Leading up to the Iranian Elections

Iranian domestic affairs are notoriously difficult to predict. This is especially true at such an important moment in the Islamic Republic when the stakes are as high as they have ever been. Rumors, unreliable polling and opaqueness in the approval and electoral process have made this election (like most previous ones), very interesting.

I have a few expectations and predictions to share, based upon what has happened so far. Here is how I have come to these conclusions:

As I have made quite clear, I supported the Iran nuclear negotiations/JPOA/JCPOA because of the potential to influence this coming set of elections, as well as the Iranian youth in general. Empowered reformists and pragmatists/moderates, leads to more pressure for Iran domestically. This (at least temporarily) reduces its ability to be disruptive regionally and internationally (especially in Syria and the Gulf). This election is vital for hardliners as they are on the defensive from the implications of a negotiated settlement with the West. Any sort of agreement with the West goes against their core ideology, and the violation of nearly all of Khamenei's 'red lines' is indisputable.

Western hardliners have argued that the backlash against moderates and reformists by Khamenei and Iranian hardliners is from a position of strength, but this couldn't be further from the truth. This election is a chance for hardliners to take back the momentum, and the actions of the Guardian Council in rejecting various candidates, the refusal of Khamenei to overrule them, and the assorted hostile acts by the IRGC-Navy in the Gulf are all part of a larger strategy to distance Iran from the West. 

I was surprised by the numbers of reformists excluded from elections. I knew there would be a massive number of rejections, but I did not anticipate that the number would be so high. This more than anything shows the insecurity of the establishment. Rejections of moderates in addition to the previously mentioned reformists reinforces this. 

The exclusion of Hassan Khomeini, a cleric and grandson of the Islamic Republic's first Supreme Leader, is particularly troubling for democracy and reform in Iran, but I would not count him, or the reform movement out yet. 

One reason for these massive disqualifications (which is coupled with an unprecedented number of applications for these electoral races) is the complexity of rigging municipal elections on a nation-wide scale. The 2009 stolen election was much easier to manipulate because it was an election for only one position with only 2 serious candidates (4 total). The Majles has nearly 300 seats and the Assembly of Experts has 88. Because so many candidates were excluded, some of these seats have no competition (for example the provinces of Ardabil, Azerbaijan West, Bushehr, Hormuzgan, Khorasan North and Semnan), and hardliners will automatically win the seat(s) in these locations. 

While hardliners have the natural advantage as they control the bodies concerned with oversight, I would not count out the Iranian people. I expect large numbers to turn out and vote, especially for reformists and moderates. Sanctions have just been removed, and there is optimism. The challenge here is that Rouhani's efforts to repair the extensive damage of the past administration have not been entirely successful, and Iran is still struggling with inflation and budgetary issues.

The actions from the Iranian government before the elections are important. Will they cave and allow more reformists and moderates to run? There were rumors of this happening, but as of yet, it has not been confirmed. The more pragmatists are allowed to run, the further the election can swing in their favor. 

Rouhani seems to have aspirations to be the next Supreme Leader, and he knows that he will never gain this position if the hardliners handily win this election.

If there are additional plans to fix the elections I would suspect the Assembly of Experts to be around 75-80% hardliners, perhaps even more, and at least 60% of the Parliament (Majles) to be this way. I think the establishment is aware that if they go much higher, there are serious risks for another mass protest like 2009. 

The unknown for me is how badly the election has to be stolen for the Iranian public to protest en masse. 

As long as the reformist/moderate/pragmatist groups vote and expect the result to reflect their voting preferences, I would be cautiously optimistic for either a result or resulting protests. In either case, the current attitude of the Iranian state is unsustainable, and unacceptable and I see this election as key for moving towards making necessary changes.



UPDATE #1 (02/05/16): It appears as though an undetermined number of Majles candidates will now be allowed to run as the Guardian Council has reversed their decision in approximately 20-25% of cases:

Iran Guardian Council Spox Nejatollah Ebrahimian: 20-25% of previously disqualified parliamentary election candidates now qualified to run.

