Questions about the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Archive

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a dramatic announcement about a daring Israeli intelligence operation to steal over 100,000 documents from a secret Iranian nuclear weapons archive. The documents confirm what we have known for years, and what the IAEA has known since 2011 - that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu did not provide a straight answer on whether Iran continues to have an active nuclear weapons program—something that would clearly violate the JCPOA—or if Iran paused the program at some time. The IAEA has said that Iran's program is not active.

The reaction to Netanyahu's press conference was predictable. Once again, I find myself disappointed as the good questions, the PMD agreement questions, remain an afterthought.

The IAEA, in their report about Iran's PMDs, stated that "all the activities contained in the "Road-map" were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule". The organization effectively gave a thumbs up to Iran, saying that things are ok from the past, and that we can move forward. The new documents raise questions about what the IAEA okayed, what they knew about Iran's nuclear weapons research, and what the separate agreements referenced in the Road-map include. Did the IAEA agree to let Iran store its previous work? Was the IAEA aware that work had been saved? Did the IAEA order Iran to destroy their research? The PMD report, released in 2015, is very detailed, but without the original documents (from both the IAEA and Iran), it is nearly impossible to compare the report to what Netanyahu revealed yesterday.

While the focus of the JCPOA critics rancor about PMDs has mostly revolved around the Parchin agreement, all of these issues are important, and any obfuscation by Iran and/or the IAEA would be of interest. As I noted in 2015, the IAEA is facing a crisis of confidence; if they cannot be trusted to do their job, what is their utility?

It does not help that many critics are either lazy or deceitful. Then Representative and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with Senator Tom Cotton, claimed that they had not heard about side deals when they met with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano days after the accord was signed. The "Road-map" containing the reference to these side deals is noted explicitly in the text of the JCPOA, and they were all announced and made public on days before this meeting.

There are real and serious questions to ask, but instead, superficial questions, gross insinuations, politicking, and deceptive bombast are all the critics seem able to come up with.

Pre-Iran Deal Text Thoughts

After days of anticipation, anonymous diplomats on both sides (Western and Iranian) have told reporters that there is a deal between the P5+1 and Iran potentially resolving the nuclear dispute.

While the text of the deal is not available yet, and they've yet to even announce the deal, what we've seen so far includes bits about IAEA access to military sites, and the arms and ballistic missile embargoes. It was also reported that all of the airplane related restrictions will be lifted, giving a much needed reprieve to Iran's dilapidated domestic air travel industry.

A big worry from the West is that the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program will remain unaddressed in the deal. To ensure that Iran doesn't cheat and create a nuclear weapon, the West wants the IAEA to have unfettered access to Iranian military sites, especially Parchin. Reuters seems to think that Iran will have the right to refuse access to the IAEA, though this refusal would mean that the P5+1 and Iran would convene and 'arbitration board' to discuss the reasons why the IAEA wants access and why Iran does not wish to give it.

Of course the West would want complete access to everything, but this is unrealistic. If Iran decides to cheat this could be a problem as the implementation, the timetable and the resolution process in a situation like this can be sensitive.

The arms and ballistic missile embargoes are a bit tricky because of how the White House's fact sheet claimed that these would continue. It was not stated that these would be phased out over time, so my primary concerns of an immediate lifting of the embargoes are alleviated for the time being. We also do not know exactly when the 5 and 8 year periods begin, and what the terms are.

A major concern for me, even though I've been fairly supportive of the entire process under Obama (including outreach, sanctions and negotiations) is the inclusion of non-nuclear issues into the agreement. Iran has many problems including human rights and terrorism, but there have been efforts to keep these, and other regional concerns such as Yemen, Syria and ISIS (not to mention the Israel/Palestine conflict) out of the nuclear negotiations.

The aircraft industry restrictions pre-date the nuclear dispute and therefore one would think that this is not a part of the negotiations. While I personally think this should obviously be removed because it appears to be a civilian matter (there may be military or other reasons for these restrictions that I am unaware of), I find it troubling that they have been included along with the arms and missile embargoes. Even if these sanctions were motivated by the nuclear dispute, it is disturbing that even though White House explicitly stated that these non-nuclear issues would remain as is, they have somehow been included. It does not give much confidence in the PR abilities of the administration.

More to come (probably in a different blog)

*'Snap-back' sanctions are not addressed because they are too complicated and impossible to gauge without the actual text

Iran Deal Framework Thoughts

While the framework of the Iran nuclear deal is by no means "perfectly reassuring" (Iran won't abandon all nuclear enrichment and R&D, and probably won't join the Convention on Nuclear Safety), there are many very good clauses included, that hawks and doves alike should be pleased about.

