9 Questions the Media should be asking Iran about Syria

Iran's former FM Salehi (Also current Defense Minister Dehqan, and current FM Zarif) recently claimed that Iran notified the United States 9 months ago (via Switzerland which handles American interests relating to Iran) that chemical weapons had arrived in Syria. Iran has been sensitive towards chemical warfare because of the usage of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. News media have latched onto this claim, and criticized the United States for not responding, yet these same reporters have not raised critical questions about Mr. Salehi's claims.

1) What types of chemical weapons were they? Sarin? VX? Exactly what weapons were allegedly smuggled into Syria?

2) Which countries have or possess the capability to produce these weapons? If they are only available in certain locations, then it would almost certainly have come from one of these locations. 

3) Where did these weapons come from? The route to Syria is important for understanding who would have shipped the weapons there. If a certain route is commonly used by a certain group, then there is a good chance that there will be some connections.

4) Do 1) and 3) match up? If the weapons came from somewhere which does not possess the capabilities to produce them, there clearly is a problem with the accuracy of this information.

5) How long can the weapon last in storage (both properly stored and improperly). Iraq whose chemical weapons stockpile has not been secured throughout has sarin but according to this CIA document, the weapons have shelf-life problems and had degraded quickly

6) Is it possible for this weapon to be properly stored in Syria by rebels? Are there any special procedures that must be taken to assure that the chemical agents do not degrade?

7) Which groups received this weapon as it arrived into Syria? Are these groups capable of staging a large-scale attack over a several kilometer sized area?

8) Who are these groups aligned with? Are the others they work with more capable of making an attack of the scale of Ghouta?

9) Where are these groups located? Where do they operate from? Syria is insecure in many areas and certain factions have control of different areas. If the exact location of this smuggling is identified, then those responsible may be identified. If these groups are incapable of operating in Damascus, (due to lack of reliable transit and chemical weapons handling or whatever other reason), then the Ghouta attack almost certainly was NOT perpetrated by these groups.

Until Iran answers these questions, I believe there is no reason to question the American/English/French/German intelligence claims that Assad was almost certainly the one responsible for the Ghouta attack. It is possible that these chemical weapons allegedly brought into Syria were used at another location, but the length of time since this alleged incident and the timing of the revelation of this information is highly suspicious. It is clear that Iran is attempting to imply that the Ghouta Massacre was perpetrated by these smuggled weapons. Iran has made a serious accusation, but has provided so little evidence so that I find myself doubting their claims. 

Why Obama was Right to Delay Action on Syria

After President Obama spoke today in the Rose Garden announcing that his decision to take the matter of a possible Syrian intervention to the US Congress the reactions I saw on the television and on Twitter were mostly negative. The President has been criticized heavily on his foreign policy in recent years, especially on matters pertaining to the Middle East, and for many, this was further proof of his lack of leadership, and even worse, lack of a spine. Many military types rightly pointed out that by threatening force, and continually delaying, Assad and his military are able to prepare for the possible strikes. This is true, but the military aspect is only a part of the political decision-making process.

I have long been in favor of an active role in intervening in Syria. I believe that a head of state that willingly kills civilians and insurgents indiscriminately on a large scale for a continuing period of time, without any real attempts to verbally engage and resolve differences, must be punished and in extreme cases, removed from power. 'President' Assad, certainly is an extreme case. 

President Obama's decision to 'telegraph' his war plans, before suspending them seem strange at first, but looking deeper, I think that this is a very good political move. The Obama administration has been heavily criticized for many civil rights issues ranging from drone warfare and detention of non-combatant prisoners to privacy violations by way of the NSA. One of the arguments against Obama is that there is not enough transparency (therefore people do not have enough say in, and understanding of what the government does). The release of a declassified intelligence report on what the United States Intelligence Community believes happened on August 21, 2013 in East Ghouta is a step towards addressing the unhappiness of the American people in this regard. 

