The relationship between Saudi Arabia's and Iran's military spending is interesting, often cited, yet almost always misrepresented. Lobbyists and pundits like to point to this as an indicator of foreign policy and aggression, but the reality is that it is far more complex.
Saudi Arabia spends a significant amount money on conventional arms; President Trump during his trip to the kingdom sealed a massive $110 billion dollar arms deal. Iran on the other hand, spends much less. This is taken by many to indicate that Saudi Arabia is the aggressor, while Iran is defensive or even docile in nature. This does not take into account strategies or the structure of the defense apparatuses or funding of terror groups, which both do, despite very different military spending numbers.
Saudi Arabia has emphasized conventional weapons and arms deals, buying the latest gadgets from the US. Iran, on the other hand, focuses on its missile program, and other asymmetrical aspects. It bombastically threatens to create a blue-water navy, but this is empty talk. Iran is restricted by geography, a smaller economy, and sanctions. Iran also has the experience of the Iran-Iraq War to draw upon; a bloody war where hundreds of thousands died.
After the revolution, Iran intended to exert influence by "exporting" their revolution. Given Iran's weakness relative to the rest of the region—they are incapable of using force to conquer Iraq to Morocco and everywhere in between— they realized they needed to project soft power, and when using violence, to use it asymmetrically. Hezbollah, Amal, and various Palestinian groups benefited from this.
The most significant beneficiary of this approach is the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). In 2016-17 only 5.3 MILLION was allocated to "refurbishing the fleet" of the regular Iranian Air Force. They operate what is essentially a parallel military (with some overlap) to the regulars (Artesh). This moves them into a grey area, with a completely different command structure (while still ultimately answering to the Supreme Leader).
Asymmetric warfare is by its very nature less cost-intensive. It isn't about overpowering the enemy, but about exploiting the stronger enemy's weak points and utilizing this to the advantage of the conventionally weaker party. Comparing the simple raw military spending numbers of Saudi Arabia and Iran does not fully capture the intricacies and nuances of strategically dissimilar entities.
Showing posts with label Saudi Arabia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Saudi Arabia. Show all posts
Sunday, May 21, 2017
Saturday, January 2, 2016
Implications of al-Nimr's Execution
Today Saudi Arabia executed 47 individuals, 46 of whom appear to be Sunni (there are rumors that 3 of them were Shi'a) and allegedly linked to Al Qaeda, and one, a prominent Shi'a cleric. Iran, as the self-proclaimed protectors of Shi'ism and Shi'ites has expressed its discontent in a variety of ways; Iranians protesting at the Saudi consulate in Mashhad who seem to have caused a fire, and a large demonstration is expected at the Saudi embassy in Tehran tomorrow (there are now breaking reports that the Saudi embassy in Tehran has been at least partially burned as well from molotov cocktails).
The inclusion of Nimr in with the 46 accused terrorists/political prisoners is interesting as his case has been very high profile. Rumors of his impending execution in the past few months outraged Iranian officials and the general public. Even the relatively quietist Marja Ali Sistani, based in Najaf, Iraq, involved himself by writing to Saudi officials asking for Nimr to be pardoned.
Signs of attempts at rapprochement between Saudi and Iran appeared throughout the first years of Rouhani's administration, despite ongoing proxy conflicts in Syria and Yemen as well as Iraq to a lesser extent. They have not been exclusively positive statements, as Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the more pragmatic Iranian political figures, has also strongly condemned Saudi actions in Yemen.
Despite Iran's own status as a major human rights abuser, despite its disproportionate use of capital punishment, and despite its lack of due process and an independent judiciary, the Iranian government is objecting to another state's use of this tactic. This is an opportune time however, as Saudi is stuck in the quagmire of Yemen while Iran appears to be at least nominally withdrawing from its own in Syria, as Russia takes the lead there. Nationalism and sectarianism are important, and I expect Iran to exploit this while heavily criticizing Saudi Arabia's human rights abuses (and ignoring their own).
