Hardline Assembly of Experts Chair and Conservative Majles Speaker Selected

As expected, a hardliner and a conservative were selected to head both Iranian governmental bodies "elected" a few months back.

The leading vote getters in both elections ended up not being selected to head either the Assembly of Experts (Rafsanjani) or the Majles (Aref). The individual who was selected to lead the Assembly of Experts for the next 2 years (of the 8 year term) was in fact the last place finisher in Tehran.

The "loss" by the "moderates" in both of these decisions was not surprising for a many reasons. The elections were rigged from the beginning, with thousands of candidates disqualified, in particular those with views less in line with the regime. Additionally, as I and others have noted, the "moderate" list was in fact not as moderate as the pro-Iran lobby, and portions of the left in the United States trying to sell the Iran Deal have claimed.

With significant overlap between the "Principalists" and this "moderate" "List of Hope", it was only natural for the more hardline members of the "moderate" list to vote for the hardliners.

This complexity has gone way over many pundits heads here in the West. As the usual suspects point to the hardline victory as proof that there are no moderates (and of course no liberals) in Iran, the reality remains more complex. Again, they miss the greater point, that the elections had to be fixed to undermine genuine attempts from the population to move towards the West and the rest of the international community. The scale of this ideological schism may not be large, and many of the people pushing for change may approve of Iran's unending support for terror groups throughout the region, but the attempts to move away from the anti-Western ideologues must not be ignored.

Each time there is a political event where the hardliners do not win outright, the system, the regime, the deep state is put under pressure. This pressure forces a decision out of the regime; to allow an opening, or to crack down, and repress the population. Either way resources are expended, and the system becomes more unstable. However limited it may be, this instability at home undermines Iran's ability to conduct operations abroad; more attention must be given to preventing civil unrest.

Iran has a choice: to fully embrace autocracy like China, or to reform. They had previously mentioned attempts to create a "halal" internet, so that only sites that were deemed appropriate would be available in Iran. This failed. The real question is how far apart the Iranian public and the regime will drift, and how, when and if this will happen.

It is very difficult to measure the ideological bent of the population. The previous election for the Majles (2012) was boycott by the Reformist bloc so they only received a few seats. The election prior (2008) the "Reformists" had under 20% of the vote. Principalists have controlled the Majles since the 2004 election when they forced the heavily disqualified Reformist majority to the sidelines.

That there are so many members who are not Principalists is encouraging, but doesn't mean too much in the grand scheme of things. The greater system of control by the regime and deep state remains intact, and the Majles will continue to be more or less powerless as it has been for decades. The wins by hardline candidates are important in showing that anti-Westernism is still a fundamental value of the state, but the turnout for those with a different point of view should be encouraging to the West. The situation continues to be multi-faceted and fluid.

Iran Elections 2016 Early Thoughts

With many seats remaining unselected until the run-off election, a large number of independents with uncertain affiliations, and overlapping elections lists, there is much left unresolved by the dual Iranian elections. Despite this obvious truth, partisans on both sides in the West have rushed to claim that the results fit their pre-conceived notions of what would happen, and what this means in a larger sense. This is not helped by the spin from Iranian politicians and media. I have seen a bit of both positive and negative; a more complicated scenario which seems too difficult for the hacks to comprehend or accept.

There are a few interesting and undeniable facts about the election.

1) The leading vote-getter was a reformist. Mohammad Reza Aref, was a vice president under Mohammad Khatami, and continues to be a reformist. His revolutionary credentials are without question, yet he managed to pass the Guardian Council's vetting in both the 2013 presidential election (before withdrawing and throwing his support behind eventual winner Rouhani), and this election. He ran in Tehran, the most cosmopolitan and therefore potentially "liberal" part of the country, but the fact that he was able to receive the most votes says a lot.

2) Rafsanjani was able to receive a lot of votes. I've written a lot on Hashemi Rafsanjani in the past and for good reason; he is one of the most interesting remaining revolutionary leaders. He conspired with Khamenei to remove Ayatollah Montazeri as Deputy Supreme Leader, yet since 2009 has aligned himself with the moderates and reformists. He has been wildly unpopular for his perceived corruption, as well as his political positions, but he seems have to changed this. The state-sponsored persecution of his family may have something to do with reformists and moderates accepting him.

3) The overlapping lists don't help in understanding the political bent of the Majles and Assembly of Experts. The wonderful folks at IranPolitik.com have posted this great graphic illustrating the complexity of the lists and how the actual results are hard to understand at this point

Our summary of #IranElections2016 Assembly of Experts results pic.twitter.com/6lCGp8WzUC

— IranPolitik (@IranPolitik) March 1, 2016

The "List of Hope", billed by US media and others as a reformist-moderate coalition, is actually more socially conservative and likely hostile to the US than it would seem.

