JCPOA's Uncertainty Exacerbates Iran's Worsening Economic Problems

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was, at the time, widely believed to be a turning point for the Iranian economy, but this has not borne out. Even though it is just one piece of a complex iranian economic situation, the JCPOA is so significant that uncertainty over the fate of the deal has curtailed potential progress. With the shale oil boom keeping the price of petroleum significantly below previous highs, and even minimum budgetary breakeven expectations, Iran’s leading industry is on unsteady ground. The French oil company Total signed a significant oil deal with Iran, but many other firms in the oil industry, and in other sectors, remain hesitant. Boeing and Airbus have committed to major deals, but despite this, Iran’s economic outlook has not improved as expected. Much was made of the stream of foreign trade delegations in Iran following the implementation of the JCPOA, but there has not been a rush to invest in Iran. Substantial geopolitical risks, in addition to pre-existing issues, remain unaddressed, in large part due to uncertainty over the fate of the JCPOA, which faces a considerable test next month.

In May, President Trump will decide whether he wishes to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, or to refuse to certify, and to withdraw the United States from the accord. He has attempted to be the “anti-Obama” whenever possible - at least rhetorically - but is often hamstrung by either a failure to act decisively, or by the various distractions and domestic and foreign political dilemmas. With pressure on Trump building as the Mueller investigation continues, he will feel increasingly cornered and is likely to lash out in some manner. This is just as likely to be in the form of an angry Twitter rant as in anything substantive, but leaving the Iran Deal remains a realistic possibility. Trump has demonstrated a stubborn persistence on several issues, and the relative ease of an executive decision means there are fewer barriers between him and nullifying the United States’ involvement in the JCPOA, as much for domestic appeasement as over legitimate grievances with the deal.

The Iranian economy has faced a series of hardships in recent years; many self-made. Iran’s ongoing economic mismanagement has led to significant protests - most recently this past winter when nationwide demonstrations rocked the country - but so far such events have lacked any momentum and do not present a serious threat to the government. On April 9th, the Iranian government took a bold - and perhaps desperate - step to halt the slide of the Iranian rial by setting a new “official” exchange rate with the American dollar. At the same time, the government also outlawed the use of any other (black market) rate. Following the 35% drop in value in a week, any further instability would be dangerous for a regime facing an already restive populace.

While alluring as a potentially large and lucrative market, Iran remains as risky, if not more so, than other developing countries. Much of this is due to the uncertainty as to what President Trump may do in May, but other domestic and regional issues, including the IRGC’s influence in important commercial sectors, and the ongoing conflict in Syria, are also important. For firms wishing to invest in Iran’s potentially lucrative modernization, the decision over the JCPOA’s fate will signal either a cautious yellow light, if the deal is upheld, or a steadier red light, if President Trump yet again refuses to certify the accord. Refusal to certify the deal for a third time makes not only American firms, but also European and Asian ones, much more wary of doing business in a country that exposes them to American censure. Congress would be likely to further sanction Iran, increasing barriers to trade and business. Further prolonged uncertainty over the fate of the deal and the implications for the Iranian economy and populace puts additional pressure on an already strained Iranian financial system.

Questions about the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Archive

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a dramatic announcement about a daring Israeli intelligence operation to steal over 100,000 documents from a secret Iranian nuclear weapons archive. The documents confirm what we have known for years, and what the IAEA has known since 2011 - that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu did not provide a straight answer on whether Iran continues to have an active nuclear weapons program—something that would clearly violate the JCPOA—or if Iran paused the program at some time. The IAEA has said that Iran's program is not active.

The reaction to Netanyahu's press conference was predictable. Once again, I find myself disappointed as the good questions, the PMD agreement questions, remain an afterthought.

The IAEA, in their report about Iran's PMDs, stated that "all the activities contained in the "Road-map" were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule". The organization effectively gave a thumbs up to Iran, saying that things are ok from the past, and that we can move forward. The new documents raise questions about what the IAEA okayed, what they knew about Iran's nuclear weapons research, and what the separate agreements referenced in the Road-map include. Did the IAEA agree to let Iran store its previous work? Was the IAEA aware that work had been saved? Did the IAEA order Iran to destroy their research? The PMD report, released in 2015, is very detailed, but without the original documents (from both the IAEA and Iran), it is nearly impossible to compare the report to what Netanyahu revealed yesterday.

While the focus of the JCPOA critics rancor about PMDs has mostly revolved around the Parchin agreement, all of these issues are important, and any obfuscation by Iran and/or the IAEA would be of interest. As I noted in 2015, the IAEA is facing a crisis of confidence; if they cannot be trusted to do their job, what is their utility?

