A Successful Operation for the Iron Dome?

After a 10th update to my original Iron Dome blog from March 2013, I've decided to start a new blog post related to the system and its coverage in the media. This should hopefully make new information easier to access.



Today Israeli intelligence analyst Yossi Melman tweeted:
Rockets summary: 3361fired 584 intercepted 115 landed in populated areas 2542 in open zones 120 disintegrated in #Gaza. daily average 120
— Yossi Melman (@yossi_melman) August 5, 2014


As Update 10 in my previous blog post explained, this equates to an approximate Iron Dome success rate of 83.5%. As of yet it is unclear where the "failures" occurred. Some may have been due to a lack of coverage in the area (the rocket attack which resulted in the death of a Bedouin was partially due to the area not being protected), while others were due to technical malfunctions. The location of strikes are not publicly available, so it is hard to map the exact locations where rockets landed (the IDF has released an image of a map of the locations where rockets were allegedly launched from, but as my next blog will explain, this is of questionable accuracy).

I would imagine that many of the rockets which were not intercepted landed primarily in Sderot, and Ashkelon, while Beer Sheva and Ashdod also experienced a few failures. While not much more than theory, this would again lend credence to my earlier guess from my previous Iron Dome blog that there is a difference in success from the different types of rockets. As far as I know there were no failures in Tel Aviv, so the logical assumption would be that the smaller cities (subject to a different quantity and type of rocket) experienced the failed intercepts. There is a slight possibility that there were failures in Tel Aviv, but given the high number of sirens and corresponding explosions heard by Tel Avivians during this last conflict, it seems unlikely. It would not be easy to hide the results of the explosion of a 175 pound warhead in an urban center.



At the same time, it is interesting that with a success rate of just over 4/5 that there were no catastrophic events in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem during the last few weeks. It seems as though the Iron Dome may be operating at a different efficiency rate in different areas which are subject to different types of rocket attacks.



UPDATE 1:
Uzi Rubin wrote a new blog for Reuters on the Iron Dome. Key points not covered already in his previous critiques
1) Postol and Lloyd used the same data, yet Lloyd's assessment is that the Iron Dome's success rate is 6-8 times greater than Postol theorizes.
2) Hundreds of rockets were fired at Ashdod, yet only 12 hit residential areas
3) There have been around 135 rockets fired at Tel Aviv, yet not a single one has landed within the city (intercepted rocket debris has, but that of course isn't the point).


UPDATE 2:
Theodore Postol was given a chance to respond to Rubin's criticism which he did so here: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/08/06/two-views-of-iron-domes-success-in-israel/

I am not a scientist so I cannot comment on the first refutation, the rest of them I can, however.

2) Arguing that someone's argument is wrong, doesn't automatically prove the thesis of the other person (unless it is a binary argument) so this is not a valid argument.

3) Postol keeps talking about his data that he collected, though in all of his papers, memos and articles he has NEVER actually shared this data.

4) If Postol doesn't know what system was in place before, then how can he say that the system didn't work before and it suddenly works now? The warning siren system has been installed in various locations in Israel since at least 2005. In 2006 Human Rights Watch credited the warning and sheltering system with saving lives. Again Postol's argument is not a good one.

Finally Postol said that "There will certainly be impact craters in the areas where Iron Dome is reputedly defending against the rockets. In fact, the number should be nearly the same number as if Iron Dome didn’t exist." Unfortunately this is a terrible argument again. There were approximately 135 rockets sent to Tel Aviv. WHERE ARE THE 135 IMPACT CRATERS?! The rockets which targeted Tel Aviv are Fajr-5 (called M-75 by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad), and carry a 100-175 pound warhead depending on variety. The Israelis, in general, put a special emphasis on intelligence matters and are careful to not divulge locations of rocket strikes unless necessary. At the same time, I cannot imagine that 135 warheads each measuring 175 pounds struck Israel's 2nd largest city and no one noticed. Tel Aviv is a hyper-connected city; everyone has smartphones, why aren't there tweets, and Facebook posts with these impact craters? Is Postol alleging that the entire nation of Israel is conspiring to hide massive bombs going off in their city? What about all the foreigners in Tel Aviv, are they in on the plot?

Postol's analysis again is awful, but he has put all of his eggs in the basket, so I cannot see him backing down any time soon. I have heard stories of Postol's obstinance and unwillingness to see other points of view and it appears as though these stories are repeating themselves.


UPDATE 3:
Richard Lloyd posted a .pdf with his calculations and illustrations. It is clear from the illustrations on pages 9-12 that he and Theodore Postol are working together in some capacity, because the illustrations nearly exactly match ones used previous by Postol (figures 5-8).

This again brings to mind Rubin's critique that if they used the same information why are their estimates so different. It appears to me as though Lloyd has a better understanding of how an intercept works because he explicitly writes about the distance between the intercepting Tamir missile and the oncoming rocket, while Postol is more concerned with angles. It is important to consider the simple fact that the intercepting explosions theorized by both Postol and Lloyd are conical in nature and therefore will expand more, the further it moves away from the Tamir missile.

A explosion would cover a wider area less densely from further away

This situation would also result in less intercepting steel rods (or whatever the Tamir missile uses for interception) per unit of space which could explain why the intercept rate is higher for the larger rockets sent to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (and possibly could account for differences between those sent to Sderot vs Ashdod and Beer Sheva). A larger size warhead presents more of a target, while a smaller warhead is more difficult to hit. This could be especially true if Postol and Lloyd are underestimating the distance from the interceptor to the oncoming rocket. This would also partially explain why the Iron Dome is unable to intercept mortar bombs which have a relatively small volume of explosive material (the other reason is time allowed for intercept). 

