Earlier this week the US government publicly went after the IRGC. President Trump's Nowruz statement on Monday was mainly about the evils of the IRGC rather than the holiday itself. On Friday Deputy AG Rod Rosenstein announced indictments for a number of Iranians with the IRGC for hacking.
A third incident, the naming of John Bolton as the new national security adviser to President Trump can also be seen as an anti-IRGC move, given Bolton's belligerence towards the regime and his affinity for the Marxist cult the MeK.
Whether this is coincidental or not is hard to discern, given the chaotic and disjointed nature of the administration and so it is the hacking announcement that interests me most.
A few years back I'd noticed a series of pro-Iranian bots tweeting about the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei's "Letter to the Youth in Europe and North America". I wrote about this in detail noting how the bots and message evolved. It was not particularly sophisticated, did not gain much traction, but polluted trending and other hashtags on various social media. Another followup campaign titled "Powerful_Iran" was covered by the BBC.
The hacks and bots seem connected, and are clearly linked to the regime in some manner, but the details are unclear. The distinction between the more skilled hackers and the Twitter bots makes me curious about the Iranian cyber programs, how they are set up, who runs them, and if there are multiple organizations or factions running them. I would be surprised if the recently indicted hackers are directly responsible for the older bot networks, but I'd also not rule it out.
Showing posts with label Khamenei. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Khamenei. Show all posts
Saturday, March 24, 2018
Monday, October 17, 2016
No, FRUS doesn't have all the answers
A recent article in Politico on the 1953 Iran Coup, while well intentioned, is unfortunately fundamentally flawed. Malcolm Byrne, who collaborated with Mark Gasiorowski to provide one of the most important academic books on the coup, writes in support of releasing the updated FRUS (Foreign Relations of the US). I too have argued for the same thing, but our reasons are very different.
Mr. Byrne makes a variety of mistakes in his assessment of the situation, ones that someone with his experience with archival documents, and with this episode in history should not make.
First he neglects to mention that the first coup attempt failed miserably, leading to the arrest of dozens of high-ranking officers and conspirators. There was no backup plan. Mr. Byrne does not state how one man, with zero knowledge of Persian managed to create a 2nd coup a mere three days later after his entire plan collapsed.
He also fails to account for competing interests, including Iranians who despised the Iranian Prime Minister, who wished to remove Mr. Mossadeq from power. He ends his introductory paragraph blaming the coup for feelings of anti-Americanism that endure to this day, ignoring once again, that clerics, including the direct spiritual predecessor of Ayatollah Khomeini (Ayatollah Kashani), was key in the attempts to remove Mossadeq from power.
His argument is based upon the core principle that the US, and the US alone (well including the UK), is guilty of overthrowing Mossadeq, rejecting the possibility of domestic (or other foreign) collaboration.
Mr. Byrne goes on to claim that the American public does not have full-access to the full historical record. This is partially true, as the CIA "lost" all of its files from the time in a suspicious fire, and some of the documents from the State Department remain classified. At the same time, the vast majority of these documents ARE available at the National Archives in Maryland.
Mr. Byrne also seems to not understand the point of the FRUS system. These are not complete records containing every single cable to and from an embassy or consulate. There are a small fraction that are included in FRUS collections. They are selected to be pertinent, not a complete data dump. There are many more documents from and to Tehran and other places that are in the National Archives, I have seen them myself. Most of them are mundane, but some are quite interesting. It would be nice to include these in a massive digital archive including every single document, but this is not how the FRUS system is set up.
Mr. Byrne claims that the US and UK role in the coup is covered up, and the documents the State Department refuses to release will prove the two parties guilty. In the Archives, the additional documents I have read myself, indicate otherwise as I have demonstrated here and here.
Mr. Byrne believes that US and UK guilt over the coup is the major reason to not release the documents, but his analysis falls far short. He does not account for the local efforts to remove the Shah, and their ties to the current regime. He additionally fails to mention the saga (covered by David Ignatius of the Washington Post), where BP (formerly AIOC) forced Kermit Roosevelt and his publishing company to pull the entire run, though he has written about it in the past.
What would be more infuriating for the regime, to show that the US was involved (which is what they are already furious about), or that major regime figures, or their direct influences played a role in fomenting the coup?
Given the sensitivity of the Iran nuclear talks which have been ongoing, this delay makes sense in that they do not want to upset the Iranians so that they completely withdraw, and years of diplomatic efforts are lost.
While I agree with Mr. Byrne that the updated FRUS should be released, I strongly disagree with his analysis and I am very disappointed with his failure to mention the most likely scenario: that documents will show involvement from the Iranian clergy.
There are classified documents out there, documents which have not undergone their 50 year declassification review. Why hasn't Mr. Byrne filed MDRs (Mandatory Declassification Review) for these documents? He spends his time working on archives, yet in his article he ignores this potentiality.
His argument does not stand up. It does not make any sense for him to claim that the documents are not available when they mostly are. For the few that are classified, he simply has to go to the Archives and find the sheet that says how there is a classified document missing and then file an MDR. Yet he refuses to mention this aspect in his article, instead making it about some conspiracy to hide the truth from the American people.
It is also quite disheartening that he is convinced that there are going to be documents giving us a definitive answer as to what happened, and who the guilty parties are. I have demonstrated how even the CIA's latest (known) internal history has at least one glaring mistake (see #5). If the CIA doesn't have the story straight, how would the State Department?
There may be documents proving Mr. Byrne right, yet his shoddy work, and misleading, baseless claims do not help shed a light on a complicated historical event.
In conclusion, this quote from Donald Wilber, the author of the CIA's first internal history of the coup sums up the entire situation: "The early accounts of various participants differed widely enough to make it impossible to follow the slender thread of truth through the dark night"
Mr. Byrne makes a variety of mistakes in his assessment of the situation, ones that someone with his experience with archival documents, and with this episode in history should not make.
