Khamenei's Eid al Fitr Speech

Ayatollah Khamenei's Eid al Fitr speech has received quite a bit of attention in the international press (here, here and here) because it is the first time Khamenei has spoken directly about the recent nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran. The speech was nothing out of the ordinary, as Khamenei repeated the same tropes he has repeated for decades. This was immediately jumped upon as proof that Iran, and Khamenei in particular, negotiated in bad faith, that Iran will never change et cetera et cetera. It is much more complicated than this.

Once again, the people saying this do little more than display their intense narcissism and lack of political acumen. These speeches are nearly always about domestic issues more than international ones (even when talking about international affairs), and at the same time they must be taken in context. Khamenei is a reactionary, a pragmatic one at that, but his political bent remains one way and will remain this way. This doesn't mean that Iran isn't going to change; Khamenei himself is threatened by this change and must act to mitigate this. The Eid al Fitr speech is a way for him to do this.

Rouhani, like Khatami a decade ago and Montazeri 30 years ago, is a challenge to the Ayatollah's politics. This coming year is a most important one, as the Majles and the Assembly of Experts both are slated to hold one of the most significant elections in the history of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei wishes to ensure his legacy continues once he dies, which means stifling domestic dissent, especially reformists, and electing a conservative AoE, so that if Khamenei were to die during this 8 year term, an 'acceptable' principalist candidate (or candidates) are selected to succeed him.

Iran needed the sanctions relief, and this gives room to Rouhani and his administration to improve the economy (one of the few important things the Iranian president has some degree of control over), but at the same time Khamenei wants to makes sure that the hardliners are not sidelined. I expect crackdowns, especially in the media (probably a closure or a lawsuit directed at reformist newspapers or journalists), as Khamenei tries to give a boost to the Islamic right.

One of the worst articles on Iran ever.

I often disagree with some aspect of the articles I read about Iran. Usually it is something minor, and occasionally it is an entire argument that I disagree with. These arguments are opinion based, and use facts to back up their opinions, so while my disagreement is there, it is often a matter of opinion. So when I today encountered a truly remarkably terrible article I felt compelled to comment on and refute it in its entirety.

Micah Halpern's HuffPo piece, 'Where is the Ayatollah' is one of those terrible articles clearly written by an amateur with little understanding of the past or present. Thankfully it was a short article so my face was not permanently contorted into a horrible grimace by the experience. 

I will now take Halpern's claims and destroy them: 

1) 'Rafsanjani is believed to be a reformer and as such, he could really create change'

No. Rafsanjani is not, was not, and will not be a reformer. He has long been what we call a 'pragmatist', someone who works within the system to create solutions that are not necessarily based on an ideology. Reformists connect him to the horrific crimes of his office (while president and in previous roles as well) towards the more liberal parts of the Iranian population. In the run up to the recent presidential elections where the most moderate candidate remaining at the end won (Rouhani), there was some doubt that the wave of reformist and moderate voices would embrace Rouhani because of his close ties to Rafsanjani.

Conclusion: Implying that Rafsanjani is a reformer is stupid, and speculating based on a miserably failed understanding of reality is even stupider. -2 points for Mr Halpern.

2) 'He is extremely well qualified to be the Supreme Leader, even more qualified than Khamenei in terms of his level of learning and academic standing'

The favored replacement for Ayatollah Khomeini in the 80s was a man named Hussein-Ali Montazeri. He was the highest ranking Shi'a mujtahid to support Khomeini's idea of Velayat-e Faqih (others who would have outranked him—albeit not by a lot—such as Morteza Mottahari, were assassinated during the revolutionary period). Montazeri became more liberal during the Iran-Iraq war, especially in regards to the civil rights violations he saw being perpetrated by the regime and publicly stated his opposition. Montazeri was a principled man but had very little political acumen. Montazeri was also responsible for 'exporting the revolution', a similar role to what the Qods Force plays today, although less militant by nature. The brother of Montazeri son-in-law, Mehdi Hashemi was in charge of this office and was executed for revealing RAFSANJANI's role in Iran-Contra (hint: it was major). Montazeri took this, amongst other actions against him very personally. Long story short, Montazeri was removed from his position as deputy Supreme Leader, leaving Khomeini's ideology in trouble. It previously had been stated that the Faqih must be the most educated (see Khomeini's Islamic Government for more on this), but because the 2nd most educated (not counting other Shi'a clerics in other countries which were and continue to be nearly universally opposed to the idea), the replacement, was in opposition to the regime, they had to make changes. Khomeini eventually changed the constitution so that the Faqih no longer needed to be the most educated, highest-ranking mujtahid which allowed Khamenei, who was a relatively low ranking Hojjat-o-Eslam prior to this, to take over. At the time there was speculation in the West that because there was not a viable replacement, that Iran may decide to have a council of Supreme Leaders (I read this article in a 25 year old magazine during my MA but I cannot find it online anywhere). Khamenei was the President of Iran at the time, but he was by no means the most senior cleric. There was also a Prime Minister at this point, a position with more power than the Presidency, which had been occupied by more moderate and liberal people such as Mehdi Bazargan (since exiled) and Mir-Hossein Mousavi (who has been under house arrest for years following his Green Movement protests), but this position was removed in a joint effort of Khamenei and Rafsanjani. The two of them then swapped when Rafsanjani pushed Khamenei as the candidate for Supreme Leader, and Rafsanjani took the presidency. 