It does not help that many critics are either lazy or deceitful. Then Representative and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with Senator Tom Cotton, claimed that they had not heard about side deals when they met with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano days after the accord was signed. The "Road-map" containing the reference to these side deals is noted explicitly in the text of the JCPOA, and they were all announced and made public on days before this meeting.

There are real and serious questions to ask, but instead, superficial questions, gross insinuations, politicking, and deceptive bombast are all the critics seem able to come up with.

Will the Iranian Arms Embargo Remain?

For me, one of the most interesting aspects of the Iranian nuclear negotiations is the sanctions, their meanings and classifications, and the circumstances under which they may be removed. For months, or perhaps even years, Iranian officials have unanimously and unequivocally stated that 'all' sanctions must be removed, and removed immediately. The P5+1, especially the Americans have stated that nuclear sanctions are a part of the negotiations, while 'non-nuclear' sanctions are not. Recently, Iranian rhetoric softened slightly when Ayatollah Khamenei stated that there will be a time-table for the removal of sanctions rather than immediate and complete reversal. The latest statement from the Iranian negotiating team in Vienna however, insists on removing an arms embargo placed on Iran.

They are, as far as I can tell, referring to the UN Security Council Resolution 1747, unanimously supported in 2007, punishing Iran for proliferation concerns and not fully complying with the IAEA. The sanctions clearly have a nuclear connection, but at the same time, explicitly mention ballistic missiles. The factsheet released by the White House in April in the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) emphatically states that while nuclear sanctions will be removed, "U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal." The following excerpt from the JCPOA indicates that there is a plan to create a new resolution reaffirming the embargo on "conventional arms and ballistic missiles".

Given the inconsistencies here, there are a few important questions to be asked: 

1. Will the arms embargo remain or be renewed in some way?
2. Is Iran reneging on previously agreed terms?
3. Did the White House put this in the JCPOA while it was still up for negotiation?
4. Is this appeasement of hardline constituencies? Is one side trying to take advantage of the other? Does Iran not want a nuclear deal after all?

These questions are incredibly important, not only for understanding the contributions made by the different sides, but also because there are legitimate concerns over weaponry going to and coming from Iran. Hezbollah and other terror groups are armed by Iran, and easing restrictions on the Iran's armaments is bound to create further instability. Israel has not been afraid to bomb Syria, Lebanon and Sudan when they feel threatened by a possible arms transfer, usually of more advanced weaponry. The likelihood of this happening again would be much higher with this arms embargo removed. Iran may change its behavior towards its terror clients in the long-term, but a radical reduction in the scope and frequency of its covert actions is unlikely in the short term.

Iran vs. America in Yemen and the Gulf

With the tensions in Yemen increasing and Iran and the US backing different sides, it was only a matter of time before the two found themselves at odds. While the US has not participated in the bombing, according to the Saudi news organization Al-Arabiya, they've participated in aerial refueling and other methods of logistical support (including rescuing 2 Saudi pilots whose plane either malfunctioned or was shot down). Several days ago it was reported that an Iranian convoy bearing weapons intended for the Houthi rebels was en route to Yemen. The United States redeployed naval assets and it appears as though the convoy (which includes armed ships) has reversed course and is headed back towards Iran.

The United States has a qualitative advantage militarily and in my estimation these events are a perfect example of this. Iran knows that their naval forces cannot possibly win a conventional battle with the United States, and even approaching the fleet is a dangerous escalation. The situation is quite different than that in Syria for a variety of reasons. While Iran has no trouble sending paramilitary fighters, arms and logistical support to Syria and Hezbollah in Syria, it is much more difficult to send so much through such a busy waterway at a time when the world's attention on focused on Yemen.

There is a not so fine line between supporting guerrilla forces and engaging a military might on its own terms. Iran has always worked asymmetrically (e.g. in Bahrain) and while they are habitual braggarts (Iran's military posturing) their actions tend to be closer to this than brinksmanship. The results here are unsurprising, and underscore the priorities of the two sides; the US wants to preserve hegemony, and while Iran lacks the power to directly confront the US, there are others ways it hopes to use to get around this in its quest for regional supremacy and international recognition.

Iran Deal Framework Thoughts

While the framework of the Iran nuclear deal is by no means "perfectly reassuring" (Iran won't abandon all nuclear enrichment and R&D, and probably won't join the Convention on Nuclear Safety), there are many very good clauses included, that hawks and doves alike should be pleased about.