These scientists are using publicly available videos instead of raw data. This leaves a lot of room for error. While their models are not terrible (though Lloyd's clearly superior to Postol's), a lack of access on their part to the obviously classified Israeli data severely undermines their work.

The more I learn about the methodologies of the two, the more I believe the Israeli side, and not just because of my personal experience in Tel Aviv during Operation Pillar of Freedom.


UPDATE 4:
The IDF has reportedly claimed that an upgraded version of the Iron Dome intercepted at least 10 mortars during the last round of violence. I find this hard to believe but I am not the expert here. I would think that because the size of the warhead is small, and the flight time of the projectile is short, hitting it in less time would prove more difficult than a rocket sent to a city further away.


UPDATE 5:
This took me a while to notice, but earlier today when I was reviewing the (Hebrew) totals of damage claims from 2012's conflict I noticed that 40 of the claims were agricultural, and over 1000 were vehicles. Only ~2/3rds of the damage claims were relating to structures. The point of the Iron Dome is to defend structures and people (I have discussed this topic previously and it is not worth repeating), and since we know people are not plants, and people are also not cars (and no people in cars were killed), the number of damage claims in places that were primary objectives was even fewer than the number which Pedatzur, Postol and Lloyd referenced as a larger than expected value. There is the chance that quite a few of these cars were parked outside homes, but there is also the chance that they were in other places far from structures. There is also the possibility that these vehicles were agricultural in nature. Again this method of taking damage claims and extrapolating to mean something far greater is cumbersome, and as I have demonstrated, prone to misinterpretation. Even if these figures were in some way troubling, the fact remains that they are in fact not nearly as high as one would expect.


UPDATE 6:
I've been spending the last few weeks trying to figure out the motivations for the 3 main anti-Iron Dome people; Ted Postol, Richard Lloyd and Reuven Pedatzur. I have found some very interesting, and revealing information about a few of them and the reasons for their vociferous opposition to the system.

Reuven Pedatzur was a primary supporter of the THEL (Tactical High Energy Laser) system which was jointly developed by Israel and the United States. It was known as Nautilus at the time, and is now known as SkyGuard. For those interested in defensive systems, it is similar to the system has been publicized a few times recently following successful tests by the US Navy. The General Accounting Office (now know as the Government Accountability Office) found significant problems in the manufacturing of the system. There were also problems with the size, vulnerability, and performance in acclimate weather. The model intended for Israel was large, approximately the size of 6 school buses. This would provide an easy target for terrorists, something especially dangerous given the chemicals involved in creating the laser beam. The system also faired very poorly in cloudy or dusty situations, rendering it nearly useless in the arid regions of Israel, as well as the areas with heavy precipitation or cloud cover. It had some additional problems, though they could likely have been overcome with time. The two main arguments by Mr. Pedatzur against the Iron Dome was that each interceptor cost between 10 and 20 times more money than a similar result (destroyed rocket) by the THEL, and that Iron Dome was incapable of defending Sderot. We all know now that Sderot is and has been defended by Iron Dome for years so this is not an issue. As far as the money is concerned, it was estimated that DOZENS of THEL systems would need to be purchased to properly cover Israel (at the time the threat was only very short range projectiles, so it is unclear if this number would be increased even further with the new types of rockets employed by Palestinian militants) and each THEL system would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. With both of Pedatzur's main points now irrelevant, the most important factor distinguishing the two is Iron Dome's ability to operate in any climate.

Richard Lloyd previously worked for Raytheon, where he devised many new products such as this one, a wide area dispersal warhead. In all of Lloyd and Postol's diagrams they show an interceptor with a conical dispersal (radial-pattern warhead), while the warhead designed by Lloyd covers a much greater area (in essence half of a sphere). If Lloyd was hoping to use this warhead for the Iron Dome rather than the one that they settled on, I could see why he would be quite upset with a different model being used instead.

I also managed to find a very interesting patent from Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, titled "Warhead for Intercepting System". It is clear from the "FIELD AND BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION" that this warhead was developed with the Iron Dome in mind. What was most interesting was the following sentences from the patent:

"The approach used by larger systems designed for intercepting medium-range or long-range ballistic missiles is not readily scaled down for application to short range rockets of the types described above. Specifically, the relatively low velocity of the target rocket itself renders collision with small low velocity particles ineffective to defeat the rocket. Instead, a high velocity impact is required to reliably defeat the rocket. Although such a high velocity impact could in principle be produced by a fragmentation warhead, classical fragmentation warheads of suitable dimensions are typically not sufficient."

This indicates that the Israeli scientists realized that the approach for larger systems (like Patriot) DID NOT WORK, so something NEW was required. They go on to describe a "projectile blade" which I do not quite understand myself, but appears to be something new enough where a patent would be necessary to protect the invention. This patent was first filed in 2007, so while it may not be the final product used, it almost certainly is related in some way. There were also quite a few patents from Rafael dealing with 3D modeling, and trajectory tracking of projectiles and optimization of current processes. These patents while very interesting and almost certainly intended to track rocket fire originating from Gaza.

AviationWeek's Bill Sweetman recently wrote a great succinct blog about how Postol's methodologies are problematic from a technical perspective. He states that Postol's claims about access to specific information is false, and many of Postol's assumptions are false, and/or highly unlikely. Sweetman also notes the possibility that Iron Dome's Tamir interceptors use 'explosively formed projectiles' like the Trophy system which protects Israel tanks. (For what it is worth, Trophy has been billed as the 'Iron Dome' of Israeli tanks, so this assumption makes sense). Is it a coincidence that 'explosively formed projectiles' is a MAJOR part of the patent I mentioned several paragraphs ago? Perhaps this is the entire basis of this technical achievement which Postol either doesn't care to admit, or is too lazy to research?