First he neglects to mention that the first coup attempt failed miserably, leading to the arrest of dozens of high-ranking officers and conspirators. There was no backup plan. Mr. Byrne does not state how one man, with zero knowledge of Persian managed to create a 2nd coup a mere three days later after his entire plan collapsed.
He also fails to account for competing interests, including Iranians who despised the Iranian Prime Minister, who wished to remove Mr. Mossadeq from power. He ends his introductory paragraph blaming the coup for feelings of anti-Americanism that endure to this day, ignoring once again, that clerics, including the direct spiritual predecessor of Ayatollah Khomeini (Ayatollah Kashani), was key in the attempts to remove Mossadeq from power.
His argument is based upon the core principle that the US, and the US alone (well including the UK), is guilty of overthrowing Mossadeq, rejecting the possibility of domestic (or other foreign) collaboration.
Mr. Byrne goes on to claim that the American public does not have full-access to the full historical record. This is partially true, as the CIA "lost" all of its files from the time in a suspicious fire, and some of the documents from the State Department remain classified. At the same time, the vast majority of these documents ARE available at the National Archives in Maryland.
Mr. Byrne also seems to not understand the point of the FRUS system. These are not complete records containing every single cable to and from an embassy or consulate. There are a small fraction that are included in FRUS collections. They are selected to be pertinent, not a complete data dump. There are many more documents from and to Tehran and other places that are in the National Archives, I have seen them myself. Most of them are mundane, but some are quite interesting. It would be nice to include these in a massive digital archive including every single document, but this is not how the FRUS system is set up.
Mr. Byrne claims that the US and UK role in the coup is covered up, and the documents the State Department refuses to release will prove the two parties guilty. In the Archives, the additional documents I have read myself, indicate otherwise as I have demonstrated here and here.
Mr. Byrne believes that US and UK guilt over the coup is the major reason to not release the documents, but his analysis falls far short. He does not account for the local efforts to remove the Shah, and their ties to the current regime. He additionally fails to mention the saga (covered by David Ignatius of the Washington Post), where BP (formerly AIOC) forced Kermit Roosevelt and his publishing company to pull the entire run, though he has written about it in the past.
What would be more infuriating for the regime, to show that the US was involved (which is what they are already furious about), or that major regime figures, or their direct influences played a role in fomenting the coup?
Given the sensitivity of the Iran nuclear talks which have been ongoing, this delay makes sense in that they do not want to upset the Iranians so that they completely withdraw, and years of diplomatic efforts are lost.
While I agree with Mr. Byrne that the updated FRUS should be released, I strongly disagree with his analysis and I am very disappointed with his failure to mention the most likely scenario: that documents will show involvement from the Iranian clergy.
There are classified documents out there, documents which have not undergone their 50 year declassification review. Why hasn't Mr. Byrne filed MDRs (Mandatory Declassification Review) for these documents? He spends his time working on archives, yet in his article he ignores this potentiality.
His argument does not stand up. It does not make any sense for him to claim that the documents are not available when they mostly are. For the few that are classified, he simply has to go to the Archives and find the sheet that says how there is a classified document missing and then file an MDR. Yet he refuses to mention this aspect in his article, instead making it about some conspiracy to hide the truth from the American people.
It is also quite disheartening that he is convinced that there are going to be documents giving us a definitive answer as to what happened, and who the guilty parties are. I have demonstrated how even the CIA's latest (known) internal history has at least one glaring mistake (see #5). If the CIA doesn't have the story straight, how would the State Department?
There may be documents proving Mr. Byrne right, yet his shoddy work, and misleading, baseless claims do not help shed a light on a complicated historical event.
In conclusion, this quote from Donald Wilber, the author of the CIA's first internal history of the coup sums up the entire situation: "The early accounts of various participants differed widely enough to make it impossible to follow the slender thread of truth through the dark night"
Sunday, May 29, 2016
Hardline Assembly of Experts Chair and Conservative Majles Speaker Selected
As expected, a hardliner and a conservative were selected to head both Iranian governmental bodies "elected" a few months back.
The leading vote getters in both elections ended up not being selected to head either the Assembly of Experts (Rafsanjani) or the Majles (Aref). The individual who was selected to lead the Assembly of Experts for the next 2 years (of the 8 year term) was in fact the last place finisher in Tehran.
The "loss" by the "moderates" in both of these decisions was not surprising for a many reasons. The elections were rigged from the beginning, with thousands of candidates disqualified, in particular those with views less in line with the regime. Additionally, as I and others have noted, the "moderate" list was in fact not as moderate as the pro-Iran lobby, and portions of the left in the United States trying to sell the Iran Deal have claimed.
With significant overlap between the "Principalists" and this "moderate" "List of Hope", it was only natural for the more hardline members of the "moderate" list to vote for the hardliners.
This complexity has gone way over many pundits heads here in the West. As the usual suspects point to the hardline victory as proof that there are no moderates (and of course no liberals) in Iran, the reality remains more complex. Again, they miss the greater point, that the elections had to be fixed to undermine genuine attempts from the population to move towards the West and the rest of the international community. The scale of this ideological schism may not be large, and many of the people pushing for change may approve of Iran's unending support for terror groups throughout the region, but the attempts to move away from the anti-Western ideologues must not be ignored.
Each time there is a political event where the hardliners do not win outright, the system, the regime, the deep state is put under pressure. This pressure forces a decision out of the regime; to allow an opening, or to crack down, and repress the population. Either way resources are expended, and the system becomes more unstable. However limited it may be, this instability at home undermines Iran's ability to conduct operations abroad; more attention must be given to preventing civil unrest.