Key points from the JCPOA:

• Centrifuges reduced to 6104, with 5060 able to enrich uranium and all of them are IR-1, Iran's first generation and least capable centrifuge
• A major reduction (97%) in Iran's LEU (low-enriched uranium). While it remains unclear how exactly this will happen, it is believed that this will be due to a mixture of dilution and shipping extra stocks out of country (probably to Russia)
• All excess centrifuges will be put into IAEA monitored storage
• Fordow will be converted and heavily restricted from nuclear activities for 15 years
• Iran's later generations of centrifuges will not be used for 10 years
• IAEA will have 'regular' access to all of Iran's nuclear facilities (including Natanz and what will be a formerly nuclear site, Fordow)
• IAEA will have access to the supply chain and will also have access to and surveillance of uranium mines and mills for 25 years
• Iran will sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT
• Arak will be redesigned, and made incapable of producing weapons-grade plutonium and its core will be either destroyed or taken out of country
• Iran will receive sanctions relief IFF it abides by the terms (IAEA will address enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency)
• IAEA has to VERIFY Iran has taken the right steps before sanctions are removed 
• US Sanctions on Iran for human rights, terrorism, and ballistic missiles remain in place

A common refrain from hawks is that Iran has refused to address PMD (possible military dimensions), and has worked on developing its ballistic missile program. These concerns are valid. They've also worried about IAEA access to sensitive sites, and centrifuge R&D.

There are clauses in the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) which address all of these. If this is in fact accurate, the deal looks to be quite good.

There are a few drawbacks included, such as the continuation of enrichment at Natanz, though limiting the enrichment to a relatively low number of first generation centrifuges strictly limits Iran's enrichment capabilities. Jeffrey Lewis wrote here about the type of centrifuges used and how the number of total centrifuges operational is less important than how modern the centrifuges are.

Another possible downside to the JCPOA is the removal of sanctions. It remains unclear exactly under what circumstances the sanctions would be removed, how they would be removed, and if the conditions of removal are violated, how and how quickly the sanctions would be reimplemented. It seems as though only nuclear related sanctions are to be removed, which leaves quite a few sanctions left over.

One of the key components in the JCPOA is that the IAEA has to VERIFY and CONFIRM. Previously the IAEA has been unable to do this, so for this to be the case, Iran has to give MORE than it has in the past. This is a clear victory for the West. Also understated is the access to the supply chain granted under the JCPOA. If Iran were to secretly stash some nuclear materials and create a new nuclear site it would be much easier to take from an earlier stage in the process rather than from a facility that is already monitored by the IAEA.

Overall the deal looks very good for the West, though it is still not signed and completed so terms may change. If this framework is in fact accurate, Iran has conceded a lot (with the exception of Natanz which in my opinion looks like this is what the P5+1 'gave up' in exchange for other concessions). It is quite telling that the conservative editor of Iran's Kayhan newspaper Shariatmadari said Iranian nuclear negotiators: "We've given them a horse with saddle and received back its corpse."

Hardline Iranian editor Shariatmadari on the Lausanne understanding: "We've given them a horse with saddle and received back its corpse."
— Saeed Kamali Dehghan (@SaeedKD) April 2, 2015

If the most anti-American factions of the Iranian elite are upset with the deal thinking they gave up too much, then it is a good deal for the West.

More Iranian Nuclear Sites?

The MeK announced today that they have more evidence of Iranian nuclear intransigence. According to news reports, a site in northeastern suburban Tehran houses a secret underground facility where uranium enrichment has occurred for nearly a decade.

The MeK press release is available on DropBox, and details their history in revealing information about Iran's nuclear facilities. Strangely enough, in this history they neglect to include another 'revelation' made a mere 16 months ago. At this time it was claimed that an underground facility around 70 km northeast of Tehran under a mountain near the town of Damavand housed more illegal Iranian nuclear activities, though the details were unclear.

I noted a few problems with the claims, notably the notorious unreliability of the MeK, as well as the very suspicious timing. Less than a month prior, the most left-leaning candidate, Hassan Rouhani, was elected president of Iran in a shockingly uncompetitive landslide. This 'revelation' was no doubt intended to ruin any possible good will or potential rapprochement between Iran and the West.

Today as well, the timing is suspicious. Rumblings from both Iranian and international press seem to indicate an optimism that a nuclear deal is imminent. The MeK is trying to remain relevant, while also scuttle any possibility for a nuclear deal while alleging that Iran's actions are so terrible that a nuclear deal would be a terrible thing for the West. They have been right in the past, but this is not always the case, and the example of July 2013 shows, they are not reliable.