Mr. Sweetman also notes (just as Uzi Rubin and I have) that Postol's entire argument is based upon cell phone and low-quality hand held camera footage. He does not have ANY spatial reference in the videos and he does not have a 3D modeling of the trajectory and intercept of the rockets. He has however, made assumptions about the way things are, both related to the system, as well as other factors. If you recall UPDATE 2 of this blog where I talk about Postol's claim that the shelter and warning system saved lives, while he also acknowledged that he had no clue what systems were in place in 2006. I demonstrated why this assertion (among others) was foolish, and why it seems as though Postol is blindly pursuing some goal of his, while creating his own invalid evidence. This is not the scientific method. Similarly if the patent that I mentioned has anything to do with the warhead used by the Tamir interceptors, I would think that Postol's entire conception of how this intercept works is incorrect. Uzi Rubin alluded to this in the blog hosted by ACRS-ME. If Postol doesn't understand how something works, AND his evidence is bad, AND his reasoning is problematic, how can he consider himself an expert? How come no one is questioning him? How can he get away with this? Once the whole house of cards collapses, what is left?

As far as I can tell Postol does not own any patents (though he is quoted in a few), so his interest in this does not appear to be financial. He did argue in a New York Times op-ed for his own proposal to intercept North Korean and Iranian ICBMs with drones just after the missiles were launched. Postol claims that all launch sites are known, though the ability to conceal something from an enemy should NEVER be underestimated. There are a lot of reasons why this proposal is foolish, but it is not worth my time. They are rather simple problems, that most college students with an iota of critical thinking ability could come up with.


UPDATE 7:
In recent weeks there have been numerous announcements of new Israeli defense tech, often referred to as 'the Iron Dome of xxxxxxx'. In most cases, it seems to be just branding, as most of them are not similar to Iron Dome in any way, except for being a defensive shield.

Earlier today however, it was announced that there are plans to make a ship-based version of Iron Dome, called C-Dome (I assume this is a play on words), which uses the same intercepting missiles (TAMIR). This is significant because many other forms of intercepting defensive systems are not like the Iron Dome, and shows the possibility of adapting this technology to a new environment. Israel has reportedly had problems selling the Iron Dome to others (mostly because there are very few that face the same type of asymmetric threat as short-range unguided rockets), and this would be a possibly massive breakthrough.

The obstacle is that so far Iron Dome has only defended against unguided rockets, and a ship at sea is not likely to be a reasonable target for an unguided projectile traveling more than a few miles. A ship is a small target relatively, so unless the projectile is a guided missile, it would be near impossible for the rocket to hit the target. If the new C-Dome is intended to defend against guided missiles then this would be a huge step forward for the technology. As of yet, the Iron Dome has only been used against unguided rockets, and even if there have been tests defending against guided missiles, Rafael has yet to disclose this.

If this technology is possible it could be very important, but it is unclear what exactly this would be used to defend against, and therefore if there are other navies with the same or similar needs.


UPDATE 8:
More details about the C-Dome were revealed in the last two days. Russia Today's article mentions that the system is expected to be capable of intercepting guided missiles. Ynet confirmed that the interceptors used by C-Dome will also be of the 'Tamir' variety, quoting Rafael's spokesman who said that the missiles are more than 99.5% comparable to those used in the Iron Dome system.

The ability to intercept guided missiles is very important, and it is interesting that they intend to use Tamir interceptors and the 'special warhead' which has been specially designed to avoid the scalability problems I previously mentioned (UPDATE 6 relating to the Rafael patent). Assuming this product works as planned, there would undoubtedly be a huge market to fill. Iron Dome and/or C-Dome have the advantage over laser and rail gun type defensive systems as they are able to engage multiple targets simultaneously, but there already are two potential competitors: Raytheon's RAM (Rolling Airframe Missile), and MBDA's VL-Mica. Rafael's system however has the advantage of the brand of the battle-tested Iron Dome and Tamir.

UPDATE 9:
Despite many claims that Rafael is incapable of finding foreign buyers of Iron Dome, Israel National News (Israeli far-right settler news organization) reported that the US Army will be purchasing a battery.
—More to come—

Gaza Explosions and Rockets Seen from Space?

Earlier today a tweet went viral (over 12,000 retweets and over 3,000 favorites as of 0344 GMT 24/7/14; nearly 43,000 retweets, and over 12,000 favorites as of 2115 GMT 26/7/14) from astronaut Alexander Gerst, currently residing in the International Space Station (ISS):

My saddest photo yet. From #ISS we can actually see explosions and rockets flying over #Gaza & #Israel pic.twitter.com/jNGWxHilSy
— Alexander Gerst (@Astro_Alex) July 23, 2014

Maybe because I am spatially hyper-aware, but this immediately set off alarm bells for me. After taking a second with the image, I saw that the photo clearly is showing something entirely different from what the astronaut has implied.

The image is oriented with West at the top, and North to the right. The lights are from cities and highways. On the upper right Haifa and Haifa Bay are clearly visible. On the lower portion, Amman is clear (note the different color of lights for this city). In the middle of the image is Jerusalem, with the Tel Aviv metropolitan slightly above and to the right (Northwest). Between the two is Ben Gurion Airport. To the left (South) of Tel Aviv are Ashdod and Ashkelon respectively. Below and to the right (Southeast) of Ashdod and Ashkelon, Beer Sheva is clear, with the line between Beer Sheva and Tel Aviv being Highway 6. All the way to the upper left (Southwest) is al Arish, with Gaza between there and Ashkelon. Just to the lower right (Northeast) of Gaza is Sderot.

I have crudely annotated the image to show this. Remember the distance from Gaza City to Haifa is approximately 90 miles.