Here is the corresponding graphic for the Majles:

Our summary of #IranElections2016 Parliament results. As with our AoE graphic this is based on analysis of lists. pic.twitter.com/PfqU58XOxT

— IranPolitik (@IranPolitik) March 2, 2016

This is hard to bill as a "reformist" victory, as the List of Hope is a mixture of reformists, moderates and conservative pragmatists. Additionally, a 27.5% share, while currently the largest, is not so significant. 

This is understandable as Iranian politics are notoriously faction-based, and personal issues can cause individuals to switch alliances. Ali Motahari, a conservative with somewhat pragmatic inclinations is a prime example of this. He was on the List of Hope, but no one in their right mind would categorize him as a reformist.

4) The List of Hope did very well in Tehran, but less so in other parts of the country. This shows that Tehran isn't necessarily Iran, but also that there is a concentration of like-minded individuals in this area. 

5) Results outside Tehran really cut into the List of Hope's success in the capital. While Aref has a slight chance to become the speaker of the Majles, there are still plenty of conservative voices that will strongly oppose this. 

6) The positive feelings about the Iran Deal in the less anti-Western population are clearly evident in Tehran. Despite obvious tampering, and some ridiculous rulings from the Guardian Council (approving a 24 year old to run for the clerical body, the Assembly of Experts, is laughable), the Iranian public seems to have accepted the regime for at least this election.

7) The Majles does not have much power to change the law no matter (see the "changed" child marriage law under Khatami on the top of page 5), but it is a symbolic victory of sorts, and that a clear reformist ended up with the most votes should deeply frighten the hardliners.

8) The Assembly of Experts results could come back to haunt the hardliners. There appears to be a sizable block of reformists/moderates/pragmatists that are capable of preventing a hardline Supreme Leader or Supreme Council if Khamenei dies this term. Additionally, two of the most hardline candidates lost their seats, Ayatollahs Yazdi, and Mesbah Yazdi. Hardliner Gholam-ali Haddad-Adel also lost his seat in the Majles

9) The incredibly low incumbency rate (30%) makes the situation even more unclear. As many of the individuals are new, it is uncertain how they may be as members of parliament. 

I still support the JCPOA. Frankly, there was no chance of continuing the level of sanctions necessary to force the regime change we desperately want, especially given the unwillingness of European partners, not to mention the much less friendly Russian and Chinese interests. It is unrealistic to argue that other states would have gotten on board with unending sanctions. Italy and Greece have been highly dependent on Iranian oil, as has India, South Korea and South Africa, all countries that otherwise may have accepted a US political position. The result was not ideal, but given the number of disqualifications, a very strong showing in Tehran for a clearly defined reformist is encouraging. The hardliners are threatened by the results, and while their ability to control the population through their standard nefarious methods remains mostly unchecked, the ideological threat of a reform-minded populace has to be of concern for them. 

Hashemi Jailed, Ahmadi-Nezhad Hoping for a Comeback?

Two significant events occurred this past week concerning Iranian domestic politics.

1) Mehdi Hashemi, the son of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (former president and former head of the Assembly of Experts, and current head of the Expediency Council), was sentenced to 10 years in prison for his role in corruption and other associated crimes

2) Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nezhad (another former president) attempted to create a new political party for his followers (YEKTA) which evidently has been banned the day after formation.

Both of these events show attempts to reinforce the status quo among the Iranian governing elite. Hashemi's family has suffered intense persecution since the 2009 election when the former president gave nominal support to the Green Movement. He has since lost his position as head of the Assembly of Experts (and failed in his 2015 re-election bid), though his protégé Hassan Rouhani's surprising election to the Iranian presidency in 2013 shows that he and his ideology has at least some public support.

Ahmadi-Nezhad's comeback has been quiet, though his position in the Expediency Council (a body appointed by the Supreme Leader) shows that he is not necessarily out of the picture indefinitely.

These events show the power and conservatism of the Iranian political system and how difficult 'change' can be. The upcoming legislative elections are sure to be very interesting as reformists will feel empowered by the relatively moderate Rouhani election, and conservatives will be desperate to stamp out this reemerging threat.

Despite this, a person like Ahmadi-Nezhad could turn the situation on its head if he manages to gain enough momentum to pose a threat to the established conservative factions. Iranian domestic politics are so multi-faceted any power shifts can lead to unprecedented and indeterminate changes.

Next Chairman of the Assembly of Experts

With the recent death of Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani following a a several month long coma, a new chairman of the Assembly of Experts will be chosen soon. The Islamic Republic is still undergoing what Matthew Wells called a 'Thermidor', and fighting between Iranian political factions continues. At such a pivotal time, with remaining questions over the health of the Supreme Leader, the chairmanship is increasingly important and all the factions will want the position to go to someone who will promote their agenda.

Acting Chairman Ayatollah Shahroudi is a possibility for the position, along with former Chairman, Chairman of the Majles, and President of Iran, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani. For years there have been poor relations between Rafsanjani and his family and conservative elements of the Islamic Republic, and a return as chairman of the Assembly of Experts is probably too much to hope for for Rafsanjani. Shahroudi is more likely, but it would not surprise me if someone else entirely gets selected.

The Chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts is more than symbolically important, and at this critical time, the decision is an important one.

The Ayatollah's Health

Today it was announced that Ayatollah Khamenei had successful prostate surgery. This level of transparency from Iran is unprecedented. While speculation about the health of the Supreme Leader is nothing new, an acknowledgment of the Ayatollah's medical situation by the Iranian government is a drastic shift.

Khamenei is paralyzed in one arm due to an assassination attempt in 1981, but this is not his only health problem. In October of last year, Khamenei was out of the public eye for weeks. Some believed that this was due to recurrence of a long term chronic illness. US State Department cables leaked by Wikileaks alleged that Khamenei has cancer, believed to be terminal. In 2007, Khamenei missed an important religious event, and for a while, there were rumors that he had died.

It is unclear if the prostate operation has anything to do with the Ayatollah's other rumored health problems or if this was the problem from the beginning and he will be in better health in the near future. If the Ayatollah is terminally ill, there may be some interesting times ahead as the administrative body tasked with selecting the replacement is currently a bit unstable.

Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani the head of the governmental body (Assembly of Experts) responsible for electing (and theoretically replacing a Supreme Leader if necessary) is currently in a coma following a heart attack in June. The newest session of the Assembly of Experts was recently convened without Mahdavi-Kani, and a prominent reformist cleric and member of the assembly was also absent. Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former President, Speaker of the Majles (Parliament) of Iran, and chairman of the Assembly of Experts, whose family has been systematically persecuted, was pictured today kissing the forehead of Ayatollah Khamenei. Rafsanjani may be back in the good graces of the establishment, and able to influence the selection (possibly even getting himself nominated).

Head of Assembly of Experts Mahdavi-Kani in coma

With the Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani reportedly in a coma following a heart attack, a new head of the Assembly of Experts will likely have to be selected at some point in the near future. 

The Assembly of Experts is a body of Mujtahids that are responsible for electing and removing the Supreme Leader. As I have written before, Iran’s governmental structure is complicated at best, and while in theory this group has these powers, there is virtually no chance of them removing the Supreme Leader at any point (and even if they wanted to, the Supreme Leader has other powers, including complete control of the judiciary and armed forces, which would make this near impossible). That being said, they do have the authority to select the next Supreme Leader when the time comes. 

The chairmanship of this group is of particular importance. Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani had been the chairman prior to his decision to express some support for the Green Movement of 2009, but was forced out and replaced by Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani. Mahdavi-Kani is less hardline than some of the alternatives so this was actually seen as a minor victory for Rafsanjani who stood to lose a lot more. 

Rafsanjani’s family has been heavily persecuted by the state as well as his domestic rivals which I have also written about in the past, and I would be very surprised if Rafsanjani was reinstated. And even though the Supreme Leader recently delegated additional constitutional powers to the body which Rafsanjani is still the chair of (the Expediency Council), it seems unlikely that there would be another significant move to benefit Rafsanjani. Khamenei and Rafsanjani are still rivals and the Supreme Leader does not want to empower him.

UPDATE 1: A list of folks who have reportedly visited the Ayatollah include the Supreme Leader, the President, the head of the Basij, Khomeini's grandson and others.

UPDATE 2: Ahmed Khatami, the hardline cleric evidently cancelled the upcoming elections to replace Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani. Ayatollah Rafsanjani was a (the?) favorite to replace the comatose Mahdavi-Kani, despite habitual and continuing persecution against Rafsanjani and his family from regime insiders.

UPDATE 3: Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani has died according to multiple sources (PressTV, Fars etc). It is unclear what steps will be taken to replace him, if the acting chairman (Shahroudi) will be promoted, or if there will be elections. 

Is Corruption in Iran finally being addressed?

The arrest of Babak Zanjani is a significant event in Iran. Corruption in Iran is understood to be rampant; figures as significant as former Presidents Ahmadi Nezhad and Hashemi Rafsanjani have been accused of abusing their authority for financial and/or nepotistic reasons. In-fighting and factionalization in Iran is also a problem, with the various groups at odds with each other. If someone like Zanjani who allegedly has been instrumental in helping the Islamic Republic avoid US/EU sanctions has now fallen out of favor, one must wonder why this would happen now before the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran has not yet been applied? 

The sanctions relief scheduled to implemented under the new nuclear agreement has not started yet. One would think that someone who has supposedly been so important to the Islamic Republic's efforts in limiting the bite of international sanctions would not be thrown in jail, especially not at this stage. Was the alleged corruption so significant that Iran's government and economy would be better off without such an important businessman? Is this a sign that there will be efforts aimed at reducing corruption in Iran, or is this a personal vendetta or domestic political squabbling? President Rouhani is close to former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who also has been accused of corruption amongst other criminal acts. Will Rafsanjani also be investigated for corruption or will his ties to the President exempt him?

Babak Zanjani's arrest is interesting and it remains to be seen if this is the first step towards a genuine attempt to eliminate corruption or if this is just political witch hunt like what happened to Russian oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky. I hope that this will be a step towards stopping corruption, and that Setad, the case exposed by Reuters, as well as any other abusers of the system will also be subject to investigation.