Iran has a choice: to fully embrace autocracy like China, or to reform. They had previously mentioned attempts to create a "halal" internet, so that only sites that were deemed appropriate would be available in Iran. This failed. The real question is how far apart the Iranian public and the regime will drift, and how, when and if this will happen.
It is very difficult to measure the ideological bent of the population. The previous election for the Majles (2012) was boycott by the Reformist bloc so they only received a few seats. The election prior (2008) the "Reformists" had under 20% of the vote. Principalists have controlled the Majles since the 2004 election when they forced the heavily disqualified Reformist majority to the sidelines.
That there are so many members who are not Principalists is encouraging, but doesn't mean too much in the grand scheme of things. The greater system of control by the regime and deep state remains intact, and the Majles will continue to be more or less powerless as it has been for decades. The wins by hardline candidates are important in showing that anti-Westernism is still a fundamental value of the state, but the turnout for those with a different point of view should be encouraging to the West. The situation continues to be multi-faceted and fluid.
The leading vote getters in both elections ended up not being selected to head either the Assembly of Experts (Rafsanjani) or the Majles (Aref). The individual who was selected to lead the Assembly of Experts for the next 2 years (of the 8 year term) was in fact the last place finisher in Tehran.
The "loss" by the "moderates" in both of these decisions was not surprising for a many reasons. The elections were rigged from the beginning, with thousands of candidates disqualified, in particular those with views less in line with the regime. Additionally, as I and others have noted, the "moderate" list was in fact not as moderate as the pro-Iran lobby, and portions of the left in the United States trying to sell the Iran Deal have claimed.
With significant overlap between the "Principalists" and this "moderate" "List of Hope", it was only natural for the more hardline members of the "moderate" list to vote for the hardliners.
This complexity has gone way over many pundits heads here in the West. As the usual suspects point to the hardline victory as proof that there are no moderates (and of course no liberals) in Iran, the reality remains more complex. Again, they miss the greater point, that the elections had to be fixed to undermine genuine attempts from the population to move towards the West and the rest of the international community. The scale of this ideological schism may not be large, and many of the people pushing for change may approve of Iran's unending support for terror groups throughout the region, but the attempts to move away from the anti-Western ideologues must not be ignored.
Each time there is a political event where the hardliners do not win outright, the system, the regime, the deep state is put under pressure. This pressure forces a decision out of the regime; to allow an opening, or to crack down, and repress the population. Either way resources are expended, and the system becomes more unstable. However limited it may be, this instability at home undermines Iran's ability to conduct operations abroad; more attention must be given to preventing civil unrest.
Iran has a choice: to fully embrace autocracy like China, or to reform. They had previously mentioned attempts to create a "halal" internet, so that only sites that were deemed appropriate would be available in Iran. This failed. The real question is how far apart the Iranian public and the regime will drift, and how, when and if this will happen.
It is very difficult to measure the ideological bent of the population. The previous election for the Majles (2012) was boycott by the Reformist bloc so they only received a few seats. The election prior (2008) the "Reformists" had under 20% of the vote. Principalists have controlled the Majles since the 2004 election when they forced the heavily disqualified Reformist majority to the sidelines.
That there are so many members who are not Principalists is encouraging, but doesn't mean too much in the grand scheme of things. The greater system of control by the regime and deep state remains intact, and the Majles will continue to be more or less powerless as it has been for decades. The wins by hardline candidates are important in showing that anti-Westernism is still a fundamental value of the state, but the turnout for those with a different point of view should be encouraging to the West. The situation continues to be multi-faceted and fluid.
Tuesday, March 1, 2016
Iran Elections 2016 Early Thoughts
With many seats remaining unselected until the run-off election, a large number of independents with uncertain affiliations, and overlapping elections lists, there is much left unresolved by the dual Iranian elections. Despite this obvious truth, partisans on both sides in the West have rushed to claim that the results fit their pre-conceived notions of what would happen, and what this means in a larger sense. This is not helped by the spin from Iranian politicians and media. I have seen a bit of both positive and negative; a more complicated scenario which seems too difficult for the hacks to comprehend or accept.
There are a few interesting and undeniable facts about the election.
1) The leading vote-getter was a reformist. Mohammad Reza Aref, was a vice president under Mohammad Khatami, and continues to be a reformist. His revolutionary credentials are without question, yet he managed to pass the Guardian Council's vetting in both the 2013 presidential election (before withdrawing and throwing his support behind eventual winner Rouhani), and this election. He ran in Tehran, the most cosmopolitan and therefore potentially "liberal" part of the country, but the fact that he was able to receive the most votes says a lot.
2) Rafsanjani was able to receive a lot of votes. I've written a lot on Hashemi Rafsanjani in the past and for good reason; he is one of the most interesting remaining revolutionary leaders. He conspired with Khamenei to remove Ayatollah Montazeri as Deputy Supreme Leader, yet since 2009 has aligned himself with the moderates and reformists. He has been wildly unpopular for his perceived corruption, as well as his political positions, but he seems have to changed this. The state-sponsored persecution of his family may have something to do with reformists and moderates accepting him.
3) The overlapping lists don't help in understanding the political bent of the Majles and Assembly of Experts. The wonderful folks at IranPolitik.com have posted this great graphic illustrating the complexity of the lists and how the actual results are hard to understand at this point
There are a few interesting and undeniable facts about the election.
1) The leading vote-getter was a reformist. Mohammad Reza Aref, was a vice president under Mohammad Khatami, and continues to be a reformist. His revolutionary credentials are without question, yet he managed to pass the Guardian Council's vetting in both the 2013 presidential election (before withdrawing and throwing his support behind eventual winner Rouhani), and this election. He ran in Tehran, the most cosmopolitan and therefore potentially "liberal" part of the country, but the fact that he was able to receive the most votes says a lot.