Key points from the JCPOA:

• Centrifuges reduced to 6104, with 5060 able to enrich uranium and all of them are IR-1, Iran's first generation and least capable centrifuge
• A major reduction (97%) in Iran's LEU (low-enriched uranium). While it remains unclear how exactly this will happen, it is believed that this will be due to a mixture of dilution and shipping extra stocks out of country (probably to Russia)
• All excess centrifuges will be put into IAEA monitored storage
• Fordow will be converted and heavily restricted from nuclear activities for 15 years
• Iran's later generations of centrifuges will not be used for 10 years
• IAEA will have 'regular' access to all of Iran's nuclear facilities (including Natanz and what will be a formerly nuclear site, Fordow)
• IAEA will have access to the supply chain and will also have access to and surveillance of uranium mines and mills for 25 years
• Iran will sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT
• Arak will be redesigned, and made incapable of producing weapons-grade plutonium and its core will be either destroyed or taken out of country
• Iran will receive sanctions relief IFF it abides by the terms (IAEA will address enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency)
• IAEA has to VERIFY Iran has taken the right steps before sanctions are removed 
• US Sanctions on Iran for human rights, terrorism, and ballistic missiles remain in place

A common refrain from hawks is that Iran has refused to address PMD (possible military dimensions), and has worked on developing its ballistic missile program. These concerns are valid. They've also worried about IAEA access to sensitive sites, and centrifuge R&D.

There are clauses in the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) which address all of these. If this is in fact accurate, the deal looks to be quite good.

There are a few drawbacks included, such as the continuation of enrichment at Natanz, though limiting the enrichment to a relatively low number of first generation centrifuges strictly limits Iran's enrichment capabilities. Jeffrey Lewis wrote here about the type of centrifuges used and how the number of total centrifuges operational is less important than how modern the centrifuges are.

Another possible downside to the JCPOA is the removal of sanctions. It remains unclear exactly under what circumstances the sanctions would be removed, how they would be removed, and if the conditions of removal are violated, how and how quickly the sanctions would be reimplemented. It seems as though only nuclear related sanctions are to be removed, which leaves quite a few sanctions left over.

One of the key components in the JCPOA is that the IAEA has to VERIFY and CONFIRM. Previously the IAEA has been unable to do this, so for this to be the case, Iran has to give MORE than it has in the past. This is a clear victory for the West. Also understated is the access to the supply chain granted under the JCPOA. If Iran were to secretly stash some nuclear materials and create a new nuclear site it would be much easier to take from an earlier stage in the process rather than from a facility that is already monitored by the IAEA.

Overall the deal looks very good for the West, though it is still not signed and completed so terms may change. If this framework is in fact accurate, Iran has conceded a lot (with the exception of Natanz which in my opinion looks like this is what the P5+1 'gave up' in exchange for other concessions). It is quite telling that the conservative editor of Iran's Kayhan newspaper Shariatmadari said Iranian nuclear negotiators: "We've given them a horse with saddle and received back its corpse."

Hardline Iranian editor Shariatmadari on the Lausanne understanding: "We've given them a horse with saddle and received back its corpse."
— Saeed Kamali Dehghan (@SaeedKD) April 2, 2015

If the most anti-American factions of the Iranian elite are upset with the deal thinking they gave up too much, then it is a good deal for the West.

Syrian Nuclear Aspirations?

Der Spiegel this week alleged that Syria is attempting to work towards a nuclear weapon, with varying types of assistance from Iran, Hezbollah and North Korea. If true, this would be a massive story, with significant geopolitical ramifications. Syria has denied the allegations.

Syria is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as is Iran, while North Korea is not. Under this treaty, states are prohibited from developing nuclear weapons and from helping others develop these technologies.

In 2006, the IAEA ruled that Iran is in "non-compliance" with the NPT, namely, Iran's safeguards agreement. If these new allegations are true, Iran would be in blatant violation of this treaty. Given the attempted rapprochement between Iran and the West, primarily regarding its nuclear program, a discovery of this nature would almost certainly cause irreparable damage to ongoing nuclear negotiations. Iran would also face new, harsh sanctions.

The report from Der Spiegel however, is poorly sourced, and experts have claimed that the information contained in the report is in fact, incorrect. The report cites "Western intelligence agencies" as the source for this information, and indicates that Der Spiegel has documents from these sources showing that Syria is working to build a nuclear weapon.

As is the case with any anonymous source, a proper vetting of the information is necessary, yet in this instance near impossible. It would be very difficult to have two separate sources able to confirm this information. Information regarding Iran's nuclear program is notoriously hard to come by. While there have been cases when new and valid information was revealed, there are also many instances of false and misleading information released by the same sources.

It is best to take this report with a grain of salt. It is unclear if the documents held by Der Spiegel are legitimate, or an attempt by the hawkish members of the Western coalition who wish to avoid any reconciliation between Iran and the West, to falsify documents to push their agenda.