UPDATE:
I should have trusted my gut and checked the image used for the safe door. Others have noted that it is in fact copied from the website an Iranian company that sells safes. The MeK's website put forward a bizarrely fitting rambling refutation which makes them look like liars, and incompetent ones at that.

While the color appears slightly different in the background it is clear that the image is the exact same as the one on the company sales website. The major difference is that there are horizontal white lines across.

Here is a comparison of the images

It is clear that the coloration and saturation are nearly identical. The image used is clearly the same. 

The MeK claim that this image is taken from one of their sources, yet they have no explanation for why the EXACT same photo, with the same detailed bricks, and spots are used. For this to have happened naturally the picture would have to have been taken from the exact same spot and the camera would have had to have been held at the exact same height. 

The complexities of creating this exact same situation make the MeK claims laughable. Furthermore, the image posted on the Iranian companies site is dated to February 12 of this year so it would have to be a hell of a coincidence for them to have posted photo that is now suddenly relevant.

As I'd mentioned before the MeK is of questionable reliability and this merely serves to reinforce my previous statements. 

Syrian Nuclear Aspirations?

Der Spiegel this week alleged that Syria is attempting to work towards a nuclear weapon, with varying types of assistance from Iran, Hezbollah and North Korea. If true, this would be a massive story, with significant geopolitical ramifications. Syria has denied the allegations.

Syria is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as is Iran, while North Korea is not. Under this treaty, states are prohibited from developing nuclear weapons and from helping others develop these technologies.

In 2006, the IAEA ruled that Iran is in "non-compliance" with the NPT, namely, Iran's safeguards agreement. If these new allegations are true, Iran would be in blatant violation of this treaty. Given the attempted rapprochement between Iran and the West, primarily regarding its nuclear program, a discovery of this nature would almost certainly cause irreparable damage to ongoing nuclear negotiations. Iran would also face new, harsh sanctions.

The report from Der Spiegel however, is poorly sourced, and experts have claimed that the information contained in the report is in fact, incorrect. The report cites "Western intelligence agencies" as the source for this information, and indicates that Der Spiegel has documents from these sources showing that Syria is working to build a nuclear weapon.

As is the case with any anonymous source, a proper vetting of the information is necessary, yet in this instance near impossible. It would be very difficult to have two separate sources able to confirm this information. Information regarding Iran's nuclear program is notoriously hard to come by. While there have been cases when new and valid information was revealed, there are also many instances of false and misleading information released by the same sources.

It is best to take this report with a grain of salt. It is unclear if the documents held by Der Spiegel are legitimate, or an attempt by the hawkish members of the Western coalition who wish to avoid any reconciliation between Iran and the West, to falsify documents to push their agenda.

Iranian-Russian Nuclear Plant Cooperation

Today it was announced that Russia and Iran intend to build two additional nuclear reactors in Iran with the possibility of building six more. Iran has long stated its intentions to pursue nuclear power as an alternative to fossil fuels, yet despite this commitment, serious safety concerns persist. As I've written several times (here, here, here and here), Iran has yet to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety, an incentive-based program intended to improve safety standards at nuclear power facilities. Iran, in fact, is the ONLY country in the world with a nuclear power plant that has not joined the convention. Even Israel, which is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is party to the convention. Iran is located in a seismically sensitive part of the world, and the decision to build further nuclear plants given the safety concerns is troubling.

There are a few reasons why Iran has chosen to work with Russia again. Russia took over the Bushehr project from a German company after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and even though the project was delayed many times and problematic, it has finally been completed. Russia is also one of the leaders from the anti-Western camp, and Iran values this position. There may be better, cheaper alternatives for cooperation on a nuclear power facility, yet for now Russia is the logical partner.

Personally I am still very worried about nuclear power facilities in Iran. The safety issues are well-documented, yet no one is paying attention to the potential environmental hazards. A whistleblower from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran provided a document to The Times which stated that:

...Bushehr, which began operating last month after 35 years of intermittent construction, was built by "second-class engineers" who bolted together Russian and German technology from different eras; that it sits in one of the world's most seismically active areas but could not withstand a major earthquake; and that it has "no serious training program" or a contingency plan for accidents.

This corroborates other claims about problems including cracks resulting from earthquakes, and a broken cooling pump which forced a shutdown of the plant. The plant is designed to sustain up to a magnitude 8 earthquake without serious damage, yet the several meter long cracks mentioned in the previous sentence were the result of a mere 6.4 earthquake.

Even though there are many problems with Iran's nuclear power plants, the Iranians are continuing to build. I hope that they take steps to address these issues, especially the ones relating to safety. The Iranian ambassador to the UN promised that Iran would be working to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety in January 2013, yet this has not happened yet. The world does not need another nuclear disaster, especially so soon after Fukushima.