2) Rafsanjani was able to receive a lot of votes. I've written a lot on Hashemi Rafsanjani in the past and for good reason; he is one of the most interesting remaining revolutionary leaders. He conspired with Khamenei to remove Ayatollah Montazeri as Deputy Supreme Leader, yet since 2009 has aligned himself with the moderates and reformists. He has been wildly unpopular for his perceived corruption, as well as his political positions, but he seems have to changed this. The state-sponsored persecution of his family may have something to do with reformists and moderates accepting him.
3) The overlapping lists don't help in understanding the political bent of the Majles and Assembly of Experts. The wonderful folks at IranPolitik.com have posted this great graphic illustrating the complexity of the lists and how the actual results are hard to understand at this point
Our summary of #IranElections2016 Assembly of Experts results pic.twitter.com/6lCGp8WzUC— IranPolitik (@IranPolitik) March 1, 2016
The "List of Hope", billed by US media and others as a reformist-moderate coalition, is actually more socially conservative and likely hostile to the US than it would seem.
Here is the corresponding graphic for the Majles:
Our summary of #IranElections2016 Parliament results. As with our AoE graphic this is based on analysis of lists. pic.twitter.com/PfqU58XOxT— IranPolitik (@IranPolitik) March 2, 2016
This is hard to bill as a "reformist" victory, as the List of Hope is a mixture of reformists, moderates and conservative pragmatists. Additionally, a 27.5% share, while currently the largest, is not so significant.
This is understandable as Iranian politics are notoriously faction-based, and personal issues can cause individuals to switch alliances. Ali Motahari, a conservative with somewhat pragmatic inclinations is a prime example of this. He was on the List of Hope, but no one in their right mind would categorize him as a reformist.
4) The List of Hope did very well in Tehran, but less so in other parts of the country. This shows that Tehran isn't necessarily Iran, but also that there is a concentration of like-minded individuals in this area.
5) Results outside Tehran really cut into the List of Hope's success in the capital. While Aref has a slight chance to become the speaker of the Majles, there are still plenty of conservative voices that will strongly oppose this.
6) The positive feelings about the Iran Deal in the less anti-Western population are clearly evident in Tehran. Despite obvious tampering, and some ridiculous rulings from the Guardian Council (approving a 24 year old to run for the clerical body, the Assembly of Experts, is laughable), the Iranian public seems to have accepted the regime for at least this election.
7) The Majles does not have much power to change the law no matter (see the "changed" child marriage law under Khatami on the top of page 5), but it is a symbolic victory of sorts, and that a clear reformist ended up with the most votes should deeply frighten the hardliners.
8) The Assembly of Experts results could come back to haunt the hardliners. There appears to be a sizable block of reformists/moderates/pragmatists that are capable of preventing a hardline Supreme Leader or Supreme Council if Khamenei dies this term. Additionally, two of the most hardline candidates lost their seats, Ayatollahs Yazdi, and Mesbah Yazdi. Hardliner Gholam-ali Haddad-Adel also lost his seat in the Majles
9) The incredibly low incumbency rate (30%) makes the situation even more unclear. As many of the individuals are new, it is uncertain how they may be as members of parliament.
I still support the JCPOA. Frankly, there was no chance of continuing the level of sanctions necessary to force the regime change we desperately want, especially given the unwillingness of European partners, not to mention the much less friendly Russian and Chinese interests. It is unrealistic to argue that other states would have gotten on board with unending sanctions. Italy and Greece have been highly dependent on Iranian oil, as has India, South Korea and South Africa, all countries that otherwise may have accepted a US political position. The result was not ideal, but given the number of disqualifications, a very strong showing in Tehran for a clearly defined reformist is encouraging. The hardliners are threatened by the results, and while their ability to control the population through their standard nefarious methods remains mostly unchecked, the ideological threat of a reform-minded populace has to be of concern for them.
Thursday, February 4, 2016
Leading up to the Iranian Elections
Iranian domestic affairs are notoriously difficult to predict. This is especially true at such an important moment in the Islamic Republic when the stakes are as high as they have ever been. Rumors, unreliable polling and opaqueness in the approval and electoral process have made this election (like most previous ones), very interesting.
I have a few expectations and predictions to share, based upon what has happened so far. Here is how I have come to these conclusions:
As I have made quite clear, I supported the Iran nuclear negotiations/JPOA/JCPOA because of the potential to influence this coming set of elections, as well as the Iranian youth in general. Empowered reformists and pragmatists/moderates, leads to more pressure for Iran domestically. This (at least temporarily) reduces its ability to be disruptive regionally and internationally (especially in Syria and the Gulf). This election is vital for hardliners as they are on the defensive from the implications of a negotiated settlement with the West. Any sort of agreement with the West goes against their core ideology, and the violation of nearly all of Khamenei's 'red lines' is indisputable.
Western hardliners have argued that the backlash against moderates and reformists by Khamenei and Iranian hardliners is from a position of strength, but this couldn't be further from the truth. This election is a chance for hardliners to take back the momentum, and the actions of the Guardian Council in rejecting various candidates, the refusal of Khamenei to overrule them, and the assorted hostile acts by the IRGC-Navy in the Gulf are all part of a larger strategy to distance Iran from the West.
I was surprised by the numbers of reformists excluded from elections. I knew there would be a massive number of rejections, but I did not anticipate that the number would be so high. This more than anything shows the insecurity of the establishment. Rejections of moderates in addition to the previously mentioned reformists reinforces this.
The exclusion of Hassan Khomeini, a cleric and grandson of the Islamic Republic's first Supreme Leader, is particularly troubling for democracy and reform in Iran, but I would not count him, or the reform movement out yet.