Unfortunately, due to Mr. Gerst being unclear with his words, and a whole lot of people (including a LOT of world-renowned reporters and their editors) not asking the right questions, the public is now of the opinion that this is a photo of explosions and rockets in Gaza. I will not contest Mr. Gerst's assertion that the rockets and explosions are visible from the ISS, but they are certainly not visible in the image he shared. Imagine how large an explosion would have to be for it to show up on a picture from space with such a large amount of land displayed (my guesstimate is that it shows about 180 miles by 110 miles). While Mr. Gerst apparently thinks that it is a sad photo, I think it is an awesome photo; I love how city lights look from space. If anything, I find this image to be awe-inspiring because of how to shows the mark of human civilization in the world.

UPDATE: finally Mr. Gerst acknowledged that there are no explosions visible in his photo. Unfortunately he did not post any correction to this on twitter, did not correct the many reporters and news sources that said there were explosions in the photo and simply posted a link to his blog where he briefly (and insufficiently in my opinion) discussed why the photo made him sad.

Iranian military threats provide fodder for US/Israel Iran hawks

Apologies for the lengthy absence. Work has been very busy and I hope to have a more substantial post up soon, but for now this will have to do.

There have been quite a few strange stories coming involving Iran over the last few weeks. First there was the gem of a story involving Edward Snowden, Nazis, and space aliens, and now we have another pair of ridiculous bellicose statements coming from Iran. 

Evidently Supreme Leader Khamenei decided that now is as good a time as any to try and get the attention of the West and to demonstrate the power of Iran's navy by sending several ships towards the Atlantic Ocean. Iranian State TV on Friday aired a simulated video of an Iranian counterattack on Tel Aviv, Haifa and Dimona following a hypothetical strike by Israel and/or the United States. So what is to be made of these events?

Other than the typical attempts to gain regional or global attention/recognition, the timing of this is interesting as it comes just after the failed attempt by Iran hawks in the Senate to force another sanctions bill through. Khamenei and the regime are likely emboldened by this, and see an opportunity to exploit an advantageous situation. Because serious nuclear negotiations are ongoing, this provides a perfect opportunity to appease the Supreme Leader's arch-conservative base. Iran by now has realized that the United States is in fact serious about negotiations, and that this can be utilized to the regime's advantage. While in the future Iran may become a world naval power (I would bet my life on this never happening), this looks to be another meaningless gesture, not unlike the claim that Iran was about to build nuclear powered submarines. The computer simulation should be treated the same way, although the real-life capabilities of Iranian missiles and rockets are certainly much more threatening than a few ships floating around the Atlantic Ocean.

Unfortunately, hawks in both Israel and the United States are undoubtedly going to point to these instances as 'proof' that nuclear negotiations are disingenuous. On the bright side, it looks as though this is once again nothing more than a bit of clever politics by the Iranian leader. 

UPDATE: as this EA Worldview post shows, the flotilla was and continues to be a non-story 

More than a Game: Palestine Vs. Afghanistan, a World Cup Qualifier in Ramallah

Those who know me know how much of a soccer enthusiast I am. For better or worse, the sport has dominated my life, and I have gone to extraordinary lengths at times to play or to watch the sport. When I was young we used to travel to every San Jose Earthquakes (originally known as the San Jose Clash) home game, despite the 100+ mile journey. I traveled throughout most of the western United States during my youth career, and even to the United Kingdom for a youth tour. When I visited Spain with my family in the early 2000s, we were fortunate enough to attend a Champions League 1/4th final match between F.C. Barcelona and Chelsea FC. Despite these diverse experiences, of all the times that I've had with the sport, my most interesting was probably a World Cup Qualifying match I attended while a student in Israel. 

My sisters and I with Pep Guardiola before the Barcelona/Chelsea match

I always enjoy attending matches in foreign countries because of the different types of fans and environments that are out there. So when I heard of a most interesting and unique soccer game in the summer of 2011, I was very excited. The match was a preliminary round World Cup Qualifier (for Brazil 2014) in the Asian Football Confederation between two unlikely opponents, Palestine and Afghanistan. Both footballing organizations have endured, despite a difficult last few years. The Taliban's rule over Afghanistan was repressive (the national stadium in Kabul was used for public executions, not soccer), and even though the United States and NATO had intervened by 2001, the violence of the Taliban and Haqqani Network have continued to render the country unsafe for many. The Palestinian Football Federation as well, has had a tough time with Israeli travel restrictions preventing players from the West Bank and Gaza from traveling to the other area, or even from leaving to play qualifiers abroad. 

Israel and the West Bank have long been unsafe, but while I was studying at Tel Aviv from 2010-2012 things had become quite a bit calmer. Still, the United States Embassy restricts its staff from traveling to the West Bank. Israelis too, with the memory of the Ramallah lynching of 2000 fresh in their minds, would never dream of traveling to the Palestinian portion of the West Bank (Israeli citizens are currently prohibited from traveling to Area A, the part of the West Bank under control of the Palestinian Authority). 

I, however, in my bravery (or naïveté), was unfazed, and determined to attend this unique matchup at all costs. I tried to recruit some classmates and friends, but most were either out of town or unwilling to travel all this way just for a soccer game (we had a 4 hour Arabic lesson early the next morning). It did not help my cause that I had nothing more than the city and a time for the game; I did not know what stadium it would be played out, how much it cost, how to get there, and if foreigners would be restricted from going. I nearly did not go because I did not wish to travel alone, but in the end, a friend of mine who happened to have arranged a group of his friends to go to Ramallah, said that he would come with me to the game. 