Obama's decision to task Congress is advantageous for the administration for many ways. Congress has been an obstinate thorn in Obama's side for the last 5 years, attempting to undercut and undermine his every move (or lack thereof). Even though Congress's approval rating is the lowest it has been in years, they are still elected representatives of the American people and in theory, a more 'democratic' apparatus than an executive decision by one man. By passing the responsibility on to Congress, Obama is able to deflect the attention from himself. The way in which both he and Secretary of State Kerry have reiterated the allegations against Assad's usage of chemical weapons makes it clear that they both believe that military action must be taken. In many cases this should be a slam dunk, an easy decision to make. However, with the difficulties and financial expenses of interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya still on the mind of the American voter and taxpayer, public support for an intervention in Syria is very lower. Before the Ghouta Massacre, support from Americans was as low as 9%. 

Despite the very low support in the earlier poll, a new poll has shown a sharp increase; 42% support 'military action against the Syrian government in response to the use of chemical weapons' (50% opposed and 8% were undecided). When the military action is 'limited to air strikes using cruise missiles launched from U.S. navy ships that were meant to destroy military units and infrastructure that have been used to carry out chemical attacks' a plurality of 50% supported this action (44% oppose and 6% were undecided). Nearly 60% of respondents indicated that they believe use of chemical weapons is a 'red line' which requires a 'significant U.S. response, including the possibility of military action'. A similar number believed that the most important objective of military action in Syria would be to stop the use of chemical weapons. What is most surprising about this poll is that a full 79% thought that President Obama should be required to receive approval from Congress before taking military action in Syria. 

The poll numbers show a clear increase in support for military action against Syria, but it is not a majority, and given Obama's other domestic troubles and the looming debt crisis, it makes a lot of sense to listen to the will of the people. This way, if Congress again proves to be unwilling be more than sticks in the mud, Obama can say that he tried to listen to the American people. If Obama does take military action after Congress says no (which he said he believes he legally can do), then Obama shows his spine and his willingness to make a tough choice. If Congress says yes, then Obama is able to say that he was right in wishing to intervene militarily, and also that he was willing to listen to Congress and act in a bipartisan manner for the good of the country. 

Support for strikes against Syria are not popular in several key allied countries around the world. The UK's House of Commons voted against authorizing military force, and Germany, Canada and Poland stated that they would not participate in aggressive action against Assad's regime. The United States has unilaterally used military force to the discontent of many around the world. The rush to war in Iraq 2003 is a prime example of where the intelligence was wrong and going around the United Nations did not help the United States' standing abroad. By delaying until more intelligence is gathered, and more debate is held, this administration hedges its own bet on the non-confirmation of Assad's culpability in the chemical attack. If further evidence is produced which exonerates or convicts Assad, then this stall for time will look to have been a wise decision. 

Assad has now been able to disperse and prepare his troops for a looming strike which is not good if the intention is solely to damage his military. However, this is a slightly unrealistic point of view as the goal of an intervention is (or at least should be) not to destroy the army of Assad and create even further instability, but to punish the use of chemical weapons. No matter when the US strikes (if it chooses to do so), the military power of Assad's forces are weaker by order of magnitudes in comparison to the US. We have to be honest in accepting the fact that we are not out there to destroy Assad's army, and forcibly taking his chemical weapons would require troops to physically secure sites. This is an unrealistic goal. What is more feasible is heavily damaging Assad's air force, air defense, and if possible, chemical weapons delivery systems. This leaves him vulnerable to further air strikes (by the West or Israel) and avoids committing the US and its allies to a lasting presence.

So it is my belief that Obama has made the correct choice in this situation. I would love it if the United States and its allies were able to destroy all of Assad's forces and his properties but this is an unreasonable expectation. A series of strikes, especially on airfields, would damage the Assad regime's ability to conduct war and show the world that using chemical weapons is unacceptable. This decision must not be rushed towards, and Obama's delay allows time to think, among other things.