— Hanif Zarrabi-K. (@hanifzk) February 5, 2016

Again because of the absurd opaqueness of the system it is unclear where this decision was made and why it was made. It is believed that various high-level figures were upset with the decision to bar so many candidates. At this time however, the identities and political affiliations of the candidates are unknown, so it is just as likely that hardliners, or even moderates were approved ahead of reformists.

One of the worst articles on Iran ever.

I often disagree with some aspect of the articles I read about Iran. Usually it is something minor, and occasionally it is an entire argument that I disagree with. These arguments are opinion based, and use facts to back up their opinions, so while my disagreement is there, it is often a matter of opinion. So when I today encountered a truly remarkably terrible article I felt compelled to comment on and refute it in its entirety.

Micah Halpern's HuffPo piece, 'Where is the Ayatollah' is one of those terrible articles clearly written by an amateur with little understanding of the past or present. Thankfully it was a short article so my face was not permanently contorted into a horrible grimace by the experience. 

I will now take Halpern's claims and destroy them: 

1) 'Rafsanjani is believed to be a reformer and as such, he could really create change'

No. Rafsanjani is not, was not, and will not be a reformer. He has long been what we call a 'pragmatist', someone who works within the system to create solutions that are not necessarily based on an ideology. Reformists connect him to the horrific crimes of his office (while president and in previous roles as well) towards the more liberal parts of the Iranian population. In the run up to the recent presidential elections where the most moderate candidate remaining at the end won (Rouhani), there was some doubt that the wave of reformist and moderate voices would embrace Rouhani because of his close ties to Rafsanjani.

Conclusion: Implying that Rafsanjani is a reformer is stupid, and speculating based on a miserably failed understanding of reality is even stupider. -2 points for Mr Halpern.

2) 'He is extremely well qualified to be the Supreme Leader, even more qualified than Khamenei in terms of his level of learning and academic standing'

The favored replacement for Ayatollah Khomeini in the 80s was a man named Hussein-Ali Montazeri. He was the highest ranking Shi'a mujtahid to support Khomeini's idea of Velayat-e Faqih (others who would have outranked him—albeit not by a lot—such as Morteza Mottahari, were assassinated during the revolutionary period). Montazeri became more liberal during the Iran-Iraq war, especially in regards to the civil rights violations he saw being perpetrated by the regime and publicly stated his opposition. Montazeri was a principled man but had very little political acumen. Montazeri was also responsible for 'exporting the revolution', a similar role to what the Qods Force plays today, although less militant by nature. The brother of Montazeri son-in-law, Mehdi Hashemi was in charge of this office and was executed for revealing RAFSANJANI's role in Iran-Contra (hint: it was major). Montazeri took this, amongst other actions against him very personally. Long story short, Montazeri was removed from his position as deputy Supreme Leader, leaving Khomeini's ideology in trouble. It previously had been stated that the Faqih must be the most educated (see Khomeini's Islamic Government for more on this), but because the 2nd most educated (not counting other Shi'a clerics in other countries which were and continue to be nearly universally opposed to the idea), the replacement, was in opposition to the regime, they had to make changes. Khomeini eventually changed the constitution so that the Faqih no longer needed to be the most educated, highest-ranking mujtahid which allowed Khamenei, who was a relatively low ranking Hojjat-o-Eslam prior to this, to take over. At the time there was speculation in the West that because there was not a viable replacement, that Iran may decide to have a council of Supreme Leaders (I read this article in a 25 year old magazine during my MA but I cannot find it online anywhere). Khamenei was the President of Iran at the time, but he was by no means the most senior cleric. There was also a Prime Minister at this point, a position with more power than the Presidency, which had been occupied by more moderate and liberal people such as Mehdi Bazargan (since exiled) and Mir-Hossein Mousavi (who has been under house arrest for years following his Green Movement protests), but this position was removed in a joint effort of Khamenei and Rafsanjani. The two of them then swapped when Rafsanjani pushed Khamenei as the candidate for Supreme Leader, and Rafsanjani took the presidency. 