Us on the bus in Jerusalem about to go to Ramallah 

The day of the game was incredibly hot, even for an Israeli/Palestinian summer's day. I remember waiting at the bus stop next to the dormitories before 8 am and feeling the sweat dripping down my back. The bus ride from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was unremarkable. We met my friend's friends in Jerusalem where the buses to Ramallah were supposed to pick us up. The stop was basically a run-down parking lot, certainly not a place I would want to be after dark, but because were a variety of minibuses there with Arabic signs, we figured that we were probably in the right place. We all checked to make sure that we had our passports so that we would be able to re-enter Israel, and hopped on the bus.

Traveling out of Israel into the Israeli controlled portions of the East Jerusalem and the West Bank is a cinch, I've accidentally done it a few times in a rental car while lost in Jerusalem's labyrinth like maze of highways, although once we had passed Qalandia checkpoint it became clear where we were. What struck me the most about the short drive into Ramallah was the amount of construction. Under Prime Minister Fayyad the economic situation in the West Bank had improved drastically. There were new projects under construction all around us, both residential and commercial. In Ramallah this too was the case. I was surprised at how nice some of the shops and streets in Ramallah were. Many of them would not have been out of place in a fancy neighborhood of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. 

After my friend and my new acquaintances had lunched and had some of the best Limon-Nana (fresh Lemonade with Mint) we'd ever had at a local coffee shop (no, not the infamous Stars and Bucks), we decided to travel around the city a bit. We visited the old city, a beautiful, well-kept, quiet neighborhood just outside the center of town. One of the highlights of this part of the day was being ambushed by a young boy who pretended to shoot us with a stick servicing as a gun. A few years earlier this would probably have made most of us nervous, but because things have been more peaceful in recent years, this was nothing more than a charming interaction with a local.

View from lunch of the main intersection in Ramallah. Photo Credit: Axel Angeles 

Yasser Arafat's Tomb. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

We made our way back into town and then out again as we walked to the tomb of Yasser Arafat. At the site there was a heavy security presence, but once the guards saw our passports and heard us speak English, they were all very friendly and wanted to speak with us. I had thought that they may resent our presence because we had come from Israel, but they did not seem to mind one bit. I ended up asking them about the soccer game which was supposed to be somewhere in Ramallah later that evening. Because Football (Soccer) is widely considered the global sport and the World Cup is it's biggest stage, I'd thought that there would be incredible excitement for the rare occurrence of a qualifying match, but none of the guards even knew that there was a game going on

We then went into town for dinner which was both cheap and delicious, and again I asked our waiter about the game. He too did not know that there was a game, but said that if there was one, it would be at Arram stadium (in colloquial Arabic especially, the 'Al' article marker drops the 'l' sound, in this case changing Al-Ram to Arram) a town just outside Ramallah. The waiter pointed in several directions (West and North) while saying that it was near Jerusalem (which is to the Southeast). Because I am a geographically obsessed person who is always aware of the cardinal directions at all times this was frustrating for me, but the maitre'd said that we wouldn't have a problem if we were to take the bus towards Jerusalem, or in the worst case we could find taxi drivers who would know how to get there. So me and my friend (the others decided they did not want to go to the game) went downstairs and began to look for the bus stop where we could catch a ride to the stadium.

Mural of Marwan Barghouti near Qalandia. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

I'd been studying written Arabic for almost a year at this point and so I knew that the local name for Jerusalem in Arabic was Al-Quds. I asked many people on the street for the bus to 'Al-Quds' as I became increasingly frantic, but they were either unable to help me or had no idea what I was talking about. Finally someone came up to me and asked if I meant 'Al Ouds'. At this point the game had been going for almost 15 minutes so me and my friend both were willing to take the risk. The man led us into a dark and dirty garage and we were both a bit worried that something might happen to us, but once the driver of the minibus and several others got on, we figured we would be safe. 

The drive to the stadium was not a lengthy one, but the traffic and construction made it seem like an eternity. Fortunately the driver had the football match on the radio, so while it was in rapidly spoken Arabic, I was able to distinguish some of what was happening in the game. While in the minibus we drove past Qalandia checkpoint, but this time we went around rather than through it. We then travelled alongside the separation barrier for another couple of kilometers. For the majority of its length, the separation barrier is nothing more than a wire fence, but in the Jerusalem area in particular, it is a massive 5 meter+ concrete wall. It was an interesting experience for me seeing all of the graffiti written on the wall. Surprising to me was the amount of non-Arabic script. The majority was in English (without too many grammatical mistakes common to non-native speakers), although many other European languages were common as well. Finally we got to the stadium which was basically in an alley off the side of the frontage road along the wall. There were several dozen young boys outside the stadium, and again a significant and heavily armed security presence (I am not sure if I will ever get used to seeing uniformed individuals walking around in a civilian environment while carrying automatic weaponry even though I lived in Israel for over 2 years). There were even fewer English speakers at the stadium than there were in Ramallah and it took us several minutes talking to the guards to find someone who could speak English to us. Eventually we located one and we explained that we wanted to see the game. The police man looked at us, clearly perplexed, and asked for our passports. We both handed them over and he took them over to his boss. The man quickly returned and ushered us into the stadium, allowing us to skip the ticket booth and the line to get in. 

We had made it to the game just before half time and the sun was getting quite low in the sky behind us, and the bank of seats cast a broad shadow across the pitch. The stadium, while small and dilapidated, had a significant concentration of fans. There were even some fans waving Afghan flags. I am not certain if they were Afghans who had travelled from Afghanistan, but because there was a youth national team in the stands as well, it certainly seemed a possibility. Even more surprising for my friend and I, was that there were women and children at the game as well. In many of the more conservative Islamic places this would not be allowed so it was interesting to see a more open environment. Earlier in the day after our lunch the owners of the cafe had let slip that women were not allowed into the establishment, but since we were visitors it was ok just this one time. After this experience, the presence of women at the game was even more interesting and strange to me.