One of the worst articles on Iran ever.

I often disagree with some aspect of the articles I read about Iran. Usually it is something minor, and occasionally it is an entire argument that I disagree with. These arguments are opinion based, and use facts to back up their opinions, so while my disagreement is there, it is often a matter of opinion. So when I today encountered a truly remarkably terrible article I felt compelled to comment on and refute it in its entirety.

Micah Halpern's HuffPo piece, 'Where is the Ayatollah' is one of those terrible articles clearly written by an amateur with little understanding of the past or present. Thankfully it was a short article so my face was not permanently contorted into a horrible grimace by the experience. 

I will now take Halpern's claims and destroy them: 

1) 'Rafsanjani is believed to be a reformer and as such, he could really create change'

No. Rafsanjani is not, was not, and will not be a reformer. He has long been what we call a 'pragmatist', someone who works within the system to create solutions that are not necessarily based on an ideology. Reformists connect him to the horrific crimes of his office (while president and in previous roles as well) towards the more liberal parts of the Iranian population. In the run up to the recent presidential elections where the most moderate candidate remaining at the end won (Rouhani), there was some doubt that the wave of reformist and moderate voices would embrace Rouhani because of his close ties to Rafsanjani.

Conclusion: Implying that Rafsanjani is a reformer is stupid, and speculating based on a miserably failed understanding of reality is even stupider. -2 points for Mr Halpern.

2) 'He is extremely well qualified to be the Supreme Leader, even more qualified than Khamenei in terms of his level of learning and academic standing'

The favored replacement for Ayatollah Khomeini in the 80s was a man named Hussein-Ali Montazeri. He was the highest ranking Shi'a mujtahid to support Khomeini's idea of Velayat-e Faqih (others who would have outranked him—albeit not by a lot—such as Morteza Mottahari, were assassinated during the revolutionary period). Montazeri became more liberal during the Iran-Iraq war, especially in regards to the civil rights violations he saw being perpetrated by the regime and publicly stated his opposition. Montazeri was a principled man but had very little political acumen. Montazeri was also responsible for 'exporting the revolution', a similar role to what the Qods Force plays today, although less militant by nature. The brother of Montazeri son-in-law, Mehdi Hashemi was in charge of this office and was executed for revealing RAFSANJANI's role in Iran-Contra (hint: it was major). Montazeri took this, amongst other actions against him very personally. Long story short, Montazeri was removed from his position as deputy Supreme Leader, leaving Khomeini's ideology in trouble. It previously had been stated that the Faqih must be the most educated (see Khomeini's Islamic Government for more on this), but because the 2nd most educated (not counting other Shi'a clerics in other countries which were and continue to be nearly universally opposed to the idea), the replacement, was in opposition to the regime, they had to make changes. Khomeini eventually changed the constitution so that the Faqih no longer needed to be the most educated, highest-ranking mujtahid which allowed Khamenei, who was a relatively low ranking Hojjat-o-Eslam prior to this, to take over. At the time there was speculation in the West that because there was not a viable replacement, that Iran may decide to have a council of Supreme Leaders (I read this article in a 25 year old magazine during my MA but I cannot find it online anywhere). Khamenei was the President of Iran at the time, but he was by no means the most senior cleric. There was also a Prime Minister at this point, a position with more power than the Presidency, which had been occupied by more moderate and liberal people such as Mehdi Bazargan (since exiled) and Mir-Hossein Mousavi (who has been under house arrest for years following his Green Movement protests), but this position was removed in a joint effort of Khamenei and Rafsanjani. The two of them then swapped when Rafsanjani pushed Khamenei as the candidate for Supreme Leader, and Rafsanjani took the presidency. 

Conclusion: While religious qualifications have some connection to the office of the Supreme Leader, implying this is the sole criteria is foolish and uninformed. Halpern also does not mention the fact that Rafsanjani was removed from his position as the chairman of the Assembly of Experts in 2011, the legislative body tasked with overseeing the Supreme Leader. -2 points for Mr. Halpern.

3) 'The friendship never suffered over the fact that they have starkly contrasting visions of the way Islam should play out in the Islamic Republic.'

Probably not the case. I am unfamiliar with the details of the personal relationship between the two figures, as are most Westerners, but it is safe to say that today they are not the most friendly. The Rafsanjani family has been heavily persecuted since 2009 and Rafsanjani's decision to lend some support to the Green Movement (which has since increased). Rafsanjani's children have been arrested, beaten, jailed etc. as I wrote here on my blog . The idea that they would remain friends despite the state-sponsored abuse of the family is beyond ridiculous. Also see my conclusion for #2, where Rafsanjani was removed from his chairmanship. If this is not evidence of a break in friendship I do not know what is...Max Fisher wrote a blog on the 'tumultuous' relationship of the two. 