Conclusion: While religious qualifications have some connection to the office of the Supreme Leader, implying this is the sole criteria is foolish and uninformed. Halpern also does not mention the fact that Rafsanjani was removed from his position as the chairman of the Assembly of Experts in 2011, the legislative body tasked with overseeing the Supreme Leader. -2 points for Mr. Halpern.

3) 'The friendship never suffered over the fact that they have starkly contrasting visions of the way Islam should play out in the Islamic Republic.'

Probably not the case. I am unfamiliar with the details of the personal relationship between the two figures, as are most Westerners, but it is safe to say that today they are not the most friendly. The Rafsanjani family has been heavily persecuted since 2009 and Rafsanjani's decision to lend some support to the Green Movement (which has since increased). Rafsanjani's children have been arrested, beaten, jailed etc. as I wrote here on my blog . The idea that they would remain friends despite the state-sponsored abuse of the family is beyond ridiculous. Also see my conclusion for #2, where Rafsanjani was removed from his chairmanship. If this is not evidence of a break in friendship I do not know what is...Max Fisher wrote a blog on the 'tumultuous' relationship of the two. 

Conclusion: They do have 'starkly contrasting visions of the way Islam should play out in the Islamic Republic', but saying the friendship never suffered is a bit of a leap. .5 points for Mr Halpern for almost not being wrong

4) 'After the reports of Syria gassing its own citizens Rafsanjani made the following statement: "A government that uses chemical bombs against it people, will face hard consequences, just like Saddam, who earned eternal shame in the bombing of Halabja and suffered such a horrible fate."'

Not only is this completely unrelated to the surrounding paragraphs, it is completely irrelevant. Iranians are rightfully very sensitive to the use of chemical weapons because of the extensive use by Iraq on Iranian soldiers and civilians during the Iran-Iraq War. At the time of this quote from Rafsanjani the prevailing claim among non-Western powers was that Syrian rebels had used the chemical weapons so this made complete sense.

Conclusion: Terrible organization and taking something out of context. -1 points for Mr. Halpern for not doing his homework.

5) When he announced that he was running for president in the 2013 election, a position he was elected to twice already, he was disqualified for two reasons. He was over the maximum age and he had supported protestors on the street during the Green Revolution.

There is no maximum age for the office of president. Read the constitution, it clearly says nothing about this. The GIVEN reason by the Guardian Council for excluding him was his age, despite the fact that many members of the Guardian Council is significantly older than Mr. Rafsanjani and the Guardian Council's term is 6 years which is longer than the 4 year term of the presidency. Lastly, Rafsanjani's support of the Green Revolution was also not as clearcut as Mr. Halpern stated. 

Conclusion: Being almost right on Rafsanjani and the Green Movement (calling it the Green Revolution is another negative for Mr. Halpern) results in -.5 points for Mr Halpern

6) 'In a fascinating move, Khomeini's daughter sent a letter to the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei and then even published it in May 2013 asking the Supreme Leader to overrule the committee and let Rafsanjani run.'

Some of Khomeini's children and grandchildren are relatively liberal, and while this is true, it is again taken out of context by Mr. Halpern

Conclusion: A half truth reduced by context. A generous .5 points for Mr. Halpern

7) 'Why has the Supreme Leader, the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei not been seen in public of late, I am not about to speculate.'

The entirety of Mr. Halpern's article is full of untruths and things taken out of context, it would be just as useful for him to speculate as it is for him to put pen to page (or finger to keyboard)

Conclusion: Do I need a reason? -1 points for Mr. Halpern

FINAL CONCLUSION: Do not read this article. It is terrible and the author should be ashamed. HuffPo should be ashamed for publishing it, as should its entire staff for being associated with this. I am sure that there is something else I missed in the article that is terrible, but frankly it is not worth my time to identify and critique it.