Some of the Afghan fans with flags. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

The game itself was boring and of very poor quality. I remarked during the game to my friend that I and/or most of my college teammates, if we were eligible to play for either team, would not have been anywhere near the worst players on the pitch. The fans too were not very enthusiastic, and seemed more interesting in talking to each other than the game. This may have been a function of the stifling heat or something else entirely, but this is unclear. Palestine had won the first game 2-0 (played in Tajikistan due to security concerns) and needed to win, tie the game or lose by just one goal to advance to the next round which would be a home and home series against Thailand. Palestine scored just before we arrived to the stadium making the total aggregate 3-0, before Afghanistan clawed one back early in the 2nd half. The score stayed the same until the final whistle and Palestine were through to the next round. 

The match! Palestine is in Green and Afghanistan in Red. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

My friend and I were a bit nervous at this point because it was near dark and we were over a mile from the Qalandia checkpoint and about 5 miles from the bus stop in Ramallah where we knew we could get a bus back to Jerusalem. We would have preferred to take a bus back to Ramallah or Qalandia, but because the frontage road was so busy and neither of us spoke serviceable Arabic, we figured this was an impossible task. On the bright side this gave us a great opportunity to examine the wall and its graffiti even closer. It was getting closer and closer to dark so I was pushing my friend to get back to the checkpoint so we could get back to Jerusalem safely. In hindsight I was very glad that he took so much time taking photographs because they are quite good and help me remember parts of the day.

The wall. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

The wall. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

We eventually reached the checkpoint, but because we had not come with a bus or a car we were a bit worried if we would be able to cross. The Israelis also are known to close the border unannounced for indefinite periods of times and neither of us wanted to be stuck in an unfamiliar territory after dark without any language skills, much in the way of money, and no mobile phone service. For a while we walked behind a young boy dragging a cooler full of water he was trying to sell to the dozens of cars and vans waiting for permission to cross the border, and eventually hopped one of the first buses in line. We had to get off the bus right away to go through the checkpoint and show our identification to the Israeli border guards.

The boy and his cooler as we approached the Qalandia Checkpoint near sunset. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

One of the common horror stories from Palestinians is how they are subject to humiliating conditions at checkpoints, and Qalandia is known to have some of these problems, partially due to the high volume of traffic at this location. The experience of walking up to the actual checkpoint is uncomfortable. You enter a passageway with chicken-wire on both sides and above your head, sometimes doubled up and always just above your head. Despite the open air blowing through, its a claustrophobic and stressful time. Even though there were only a handful of people in front of us, it took us about ten minutes of waiting before they cleared the people ahead of us. Because my friend and I were both Americans we breezed right through once they saw our passports, but others were subject to much heavier scrutiny. We jumped back onto the bus and headed back into Jerusalem and then to our final destination of Tel Aviv.

It was a fascinating day full of adventure and learning (I found out from my Arabic professor the next day that Al-Ouds is the local colloquial way of saying Al-Quds or Jerusalem), and I am glad that I took the leap of faith and traveled to an unfamiliar and potentially dangerous place. I will never forget this day and the interesting events which took place. While the quality of the soccer match was abysmal, and the fans were not the most exciting or interactive that I have experienced, for socio-political-geographical reasons this is the most interesting soccer-related experience I have had.

UPDATE 1: the mural with a man's face is of Marwan Barghouti, not Omar Barghouti.

Obama in Israel

Recently I returned from Israel after spending nearly 2 and a half years studying for my Masters degree at Tel Aviv University. Tel Aviv is a fairly liberal city, with bars and clubs, beaches and cafes, and even a few museums and art galleries. It is also a young and lively place, where people are often friendly and willing to engage anyone. This can be a blessing and a curse as one can imagine. Politics is often something that arises in conversation, and Israelis rarely mince their words on this subject. 

Throughout my 2+ years in Israel, I rarely heard anything positive about Obama. Even in Tel Aviv there were not many kind words for him. Some told me that they didn't particularly care for him, but also didn't dislike him. People would tell me that Obama liked Palestinians and not Israelis, that his speech in 2009 in Cairo was the worst thing he could have done as a president, that he did not give enough money to Israel. A taxi driver I had emphatically told me that he did not like Obama because Obama was a Muslim. I asked him why he said that Obama was not a Christian, and his reply was a dismissive "everyone knows this". 

In the build up to the US Presidential election of 2012 I was exposed to even more anti-Obama rhetoric. "He is not good for Israel", "He is trying to appease the Iranians like Chamberlain did to Hitler", "He insulted Bibi because he hates Israel". This went on and on, usually without any real justification or facts as support. 

Today I woke up to glowing praise from all sides of the Israeli political spectrum (with the possible exception of the pro-settler crowd) for Obama and his speech. Even the right-wing Ynet (English version of Yediot Aharonot) had some nice things to say about Obama. The Jerusalem Post (center-right), the Times of Israel (center), and Haaretz (left) all had positive articles about what Obama said. 

From the guy who "threw Israel under the bus" to this, it is pretty impressive that a speech can make such a difference. I would be interested to see if some of the people who I spoke to and had such negative opinions of Obama have changed their minds at all.

Update 1:
Israel National News (Pro-settler and based in the West Bank settlement of Beit El) has released this article where Obama is called a "true friend of Israel" by multiple members of the religious-Zionist HaBayit HaYehudit (Jewish Home) so it appears as though Obama has won over every significant political group in Israel, the exception being Shas (Ultra-Orthodox Sephardic political party).

Update 2:
Times of Israel has a poll showing that 39% of Israelis changed their minds towards Obama in a positive way. 