Conclusion: They do have 'starkly contrasting visions of the way Islam should play out in the Islamic Republic', but saying the friendship never suffered is a bit of a leap. .5 points for Mr Halpern for almost not being wrong

4) 'After the reports of Syria gassing its own citizens Rafsanjani made the following statement: "A government that uses chemical bombs against it people, will face hard consequences, just like Saddam, who earned eternal shame in the bombing of Halabja and suffered such a horrible fate."'

Not only is this completely unrelated to the surrounding paragraphs, it is completely irrelevant. Iranians are rightfully very sensitive to the use of chemical weapons because of the extensive use by Iraq on Iranian soldiers and civilians during the Iran-Iraq War. At the time of this quote from Rafsanjani the prevailing claim among non-Western powers was that Syrian rebels had used the chemical weapons so this made complete sense.

Conclusion: Terrible organization and taking something out of context. -1 points for Mr. Halpern for not doing his homework.

5) When he announced that he was running for president in the 2013 election, a position he was elected to twice already, he was disqualified for two reasons. He was over the maximum age and he had supported protestors on the street during the Green Revolution.

There is no maximum age for the office of president. Read the constitution, it clearly says nothing about this. The GIVEN reason by the Guardian Council for excluding him was his age, despite the fact that many members of the Guardian Council is significantly older than Mr. Rafsanjani and the Guardian Council's term is 6 years which is longer than the 4 year term of the presidency. Lastly, Rafsanjani's support of the Green Revolution was also not as clearcut as Mr. Halpern stated. 

Conclusion: Being almost right on Rafsanjani and the Green Movement (calling it the Green Revolution is another negative for Mr. Halpern) results in -.5 points for Mr Halpern

6) 'In a fascinating move, Khomeini's daughter sent a letter to the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei and then even published it in May 2013 asking the Supreme Leader to overrule the committee and let Rafsanjani run.'

Some of Khomeini's children and grandchildren are relatively liberal, and while this is true, it is again taken out of context by Mr. Halpern

Conclusion: A half truth reduced by context. A generous .5 points for Mr. Halpern

7) 'Why has the Supreme Leader, the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei not been seen in public of late, I am not about to speculate.'

The entirety of Mr. Halpern's article is full of untruths and things taken out of context, it would be just as useful for him to speculate as it is for him to put pen to page (or finger to keyboard)

Conclusion: Do I need a reason? -1 points for Mr. Halpern

FINAL CONCLUSION: Do not read this article. It is terrible and the author should be ashamed. HuffPo should be ashamed for publishing it, as should its entire staff for being associated with this. I am sure that there is something else I missed in the article that is terrible, but frankly it is not worth my time to identify and critique it.

P.S. Another bit which Mr. Halpern did not mention at all: Khamenei's arm has been paralyzed since a failed assassination attempt in 1981, his health has also been in question several times as the CableGate affair demonstrated. It 'fits' into the context of the article, why was this ignored? -1 points for Mr. Halpern

Running total: 1) -2, 2) -4, 3) -3.5, 4) -4.5, 5), -5, 6) -4.5, 7) -5.5 and a bonus -1 reaching a total of -6.5. Truly an embarrassing work.

Partial List of Rouhani's Cabinet Nominations

Finally the list has been released!

http://en.irna.ir/News.aspx?Nid=80762362


Bijan Namdar Zanganeh for oil ministry (same as Sharq and Tasnim)
Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli for interior ministry 
Ali Tayyeb-Nia for ministry of economy and finance 
Mahmoud Alavi for intelligence ministry (many expected Ali Younesi to this position)
Hamid Chitchiyan for energy ministry 
Hossein Dehqan for defense ministry (Tasnim picked this)
Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh for industry, mine and commerce ministry 
Mahmoud Hojjati for agriculture Jehad ministry 
Ali Rabiei for ministry of labor, cooperative and social welfare 
Abbas Akhoundi for ministry of roads, housing and urban development 
Mohammad Ali Najafi for education ministry 
Hassan Qazizadeh-Hashemi for ministry of health, treatment and medical education 
Masoud Soltanifar for sports and youth ministry 
Mohammad Javad Zarif for foreign ministry 
Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi for justice ministry 
Ali Jannati for ministry of culture and Islamic guidance 
Mahmoud Vaezi for ministry of communications and information technology 
Jafar Mili-Monfared for ministry of sciences, research and technology 

Comparing this to the list of rumored cabinet members which I compiled from a variety of sources, the end result is is very different. Pretty much the only pick which most got right is Bijan Namdar Zanganeh as Oil Minister. 

Zanganeh was a member of Khatami and Rafsanjani's cabinets.
Nematzadeh was a member of Rafsanjani's cabinet.
Najafi was a member of Khatami and Rafsanjani's cabinets.

Comparing this list to the leaked/rumored lists, Ali Younesi was an early front-runner for Intel who was not selected, and Mahmoud Vaezi was a near universal pick for Foreign Ministry who was also not picked. Al-Monitor's Ali Hashem was incorrect in every pick he made, although this list from IRNA is incomplete and there are a few positions which may end up being filled by those that Mr. Hashem claimed would do so. The Iranian newspaper Bahar had a few selections correct such as Mr. Zarif to the Foreign Ministry.