Iran and Petroleum Prices

One of the overlooked stories of 2014 was the causes of and the geopolitical implications from the dropping oil prices. Numerous articles were written covering aspects of it, yet so few actually tried to look at the situation from the most broad of perspectives.

As everyone knows, the price of oil per barrel and at the pump has dropped over the last few months, mostly as a result of the relationship between demand and supply changing. Supply has been ramped up, especially by US producers. The United States now produces the most oil it has since 1985, and more than all of the OPEC countries including Saudi Arabia. At the same time, OPEC is also producing record amounts.

Many of the countries in OPEC have oil-dependent economies, and fluctuations in the price of oil affect the way their government operates. The budgets are set to expect a certain price of oil, and if the price drops below this, they will have budgetary problems. Iran in particular is facing difficulties, as the sanctions implemented against the Islamic Republic, combined with a lower price of their most important export has greatly reduced potential revenues.

Even though many of the OPEC countries are now facing possible budget deficits, the cartel agreed to not withhold supply and drive up the price of oil. It appears as though the Saudis and the Gulf Nations are willing to withstand lower prices in the short term, because it damages their bitter rival the Iranians, and OPEC's diminished global influence due to US shale oil producers.

Some have framed this as a purely anti-Iran move, but it is a bit more complex than this. If the OPEC members reduce supply, they are not only working with US oil companies, they are acting in a manner that is only beneficial in the short-term. By working together to keep oil prices low, they will soon drive many of the US shale oil companies out of business.

Fracking (shale oil extraction method) was adopted by American (and Canadian) companies because oil had previously been significantly more expensive, and the fracking process can require a higher break-even point to be profitable. If these companies are allowed to continue to operate (by keeping oil prices high), the damage to OPEC countries will continue. Conversely, if these companies are driven out of business, OPEC has a good chance to regain it's control over world petroleum markets.

The US has long had a policy of utilizing Middle Eastern oil over North American for geo-strategic reasons (see citation in my previous blog). Oil production's increase in North America is striking. Is this a last ditch effort to obtain as much shale oil as possible before the environmentally-damaging process is banned? Is there another "back-up" supply of extractable petroleum or is this the US's last 'trump card' in the oil market?

In some ways this looks like a plot between the Saudis and Americans to damage Iran, Russia and Venezuela financially, but there are quite a few other angles which complicate the situation greatly. Lastly, the insistence by Iran that OPEC cut production, shows Iran's financial woes are very real, and that economic mismanagement by the previous administration in conjunction with external pressures have seriously damaged the economy.

Iran denies supporting Bahraini opposition forces

Bahrain's Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad bin Muhammad Al Khalifa claimed that Iran was helping train opposition forces and interfering in Bahrain's internal affairs several days ago. This is a fairly regular occurrence and seems to happen every few months (January 2014, March 2014,  April 2011, May 2011 etc). Yesterday the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman denied this claim and expressed indignation that Bahrain was not respecting the civil rights of its citizens. The human rights situation is not great in Bahrain (See Human Rights Watch on Bahrain), but there are other places with a poor human rights record that Iran does not seem to have a problem with, such as North Korea, Sudan and Syria, and the situation in Iran is also nothing to brag about. 

This is probably a non-story like almost every other story in the news regarding Iran. At the same time, the fact that this event has had almost no coverage at all is interesting considering the other concurrent diplomatic issues. A United States government official in Bahrain was recently expelled from the country, and Bahrain has reportedly improved ties with the Kremlin. I don't see relations between the US and Bahrain suffering too much more, especially given the US Navy base in the kingdom, but the recent decisions by the Bahraini ruling family are interesting to say the least. 

Head of Assembly of Experts Mahdavi-Kani in coma

With the Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani reportedly in a coma following a heart attack, a new head of the Assembly of Experts will likely have to be selected at some point in the near future. 

The Assembly of Experts is a body of Mujtahids that are responsible for electing and removing the Supreme Leader. As I have written before, Iran’s governmental structure is complicated at best, and while in theory this group has these powers, there is virtually no chance of them removing the Supreme Leader at any point (and even if they wanted to, the Supreme Leader has other powers, including complete control of the judiciary and armed forces, which would make this near impossible). That being said, they do have the authority to select the next Supreme Leader when the time comes. 

The chairmanship of this group is of particular importance. Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani had been the chairman prior to his decision to express some support for the Green Movement of 2009, but was forced out and replaced by Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani. Mahdavi-Kani is less hardline than some of the alternatives so this was actually seen as a minor victory for Rafsanjani who stood to lose a lot more. 