ISIS wants Iran's 'Nuclear Secrets'?

Yesterday The Sunday Times published a report indicating that the 'Islamic State' intends to obtain Iran's nuclear secrets, among other bizarre, ambitious and unrealistic schemes. The nuclear one is most interesting for a variety of reasons.

It appears as though this point was either misunderstood by the reporters, or the Islamic State has no idea how nuclear technology works. If the Islamic State wants Iran's 'nuclear secrets' are they referring to nuclear reactors and enrichment, or are they referring to secrets about nuclear weaponry? The report claims that the Islamic State wants nuclear weapons, but no one believes that Iran actually has nuclear weapons, and most do not even believe that Iran has the requisite technologies developed to make a nuclear weapon if they wished to.

So what are the 'nuclear secrets' the Islamic State desires? I cannot imagine it, but do they wish to build a nuclear reactor or enrichment facility? Does the Islamic State have intelligence that Iran has completed experiments such as those alleged to have occurred at Parchin, and that the information relating to these experiments is still accessible? How would they know of these experiments? Is their intelligence on Iran's nuclear research superior to that of the Israelis, Americans, British, Australian etc?

Additionally, IF Iran has in fact conducted these experiments AND the Islamic State somehow knows about them, does ISIS actually plan on making a nuclear weapon? Why would they want to make a more complicated device requiring more time, expense, material and expertise when a dirty bomb would suffice? Do they even have nuclear scientists that could make a proper nuclear weapon?

Disappointingly, the reporters did not examine these claims critically, noting the problems with the logic, nor clarifying some important points. It is not the responsibility of the terrorists to write something logical. It is however the responsibility of reporters to note when something is illogical, or problematic in some way; especially when it is a 'scoop' of this magnitude. Because the reporters and editors were not careful, this story has become much more of a story than it should be.

Iran has (still) not signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety

This is your bi-monthly reminder that despite promising to join this vital nuclear safety treaty in January 2013, Iran has yet to do so. Yesterday it was announced that Iran is planning on building even more nuclear plants, which would be perfectly fine if we knew that they surpass international safety standards. Unfortunately this is not the case, and Iran continues to endanger the surrounding countries, in addition to its own citizens.

This is nothing new; I've written about why this is a dangerous situation in the past:
Earthquake danger at Bushehr
Iran and Nuclear Safety (or lack thereof)
Iran and the Convention on Nuclear Safety

I hope that whoever is running things in Iran regarding nuclear power, pulls their head out of the sand and signs this treaty before a serious accident happens. This is the last thing that we need.

Iran and the Convention on Nuclear Safety

CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

ARTICLE 1. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this Convention are:

1. to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation
2. to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such installations; 
3. to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such consequences should they occur.

After the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986, it became clear that there needed to be better international cooperation in establishing safety standards for nuclear facilities, especially power plants. A series of international treaties aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear accident were established following this catastrophe. One of the most significant of these is the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994, and like many other nuclear treaties is governed by the IAEA. There are 76 parties to the convention, including Belarus, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Unlike many other international treaties, the CNS is set up as an incentive-based program. This convention is aimed at sharing safety techniques and protocols among the international community so that the risk of a nuclear accident decreases, and in the event of an accident, the effects are mitigated by increased awareness and preparedness. This treaty has been signed or ratified by every country with a nuclear power plant (there are 34 countries with nuclear power plants), with one exception.

Iran, despite it's insistence that its nuclear program is civilian, and entirely without military capability, has not signed or ratified the CNS. Even though in early 2013 the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations indicated that his country has been working to join the treaty, this has still not happened. While Chernobyl is now a distant memory for many, the Fukushima nuclear accident is a recent reminder of the importance of proper nuclear safety standards, and international cooperation to prevent catastrophic damage to the environment and to civilization.

Iran is one of the more prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and does not always fully embrace the international community, especially the Western-dominated institutions. However, with others in a similar situation being a part of the CNS (Belarus and Syria are perhaps the best examples), Iran’s absence is even more curious. If Iran is trying to make a point and not conform to Western hegemony, why have these other countries acquiesced?

Iran may be concerned with spies taking information shared through a treaty such as the CNS, especially relating to the facilities at Arak, Fordow, and Natanz (some believe that the IAEA serves Western intelligence). However, the CNS is ONLY applicable to land-based civilian nuclear power plants, which does not include enrichment facilities, or other sensitive nuclear installations. Additionally, the CNS has clauses included in the text protecting information including: “personal data; information protected by intellectual property rights or by industrial or commercial confidentiality; and information relating to national security or to the physical protection of nuclear materials or nuclear installations”. 