If it is true that there are additional hundreds of Saudi Arabian executions pending, and especially if any of the individuals sentenced to death are Shi'ite, there may be further diplomatic tension between the two states. I am less familiar with Saudi politics, but this would appear to be some sort of statement from the interior ministry, or from the new king as to what their approach to other religions and to local international politics will be. An embrace of hardline ideologies at an increasingly volatile time in the region is worrisome.
Because the reports of the attack on the Saudi embassy are true I expect there to be significant diplomatic problems, though I am not sure either side is eager to engage in full-on conflict. The UK embassy was stormed and damaged a few years ago, but there is not the same level of animosity (or proximity) involved. Saudi Arabia will probably expel the Iranian ambassador (he already was summoned over "hostile remarks" earlier today), and potentially file complaints with the UN. If Saudi Arabians attack the Iranian embassy in Riyadh or consulate in Jeddah, a response from the IRGC-N in the Gulf is not out of the question.
If things spiral out of control, I expect this is how it would happen. For now, until we see what happens in Saudi Arabia it doesn't seem that things will be too bad. The more damage done to Saudi facilities in Iran, the worse it could get.
UPDATE #1 (1/3/16): KSA did end up expelling diplomatic staff, and additionally withdrew its own staff and broke ties with Iran. They broke ties in 1988 before restoring them in 1991. Iran has the initiative now. It remains to be seen if they will retaliate through their militant proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi or Yemen, or with the IRGC Navy. They could also give the green light for Hezbollah to attack in a Central Asian or North African country. At this point I don't think they would do this outside the region.
The inclusion of Nimr in with the 46 accused terrorists/political prisoners is interesting as his case has been very high profile. Rumors of his impending execution in the past few months outraged Iranian officials and the general public. Even the relatively quietist Marja Ali Sistani, based in Najaf, Iraq, involved himself by writing to Saudi officials asking for Nimr to be pardoned.
Signs of attempts at rapprochement between Saudi and Iran appeared throughout the first years of Rouhani's administration, despite ongoing proxy conflicts in Syria and Yemen as well as Iraq to a lesser extent. They have not been exclusively positive statements, as Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the more pragmatic Iranian political figures, has also strongly condemned Saudi actions in Yemen.
Despite Iran's own status as a major human rights abuser, despite its disproportionate use of capital punishment, and despite its lack of due process and an independent judiciary, the Iranian government is objecting to another state's use of this tactic. This is an opportune time however, as Saudi is stuck in the quagmire of Yemen while Iran appears to be at least nominally withdrawing from its own in Syria, as Russia takes the lead there. Nationalism and sectarianism are important, and I expect Iran to exploit this while heavily criticizing Saudi Arabia's human rights abuses (and ignoring their own).
If it is true that there are additional hundreds of Saudi Arabian executions pending, and especially if any of the individuals sentenced to death are Shi'ite, there may be further diplomatic tension between the two states. I am less familiar with Saudi politics, but this would appear to be some sort of statement from the interior ministry, or from the new king as to what their approach to other religions and to local international politics will be. An embrace of hardline ideologies at an increasingly volatile time in the region is worrisome.
Because the reports of the attack on the Saudi embassy are true I expect there to be significant diplomatic problems, though I am not sure either side is eager to engage in full-on conflict. The UK embassy was stormed and damaged a few years ago, but there is not the same level of animosity (or proximity) involved. Saudi Arabia will probably expel the Iranian ambassador (he already was summoned over "hostile remarks" earlier today), and potentially file complaints with the UN. If Saudi Arabians attack the Iranian embassy in Riyadh or consulate in Jeddah, a response from the IRGC-N in the Gulf is not out of the question.
If things spiral out of control, I expect this is how it would happen. For now, until we see what happens in Saudi Arabia it doesn't seem that things will be too bad. The more damage done to Saudi facilities in Iran, the worse it could get.