As a reminder, this list is incomplete, and these are only nominations, but this is very very different from what both conservatives and reformist Iranian sources estimated in June.

Rumored Members of Rouhani's new Cabinet

This list is taken from a BBC World Monitoring translation of Sharq, an Iranian Reformist Newspaper. This appeared in the 22 June, 2013 publication of Sharq, and was translated by the BBC World Monitoring service on 24 June, 2013.

What is striking about this list is the number of reformists and members with connections to Rafsanjani. (There may be more connections that I am unaware of, but most of these people are unknown outside Iran so it is hard to know for certain).

Former members of Khatami's government are highlighted in red, former members of Rafsanjani's government are highlighted in blue, former members of both are purple, former members of Mousavi's are green

First vice-president: Mohammad Reza Aref—Reformist presidential candidate from the 1392/2013 election, and former First vice-president under Khatami

Secretary of Supreme National Security Council: Ali Akbar Velayati—Presidential candidate from 1392/2013

Ministry of Education and Training: Ali Motahhari— Son of assassinated protegé of Ayatollah Khomeini, Morteza Motahhari 

Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs: Mohammad Baqer Nobakht 

Foreign Ministry: Mahmoud Va'ezi 

Ministry of Health Care and Medical Education: Mas'ud Pezeshkian—Held same position under Khatami

Ministry of Agricultural Jihad: Esa Kalantari—Same position under Rafsanjani

Ministry of Justice: Hojjat ol-Eslam Shushtari— Same position under Rafsanjani and Khatami

Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics: Akbar Torkan— Same position under Rafsanjani (Minister of Roads in Rafsanjani's 2nd term)

Ministry of Roads and Urban Development: Ali Abdol'alizadeh

Ministry of Industries, Mines and Commerce: Mohammad Reza Nehavandian 

Ministry of Science, Research and Technology: Ja'far Tawfiqi—Same position under Khatami

Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance: Mohammad Ali Zam

Ministry of Labor and Cooperatives: Morteza Bank—Deputy Foreign Minister under Khatami

Ministry of the Interior: Hojjat ol-Eslam Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri—Same position under Mousavi

Ministry of Oil: Bizhan Namdar Zanganeh— Minister of Jihad?? under Rafsanjani and Khatami

Ministry of Energy: Habibollah Bitaraf— Same position under Khatami

Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs: Mohammad Fard

Plan and Budget Organization: Mohammad Ali Najafi—Same position under Khatami (Minister of education under Rafsanjani) 

Atomic Energy Organization: Gholamreza Aqazadeh 

Ministry of Communications and Information Technology: Ahmad Mo'tamedi 

Vice-president for Majles affairs: Qodratollah Alikhani 

Environmental Protection Organization: Ma'sumeh Ebtekar—Same position under Khatami (first female leader in this role)

Central Bank: Majid Qasemi 

Vice-president of the republic and chief of the Martyr Foundation: Hoseyn Dehqan 

Vice-president of the republic for clerical affairs: Hojjat ol-Eslam Shahidi 

Vice-president for technology: Alireza Olfat—Member of Khatami's govt

Government Secretary and Spokesman: Alireza Nateqi—Chairman of Rouhani's Campaign Committee

Ministry of Information: Ali Younesi—Same position under Khatami 

Chief of the President of the Republic's Center for Women's Participation and Family Affairs: Zahra Pishgahifard—Female

Ministry of Intelligence: Ali Younesi—Same position under Khatami (unsure if same as Information Ministry)

Chief of Cultural Heritage and Handicraft Industries Organization: Hoseyn Mar'ashi 

Consultant to the president of the republic and supervisor of the Presidency Institute: Mohammad Reza Ne'matzadeh—Minister of Labor under Rafsanjani

Consultants to the president of the republic: Dr. Mohammad Reza Sadeq, Ali Asgari, Hoseyn Faridun (Rouhani's brother)

Special inspector for the president of the republic: Hoseyn Faridun (Rouhani's brother)

UPDATE 1: American Enterprise Institute published a list on 19 June based on a report from Tasnim (a principlist paper). There are some differences and some similarities, but the list is far less complete and only has a few names. E'tedad (A reformist paper) on 20 June published an analysis with similar names. Because of the consensus between several papers with different political leanings, I feel as though its safe to say that Ali Younesi and Mouhammad Reza Ne'matzadeh are both expected to play important roles in Rouhani's government. There are some significant differences between the E'tedad and Sharq lists, though they have virtually all of the same names.

UPDATE 2: Al-Monitor has weighed in with some similar opinions although the man they believe will be the next Defense Minister (Shamakhani) is someone not mentioned by E'tedad or Sharq (AEI concurs with Al-Monitor on this selection).