Rafsanjani’s family has been heavily persecuted by the state as well as his domestic rivals which I have also written about in the past, and I would be very surprised if Rafsanjani was reinstated. And even though the Supreme Leader recently delegated additional constitutional powers to the body which Rafsanjani is still the chair of (the Expediency Council), it seems unlikely that there would be another significant move to benefit Rafsanjani. Khamenei and Rafsanjani are still rivals and the Supreme Leader does not want to empower him.

UPDATE 1: A list of folks who have reportedly visited the Ayatollah include the Supreme Leader, the President, the head of the Basij, Khomeini's grandson and others.

UPDATE 2: Ahmed Khatami, the hardline cleric evidently cancelled the upcoming elections to replace Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani. Ayatollah Rafsanjani was a (the?) favorite to replace the comatose Mahdavi-Kani, despite habitual and continuing persecution against Rafsanjani and his family from regime insiders.

UPDATE 3: Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani has died according to multiple sources (PressTV, Fars etc). It is unclear what steps will be taken to replace him, if the acting chairman (Shahroudi) will be promoted, or if there will be elections. 

Wikileaks and Afghanistan

Earlier this week internationally recognized news organizations suffered heavy criticism from the anti-secrecy organization Wikileaks for redacting the name of a nation surveilled by the NSA. Even Glenn Greenwald voiced his support for redacting the country’s name for fears “that doing so could lead to increased violence.” Following this, the Wikileaks Twitter account (widely assumed to be run by Julian Assange directly), engaged Mr. Greenwald with vitriolic language and slurs, culminating in the account claiming that it would release the name of the target nation in 72 hours. 

72 hours passed, and Wikileaks did not released the name. 3 hours after the deadline the account posted the following tweet:

We have moved our publication on the identity of NSA "SOMALGET" country X to another date for media cycle reasons.
— WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) May 23, 2014

Bizarrely enough a mere hour and a half later, the handle did in fact publish the name which turned out to be Afghanistan.

STATEMENT: WikiLeaks statement on the mass recording of Afghan telephone calls by the NSA http://t.co/CYXBvjKJHj #afghanistan #nsa #snowden
— WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) May 23, 2014

While it is unclear if this in fact is true, it is certain that this action appears to be a desperate attempt at gaining attention. Anyone who has followed the news and has a memory beyond the last minute is probably more than aware of the strife in Afghanistan, and the widely varied sources of violence. It was only a few months ago when the Taliban, one of the most significant insurgent groups in the country attacked the United States Consulate in Herat, killing 3. Months before this, the Taliban set off a car bomb, murdering a US diplomat and four other Americans. 

The Taliban are not the only group which has attacked American and International interests in Afghanistan:

In September 2012 there were widespread riots over the film “Innocence of Muslims”, even though many of the rioters had not in fact seen the film clip. 

In February 2012 there were riots for a week over American troops dumping Korans in a garbage dump and burning them (the ones responsible were disciplined by the US Army). 

On April 1, 2011 the United Nations compound in Mazar-e Sharif, was stormed and as many as ten foreigners were murdered (some may have been decapitated) in response to the burning of a Koran a week and a half earlier by an American pastor. The riots continued throughout the country for a week following the attack on the compound. 

Earlier in 2011 thousands demonstrated in Qalat after young Afghan children alleged that foreigners had ‘disrespected the Koran’. 

What is clear from this brief catalogue of recent events is that Afghanistan remains a very tense place with unrest possible at any moment and for any reason. Something like what Wikileaks has alleged can prove to be deadly, even for innocents or civilians whose presence in the country is entirely innocent and well-intentioned. 

I do not know if Afghanistan is the country redacted by Glenn Greenwald, but if it is, the callousness of Julian Assange is horrifying. It would truly demonstrate how egomaniacal Julian Assange is and how little he values a human life that is not his own. 

Iran and the Convention on Nuclear Safety

CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

ARTICLE 1. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this Convention are:

1. to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation
2. to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such installations; 
3. to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such consequences should they occur.

After the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986, it became clear that there needed to be better international cooperation in establishing safety standards for nuclear facilities, especially power plants. A series of international treaties aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear accident were established following this catastrophe. One of the most significant of these is the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994, and like many other nuclear treaties is governed by the IAEA. There are 76 parties to the convention, including Belarus, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Unlike many other international treaties, the CNS is set up as an incentive-based program. This convention is aimed at sharing safety techniques and protocols among the international community so that the risk of a nuclear accident decreases, and in the event of an accident, the effects are mitigated by increased awareness and preparedness. This treaty has been signed or ratified by every country with a nuclear power plant (there are 34 countries with nuclear power plants), with one exception.