One reason for these massive disqualifications (which is coupled with an unprecedented number of applications for these electoral races) is the complexity of rigging municipal elections on a nation-wide scale. The 2009 stolen election was much easier to manipulate because it was an election for only one position with only 2 serious candidates (4 total). The Majles has nearly 300 seats and the Assembly of Experts has 88. Because so many candidates were excluded, some of these seats have no competition (for example the provinces of Ardabil, Azerbaijan West, Bushehr, Hormuzgan, Khorasan North and Semnan), and hardliners will automatically win the seat(s) in these locations.
While hardliners have the natural advantage as they control the bodies concerned with oversight, I would not count out the Iranian people. I expect large numbers to turn out and vote, especially for reformists and moderates. Sanctions have just been removed, and there is optimism. The challenge here is that Rouhani's efforts to repair the extensive damage of the past administration have not been entirely successful, and Iran is still struggling with inflation and budgetary issues.
The actions from the Iranian government before the elections are important. Will they cave and allow more reformists and moderates to run? There were rumors of this happening, but as of yet, it has not been confirmed. The more pragmatists are allowed to run, the further the election can swing in their favor.
Rouhani seems to have aspirations to be the next Supreme Leader, and he knows that he will never gain this position if the hardliners handily win this election.
If there are additional plans to fix the elections I would suspect the Assembly of Experts to be around 75-80% hardliners, perhaps even more, and at least 60% of the Parliament (Majles) to be this way. I think the establishment is aware that if they go much higher, there are serious risks for another mass protest like 2009.
The unknown for me is how badly the election has to be stolen for the Iranian public to protest en masse.
As long as the reformist/moderate/pragmatist groups vote and expect the result to reflect their voting preferences, I would be cautiously optimistic for either a result or resulting protests. In either case, the current attitude of the Iranian state is unsustainable, and unacceptable and I see this election as key for moving towards making necessary changes.
UPDATE #1 (02/05/16): It appears as though an undetermined number of Majles candidates will now be allowed to run as the Guardian Council has reversed their decision in approximately 20-25% of cases:
I have a few expectations and predictions to share, based upon what has happened so far. Here is how I have come to these conclusions:
As I have made quite clear, I supported the Iran nuclear negotiations/JPOA/JCPOA because of the potential to influence this coming set of elections, as well as the Iranian youth in general. Empowered reformists and pragmatists/moderates, leads to more pressure for Iran domestically. This (at least temporarily) reduces its ability to be disruptive regionally and internationally (especially in Syria and the Gulf). This election is vital for hardliners as they are on the defensive from the implications of a negotiated settlement with the West. Any sort of agreement with the West goes against their core ideology, and the violation of nearly all of Khamenei's 'red lines' is indisputable.
Western hardliners have argued that the backlash against moderates and reformists by Khamenei and Iranian hardliners is from a position of strength, but this couldn't be further from the truth. This election is a chance for hardliners to take back the momentum, and the actions of the Guardian Council in rejecting various candidates, the refusal of Khamenei to overrule them, and the assorted hostile acts by the IRGC-Navy in the Gulf are all part of a larger strategy to distance Iran from the West.
I was surprised by the numbers of reformists excluded from elections. I knew there would be a massive number of rejections, but I did not anticipate that the number would be so high. This more than anything shows the insecurity of the establishment. Rejections of moderates in addition to the previously mentioned reformists reinforces this.
The exclusion of Hassan Khomeini, a cleric and grandson of the Islamic Republic's first Supreme Leader, is particularly troubling for democracy and reform in Iran, but I would not count him, or the reform movement out yet.
One reason for these massive disqualifications (which is coupled with an unprecedented number of applications for these electoral races) is the complexity of rigging municipal elections on a nation-wide scale. The 2009 stolen election was much easier to manipulate because it was an election for only one position with only 2 serious candidates (4 total). The Majles has nearly 300 seats and the Assembly of Experts has 88. Because so many candidates were excluded, some of these seats have no competition (for example the provinces of Ardabil, Azerbaijan West, Bushehr, Hormuzgan, Khorasan North and Semnan), and hardliners will automatically win the seat(s) in these locations.
While hardliners have the natural advantage as they control the bodies concerned with oversight, I would not count out the Iranian people. I expect large numbers to turn out and vote, especially for reformists and moderates. Sanctions have just been removed, and there is optimism. The challenge here is that Rouhani's efforts to repair the extensive damage of the past administration have not been entirely successful, and Iran is still struggling with inflation and budgetary issues.
The actions from the Iranian government before the elections are important. Will they cave and allow more reformists and moderates to run? There were rumors of this happening, but as of yet, it has not been confirmed. The more pragmatists are allowed to run, the further the election can swing in their favor.
Rouhani seems to have aspirations to be the next Supreme Leader, and he knows that he will never gain this position if the hardliners handily win this election.
If there are additional plans to fix the elections I would suspect the Assembly of Experts to be around 75-80% hardliners, perhaps even more, and at least 60% of the Parliament (Majles) to be this way. I think the establishment is aware that if they go much higher, there are serious risks for another mass protest like 2009.
The unknown for me is how badly the election has to be stolen for the Iranian public to protest en masse.
As long as the reformist/moderate/pragmatist groups vote and expect the result to reflect their voting preferences, I would be cautiously optimistic for either a result or resulting protests. In either case, the current attitude of the Iranian state is unsustainable, and unacceptable and I see this election as key for moving towards making necessary changes.
UPDATE #1 (02/05/16): It appears as though an undetermined number of Majles candidates will now be allowed to run as the Guardian Council has reversed their decision in approximately 20-25% of cases:
Again because of the absurd opaqueness of the system it is unclear where this decision was made and why it was made. It is believed that various high-level figures were upset with the decision to bar so many candidates. At this time however, the identities and political affiliations of the candidates are unknown, so it is just as likely that hardliners, or even moderates were approved ahead of reformists.Iran Guardian Council Spox Nejatollah Ebrahimian: 20-25% of previously disqualified parliamentary election candidates now qualified to run.— Hanif Zarrabi-K. (@hanifzk) February 5, 2016
Saturday, July 18, 2015
Khamenei's Eid al Fitr Speech
Ayatollah Khamenei's Eid al Fitr speech has received quite a bit of attention in the international press (here, here and here) because it is the first time Khamenei has spoken directly about the recent nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran. The speech was nothing out of the ordinary, as Khamenei repeated the same tropes he has repeated for decades. This was immediately jumped upon as proof that Iran, and Khamenei in particular, negotiated in bad faith, that Iran will never change et cetera et cetera. It is much more complicated than this.