Conclusion: While religious qualifications have some connection to the office of the Supreme Leader, implying this is the sole criteria is foolish and uninformed. Halpern also does not mention the fact that Rafsanjani was removed from his position as the chairman of the Assembly of Experts in 2011, the legislative body tasked with overseeing the Supreme Leader. -2 points for Mr. Halpern.

3) 'The friendship never suffered over the fact that they have starkly contrasting visions of the way Islam should play out in the Islamic Republic.'

Probably not the case. I am unfamiliar with the details of the personal relationship between the two figures, as are most Westerners, but it is safe to say that today they are not the most friendly. The Rafsanjani family has been heavily persecuted since 2009 and Rafsanjani's decision to lend some support to the Green Movement (which has since increased). Rafsanjani's children have been arrested, beaten, jailed etc. as I wrote here on my blog . The idea that they would remain friends despite the state-sponsored abuse of the family is beyond ridiculous. Also see my conclusion for #2, where Rafsanjani was removed from his chairmanship. If this is not evidence of a break in friendship I do not know what is...Max Fisher wrote a blog on the 'tumultuous' relationship of the two. 

Conclusion: They do have 'starkly contrasting visions of the way Islam should play out in the Islamic Republic', but saying the friendship never suffered is a bit of a leap. .5 points for Mr Halpern for almost not being wrong

4) 'After the reports of Syria gassing its own citizens Rafsanjani made the following statement: "A government that uses chemical bombs against it people, will face hard consequences, just like Saddam, who earned eternal shame in the bombing of Halabja and suffered such a horrible fate."'

Not only is this completely unrelated to the surrounding paragraphs, it is completely irrelevant. Iranians are rightfully very sensitive to the use of chemical weapons because of the extensive use by Iraq on Iranian soldiers and civilians during the Iran-Iraq War. At the time of this quote from Rafsanjani the prevailing claim among non-Western powers was that Syrian rebels had used the chemical weapons so this made complete sense.

Conclusion: Terrible organization and taking something out of context. -1 points for Mr. Halpern for not doing his homework.

5) When he announced that he was running for president in the 2013 election, a position he was elected to twice already, he was disqualified for two reasons. He was over the maximum age and he had supported protestors on the street during the Green Revolution.

There is no maximum age for the office of president. Read the constitution, it clearly says nothing about this. The GIVEN reason by the Guardian Council for excluding him was his age, despite the fact that many members of the Guardian Council is significantly older than Mr. Rafsanjani and the Guardian Council's term is 6 years which is longer than the 4 year term of the presidency. Lastly, Rafsanjani's support of the Green Revolution was also not as clearcut as Mr. Halpern stated. 

Conclusion: Being almost right on Rafsanjani and the Green Movement (calling it the Green Revolution is another negative for Mr. Halpern) results in -.5 points for Mr Halpern

6) 'In a fascinating move, Khomeini's daughter sent a letter to the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei and then even published it in May 2013 asking the Supreme Leader to overrule the committee and let Rafsanjani run.'

Some of Khomeini's children and grandchildren are relatively liberal, and while this is true, it is again taken out of context by Mr. Halpern

Conclusion: A half truth reduced by context. A generous .5 points for Mr. Halpern

7) 'Why has the Supreme Leader, the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei not been seen in public of late, I am not about to speculate.'

The entirety of Mr. Halpern's article is full of untruths and things taken out of context, it would be just as useful for him to speculate as it is for him to put pen to page (or finger to keyboard)

Conclusion: Do I need a reason? -1 points for Mr. Halpern

FINAL CONCLUSION: Do not read this article. It is terrible and the author should be ashamed. HuffPo should be ashamed for publishing it, as should its entire staff for being associated with this. I am sure that there is something else I missed in the article that is terrible, but frankly it is not worth my time to identify and critique it.