UPDATE 3: Another translated text via BBC Monitoring with more of the same names, although this one also includes the figures appointed to the committee selecting/advising selection of the cabinet. These include:  Yunesi, Torkan, Ne'matzadeh, Hoseyn Rouhani (Faridun), Vaezi, Najafi, Jahangiri, Sadegh, Ashena. 

UPDATE 4: CSM picked up a Reuters story quoting Rouhani on his cabinet. Rouhani stated that the cabinet will be inclusive and moderate. This is encouraging to conservatives who may have felt as though they would be excluded, and goes along with the information from UPDATE 3 which states that the reformists wish to keep some of their representatives in the Majles rather than promote them to the cabinet to insure that their seats will remain in the hands of reformists.

Reactions to Rouhani's Big Victory

Here are my initial reactions and questions following the somewhat surprising result of the Iranian Presidential Election

1) There should be no doubts that the 2009 election was fraudulent. 

Many believe that the 2009 election where reformists Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi were slighted, was fixed in favor of the Supreme Leaders' favored candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nezhad (also known as Ahmadinejad). There were a number of inconsistencies including Mousavi being defeated in a landslide in his home province and that the election results were announced after only a few hours. This time there was clearly some sort of effort to count the ballots as the 40+ million cast took over 12 hours to count. 

2) Reformists and Moderates are still relevant in Iran

Another expectation about this election was that it would be either boycotted or have a low turnout. A mere 8 candidates were allowed to run (out of hundreds that registered and were not approved) and only 2 of these were not conservatives. Without many choices, why would anyone want to vote, especially if their vote would not be counted like in 2009? 

3) The Supreme Leader Khamenei is threatened

Hassan Rouhani has close ties to the ruling establishment (just like the other approved presidential candidates did), but he is closer to former president and pistachio magnate Hashemi Rafsanjani. As I have written multiple times, the Supreme Leader owes his current position (along with many other things) to Hashemi. Hashemi's family has been persecuted since raising questions about the integrity of the 2009 elections. This includes the assault and arrest of his daughter, and the arrest of his son. Another son was sacked as the head of the Tehran Metro. These were seen as efforts (endorsed by the Supreme Leader) to curtail Hashemi's influence. Another and probably more important step taken against Hashemi was his removal from the chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts in 2011. These all led to a situation where Khamenei is likely to be unhappy with the result and the potential power struggle with Hashemi, the only one with equal political history, influence, and revolutionary credentials.
In April Khamenei stated that any vote in the election is a vote for the Islamic Republic. He attempted to show that a high turn out validates the legitimacy of the electoral process and the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, two days before the election he changed course stating that everyone should vote even if they disagreed with the Islamic Republic. Khamenei then reversed course again saying that the original statement he made is valid. Khamenei's attempt to exploit Iranian nationalism and increase voter turnout shows that he may actually care about public opinion. The number of moderate votes will not be welcomed by Khamenei. 

4) The Supreme Leader is not THAT threatened

Despite this not being the "ideal" result for Khamenei, he also may not be so upset about it. Rouhani is a cleric who currently enjoys good relations with most parties in Iran. He did not receive as significant a mandate as former President Khatami, but due to his ties and his clerical background there is a good chance that he will be less radical than Khatami (I realize Khatami is not a liberal but this is a relative comparison). Rouhani does not have the religious stature to challenge Khamenei on clerical matters, and this will always be on Rouhani's mind. When Khamenei's handpicked candidate from the 2009 election Ahmadi Nezhad started acting in a manner which Khamenei did not appreciate. This included firing members of his cabinet who Khamenei then forced him to reinstate. Because of Rouhani's connections to the clergy, a problem like this does not seem to be likely.

5) Will the foreign policy change?

The Supreme Leader is in charge of all major foreign policy decisions and the country's armed forces, but the actions and words of the president can also have a big impact. Under Ahmadi-Nezhad, Iran's foreign policy took on an increasingly combative tone. While they had sponsored terrorism and continued to do so (see 1994 AMIA bombing purportedly green lit by President Rafsanjani, not to mention their ties to Hezbollah), Ahmadi-Nezhad's hostility towards Israel and holocaust denial was incredibly damaging to Iran's reputation. How much will Rouhani tone this down and try to bring about more diplomacy with the West? He is considered to be a pragmatist along with his close mentor Hashemi (who even at one point indicated that he was ok with US intervention in Bosnia if it was done correctly) so it would seem likely that there will be some foreign policy change. 

6) Can Reform happen in Iran?

While reformist former president Khatami is still wildly popular in Iran, he is considered by academics to have been an ineffective and weak leader during his two terms (he won both elections in an overwhelming landslide). An example about which I've written before before, was how his attempt to raise the age of marriage from 9 to 13 years. Because of opposition in the majles, this 'change' is a non-compulsory law and does not have to be enforced. Will reformists feel empowered by Rouhani's victory and make an effort to campaign for changes? Will they try to run in the next elections rather than boycotting like the last one?

7) Which way will Rouhani turn?