Once again, the people saying this do little more than display their intense narcissism and lack of political acumen. These speeches are nearly always about domestic issues more than international ones (even when talking about international affairs), and at the same time they must be taken in context. Khamenei is a reactionary, a pragmatic one at that, but his political bent remains one way and will remain this way. This doesn't mean that Iran isn't going to change; Khamenei himself is threatened by this change and must act to mitigate this. The Eid al Fitr speech is a way for him to do this.
Rouhani, like Khatami a decade ago and Montazeri 30 years ago, is a challenge to the Ayatollah's politics. This coming year is a most important one, as the Majles and the Assembly of Experts both are slated to hold one of the most significant elections in the history of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei wishes to ensure his legacy continues once he dies, which means stifling domestic dissent, especially reformists, and electing a conservative AoE, so that if Khamenei were to die during this 8 year term, an 'acceptable' principalist candidate (or candidates) are selected to succeed him.
Iran needed the sanctions relief, and this gives room to Rouhani and his administration to improve the economy (one of the few important things the Iranian president has some degree of control over), but at the same time Khamenei wants to makes sure that the hardliners are not sidelined. I expect crackdowns, especially in the media (probably a closure or a lawsuit directed at reformist newspapers or journalists), as Khamenei tries to give a boost to the Islamic right.
Once again, the people saying this do little more than display their intense narcissism and lack of political acumen. These speeches are nearly always about domestic issues more than international ones (even when talking about international affairs), and at the same time they must be taken in context. Khamenei is a reactionary, a pragmatic one at that, but his political bent remains one way and will remain this way. This doesn't mean that Iran isn't going to change; Khamenei himself is threatened by this change and must act to mitigate this. The Eid al Fitr speech is a way for him to do this.
Rouhani, like Khatami a decade ago and Montazeri 30 years ago, is a challenge to the Ayatollah's politics. This coming year is a most important one, as the Majles and the Assembly of Experts both are slated to hold one of the most significant elections in the history of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei wishes to ensure his legacy continues once he dies, which means stifling domestic dissent, especially reformists, and electing a conservative AoE, so that if Khamenei were to die during this 8 year term, an 'acceptable' principalist candidate (or candidates) are selected to succeed him.
Iran needed the sanctions relief, and this gives room to Rouhani and his administration to improve the economy (one of the few important things the Iranian president has some degree of control over), but at the same time Khamenei wants to makes sure that the hardliners are not sidelined. I expect crackdowns, especially in the media (probably a closure or a lawsuit directed at reformist newspapers or journalists), as Khamenei tries to give a boost to the Islamic right.
Sunday, March 22, 2015
The Ayatollah's Spam Bots
I noticed a few hours ago a rash of spam bots on Twitter promoting Ayatollah Khamenei's letter 'To the Youth in Europe and North America' while searching for something which would seem to be completely unrelated. The bots appear to be using the reasonable hashtags #Letter4u and #LetterForAll in every tweet along with a mixture of completely irrelevant (and nonsensical) ones such as #CNN, #Canada and #StandWithIsrael, and a photo with a quote from Khamenei. In every tweet there is a shortened link which redirects to Khamenei's website and the letter.
The bots seem to be on some sort of cycle where accounts post a pattern of tweets in a particular order.
There are hundreds if not thousands of accounts, most of them with over 10000 tweets. Twitter has a limit of 1000 tweets per day, and the accounts seem to have been created with this in mind.
Many of the accounts use fake photos taken from a variety of places. Some of them show celebrities, while others journalists or other media personalities.
As far as I can tell, the bots started around 10 days ago and have continued tweeting incessantly. The timing makes me think that this is in response to the letter from the 47 GOP senators, but as Holly Dagres noted in early February of this year, something similar happened on Instagram with spammed photos and quotes and hashtags. Perhaps it is just a coincidence, but I believe there is a connection to the letter.
UPDATE #1: Some of the hashtags used by the spam bots (in addition to #Letter4u and #Letter4all). From my count that is 67 hashtags co-opted by the spam bots (not counting the 2 'letter' ones). They appear to repeat every hour or so on a loop.
#israel #Netanyahu #Netanyahuspeech #StandWithIsrael
#irondome
#Obama
#Jerusalem #Zionism
#news #RT #BBC #BBCNews #CNN #NBC #ISIS #Israel #world
#USA #Canada
#netherlands #italy
#LeaderSpeaks
#supremeleader
#Message #leadership
#youth
#GazaUnderAttack #Gaza
#argentine #British
#America
#london #Cuba #uk
#Spanish #spain
#european
#Europe #Europa
#USANews
#SkyNews #Guardian
#DailyMail
#worldnews
#foxnews #NBC #Reuters
#NP
#Paris #JeSuisCharlie
#french #CharlieHebdo
#AFP
#muhammad #Iranian
#irantalks
#Iran
#Khamenei #khamenei_ir
#islamist #Quran #God
#Islamic #islamisten
#muslims #Muslim
#IslamicState
UPDATE #2:
Quite a few of the accounts sending the spam have been suspended! I've been on a mission tweeting to people whose photos were used by the attackers, and it looks like at least quite a few of the fake accounts are suspended. Twitter searches for "Iron Dome" and "Stand With Israel", "Netanyahu", #GazaUnderAttack, #CharlieHebdo, and #JeSuisCharlie don't result in hundreds of spam tweets anymore. Unfortunately hashtags like #BBCNews, #AFP, #IslamicState, are still clogged, but kudos to Twitter and the support folks for finally doing something about this obnoxious nonsense.