P.S. Another bit which Mr. Halpern did not mention at all: Khamenei's arm has been paralyzed since a failed assassination attempt in 1981, his health has also been in question several times as the CableGate affair demonstrated. It 'fits' into the context of the article, why was this ignored? -1 points for Mr. Halpern

Running total: 1) -2, 2) -4, 3) -3.5, 4) -4.5, 5), -5, 6) -4.5, 7) -5.5 and a bonus -1 reaching a total of -6.5. Truly an embarrassing work.

Note on Article 115 of the Iranian Constitution

Another excerpt from my paper on Islamic Feminism in Iran in the wake of the announcement by Ayatollah Yazdi (via Thomas Erdbrink of the New York Times's Twitter page) saying that all 12 women who registered for the Iranian Presidential Elections will be disqualified.

... Article 115 of the Iranian constitution states that only a man is allowed to become president[i]. While this is somewhat problematic as the vote for president should theoretically be a democratic affair, the biggest problem is the reasoning for this ruling. Initially it was decided that the reference in the Koran that leaders should be rajol (an Arabic word meaning "man" also transliterated as rejal) meant that the president must be a man[ii]. This is problematic as rajol is often a gender-neutral term and in Arabic literature it can mean "woman", "mankind", or "personality"[iii]. Persian is more or less a genderless language and a term such as rajol can cause difficulties, as gender indicated within the word may not mean the same thing in Persian and in Arabic. Faezeh Rafsanjani the daughter of the influential former President Rafsanjani considers this law to be hypocritical as women are allowed to run other governmental departments, but not the office of the presidency[iv].

---

[i] Ahmadi, 2006, p.48

[ii] Ibid, p. 48

[iii] Ibid, p. 48

[iv] Via Ahmadi, citing Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut, “Islamist and Secular Women Unite: Iranian Women Take on the Mullahs,” Le Monde Diplomatique (November 1996), http://mondediplo.com/1996/11.

UPDATE 1: Spoken to several Arabic speakers, and consulted my Arabic dictionary and the definition of Rajol as anything other than "man" seems increasingly unlikely. The dictionary does have the plural of Rajol (rijal, rijalat) as "important men or great personalities", but to me this is an implied masculine. Rejal in Persian is "men, statesmen, distinguished men, dignitaries, personages, V.I.P.s" I am uncertain why Ahmadi has claimed this with such authority, but as she is the one with the Ph.D. and I am not, I will have to differ to her.

Feminism in Iran

         Iran is the only country where the Head of Government (President) does not also control the military. The Head of State (Supreme Leader) does. It is also different from most governments in that the constitution  expressly prohibits women from obtaining this office. With the Iranian Presidential Elections fast approaching, I thought it would be useful to share a bit about the feminist movement in Iran. Here is an excerpt from a paper I wrote which provides a background for feminism (secular and Islamic) in Iran: 

           Following the fall of the Shah in 1979, a theocratic state came to power in Iran. This state took its legitimacy from Ayatollah Khomeini's theology of Velayat-e Faqih, which reinterpreted Twelver Shi'a beliefs to include a justification for clerical involvement in both politics and the state apparatus. This was a relatively new concept and had come from a new understanding of older practices. The ideas of innovation and transformation drove the revolution, which itself was representative of the unhappiness of the general public with the corrupt, repressive and ineffective Shah.

            Having played a large role in the street protests and civil unrest aimed towards Reza Shah, many Iranian women expected reforms benefitting them to be enacted after the fall of the shah[i]. Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged women to take part in the revolution, and so, despite his earlier writings explicitly describing his religious and political views, members of the public assumed that the version of Islam that he preferred was progressive or at least accepting. Khomeini had been quoted saying that "Islam has never been against [women's] freedom. It is, to the contrary, opposed to the idea of woman-as-object and it gives her back her dignity"[ii]. Possibly because of statements like these, most of the Iranian public would have not imagined a strict theocracy taking over once the shah fell. The primary motivating factor leading to the revolution was the belief that the ruler was unjust, corrupt and did not treat the common people with enough respect. The rapid implementation of gender-biased laws in the public and private sectors made it clear the rights previously granted (or forced) upon women were not going to kept[iii]. The progressive trends under the Shah were halted and then reversed, as many of the social reforms during the reign of the Shah giving women more rights, were abolished after the revolution[iv]. The actions of the clerical establishment following their ascent to power resulted in considerable resentment, especially from those women who had been active in overthrowing the Shah. They felt as though they deserved credit for their actions, rather than restrictions on their lifestyle[v].