Iran, despite it's insistence that its nuclear program is civilian, and entirely without military capability, has not signed or ratified the CNS. Even though in early 2013 the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations indicated that his country has been working to join the treaty, this has still not happened. While Chernobyl is now a distant memory for many, the Fukushima nuclear accident is a recent reminder of the importance of proper nuclear safety standards, and international cooperation to prevent catastrophic damage to the environment and to civilization.

Iran is one of the more prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and does not always fully embrace the international community, especially the Western-dominated institutions. However, with others in a similar situation being a part of the CNS (Belarus and Syria are perhaps the best examples), Iran’s absence is even more curious. If Iran is trying to make a point and not conform to Western hegemony, why have these other countries acquiesced?

Iran may be concerned with spies taking information shared through a treaty such as the CNS, especially relating to the facilities at Arak, Fordow, and Natanz (some believe that the IAEA serves Western intelligence). However, the CNS is ONLY applicable to land-based civilian nuclear power plants, which does not include enrichment facilities, or other sensitive nuclear installations. Additionally, the CNS has clauses included in the text protecting information including: “personal data; information protected by intellectual property rights or by industrial or commercial confidentiality; and information relating to national security or to the physical protection of nuclear materials or nuclear installations”. 

The only reason that I can imagine why Iran would not want to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety has to do with Article 6, which is as follows: '…the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact.' From this, one can see the potential problem for Iran if the plant at Bushehr would have to be shut-down (temporarily or permanently). This would be both a significant blow to the prestige of the country and its scientists, and would also severely undermine the state’s PR campaign trying to assert it’s right to peaceful nuclear technologies. 

So why exactly has Iran not signed the CNS? What possible reasons do they have for not joining this treaty? Or on the other hand, what reasons does Iran have to join the treaty? Politics is about perception, why isn’t Iran taking advantage of a situation where they could get an easy win, deflecting criticism of their nuclear program? Are they saving this as an option for later?

The reasoning behind Iran’s refusal to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety remain unclear. The simple act of joining this treaty would allay fears that Iran’s stated desire for a civilian nuclear program is not genuine. It would also increase the possibilities for Iran to reintegrate itself into the international community. There are plenty of issues to argue over in the United Nations General Assembly, disaster prevention and relief should be a given. 

Article for Enduring America

I wrote an article on the parallels of the 1950s Iranian Oil Crisis and the current Iranian nuclear negotiations. It can be accessed here:

 http://eaworldview.com/2013/12/op-ed-can-us-iran-2013-overcome-legacy-us-iran-1953/

Mossadeq and the US: an Introduction

The following is the introduction to a paper I wrote on Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and his relations with the US Administrations of Truman and Eisenhower:

The overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in August 1953 has long been a sore point for Iranians; the inspiration for many conspiracy theories and the source of much ill will directed towards the US government by the average Iranian citizen.[i] The extensive writings on this subject are predictably voluminous. While the perpetrators of the coup included foreign and domestic agents, as well as Iranians from all parts of the political spectrum, the Americans, particularly the CIA, are often singled out as the primary antagonists.

            The reasons for this are many, but important amongst them are the claims made by Kermit Roosevelt Jr. in his book, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. Roosevelt writes about his own role as a CIA agent in fomenting the civil unrest and pressuring the Shah into issuing Firmans removing Mossadeq.[ii] CIA documents corroborate some of his claims, while others contradict them.

            The British, in fact, had a significant role in the coup, but because diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Iran were severed prior to the coup, the British Embassy had been closed, and therefore the British had less of a direct role in the actual execution of the events of 16 and 19 August, 1953.[iii] The British foreign intelligence service, the MI6, which had been based out of the embassy, was restricted by the degradation in relations, but still managed to assist the CIA and the locals who acted to overthrow the Iranian government.[iv]

            Reinforcing the beliefs of American involvement were statements by Secretary of State Madeline Albright apologizing for the United States' "significant role" in the 1953 coup[v], and President Barack Obama with a similar apology in 2009.[vi] Despite the claims of responsibility by a variety of different groups, and innumerable theories on the events of August 19th, 1953, what actually happened remains difficult to determine.

            What makes this question all the more interesting is that the United States initially had been very supportive of Prime Minister Mossadeq, but then in 1953 made an attempt to overthrow Mossadeq. What caused this change?

