diverse ruling coalition is fragmented on serious issues such as the economy, the ultra-orthodox, and everything involving Palestinians. As long as Iran is on everyone's mind, the real existential issues for Israel will not be debated, and he will continue with the status quo (which while not optimal for anyone, includes him as the Prime Minister's home). 

Repeated references to Iran's naughty behavior. This will likely focus on terrorism (IRGC and Hezbollah) and Syria, with a special emphasis on Burgas, and the attempted attacks in Thailand, India, Georgia and Cyprus. He is also likely to bring up Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA in providing full access to Parchin (where some, including the IAEA, believe some nuclear weaponization testing has occurred), and its 'deception' (the legality of Iran's actions is disputed by the various parties) in not disclosing the existence of Natanz and Arak until the MeK revealed it in 2003. Lastly he will mention the attempts to infiltrate and target the country through Ali Mansouri. The timing of the release of this information by the Israeli press was certainly not coincidental (corroborated by an unnamed Israeli police official). Israel's press is subject to strict censorship laws on national security issues (on other topics it is quite open) and revealing this episode just after the United States and Iran seem on the edge of a diplomatic 'breakthrough' (quotations because at this point even agreeing to talk is 'progress') and just before his own speech is likely intended to sour the goodwill. 

Fiery rhetoric. I am probably not the only one who looks forward to Netanyahu's speeches. He is eloquent, and comes up with very interesting phrases. While I usually disagree with him, I very much enjoy his clever turns of phrase such as the 'insatiable crocodile of militant Islam' from the 2011 UNGA speech.

No matter what Mr. Netanyahu ends up saying, it is certain to be a major news item because of the importance of Israel and Iran to the American news media. There seems to be some flexibility from Israel on Iran's nuclear program, but I am hesitant to state unequivocally that Netanyahu's speech will contain the same malleability. Netanyahu's Israel has long been the 'bad cop' in the relationship with the US/EU against Iran and I do not think that this is likely to change too much in the near future.

Earthquake danger at Bushehr

Despite the problems surrounding the Fukushima Nuclear Reactor after the 2011 earthquake, nuclear work continues at Iran's Bushehr reactor. The plant is based in one of the most earthquake-prone regions of the world, yet work continues. Bushehr is supposed meant to be able to withstand earthquakes up to 7 on the Richter scale (the recent earthquake was a 6.3), but as Iran has not signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Even India, Israel and Pakistan who are not NPT signatories, have signed the CNS), it is subject to less oversight and safety measures. Nuclear accidents are potentially a huge problem and a radiation leak can affect millions, why not allow safety inspectors to help? Bushehr has nothing to do with the alleged nuclear weapons program, and has no military dimensions, so why not?

This article does a very good job of explaining internal and external fears of a nuclear disaster at Bushehr.


UPDATE 1: fixed broken link for updated Bulletin of Atomic Scientists website article