The only reason that I can imagine why Iran would not want to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety has to do with Article 6, which is as follows: '…the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact.' From this, one can see the potential problem for Iran if the plant at Bushehr would have to be shut-down (temporarily or permanently). This would be both a significant blow to the prestige of the country and its scientists, and would also severely undermine the state’s PR campaign trying to assert it’s right to peaceful nuclear technologies. 

So why exactly has Iran not signed the CNS? What possible reasons do they have for not joining this treaty? Or on the other hand, what reasons does Iran have to join the treaty? Politics is about perception, why isn’t Iran taking advantage of a situation where they could get an easy win, deflecting criticism of their nuclear program? Are they saving this as an option for later?

The reasoning behind Iran’s refusal to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety remain unclear. The simple act of joining this treaty would allay fears that Iran’s stated desire for a civilian nuclear program is not genuine. It would also increase the possibilities for Iran to reintegrate itself into the international community. There are plenty of issues to argue over in the United Nations General Assembly, disaster prevention and relief should be a given. 

Article for Enduring America

I wrote an article on the parallels of the 1950s Iranian Oil Crisis and the current Iranian nuclear negotiations. It can be accessed here:

 http://eaworldview.com/2013/12/op-ed-can-us-iran-2013-overcome-legacy-us-iran-1953/

Iran and the 'Right to Enrichment'

Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 have apparently progressed well, but have left a few key points of contention. Apparently Iran wishes the West to acknowledge its 'right to enrich'. However, Iran's belief that every country has this right is not something the West appears willing to recognize. 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) bears NO explicit mention of enrichment. It does contain some parts such as Article IV which declare an 'inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this treaty.' What is clear from this is that nuclear energy is considered to be a universal right. However 'conformity' with other articles is also demanded (Article III is NOT listed in Article IV, although according to Mark Fitzpatrick of IISS, 'The 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document affirmed that this conditionality also applies to Article III, which sets out the obligation to accept safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'). 

The IAEA is designated as the controller of safeguards and the one ultimately responsible for regulating this treaty. Iran was found in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement (designated in Article III of the NPT) on 24 September 2005, and continues to be, although the most recent IAEA statement is optimistic and hints that the IAEA's worries may soon be addressed fully. 

So why does Iran insist on the West recognizing its 'right to enrichment'? If enrichment was something clearly designated in the text of the NPT, this demand would be unnecessary and redundant. It is also not necessary for countries with nuclear power plants to also have domestic enrichment (there are 19 countries that have nuclear power plants yet do not have domestic enrichment). It makes sense for Iran to be suspicious of the West and its motives; the prejudices and ill-will are long documented. So is a recognition of Iran's 'right to enrichment' necessary, and in what circumstances is this right valid or invalid?

In my opinion, Iran's demand is stubborn and unnecessary. They are asking for something additional, while the IAEA, (the ultimate nuclear authority) has continually ruled that Iran has still yet to prove beyond a doubt that its nuclear program is purely peaceful (the IAEA has also not found any solid evidence that the nuclear program has military dimensions, so Iran has not 'violated' the NPT). Even if Iran were to return to full compliance with the IAEA, which would confirm their 'inalienable right', what is the purpose of the West stating that Iran has a 'right to enrich'? This would create a precedent where the words of the West may carry just as much if not more weight than the IAEA. This undermines the authority of the IAEA and potentially limits its mandate. It would make sense for the United States and the West to state that any state found in compliance with their IAEA safeguards agreement has the right to enrichment, but at this point it is redundant and possibly detrimental. 

I would urge Iran to drop this unnecessary demand, and instead focus on returning to compliance with the IAEA so that they would have a legal case against the West if efforts are made to prevent Iran from accessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At this point Iran is not in a good position legally because of the past 8 years of non-compliance. If the worries of the IAEA are assuaged, then Iran's access to nuclear energy can continue unimpeded, following the statute of the NPT. If Iran really wishes there to be an explicitly recognized 'right to enrichment', Article VIII of the NPT allows any signatory to propose amendments. Why not just do this? This is acting completely within the legal limits of the treaty, not going around it or trying to exploit a loophole.

P.S. Some lawyers argue that the IAEA is given more power than it should have, or that its actions are excessive or inappropriate in some way. However, the fact remains, Iran has signed the NPT which designates the IAEA as the authority, so they are subject to these laws. Also the IAEA's demand to prove that Iran's nuclear program is not weapons-related is a bit of a problem because it is very difficult to prove something like this without surrendering sovereignty, but again Iran signed the NPT so they are subject to its rules.