            At the time of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, new social justice movements took hold, in particular secular feminism, which was becoming increasingly powerful in the Western world. In Iran as well, feminism became relevant as women wanted to play a bigger role in society. These women came from all portions of society—wealthy, poor, religious and secular[vi]. This diversity indicates the general feeling of malcontent in Iran at the time. Despite social unhappiness, a military and political event distracted from this.

            The devastating war between Iran and Iraq from 1980-1988, which resulted in horrific loss of life on both sides among civilians and military forces[vii], heightened sentiments of nationalism among Iranians, as they were all personally affected by the war. A whole generation of Iranian men perished and many women were forced to work as a result[viii]. Society's reliance on women to provide them with materials for the war empowered women. The supporting efforts of Iranian women were even more important than their voluntary actions during the events leading the Islamic revolution.

            Perhaps due to the pressures of the near decade long war with Iraq, economic and social problems that had existed under the Shah were not solved by the religious rulers[ix]. These problems were then exacerbated by the baby boom of the 1980s and 1990s. The Ayatollahs, faced with enormous population growth, determined that a family planning campaign was necessary. This campaign gave women more access to contraception, another form of female empowerment[x].

            Another significant change for women in Iran is that increasing numbers have been afforded the opportunity to attend university. Today, nearly two-thirds of university students in Iran are female[xi]. Education typically leads to empowerment, but empowerment is difficult within a restrictive society. The conflict between the restrictions and the expectations of further freedoms can prove to be problematic, and often results in unhappiness amongst the female population. This is especially true when highly educated individuals are unable to find jobs, or the wages of the jobs available to them are significantly less lucrative than that of men's jobs, and are far less than that of their counterparts in Western, developed nations[xii]. Although many women who desire and then obtain baccalaureate degrees may be secular or upper-class and Westernized, the women involved in protests and efforts to attain social justice are not necessarily secular, Western-oriented women. Many Iranian women are unsatisfied with the status quo and the lack of opportunities for economic or social advancement.

            This dissatisfaction was expressed in 1997, when a reformist, Mohammad Khatami was elected president[xiii]. This shocked the conservative government because they did not expect a relatively liberal member of the political establishment to be elected to such an important and influential position. The fact that Khatami won with such an overwhelming majority proved to be a serious challenge for the conservative factions of the government[xiv]. While the Supreme Leader continues to have absolute veto power, the fact that the population could so heavily favor a reformist could have been damaging to the clerical establishment's monopoly on political power in the Islamic Republic. Prior to Khatami's election the feminist movement in Iran seemed to be gaining traction as influential writers and public figures were able to speak more freely than they had been in the past. Some of this was due to the woman's magazine Zanan (Persian for ‘women’) which operated from 1992 until its forced closure in 2008[xv]. While the magazine focused primarily on secular women's voices, it made a point of including religious feminists as well. Despite the election results and the positive hopes of feminists and liberals in Iran[xvi], the government of President Khatami proved ineffective and either unwilling or unable to stand up to the conservatives in the majlis (Persian for the Iranian parliament). During Khatami's rule, the legal marriage age for girls was raised from nine to thirteen, yet as this is a non-compulsory law, it is not always enforced[xvii]. While in theory this is an improvement for women’s rights activists, the fact that it is not mandatory has led to accusations of inefficiency and weakness by President Khatami. Despite the steps towards reformation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, in 2000 at the height of the reform movement in Iran, a mere 5% of parliamentarians in Iran were women[xviii]. This is around one-third as many as an average "developing" country according to UN statistics[xix]. Even though Khatami had a popular mandate in the form of the overwhelming support he received during the presidential elections, he failed to create strong, lasting reforms. While Khatami is considered to have been inefficient president, he managed to stay in office for a second term.     