P.S. Another bit which Mr. Halpern did not mention at all: Khamenei's arm has been paralyzed since a failed assassination attempt in 1981, his health has also been in question several times as the CableGate affair demonstrated. It 'fits' into the context of the article, why was this ignored? -1 points for Mr. Halpern

Running total: 1) -2, 2) -4, 3) -3.5, 4) -4.5, 5), -5, 6) -4.5, 7) -5.5 and a bonus -1 reaching a total of -6.5. Truly an embarrassing work.

Rafsanjani and Religious Titles in Iran

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has long been my favorite living character from the Islamic Revolution because of how complex a character he is and how he has been involved in so many significant incidents in the past. I started to follow him in earnest just over two years ago as part of an assignment I had for a class. What caught my attention in all of the articles I read about him was that Mr. Rafsanjani was occasionally referenced at "Hojatoeslam", and other times as "Ayatollah". I had previously attended a pair of lectures from the brilliant Robert Gleave of Exeter on the Hawza (Shia religious seminary), who explained the background for the structure of the Shia religious educational system, and it did not make sense to me that there would not be a singular title for him.

The Hawza is set up in a fairly similar to a university in many ways, minus some of the red tape, and administration. The most well-learned clerics teach courses to others in whatever their specialities happen to be (for example Ayatollah Khomeini was particularly skilled in studies of Mysticism and it is likely that he taught courses on this), and like university professors, are paid a small amount in return. Where the process differs from a modern university is that the requirements to reach the next "level" of scholarship are not as concrete as in Western education systems. There is no final exam or specific set of requirements. Rather the instructor or instructors judge you based upon how far you have progressed in your studies, how well you understand the material and how much scholarly work you have produced. (According to Professor Gleave some portions of this process are actually changing and some hawzas are even giving certificates similar to a diploma)

The top four levels of Shia scholarship in descending order are Marja-e Taqlid/Grand Ayatollah (source of emulation), Ayatollah (sign of Allah/God), Hojatoeslam (proof/authority of Islam), and Mujtahid (one capable of Ijtihad). Ijtihad is the idea that individuals who have enough background and understanding of the Quran and Hadith and are able to interpret the laws of Islam.

One of the controversies which the Islamic Republic faced in the late 1980s is that Ayatollah Khomeini (By this point he was one of the most learned Shia clerics in the world so calling him a Marja-e Taqlid is probably more accurate, despite the convention of calling him simply Ayatollah), was ill and once he died, they needed to have a replacement for him. The version of Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurisprudent, or simply clerical rule) which the Khomeini based his rule upon, called for a highly educated Ayatollah (by default with many followers) to be the leader of the Islamic Republic. 

Unfortunately for him, there were no other Marja-e Taqlids or even Ayatollahs who supported this idea. Even at the formation of the Islamic Republic 5 of the 6 top Marjas (2 actively opposed it, and 3 were neutral) did NOT support the idea of Velayat-e Faqih, with Khomeini being the one exception. Ayatollah Montazeri who had been "promoted" to Marja-e Taqlid during his tenure as "Deputy Supreme Leader" had broken with Khomeini over human rights abuses by the Islamic Republic (amongst other issues), and he was the highest ranking cleric who also supported the idea of Velayat-e Faqih. 

Khomeini's legacy was in danger, and because there was not a clear replacement candidate, many speculated that there would be perhaps a council of clerics leading the Islamic Republic. Strangely enough, Hojatoeslam Khamenei (then the President of Iran) was quickly "promoted" to Ayatollah and picked as the replacement. One of his contemporaries, Hojatoeslam Rafsanjani was in a similar position (Speaker of the Majles at the time), and had worked together with Khamenei to discredit Montazeri. Khamenei had been referred to in the Persian press as "Hojatoeslam" right up to the point when he was finally "promoted" to Ayatollah. At the same time the regime controlled-press tried to discredit Montazeri (who was clearly more learned than Khamenei) and used disparaging words for him (he may have even been referred to as Hojatoeslam, a rank 2 levels below what the press had previously given him). 

Rafsanjani has ended up with the short end of the stick after Khamenei became the Supreme Leader of Iran. It must have been incredibly frustrating for Rafsanjani to be more or less equal with Khamenei and then end up with nothing (the Presidency from 1989-1997 was not much of a reward as he still had to answer to Khamenei's absolute authority). Rafsanjani and Khamenei (who is a few years younger) had worked so that someone they both disliked would not gain power, and Rafsanjani was the force behind promoting Khamenei as Supreme Leader. After Rafsanjani gave some support to the reformists during the 2009 Green Revolution protests, he was no longer referred to as Ayatollah in the press, but Hojatoeslam, and his sons and daughters were persecuted against (Mehdi and Faezeh were arrested, and Mohsen was forced from his position as head of the Tehran Metro as I mentioned here). 