IISS's (International Institute for Strategic Studies) Mark Fitzpatrick has a comprehensive detailing of the NPT and Iran's 'right to enrichment' here: http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2013-1e35/november-2013-1d99/iran-enrichment-6342

The Complexities of the Iranian Government and Nuclear Negotiations

With the impending annual UN General Assembly slated for this coming week, and the anticipation of important political developments, a common story in the news is the potentiality of a diplomatic breakthrough regarding Iran's nuclear program. Much has been made of Iran's new President Hassan Rouhani's increasingly friendly tone towards America and the West and his stated desire for dialogue. From what many have written, it seems an almost foregone conclusion that for the first time in what seems like an eternity, the heads of government for the United States and Iran may meet face to face. For now, this is nothing but blind speculation; no matter how friendly the words of both sides are, no real 'progress' has been made as of yet. 

Iran is one of the most misunderstood places in the world for most Westerners. Beyond the obvious misconceptions about language, culture and ethnicity, there is also a mistaken desire to frame their entire existence within a Western paradigm. As many have pointed out, this is a problem (I would suggest reading Michael Axworthy on this). One of the significant ways in which Westerners fail to understand Iran, and in particular the Islamic Republic, is the governmental structure. The United States has a fairly simple system that many are familiar with. It has clearly delineated Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches, where each one of these three acts in a way to compliment and also to prevent the others from becoming too powerful. Iran as well has these three branches but they function in a very different way. 

Available at: http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/images/power_chart.gif

As the preceding chart from IranChamber.com shows, Iran's government is a convoluted and contradictory organizational mess. Not only is it the only state in the world where the head of government (President Rouhani in this case) does not control the armed forces (this includes the IRGC which is loyal to the revolution, and effectively the Supreme Leader), but also the Judicial is subject to the whims of the indirectly 'elected' Supreme Leader. The fact that certain 'elected' bodies (the President for example) have to be 'approved' by unelected groups, certainly doesn't help make the system any more straight-forward to outsiders.

While the former president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nezhad was in power, many on the right in Israel and America would take his words (whether they were translated well or not) at face-value. They made a sport of raving about how this fanatical and powerful leader was a menace to the world and that he must be stopped etc. Those who spoke to me during this time are probably familiar with the way in which I was sharply dismissive of this idea. President Rouhani does not have the same legal authority as the Supreme Leader, or as much as fear-mongers incorrectly claimed Ahmadi-Nezhad had. However, dismissing him as powerless is just as foolish. It remains to be seen if genuine negotiations can happen on his watch. 

Given the amount of possible disinformation and denials coming from the Iranian side, it is unclear if the hardline backbone of the Iranian government will support any sort of concession on their part. They have created a culture of resistance against the West and its allies (against the Americans, the Iraqis, the Israelis, the Shah and leftist movements such as the Communists and the MEK), and while still on this track, it may be increasingly difficult for them to disengage themselves. This same singularity of thought is also true of the conservative American Congress, and much of the Israeli political establishment. The nervous one-track hive-mind is certainly not helped by it's inability to understand the Iranian government's decision making process and power structure. Speculation can, on occasion, be beneficial, but uneducated speculation based upon a simplified understanding of a very complicated Iranian governmental apparatus helps no one. 

New Iranian Nuclear Sites?

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (political branch of the People's Mujahedin Of Iran/Mujahedin-E Khalq) has "revealed" another "new" Iranian nuclear site. Surprisingly, this article does quite a good job of addressing the potential flaws of these allegations. While this group (NCRI) has correctly identified several sites in the past, they have also been wrong about sites as well.

The NCRI clearly has an agenda, and the timing (right after the election of the 'moderate' cleric Hassan Rouhani to the Iranian presidency) makes me curious why this was released now. Many hawks have been frustrated by the election of a less controversial, antagonistic figure than Mahmoud Ahmadi Nezhad, the last president of Iran who was best known for his incendiary remarks and Holocaust denial.

If Iran were to once again to be in non-compliance with the NPT (requires proper notification to the IAEA if any new nuclear facilities are built etc.) as they admitted in 2003, it would certainly reduce the prospects for negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. Even though Binyamin Netanyahu has finally admitted that Supreme Leader Khamenei is in fact in control of the Iranian nuclear program (not Ahmadi Nezhad as Netanyahu incessantly and vociferously claimed for years), and Mr. Rouhani has not even been sworn in yet, this revelation, if true, would mitigate the positive feelings created by Rouhani's election and his attempts to repair relations with countries.

Sources close to #Rouhani say he is planning to send special envoys to some countries to repair broken ties & start new chapter with #Tehran
— Negar Mortazavi (@negarmortazavi) July 10, 2013

While I am skeptical of anything from the NCRI for the obvious reasons, I am also highly suspicious of Iran considering its track record of non-compliance. Things have appeared to have calmed down a bit regarding the Iran-Israel/US conflict and a new problem such as a hidden nuclear site would quickly ramp up tensions once again.