UPDATE #1 (1/3/16): KSA did end up expelling diplomatic staff, and additionally withdrew its own staff and broke ties with Iran. They broke ties in 1988 before restoring them in 1991. Iran has the initiative now. It remains to be seen if they will retaliate through their militant proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi or Yemen, or with the IRGC Navy. They could also give the green light for Hezbollah to attack in a Central Asian or North African country. At this point I don't think they would do this outside the region.
Thursday, October 15, 2015
GCC to buy Iron Dome?
Two days ago Sky News reported that the GCC has plans to buy the Israeli defense system the Iron Dome in addition to other missile defense systems including David's Sling and Arrow to protect against Iran. These reports are interesting, yet misleading; Iron Dome protects against a very narrow band of threats, and Iran (not including proxies) does not provide this type of threat towards any Gulf state except perhaps Kuwait.
The story emphasizes the Iron Dome (in the headline as well as the text), while downplaying the other systems potentially for sale. This is probably due to a multitude of reasons including the name recognition; Iron Dome is widely credited with successfully intercepting hundreds of rockets from Gaza and maintaining a high success rate while doing so. There are those who doubt the efficacy, but as I've pointed out here and here (and have another piece in the works), these accusations are baseless and fraudulent. The other systems are known to be less successful, but given the higher degree of difficulty in intercepting a much faster moving threat this is logical.
The Iron Dome's maximum range was initially stated to be around 70 kilometers (just about the distance from Gaza to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), though this is believed to be a slight underestimate and it may be as high as 100 km. Iran (with a few exceptions) is more than 70 km away from the GCC states, therefore Iron Dome would not be tasked with intercepting any potential Iranian rockets and missiles. The only locations that are within 70 km are the very tip of the UAE, and parts of Kuwait.
The story emphasizes the Iron Dome (in the headline as well as the text), while downplaying the other systems potentially for sale. This is probably due to a multitude of reasons including the name recognition; Iron Dome is widely credited with successfully intercepting hundreds of rockets from Gaza and maintaining a high success rate while doing so. There are those who doubt the efficacy, but as I've pointed out here and here (and have another piece in the works), these accusations are baseless and fraudulent. The other systems are known to be less successful, but given the higher degree of difficulty in intercepting a much faster moving threat this is logical.
The Iron Dome's maximum range was initially stated to be around 70 kilometers (just about the distance from Gaza to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), though this is believed to be a slight underestimate and it may be as high as 100 km. Iran (with a few exceptions) is more than 70 km away from the GCC states, therefore Iron Dome would not be tasked with intercepting any potential Iranian rockets and missiles. The only locations that are within 70 km are the very tip of the UAE, and parts of Kuwait.
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| Light blue=70 km buffer Purple=100 km buffer |
It is clear that the Iron Dome with a few exceptions has absolutely not business defending against Iranian weapons; even if Iran attacked from the coast of Iran, almost all GCC territory is far beyond 70 or even 100 km. The only way for 'Iran' to attack from inside a defensible range would be for them to attack from the sea, or for them to have somehow infiltrated borders elsewhere.
Weapons have been provided to the Houthis, and these weapons have been used to attack Saudi Arabia, but as the map below shows, the range factor makes the possible locations which 'Iran' could attack from quite limited. Additionally, Saudi already has the Patriot missile defense system which it has used against Houthi SCUDs. A deal to upgrade the system from PAC-2 to PAC-3 was just finalized. Iron Dome interceptors are cheaper than Patriot missiles by approximately a factor of 10, but when considering the number of batteries needed to defend the entire border area this is infeasible.
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| Light blue=70 km buffer Purple=100 km buffer |
The other way that Iran could attack a GCC country with extremely short-range rockets or missiles would be for them to launch these from the Persian Gulf. This is unrealistic because Iran's navy is set up to be asymmetrical and the 'asymmetrical' method of attacking with rockets would be to set up a rocket on a small speedboat; something which isn't going to happen for a number of reasons. Lastly even if 'Iran' was able to infiltrate a country and attack from within, the Iron Dome has had trouble with smaller mortars and wouldn't be able to defend against them. Larger rockets would be incredibly difficult to smuggle in to a country, though Iran could potentially arm terror groups this way. This wouldn't technically be an 'Iranian' attack. It is unclear if by 'Iran', Sky's source was also including proxies.