Will Rouhani pull a Khamenei and betray/abandon those who helped him gain power or will he respect his campaign promises and free political activists, journalists and Mousavi and Karroubi (who are still under house arrest after more than 2 years). Will he attempt to create changes in the economic system (one of the presidents key tasks)? Will he allow the press to become more free? If he does wish to and attempts to make any changes, will the Supreme Leader and the still conservative Majles allow him to, or will he be another Khatami?

UPDATE 1: mentioned Twitter posts by Khamenei on voter turnout.

Thoughts on Iran Election

Iran scholars and analysts all know that predicting an Iranian election is a bad idea. Strange things can and do happen. Polls, media and even the assertions of people on the street may not be an accurate reflection of the results from the ballot box (assuming that they have not been tampered with). 

There have been several polls conducted for the election tomorrow with a variety of results. Some show the Tehran mayor Mohammad Qalibaf (the successor to Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nezhad) with a sizable lead, while others show cleric Hassan Rouhani in the lead. 

The most "scientific" polling has been conducted by IPOS, a US based telephone survey company. Their polls, taken over a period of several days from 1067 Iranian residents show a trend towards Rouhani (possibly at the expense of reformist Mohammad-Reza Aref who withdrew and endorsed Rouhani), but also a high percentage of undecided voters (over 40% at last count). 

While reformists and moderates might look to Rouhani's perceived rising popularity as a sign of hope, I would urge caution. This poll is problematic for a variety of reasons. First, Iran is a very diverse country and obtaining a representative sample population is near impossible. Candidates often receive overwhelming support in their home province (another reason why the 2009 election was so suspicious is that Mousavi lost his home province in a landslide), and a sample size of only 1067 people is almost certainly less than representative. 

Another potential problem is the heightened security atmosphere in Iran. The authorities have taken significant steps to slow and filter internet access, and to filter certain text strings or phrases sent by SMS. It is not unreasonable to assume that Iranians believe that their telephone communications are insecure, may be recorded and are afraid to say something which can be used against them later. This fear may have an effect on the results of polling, as Iranians may be unwilling to share their opinions with a pollster who called them, especially from an American number. 

If the IPOS poll is to believed, the question is which way will the undecided voters turn? Of the 6 remaining candidates, 5 are conservative and one is considered to be a moderate. With so many conservatives to choose from, it is quite likely that many of these undecideds have yet to choose which conservative candidate they will be voting for? On the other hand it is also possible that the undecideds are torn between the moderate and the conservative group and the vote will be split along this line instead.

In either case I highly doubt that any one candidate will receive more than 50% of the votes in the first round (required to prevent a run-off). The run-off features the top 2 vote getters from round 1. To be guaranteed of a spot in the next round, 33.4% of the vote is required, although it is also possible in theory to receive as little as 10.1% of the vote and finish 2nd (if the top candidate receives 49.9% and the bottom 4 all receive 10%). In my estimation 25% should be enough to get to the 2nd round, though the weak polling numbers of Gharazi and the wild cards of Velayati (who was rumored to have withdrawn late last night) and Rezaei may change this. No matter what happens I am sure there will be some surprises.

Note on Article 115 of the Iranian Constitution

Another excerpt from my paper on Islamic Feminism in Iran in the wake of the announcement by Ayatollah Yazdi (via Thomas Erdbrink of the New York Times's Twitter page) saying that all 12 women who registered for the Iranian Presidential Elections will be disqualified.

... Article 115 of the Iranian constitution states that only a man is allowed to become president[i]. While this is somewhat problematic as the vote for president should theoretically be a democratic affair, the biggest problem is the reasoning for this ruling. Initially it was decided that the reference in the Koran that leaders should be rajol (an Arabic word meaning "man" also transliterated as rejal) meant that the president must be a man[ii]. This is problematic as rajol is often a gender-neutral term and in Arabic literature it can mean "woman", "mankind", or "personality"[iii]. Persian is more or less a genderless language and a term such as rajol can cause difficulties, as gender indicated within the word may not mean the same thing in Persian and in Arabic. Faezeh Rafsanjani the daughter of the influential former President Rafsanjani considers this law to be hypocritical as women are allowed to run other governmental departments, but not the office of the presidency[iv].

---

[i] Ahmadi, 2006, p.48

[ii] Ibid, p. 48

[iii] Ibid, p. 48

[iv] Via Ahmadi, citing Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut, “Islamist and Secular Women Unite: Iranian Women Take on the Mullahs,” Le Monde Diplomatique (November 1996), http://mondediplo.com/1996/11.

UPDATE 1: Spoken to several Arabic speakers, and consulted my Arabic dictionary and the definition of Rajol as anything other than "man" seems increasingly unlikely. The dictionary does have the plural of Rajol (rijal, rijalat) as "important men or great personalities", but to me this is an implied masculine. Rejal in Persian is "men, statesmen, distinguished men, dignitaries, personages, V.I.P.s" I am uncertain why Ahmadi has claimed this with such authority, but as she is the one with the Ph.D. and I am not, I will have to differ to her.