Why sanction the Iranian Auto Industry?

Today the United States announced a few more sanctions on Iran intended to "further tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran and isolate the Iranian government for its continued failure to meet its international obligations."

The targets of the sanctions include the Iranian Rial, the automotive sector, and any "material support to the government of Iran". 

At first I thought it strange that the auto industry would be targeted, but then I remembered an article published by Forbes from last month about how there should be sanctions imposed upon Iran's auto manufacturing industry. 

The author's main argument for sanctions is that Iranian owned car companies enable access to 'dual-use technology for Iran's nuclear designs'. The evidence that he uses for this is that there are gas cylinders produced for hybrid cars by an Iranian owned factory in Germany. These "…included carbon fiber and hardened steel – key components of Iran’s second generation nuclear enrichment centrifuges. It also had sophisticated machinery in its inventory, which can be used both to make cylinders and manufacture centrifuges." 

The problem here is that MCS, the operator of the factory, is not an Iranian car company (though as the Iranians have clearly demonstrated, their clever usage of shell corporations make determining the true owner of any company quite difficult) although the author claims that auto companies are the shadow owners of MCS. The original Washington Post article (referenced in the Forbes piece) does not describe the factory as one which creates auto-parts, but rather "high-pressure gas tanks". In fact, the word "auto" or any of its derivatives is found only once in the article where it states: "One of the dual-use materials at MCS was carbon fiber, which is often used in the aerospace and automotive fields".

So why does the author insist on sanctioning the automobile industry? The Washington Post article states that Iran has been "scouring the world for carbon fiber". High quality carbon fiber is evidently a key part of advanced stage centrifuges and so, there apparently are already sanctions on Iranian purchases of high quality carbon fiber. According to ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security), as a result of this, Iran has begun to produce its own carbon fiber (albeit of low quality).

I may be wrong, but from what I understand of the evidence, the target of the sanctions is not the actual industry itself, but those who run it (IRGC), who are also known to have attempted to proliferate materials important for nuclear activities. Therefore the argument should not be that the industry, the cars or the materials themselves that are a problem, but rather that those who lead the industry are the problem and the reason for such sanctions.

While I think that the argument on Forbes is problematic, it may not even be connected to the new Obama sanctions. The sanctions were created by executive order rather than by Congress, so instead of having to try to force an increasingly pig-headed and obstinate House of Representatives to agree with him if he wants to remove the sanctions in the future, Obama may have created a situation where he himself is able to remove them as a bargaining chip with the Iranians. 

Iran Election: Who to Follow

I've been quite busy finishing up my papers so I won't be writing much on the Iranian Presidential Election until I finish. It is really tough since it is quite interesting and lots of important things have been happening.

In brief the focus by the candidates on nuclear and economic issues is telling. These coincidentally are the same things that Western powers have also been focused on, despite the more obvious and presently troubling Syria conflict, human rights abuses and natural disasters (the recent spate of earthquakes in Iran has more or less resulted in a failure to address the significant problem of nuclear safety at Iran's facilities, not to mention building standards for residential or commercial properties in Iran).

Anyway, I thought I would instead link to other sources which will be writing and tweeting so here goes:

Websites:
Al Monitor's Iran Pulse
Enduring America's Election Guide
Enduring America's Iran Section
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Iran News Now
Meir Javedanfar (Iranian-Israeli analyst)

Twitter Feeds:
Dr. Saeed Jalili Nuclear negotiator and current presidential candidate
Hashemi Rafsanjani long-time regime insider, now sidelined
Hassan Rouhani "moderate" presidential candidate
BBC Persian Persian language tweets, but not just on Iran
Thomas Erdbrink NYT Tehran Bureau Chief
Khamenei Official twitter of the Iranian Supreme Leader, tweets in Persian, English, Arabic, Spanish and other languages
Jason Rezaian Washington Post reporter in Tehran

Earthquake danger at Bushehr

Despite the problems surrounding the Fukushima Nuclear Reactor after the 2011 earthquake, nuclear work continues at Iran's Bushehr reactor. The plant is based in one of the most earthquake-prone regions of the world, yet work continues. Bushehr is supposed meant to be able to withstand earthquakes up to 7 on the Richter scale (the recent earthquake was a 6.3), but as Iran has not signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Even India, Israel and Pakistan who are not NPT signatories, have signed the CNS), it is subject to less oversight and safety measures. Nuclear accidents are potentially a huge problem and a radiation leak can affect millions, why not allow safety inspectors to help? Bushehr has nothing to do with the alleged nuclear weapons program, and has no military dimensions, so why not?