            In 2005, his replacement was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who while relatively unknown at the time, was a former mayor of the Iranian capital of Tehran. Ahmadinejad was allied with some parts of the conservative camp, as well as with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) of which he had been a member. President Ahmadinejad and his allies restricted the feminist movement, reversing some of the limited reforms that President Khatami had enacted[xx]. In late 2006, President Ahmadinejad caused controversy when he stated that Iranian women should spend more time in the home raising their children[xxi]. Since his controversial re-election in June 2009 there have been mass protests of every variety, violently suppressed by the IRGC, its volunteer militias and the official state security forces.[xxii]

UPDATE: Iran is not the only country where the head of government does not also function as the head of state, but it is the only country where the head of government does NOT control the military. In every other country the ELECTED (or selected or appointed) head of government has control of the armed forces.

---

[i] Moghadam, Val. "Revolution, the State, Islam, and Women: Gender Politics in Iran and Afghanistan." Social Text 22.Spring (1989): 43. Print.

[ii] Sansarian, Eliz via Sameh, Catherine. "Discourses of Equality, Rights and Islam in the One Million Signatures Campaign in Iran." International Feminist Journal of Politics 12 (2010): 446. Print.

[iii] Mojab, Shahrzad. "Theorizing the Politics of 'Islamic Feminism'" Feminist Review 69.Winter (2001): 131. Print. , Moghadam, 1989: 45., Tohidi, Nayereh. "The Global-Local Intersection of Feminism in Muslim Societies: The Cases of Iran and Azerbaijan." Social Research 69.3 (2002): 858. Print.

[iv] Ibid, p. 858

[v] Ibid, p. 858

[vi] Moghadam 1989, 43

[vii] Estimates vary although some believe up to 1 million died in the first five years alone Alnasrawi, Abbas. "Economic Consequences of the Iraq‐Iran War∗." Third World Quarterly 8.3 (1986): 869. Print.

[viii] Sameh, Catherine. 2010: 446.

[ix] An early estimate put the economic cost of the war at nearly half a billion dollars See. Alnasrawi, 1986, p. 869

[x] Moghadam, Valentine via Sameh 2010: 446

[xi] Ebadi, Shirin via Barlow, Rebecca., and Shahram. Akbarzadeh. "Prospects for Feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran." Human Rights Quarterly 30.1 (2008): 24. Print. And Esfandiari, Golnaz. "Number Of Female University Students Rising Dramatically in Iran." Payvand, Iran News, Directory and Bazar. 21 Nov. 2003. Web. 26 Sept. 2011. <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/nov/1133.html>. And Mernissi, Fatima. "Muslim Women and Fundamentalism." Middle East Report 153.Jul-Aug (1988): 8-11+50. Print.

[xii] Barlow, Akbarzadeh 2008: 24

[xiii] Ibid, p. 26

[xiv] "Online NewsHour: Iranian Elections -- May 26, 1997." PBS: Public Broadcasting Service. 26 May 1997. Web. 26 Sept. 2011. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/may97/iran_5-26a.html> .

[xv] "Shutting Down Zanan." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 7 Feb. 2008. Web. 26 Sept. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/opinion/07thu1.html>.

[xvi] Ibid, p. 26

[xvii] Ibid, p. 28. The legal age had been lowered from 18 following the rise of the clergy see Moghadam, Valentine, Revolution, the State, Islam and Women. 1989, 46

[xviii] Ibid, p. 30

[xix] Ibid, p. 30

[xx] Sameh 2010, 448

[xxi] Barlow, Akbarzadeh 2008, 22

[xxii] The literature and news reporting on the Green Movement is extensive and can be found archived on every major news network as well as many forms of electronic social communications.