UPDATE #3:
There is a new set of spam bots that has been operational for just over a week which I'd not seen yet.
They also link to some youtube videos, and a file at 4shared.com which is apparently owned by someone who is named here. The name again seems to be a fake.
They use an entirely different set of hashtags including:
#letter4youth #Fair #Equality #Hezbollah #Message
#finland #czech #denmark #sweden
#USAnew
#Taliban #Alqaeda #Bokoharam
#euronews_sport #UEFAcom #uefacomLIVE #AP
#topix_usnews #President #5_News #nprnews
#euronews #neurope
#BreakingNewsUK #SkyNewsBreak #WSJbreaking
#TIME #WSJ #USABreakingNews #Jerusalem_Post
#haaretzcom #IsraelinUSA
#germany
#brazil
#Teen
#AlJazeera #france24
I hope that Twitter does something about this parallel set of spam bots, and if this is a real name they are dealt with appropriately.
UPDATE #4:
All of the spam bot accounts that I have seen are suspended! I've tried searching for all the various hashtags and nothing shows up. Hopefully this is permanent and the spam bots don't start up again.
UPDATE #5:
The bots are back in town
UPDATE #8:
The bots have evidently ceased tweeting. They appear to be still active accounts and not banned or suspended, but none of the ones I am familiar with have tweeted in 15 hours. Hopefully this is the end of the plague, but they've proven malleable and capable of change so I am not too optimistic.
#PT there are a variety of bit.ly shortened links, it seems they all redirect to @khamenei_ir’s website
— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) March 22, 2015
The bots seem to be on some sort of cycle where accounts post a pattern of tweets in a particular order.
well this is friggin creepy. #pro-#iran hackers seem to have been busy on @twitter… #IranTalks #nuclear pic.twitter.com/921cSU3NNx
— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) March 22, 2015
There are hundreds if not thousands of accounts, most of them with over 10000 tweets. Twitter has a limit of 1000 tweets per day, and the accounts seem to have been created with this in mind.
Many of the accounts use fake photos taken from a variety of places. Some of them show celebrities, while others journalists or other media personalities.
.@AnnaLindow thought you should be aware of this: someone using your photo and spreading pro-#Iran govt propaganda pic.twitter.com/CzqlZAJY97
— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) March 22, 2015
#PT looks like they don’t care if its someone with the correct gender… That isn’t a Sarah… #IranSpamBots pic.twitter.com/c4GTy14WoG
— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) March 22, 2015
.@AndrewWrites thought you should be aware of this: someone using your photo and spreading pro-#Iran govt propaganda pic.twitter.com/2BXUdBZSR5
— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) March 22, 2015
Nice beard Ms. ‘Amy Bryant' pic.twitter.com/gVwAZ6xn2Q
— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) March 22, 2015
As far as I can tell, the bots started around 10 days ago and have continued tweeting incessantly. The timing makes me think that this is in response to the letter from the 47 GOP senators, but as Holly Dagres noted in early February of this year, something similar happened on Instagram with spammed photos and quotes and hashtags. Perhaps it is just a coincidence, but I believe there is a connection to the letter.
UPDATE #1: Some of the hashtags used by the spam bots (in addition to #Letter4u and #Letter4all). From my count that is 67 hashtags co-opted by the spam bots (not counting the 2 'letter' ones). They appear to repeat every hour or so on a loop.
#israel #Netanyahu #Netanyahuspeech #StandWithIsrael
#irondome
#Obama
#Jerusalem #Zionism
#news #RT #BBC #BBCNews #CNN #NBC #ISIS #Israel #world
#USA #Canada
#netherlands #italy
#LeaderSpeaks
#supremeleader
#Message #leadership
#youth
#GazaUnderAttack #Gaza
#argentine #British
#America
#london #Cuba #uk
#Spanish #spain
#european
#Europe #Europa
#USANews
#SkyNews #Guardian
#DailyMail
#worldnews
#foxnews #NBC #Reuters
#NP
#Paris #JeSuisCharlie
#french #CharlieHebdo
#AFP
#muhammad #Iranian
#irantalks
#Iran
#Khamenei #khamenei_ir
#islamist #Quran #God
#Islamic #islamisten
#muslims #Muslim
#IslamicState
UPDATE #2:
Quite a few of the accounts sending the spam have been suspended! I've been on a mission tweeting to people whose photos were used by the attackers, and it looks like at least quite a few of the fake accounts are suspended. Twitter searches for "Iron Dome" and "Stand With Israel", "Netanyahu", #GazaUnderAttack, #CharlieHebdo, and #JeSuisCharlie don't result in hundreds of spam tweets anymore. Unfortunately hashtags like #BBCNews, #AFP, #IslamicState, are still clogged, but kudos to Twitter and the support folks for finally doing something about this obnoxious nonsense.
UPDATE #3:
There is a new set of spam bots that has been operational for just over a week which I'd not seen yet.
They also link to some youtube videos, and a file at 4shared.com which is apparently owned by someone who is named here. The name again seems to be a fake.
#letter4youth #Fair #Equality #Hezbollah #Message
#finland #czech #denmark #sweden
#USAnew
#Taliban #Alqaeda #Bokoharam
#euronews_sport #UEFAcom #uefacomLIVE #AP
#topix_usnews #President #5_News #nprnews
#euronews #neurope
#BreakingNewsUK #SkyNewsBreak #WSJbreaking
#TIME #WSJ #USABreakingNews #Jerusalem_Post
#haaretzcom #IsraelinUSA
#germany
#brazil
#Teen
#AlJazeera #france24
I hope that Twitter does something about this parallel set of spam bots, and if this is a real name they are dealt with appropriately.