            During and immediately following the Second World War, the foreign policy of the United States underwent significant changes. Up to this time, the state's foreign policy had been primarily isolationist with a few exceptions (Cuba, Philippines etc.), but with the perceived threat of rampant communism, the focus expanded and the state became more predisposed to intervene globally. This change in priorities coincided with a greater demand for natural resources (in particular petroleum) following World War II. In December 1943 a memo from the Petroleum Division stated that the US preferred “Middle Eastern oil to be developed to the maximum” while American and Caribbean oil was conserved because it would be easier to defend in war.[vii]

            Iran became a natural focal point for the building tensions to manifest themselves as it has one of the largest reserves of both natural gas as well as petroleum.[viii] Adding to this, there were tens of thousands of American troops occupying the country to ensure delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union.[ix] Even before the discovery of oil, Iran has long been important geopolitically to Western powers, with innumerable examples from history dating back to pre-Roman times.

            Perhaps the best pre-modern depiction of how the West saw this part of the world is British political geographer Halford Mackinder's 'Heartland Theory'.[x] The 'Heartland Theory' claims that a state that wishes to dominate the world must physically control the Central Asian Plateau, the Caucasus and what is today Russia.[xi] Iran is a part of this central "pivot area" which Mackinder's theory is concerned with. With the Russian Empire and then the USSR controlling the majority of the "Heartland", fears that Iran, one of the few places of the "Heartland" not under Russian/Soviet control, could fall, led to a British interest in maintaining a footprint in the region. The Great Game between Russia and Britain, where they competed over Central Asia and Iran, is an example of the struggles between global powers over this part of the world and provides the background for American political sentiments towards Iran. Though Mackinder was an academic, during the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia he was appointed "British High Commissioner in Southern Russia".[xii] Even if his theory was not wholeheartedly embraced by the British government, his presence in this part of the world as a representative of the British implies that Mackinder held some measure of influence in the British government. While Mackinder's theory was not published until 1904, the British had long seen this part of the world as essential to their geopolitical aspirations.

            The election of Republican Dwight Eisenhower as the President of the United States in 1952 changed American policy towards Iran. Eisenhower's beliefs were more in line with the British who (whether they believed it themselves or not), argued vociferously that the threat of communism was increasingly dangerous in Iran.[xiii] Initially Eisenhower's administration attempted to keep Mossadeq in power as they believed that the alternatives to him would lead to Soviet control of Iran and subsequently the rest of the Middle East. As late as March 1953, Eisenhower is on record stating that he wished for Mohammad Mossadeq to continue be the Prime Minister of Iran for he was seen as a moderating voice between the right-wing military, royalist and religious parties, and the left-wing Communist Tudeh party.

            It was the beginning of the Cold War, and the Republican President Eisenhower was fearful of the possibility that the Communists might take over the Middle East. Mossadeq was not necessarily friendly towards the Tudeh Party, but he also did not suppress them as forcefully as the Americans would have preferred. He even allowed front organizations and publishing houses of political opponents to operate.[xiv] In the dichotic view of the Western powers, the lack of a consistent, strict crackdown on Communist sympathizers by Mossadeq's government was seen as evidence of an anti-Western bias.

            The CIA’s internal history written in 1998, claims that “Even the most bitter anti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the Iranian Prime Minister was a Communist or sympathizer”.[xv] The evidence suggests that this however, is not the case. A French newspaper said the following about Mossadeq: “The opposition called him an Anglophile, The Russians entitled him the servant of American imperialism. The British labeled him a Communist”.[xvi] Mossadeq, (apparently in a bid to gain Western sympathies) overemphasized the power of the Tudeh to the West.[xvii] Despite the fact that the Tudeh (Communist) party of Iran was officially outlawed, many in the American government and some in the CIA were fearful that Prime Minister Mossadeq was sympathetic towards communism. Mossadeq’s attempt to play the sides against each other by the concept of “negative equilibrium” evidently backfired, as the Americans then saw him as weak and replaceable, rather than weak, but still worthy of support.

            The United States was stuck in a position where they had already committed resources to the Iranian government (before and during Mossadeq's tenure), and wished to resolve the oil dispute as soon as possible to reduce tensions in the unstable Middle East. At the same time the risks of harming American business interests and potentially also long-term geopolitical interests were ever-present in the minds of the Eisenhower Administration.