Methodological flaws of the recent Iron Dome criticism

Recently, Israel's left-leaning Haaretz newspaper reported that several missile-defense experts have expressed doubt on the efficacy of the IDF's Iron Dome defense system. During Operation Pillar of Defense, the system was in place to defend against short-range rockets and missiles. At the time it was considered to be a huge success despite some notable failures such as this rocket which hit and did extensive damage to an apartment building in Rishon Letzion, a suburb of Tel Aviv. 

Professor Theodore Postol, who famously disproved the alleged 96% interception rate of the Patriot missile defense system during the first Gulf War, has now claimed that the "Iron Dome's intercept rate, defined as destruction of the rocket's warhead, was relatively low, perhaps as low as 5%, but could well be lower". Postol and his colleagues studied videos of the Iron Dome in action during Pillar of Defense and determined that the appearance of a successful interception was often incorrect as there should be a secondary explosion from the warhead of the rocket. The scientists also noted that for some strange reason the Iron Dome's missiles (two are sent to intercept the incoming rocket) always exploded at the same time, even though they were in different locations and targeting the same projectile. The third bit of evidence which the scientists say are indicative of a lower interception rate is that there were over 3,000 "civilian damage reports were filed for destruction caused by incoming rockets. It is impossible, claim the scientists, that the 58 rockets that weren't intercepted - the number reported by the IDF - could have caused damage on such a large scale". 

I was in Tel Aviv during Operation Pillar of Defense and like most Tel Avivians, I spent quite a bit of time that week in the bomb shelter. There were 5 Tzevah Adom (Code Red) alarms which I heard (I did not hear the Tzevah Adom which resulted in the rocket hitting the apartment building in Rishon), one a day for 3 days (11/15/12-11/17/12, and two the last day 11/18/12). According to both Hamas, the IDF, and Israeli television stations, each time the Tzevah Adom sounded at least 2 Fajr-5 rockets were sent to Tel Aviv (EDIT: This may have been an exaggeration as I now believe that only 1 rocket was sent each time). If the warheads were not successfully intercepted and destroyed by the Iron Dome as Professor Postol and his colleagues allege, where did they go? Even with a theoretical 10% intercept rate (higher than Postol's 5% but much lower than the IDF's 84%), there would have been at least 4 other rockets which the Iron Dome would have failed to intercept over Tel Aviv. There is not much open space around Tel Aviv, and I guess that the rockets could have landed in these places, but the idea that civilian areas were struck by 4 or more 175 lb warheads and no one noticed seems beyond ridiculous. While I myself did not hear every explosion of the Iron Dome missiles or Fajr rockets, friends of mine did, so I feel it is safe to assume that the Tzevah Adoms I heard were not false alarms.

From my limited understanding of mid-air explosions and high school science classes, not to mention innumerable action movies, I am under the impression that every time something explodes in mid-air, the remnants of the original object are spread of a larger area than if the object where to strike the ground. Not every piece of the object will be immediately incinerated. Similar to small meteorite fragments such as those that recently hit Central Russia, these pieces can cause significant and widespread damage. Why do these scientists assume that once the incoming rocket is intercepted there will not be debris? This article indicates the possibility of this exact scenario I am describing where the debris from an interception (and NOT the rocket warhead) caused damage on the ground. The warhead of a Fajr-5 is certainly not responsible for this as the scale of the damage would have been much higher. This seems much more likely to be the cause of such a 'high number of damage reports' than the possibility that rockets were not successfully intercepted. Theoretically, rocket fragments will be scattered over a larger area while a warhead explosion is confined to one location. Also while not as relevant to my central argument, I am curious why the scientists would conflate the damage reports from the hundreds of Qassam rockets and mortars (which the Iron Dome or any other missile defense system may not always be able to intercept due to the short 15-20 second flight time from Gaza), and the longer range Grad and Fajr rockets which were sent towards larger cities in Southern and Central Israel?

The last and perhaps most important question is why Professor Postol changed his mind from November to now and what made him do so. He was interviewed as a missile defense expert by MIT's Technology Review in an article released on November 26th, 2012, where he claimed that the Iron Dome was effective in intercepting the rockets. I understand he may have more information now than he had then, but the conviction and authority with which he previously praised the Iron Dome has been ignored in these recent news stories and not addressed by Professor Postol himself.

While the mathematical account of the scientists seems problematic from the outset, I am not as concerned about this as much as some more basic methodological issues, and why the major media sources (who gladly picked up this story), have not made any attempt to critically analyze these claims. I am by no means convinced that the Iron Dome is a permanent (or even temporary) solution, or that it's success rate is as high as the IDF has claimed, but the arguments given by Professor Postol seem highly problematic and have not convinced me in any way. The United States has spent an enormous sum of money on overhyped military projects (like the F-35) that go nowhere and I would hate for Iron Dome to be another one of these, but until further evidence is provided, I remain unconvinced.

UPDATE 1:

I stumbled upon this Voice of America article talking about several flaws of the Iron Dome system. One of them is that the interception is based upon exploding the warhead rather than the entire rocket so there will be debris from the interception. This corroborates my point, and is another potential piece of evidence against Professor Postol's theory.

UPDATE 2:

Haaretz' Uzi Rubin has posted an article asking where the nearly 500 rockets (480 to be exact) which were understood to have either landed in or been intercepted in "built-up areas" went to. Mr. Rubin takes Professor Postol's 10% claim to indicate that 48 of the 480 would have been shot down successfully, leaving 432 rockets and their warheads unaccounted for. While it is a bit crude and does not touch on some of the other issues which I mentioned in this blog, it is  encouraging to see at least one person on a reputable site questioning Professor Postol's theory.