Israel spent a lot of money on the development and production of this system, and they would love to recoup some of the expenditures. Potential sales to Asian countries (India, South Korea and Singapore) have fallen through or been false rumors. There remain a handful of countries that could use the system, though they are few and far between. These include Poland, Ukraine, Taiwan, Afghanistan, Iraq and the 3 countries previously mentioned. Iraq and Afghanistan would be under US supervision and both parties are hesitant to place the sensitive system in a location so vulnerable.
The United States gives a lot of aid to various countries, often with the stipulation that this money MUST be spent with US defense manufacturers. Raytheon is now producing Iron Dome missiles in this fashion. It is possible that the money spent on Iron Dome by GCC states would be from the US. A more likely scenario would be that the Iron Dome was included as some sort of package deal with the longer range and therefore more useful defense systems (David's Sling and Arrow).
I myself believe that this is not an accurate story and that this is disinformation spread for a political or economic agenda. It makes almost no sense for the GCC to buy the Iron Dome, even for the psychological purpose of making their citizens feel more safe. It is possible that this will be sold no matter, but I find it highly doubtful.
Bilal Saab from the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center agrees with me, the reports of GCC attempting to buy Iron Dome are 'total BS'
Gulf states buying Israeli Iron Dome? I call total BS in my interview with @Annahar http://t.co/Xzk6F4fQ6i— Bilal Y. Saab (@BilalYSaab) October 16, 2015
Friday, April 24, 2015
Iran vs. America in Yemen and the Gulf
With the tensions in Yemen increasing and Iran and the US backing different sides, it was only a matter of time before the two found themselves at odds. While the US has not participated in the bombing, according to the Saudi news organization Al-Arabiya, they've participated in aerial refueling and other methods of logistical support (including rescuing 2 Saudi pilots whose plane either malfunctioned or was shot down). Several days ago it was reported that an Iranian convoy bearing weapons intended for the Houthi rebels was en route to Yemen. The United States redeployed naval assets and it appears as though the convoy (which includes armed ships) has reversed course and is headed back towards Iran.
The United States has a qualitative advantage militarily and in my estimation these events are a perfect example of this. Iran knows that their naval forces cannot possibly win a conventional battle with the United States, and even approaching the fleet is a dangerous escalation. The situation is quite different than that in Syria for a variety of reasons. While Iran has no trouble sending paramilitary fighters, arms and logistical support to Syria and Hezbollah in Syria, it is much more difficult to send so much through such a busy waterway at a time when the world's attention on focused on Yemen.
There is a not so fine line between supporting guerrilla forces and engaging a military might on its own terms. Iran has always worked asymmetrically (e.g. in Bahrain) and while they are habitual braggarts (Iran's military posturing) their actions tend to be closer to this than brinksmanship. The results here are unsurprising, and underscore the priorities of the two sides; the US wants to preserve hegemony, and while Iran lacks the power to directly confront the US, there are others ways it hopes to use to get around this in its quest for regional supremacy and international recognition.
The United States has a qualitative advantage militarily and in my estimation these events are a perfect example of this. Iran knows that their naval forces cannot possibly win a conventional battle with the United States, and even approaching the fleet is a dangerous escalation. The situation is quite different than that in Syria for a variety of reasons. While Iran has no trouble sending paramilitary fighters, arms and logistical support to Syria and Hezbollah in Syria, it is much more difficult to send so much through such a busy waterway at a time when the world's attention on focused on Yemen.
There is a not so fine line between supporting guerrilla forces and engaging a military might on its own terms. Iran has always worked asymmetrically (e.g. in Bahrain) and while they are habitual braggarts (Iran's military posturing) their actions tend to be closer to this than brinksmanship. The results here are unsurprising, and underscore the priorities of the two sides; the US wants to preserve hegemony, and while Iran lacks the power to directly confront the US, there are others ways it hopes to use to get around this in its quest for regional supremacy and international recognition.
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