UPDATE #4:
All of the spam bot accounts that I have seen are suspended! I've tried searching for all the various hashtags and nothing shows up. Hopefully this is permanent and the spam bots don't start up again.
UPDATE #5:
The bots are back in town
UPDATE #6:
More bots
they appear to be using some strange service or hack to post these tweets. usually TweetDeck will tell me what app or site the user is using to post their tweets (so here is my tweet showing I use TweetDeck). When something like this showing "TweetDeck" or "Twitter Web Client" shows up, the text is a clickable link. These clickable links either don't lead anywhere or they redirect to sites that have invalid security certificates.
UPDATE #7:
The bots are still going and Twitter doesn't care. Just counting these 10 accounts there are close to 900k tweets now (this screenshot was taken a few days ago and each bot posts just under 1k tweets per day)
882 THOUSAND pro-#Iran regime spam tweets from these 10 accounts. @twitter @support @jack @dickc have done nothing pic.twitter.com/w1V0zsdO3Z
— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) June 10, 2015
Including this other account which I neglected to include there are over 1 million spam tweets. I find it strange that they wouldn't care about halting this.
UPDATE #8:
The bots have evidently ceased tweeting. They appear to be still active accounts and not banned or suspended, but none of the ones I am familiar with have tweeted in 15 hours. Hopefully this is the end of the plague, but they've proven malleable and capable of change so I am not too optimistic.
UPDATE #9:
Khamenei released another open letter, and coincidentally an inordinate number of bots started tweeting his nonsense. The letter was released yesterday, and the bots started tweeting immediately. The patterns of tweeting are different (it seems one account will send around 10 very quickly, and then another account will emulate this), but the fact that they are also using a service spoofer, and they seem to have started tweeting this letter almost immediately makes me think there is a connection to the regime. There are still some incompetencies including broken hashtags, but they are using mostly photos of people that appear to be moderately realistic (compare to the last set where there were photos of an Orthodox Jew tweeting Islamist rhetoric).
Lastly the profile pictures do appear to be stolen, though as I mentioned they are much less suspicious than previous versions.
At the same time, it appears as though several Iranian (and non-Iranians) journalists that had tweeted about the Ayatollah's letter have been suspended by Twitter per Iranian government request? At the same time Twitter ignores this same government's spam bots abusing its service?
UPDATE #10:
Another weird development. It appears as though the spam continues, and the spamming accounts are not blocked, but their spam tweets aren't also showing up and searching for the hashtags used results in no results. To test this, I tweeted with the #Letter4U hashtag and it did show up in the search results. I also tried this with #CommonWorry and a similar thing happened
UDATE #11 (12/15/15):
Another strange development. A series of bots tweeting in Dutch about Khamenei's letter. This group has between 7000 and 63000 followers, follows 18-63 accounts, has tweeted 138-163 times (as of this update), and has 'liked' 71-79 tweets. They are all using the same service spoofing methods as previous bots. I am curious why they chose to tweet in Dutch and if there are parallel set-ups in other languages. I would suspect that the followers are bought.
accounts used: QuyhgMelton
RebeccaOyiuhjy
NneitensteinAa
MikDean201
RarickR16
QoscarUrian
mui_rebecca
Second group:
PeterStekiel
Ania_Niedieck
Nina_Braun12
B__Muller
OY123121
 |
| Taking names and photos from different accounts to create spam accounts |
UPDATE #12 (12/16/15):
I found some German spam bots tweeting about the letter:
kluge_diana
ZManuela2
DuerrJurgen
mahler_stefanie
eric_wagner0
donnacasshrist1
flix_schulz
KrugerRobert5
tracyspeterson
They have very different metrics than the Dutch set. Namely, less followers and more tweets.
UPDATE #13 (12/16/15):
More bots, posting graphics about Khamenei's letter, or terrorism or whatever. Using trending hashtags in all different languages.
Also the bots have figured out how to get past Twitter's filtering of the #Letter4U and #CommonWorry hashtags
UPDATE #14 (12/21/15)
The bots from Update #13 have been suspended, while the bots from Update #12 ceased tweeting 6 days ago.
However, another set of new bots with quite a few followers have emerged. These look like the most sophisticated by far, even though they clearly are bots. They tweet without links or photos at times, and do so in a way that makes it seem as though they are real users. It is clear they are not because these bots copy each other verbatim. These changes appear to have fooled whatever basic filter Twitter's staff implemented to mute them. The bots tweet in at least 2 languages, and I would suspect they use more than just these two. As the last 8 months have demonstrated Twitter has no interest in stopping regime sanctioned spam bot floods, while they BANNED Sputnik_INTL a clearly marked parody account mocking the "news" org Sputnik. Curious that their actions have supported Russia and Iran...
UPDATE #15 (12/22/15):
There is now a group of MeK bots tweeting and retweeting each other about Iran regime abuses and various other current affairs news. They are also using the #Letter4U hashtag sometimes which the filter put in place by Twitter is incapable of catching. The bots link to an MeK site where news stories (or propaganda) are hosted. These are often taken verbatim from other sites.
UPDATE #16 (02/05/16):
The author and journalist Azadeh Moaveni wrote for Foreign Policy about attempts from Iranian intelligence to entrap her and to also get advice on how to promote the #Letter4U campaign. There clearly are major deficiencies in the execution of the outreach program. I also stumbled upon a bizarre group that set up a booth at Wayne State University near Detroit (and Dearborn, Michigan) to promote the Ayatollah's message and letters. This group seems to be affiliated with a Canadian NGO. It is unclear if any laws are being broken by promoting Iran regime propaganda, but they've not seem to gained much attention so far so I would assume its not of great concern at the moment.
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