UPDATE 3:

The BBC's Kevin Connolly has a new short (and more or less worthless) video report on the Iron Dome. Brings up the same flawed arguments (he even states that Israel claims that 90% of the rockets fired at it were intercepted, despite the incredibly obvious fact that this is not true, and was never claimed by Israel). Shoddy journalism as it takes a 5 second Google query to note that the claim of the Israelis is that 90% of the rockets it ATTEMPTED to engage were successfully intercepted. In either case, just another example of how uncritical thinking by those in positions of authority can be problematic as they perpetuate untruths.

UPDATE 4:

Uzi Rubin has posted another, more complete refutation of Professor Postol's argument. It can be accessed here. Postol's memo is also available now and can be accessed here. This memo contains no data, and no real methodological explanation.

UPDATE 5:

Postol (and his friend Richard Lloyd) have stood by their claim of the Iron Dome not working despite increasing evidence to the contrary. In another interview with MIT's Technology Review, they have reiterated their doubt as to the system's efficacy. I am guessing that they have not been in Israel and do not understand the geography of the area, because there is no other excuse for such a poor hypothesis given the available data. If all of these rockets' warheads were not detonated where are the impact craters? It defies logic.

UPDATE 6: 

Here is the new "paper" from Postol, which includes "data". He now says the rockets' warheads are small which is why there are fewer casualties. He doesn't explain how this relates to his earlier claim that there are a large number of damage reports. I am not sure how he can be taken seriously, when he fails to provide real data, and he changes the basis for the argument without changing his conclusion or even saying WHY he changed his argument. Postol also argues that the explosions from warheads that hit their target is localized, again reinforcing my original point about mid-air interceptions causing a wider debris field and therefore more opportunities for damage.

UPDATE 7: 
I stumbled upon this post with some technical specifications of the Iron Dome. Assuming that this is correct: the Iron Dome interceptors (Tamir) have a warhead of 11 kg (~24 lbs). The warheads of Fajr-5 are 175 kg according to Wikipedia, while the Hamas/PIJ version (M-75) are 175 lb according to other sources. So let us imagine a hypothetical situation where Postol is correct and these warheads are NOT exploded. Everyone in Tel Aviv (which is a fairly large city) heard an explosion, or perhaps multiple explosions, and many had their houses shake and windows rattle. Is a 20 pound warhead big enough to cause this to happen all over the city? Secondly, if everyone is hearing the 24 pound warhead and the 175 (or 375+ if wikipedia is correct) warhead remains unexploded by the Tamir, why didn't anyone hear/feel/die from the warhead with 8-15 TIMES the mass? This is a simple logical problem with Postol and Lloyd's claims, and it is simply inexplicable that folks have not questioned them. Perhaps it is because of my geographic training and spatial awareness which makes this seem a simple question, but it is shocking that these questions are ignored by so many whose job it is to be asking them. This information circles back to a rather important point which I made in my original post: Is there a difference between Qassam/Katyusha and Grad/Fajr/M302 rockets? Perhaps the Iron Dome DOES have trouble with the shorter range rockets, but if this is the case, why does Postol conflate the two vastly different scenarios? And secondarily, why does Postol conflate ICBM defense, with the type of rocket defense that Iron Dome is intended to be? The more I learn about this, the more strange Postol's argument seems.

UPDATE 8: 
The plot thickens! Uzi Rubin in 2006 (before Iron Dome existed), wrote a report about Hezbollah's rockets during the 2006 conflict. The report is available here. About halfway through the report, Exhibit B is an image of a guard-rail with damage from what is described as a 220m Anti-Personnel rocket which Rubin said is likely to be 

• "220mm rocket," range 70 km (probably Syrian-manufactured Russian "Ouragan" Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS])

In Postol's report from 2013 available here, he used the same image on page 6 and wrote (on the page above) that it was from a Qassam rocket. 

Qassam rockets are NOT the same as 220mm rockets, they do not have the same warhead, or range. There are many possibilities; Rubin has misidentified the source of the damage in the image (least likely since his was the original image); Postol has used the wrong description in his paper, which damages his credibility as an expert; Postol used the image knowing it was from another rocket and lied about it on purpose. I used both TinEye.com and Images.Google.com to try and identify the earliest instance of the same image, and all that I could find was links back to Rubin's original paper. This would seem to indicate that Rubin's is the original image and he either took the photo himself, or obtained it directly from someone who was at the scene. Why would Postol take someone else's image and use a misleading description? This is troubling, since so many seem to be taking Postol's account at face-value without asking the tough (or in this case fairly simple) questions. In either case, I would hope that Postol can explain his usage of this image because it is discouraging that an MIT professor would do something so underhanded.

UPDATE 9:
I am ecstatic, finally an article that understands (some of) the basics and asks good questions. Armin Rosen from Business Insider wrote this article about the damage report side of things. While not perfect, it at least asks (some of) the questions that should be asked of Postol and his followers. 

UPDATE 10: 
Israeli intelligence analyst Yossi Melman tweeted some numbers of rockets sent from Gaza. If they are correct, the Iron Dome's "success rate" would calculate to 83.5% (# intercepted/(# intercepted+ # landed in populated areas)) 584/(584+115). Rockets that are not going to land in populated areas are not worth intercepting, as the damage is likely to be negligible, so the rockets sent to "open areas" should not be considered failures of the Iron Dome. This has been a common misunderstanding by journalists from world-renowned publications as I noted in Update 3.

Rockets summary: 3361fired 584 intercepted 115 landed in populated areas 2542 in open zones 120 disintegrated in #Gaza. daily average 120
— Yossi Melman (@yossi_melman) August 5, 2014

These numbers are not great considering that the IDF has said the system is improving from previous times, but there also has to be some adjustment for the fact that the rockets have been fired in a manner intended to test the limits of the system (e.g. multiple barrages at different cities, or massive barrages sent to one city).