Today Rafsanjani is likely to be called either Ayatollah or Hojatoeslam, depending on how the person feels about him. Unlike in the Hawzas of Najaf or other places outside Iran where Islam and politics are often separated to a greater extent than in Iran, the titles given to religious figures may be representative of political-religious authority, rather than a recognition of Islamic scholarship. When someone is given a title, it is just as likely that this is a symbol of political power as it is that this person has actually extensively studied theological issues in the Hawza. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has not spent much of his time in the last 30 years working on religious issues, he has been running the country and his pistachio business. Doesn't it make sense that he should be the same "rank" as before unless he has actually produced religious scholarship and been active in the seminary? It can be incredibly frustrating, but on the bright side it is easy to tell how a particular newspaper (and therefore whoever runs the paper) feels about a particular person by what title is bestowed upon them.

The Enemy of my Enemy

Is the enemy of my enemy my friend? Innumerable examples of this from Osama bin Laden to Soviet Russia in World War 2, indicate otherwise. In the volatile Middle East in particular, shifting alliances cause problems for everyone but the most able political manipulators. 

In 20th century Iran there is a prevalent theme of doomed alliances. In the oil-nationalization dispute with Britain, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq's National Front was made up of several nationalist political parties. Due to several factors including external meddling (Soviet, British and American), gaps soon appeared between the parties. Some of these parties ended up working in conjunction with the British and Americans to overthrow Mossadeq in 1953. This same theme of broken coalitions was perhaps most important in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nearly every part of Iranian society was upset with the Shah's increasingly despotic rule and all worked together to ensure his fall. There were Islamists, Marxists, Communists, Socialists, Intellectuals and others, all working together because they shared a common enemy. In the end, one group won at the expense of all of the others. While the most significant gaps at the time were between the religious, the seculars and the Marxists/Communists, even amongst the religious groups which supported Ayatollah Khomeini there were huge ideological gaps. 

The dismissal of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri as the successor to Ayatollah Khomeini several months before Khomeini's death is an important example of the ideological gaps between the religious factions. There are several reasons why Montazeri was dismissed from his position. First he was not a very astute politician, but probably more importantly, Hashemi Rafsanjani (chairman of the Majles at the time, and President shortly thereafter) and the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (President at the time) worked together to undermine the authority of Montazeri so they each would have a chance to gain more power. While Rafsanjani and Khamenei were once allied in their opposition to Montazeri, their own personal and political differences have since then made them fierce rivals, if not outright enemies. After the disputed 2009 Iranian Presidential Election Rafsanjani expressed marginal support for the reformists and has since criticized the Islamic Republic many times. Since then, several of his children have been jailed, assaulted, and forced to resign from their jobs. Rafsanjani himself was removed as the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the group responsible for electing, supervising and theoretically removing the Supreme Leader. There can only be one winner, and for now, Rafsanjani is not it. This may change a bit in the Iranian Presidential election this June, but given the fractious state of Iranian politics, this is difficult to predict.

Moderates, seculars and former regime insiders are not the only ones who have been betrayed by their former allies. The United States has also been burned by former partners so many times in the Middle East it is puzzling why the government seems unable to learn from their mistakes. Today support from Congress for the Islamo-Marxist terrorist cult MeK (Mujahedin-e Khalq) is just as troubling. This support is based purely on parallel mutual enmities between the US and Iran and the MeK and Iran. While trumpeted as a "democratic" alternative to the IRI, opinion polls show support amongst Iranian-Americans for the MeK under 1%. I would hope that Washington has learned from the lessons of Iraq and Ahmed Chalabi. The lack of action in Syria by the Obama Administration is a cause for both concern (innocents are being slaughtered), but it is also somewhat encouraging as there is not a rush to give armed support to groups that have the potential to harm us in the future. Perhaps the lessons of Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan circa 1979 may have taught us something after all?

As cartoonist Howard Taylor wisely pointed out: "The Enemy of my Enemy is my Enemy's Enemy, no more, no less." Hopefully this is taken to heart by policy makers in the future as they are not the ones who suffer from their mistakes, we all are.


UPDATE 1: I am embarrassed to admit that I misread the poll on Iranian-Americans and the 5% (that support the MeK) I initially quoted was actually 5% OF THE 15% who openly state that they DO support an opposition group. So the poll responses indicate that 6 people out of the 800 who participated in the survey stated that they support the MeK, resulting in a total of .75%.