This article does a very good job of explaining internal and external fears of a nuclear disaster at Bushehr.


UPDATE 1: fixed broken link for updated Bulletin of Atomic Scientists website article

North Korea is NOT Iran (and Vice Versa)

After all the hullabaloo over North Korea and the unproductive nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan, certain usual suspects predictably brought out their old arguments about why Iran is so bloodthirsty and must be stopped. One of their favored arguments is the war-mongering nature and overall craziness of the North Koreans and how Iran must be stopped from becoming like them. When I no longer find it amusing, I become disturbed at this nonsense as it is paranoid and problematic in its bellicosity. 

There are a number of reasons why these comparisons between Iran and North Korea are illogical and ridiculous. Firstly, North Korea is not, and will never be Iran. North Korea is the bastard step-child of bastard step-children, isolated from the world. They rely on food aid, while simultaneously spending their budget developing weapons and running massive slave labor camps. As bad as some of the human rights abuses are in Iran, these countries are fundamentally different. No matter what one feels about the way in which Iranian elections have occurred (or not, depending on your point of view), they at least have the semblance of multiple political parties, and representatives from minorities are elected to the Majles (Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, and Zoroastrians). While things are becoming more difficult for Iranians as sanctions cut further into the ability of the state and its citizens to conduct business, it is very very far from becoming anything like North Korea economically. 

The next reason why this comparison is problematic is that North Korea considers South Korea and the South Korean people to be a part of the greater Korea that must be united (The North Korean political front is called the "Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland"). This perceived need for 'unification' perpetuates a conflict-minded state that will not be able to reconciled with its neighbor until one of them ceases to exist (I am counting an overthrow of the Kims in this category). Unlike North Korea vs. South Korea, Iran, and Islam (Sunni, Shia or other sect) are not diametrically opposed to Israel and Zionism. The current governments of the two states often disagree with each other, but they are not inherent enemies, it is not an existential disagreement. 

What people should be afraid of is not an Iranian nuclear weapon, but any nuclear weapon. Any capability to cause so much destruction, no matter how just and restrained the one who controls this power is, is potentially dangerous.

Quantifying Sanctions?

As a news junkie, I spend a lot of time on Twitter and all of the relevant foreign policy news sites. On these sites there is a relatively healthy debate over the efficacy of sanctions against Iran, but the lack of geographic thinking in the discussion is disheartening. By 'geographic' I do not mean just the physical space itself, but rather a more complete holistic approach. 

Both sides vociferously argue that their opinion is valid, while listing a variety of reasons. Those in favor of sanctions point to the lack of diplomatic progress in negotiations as proof that more drastic measures are necessary, namely increased sanctions, with the potential of military action if Iran does not change its behavior. Those opposed to sanctions talk about how the sanctions are rather crudely implemented, restricting humanitarian goods like medicine. Others who are opposed to sanctions believe that the measures are not enough, and the lack of any significant concessions by Iran means that the West must react militarily to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (or the capability to build a nuclear weapon). I am not going to write about these arguments because the specifics details are not as interesting to me. I am much more interested in the big picture, which is why the lack of a comprehensive discussion of the entire situation is disturbing to me. 

It is certainly true that Iran's production of nuclear material has increased significantly since the various sanctions were implemented, but how can one measure the true impact of these sanctions? Do we look at the rapidly falling value of Iranian currency and the rampant inflation? Do we look at year by year or month by month comparisons of how much petroleum based products are exported by Iran? Do we look at the Iranian budget as an indicator of financial health? Do we look at the number of centrifuges used by Iran, or the quantity of enriched uranium which it has? 

Some will say that the increasing number of centrifuges which Iran is using indicates that sanctions are not having their desired effect. This is certainly possible, but what may be overlooked by this estimation is the possibility that Iran's rulers have placed an increased importance upon their nuclear program as a way to gain leverage with the West. From their actions, it seems as though the Iranians act rationally, couldn't this be an expression of their rationality? When one is put into a difficult situation isn't it natural to try and gain leverage in whatever way possible? 

Assuming some sort of interconnectivity between all things, claiming that sanctions are not having an effect on Iran is a ridiculous notion. Following this logic, won't there then be at least some impact on Iran's nuclear program? Iran does not exist in a vacuum, and its various governmental programs are similarly not isolated from every other part of the country's governmental apparatus.

Just because it is very difficult to quantify the impact of sanctions upon a program, this does not exclude the possibility of there being some sort of connection. The sanctions, while crude at best, clearly have had some sort of impact on Iran. While the effect of and the ability to measure sanctions on Iran's nuclear program is debatable, what is certain is that insufficient measurements using simplified methods will lead to simplistic, insufficient conclusions.