            The Truman administration had spent millions of dollars trying to support the Iranian economy through loans and grants.[xviii] This was intended to keep the Iranian government as stable as possible and prevent a Communist takeover. There were also American officials who were sympathetic to Iran's Mossadeq-inspired drive for oil nationalization which complicated the US-Iran relationship even further.[xix] Other Americans were worried for the potential of nationalization happening in American areas of influence and oil production such as Saudi Arabia.[xx] That the oil agreement with Saudi Arabia had recently been renegotiated to a still profitable 50/50 split may have alleviated some of these fears. However, the Anglo Iranian Oil Company’s (AIOC) 'concessionary' deal with Iran was far more exploitative (to the benefit of the British) than the Saudi Aramco agreement and the Iranians were well-aware of this fact.[xxi]

            Mossadeq, in his idealism, believed that the United States with its principles of democracy and justice, was likely to side with him in his struggles against the British. Iran and the US had been enjoying closer relations at the expense of Britain and the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War, which reinforced Mossadeq’s beliefs.[xxii] He evidently did not anticipate that political expediencies and historical alliances would play such strong roles in the American decision making process. The good relations which Mossadeq had with several key American officials and negotiators, likely have convinced him that the rest of the government was also sympathetic to his situation. As time passed and an agreement was not reached, Mossadeq's relations with the Americans soured. One reason for this was apparently the perceived mutability of Mossadeq in his oil negotiations. The United States while relatively neutral in the process, wanted the matter settled, as the dispute was a destabilizing factor in an unstable, potentially volatile, geopolitically important region.

            Mossadeq was named Time Magazine's Man of the Year for 1951 for his work in nationalizing Iran's oil and other achievements.[xxiii] Despite this honor, the description of his physical and personal characteristics was overwhelmingly negative and used marginally racist words.[xxiv] These sentiments can be described as representative of American public perception, and if not, that fact that these words came from a leading national magazine publication, understandably had a significant influence on people. The New York Times often described Mossadeq as a ‘dictator’, although the paper never bestowed this disparaging title upon the Shah who ruled for 25 years after Mossadeq fell from power.[xxv] Iran was not a wealthy country, and was seen as backwards by many in the West. Disparaging or patronizing attitudes from the West towards the developing countries and their people was commonplace and impacted interactions between the states and individuals, certainly including those between Mossadeq and the West.

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[i] In the executive system of the time Iran, Prime Minister was elected by the Parliament (Majles). Mossadeq was voted in by a 79-12 margin. See Foran, John. "Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution., 1993. 285.

[ii] Bayandor claims that the removal process is technically legal, but because of the duress it was an illegal act. Bayandor, Darioush. Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited. 2010..

[iii] Keddie, Nikki R., Yann Richard, and Nikki R. Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution., 2003. 129

[iv] Katouzian, Homa. "Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Musaddiq's Memoirs. By Mohammad Mosaddeq. Trans. Homa Katouzian. London: 1988. 55

[v] Albright, M. (2000, March 17). American-Iranian Relations. Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, Washington, D.C.

[vi] "Obama Admits US Involvement in 1953 Iran Coup." AFP. Google, 04 June 2009. Web. 10 Mar. 2013.

[vii] 1 December 1943, folder: ‘Petroleum Reserves Corporation Activities. 7/3/43-1/1/44’ box 1, Records of the Petroleum Division, RG 59 via Anderson, Irvine H. "The American Oil Industry and the Fifty-Fifty Agreement of 1950." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 151

[viii] It was known that Iran possessed vast reserves of oil-based fuels, and the discovery and understanding of how much Iran has is not a recent development.

[ix] Foran 271

[x] O'Hara, Sarah, and Michael Heffernan. "From Geo-Strategy to Geo-Economics: The ‘Heartland’ and British Imperialism Before and After MacKinder." (2006): 54

[xi] O’Hara and Heffernan 67

[xii] O’Hara and Heffernan 66

[xiii] Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and after. 2003. 121; Azimi, Fakhreddin. Iran: The Crisis of Democracy. 1989. 295; Ferrier, Ronald W. "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 186; Louis, Wm. Roger. "Musaddiq and the Dilemmas of British Imperialism." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 242

[xiv] Foran 290; Cottam, Richard W. Nationalism in Iran. 1964. 215

[xv] Koch, Scott A., "Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953," Top Secret Draft History, History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1998., 79

[xvi] Bill, James A. Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 265

[xvii] Bill 277

[xviii] Truman’s Point Four program was intended to help develop Iran, and was responsible for investing tens of millions of US dollars in Iran.

[xix] In particular George McGhee, and Dr. Henry F. Grady, US Ambassador to Iran from 1950-1951

[xx] Bill 273; Siavoshi, Sussan. "The Oil Nationalization Movement, 1949-1953." A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran. By John Foran. 1994. 128

[xxi] Bill 273

[xxii] Foran 271

[xxiii] "Man of the Year: Challenge of the East." Time 7 Jan. 1952: n. pag. Time Magazine. Web.

[xxiv] Bill 265; "Man of the Year: Challenge of the East." Time 7 Jan. 1952: n. pag. Time Magazine. Web.

[xxv] Bill 265