More than a Game: Palestine Vs. Afghanistan, a World Cup Qualifier in Ramallah

Those who know me know how much of a soccer enthusiast I am. For better or worse, the sport has dominated my life, and I have gone to extraordinary lengths at times to play or to watch the sport. When I was young we used to travel to every San Jose Earthquakes (originally known as the San Jose Clash) home game, despite the 100+ mile journey. I traveled throughout most of the western United States during my youth career, and even to the United Kingdom for a youth tour. When I visited Spain with my family in the early 2000s, we were fortunate enough to attend a Champions League 1/4th final match between F.C. Barcelona and Chelsea FC. Despite these diverse experiences, of all the times that I've had with the sport, my most interesting was probably a World Cup Qualifying match I attended while a student in Israel. 

My sisters and I with Pep Guardiola before the Barcelona/Chelsea match

I always enjoy attending matches in foreign countries because of the different types of fans and environments that are out there. So when I heard of a most interesting and unique soccer game in the summer of 2011, I was very excited. The match was a preliminary round World Cup Qualifier (for Brazil 2014) in the Asian Football Confederation between two unlikely opponents, Palestine and Afghanistan. Both footballing organizations have endured, despite a difficult last few years. The Taliban's rule over Afghanistan was repressive (the national stadium in Kabul was used for public executions, not soccer), and even though the United States and NATO had intervened by 2001, the violence of the Taliban and Haqqani Network have continued to render the country unsafe for many. The Palestinian Football Federation as well, has had a tough time with Israeli travel restrictions preventing players from the West Bank and Gaza from traveling to the other area, or even from leaving to play qualifiers abroad. 

Israel and the West Bank have long been unsafe, but while I was studying at Tel Aviv from 2010-2012 things had become quite a bit calmer. Still, the United States Embassy restricts its staff from traveling to the West Bank. Israelis too, with the memory of the Ramallah lynching of 2000 fresh in their minds, would never dream of traveling to the Palestinian portion of the West Bank (Israeli citizens are currently prohibited from traveling to Area A, the part of the West Bank under control of the Palestinian Authority). 

I, however, in my bravery (or naïveté), was unfazed, and determined to attend this unique matchup at all costs. I tried to recruit some classmates and friends, but most were either out of town or unwilling to travel all this way just for a soccer game (we had a 4 hour Arabic lesson early the next morning). It did not help my cause that I had nothing more than the city and a time for the game; I did not know what stadium it would be played out, how much it cost, how to get there, and if foreigners would be restricted from going. I nearly did not go because I did not wish to travel alone, but in the end, a friend of mine who happened to have arranged a group of his friends to go to Ramallah, said that he would come with me to the game. 

Us on the bus in Jerusalem about to go to Ramallah 

The day of the game was incredibly hot, even for an Israeli/Palestinian summer's day. I remember waiting at the bus stop next to the dormitories before 8 am and feeling the sweat dripping down my back. The bus ride from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was unremarkable. We met my friend's friends in Jerusalem where the buses to Ramallah were supposed to pick us up. The stop was basically a run-down parking lot, certainly not a place I would want to be after dark, but because were a variety of minibuses there with Arabic signs, we figured that we were probably in the right place. We all checked to make sure that we had our passports so that we would be able to re-enter Israel, and hopped on the bus.

Traveling out of Israel into the Israeli controlled portions of the East Jerusalem and the West Bank is a cinch, I've accidentally done it a few times in a rental car while lost in Jerusalem's labyrinth like maze of highways, although once we had passed Qalandia checkpoint it became clear where we were. What struck me the most about the short drive into Ramallah was the amount of construction. Under Prime Minister Fayyad the economic situation in the West Bank had improved drastically. There were new projects under construction all around us, both residential and commercial. In Ramallah this too was the case. I was surprised at how nice some of the shops and streets in Ramallah were. Many of them would not have been out of place in a fancy neighborhood of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. 

After my friend and my new acquaintances had lunched and had some of the best Limon-Nana (fresh Lemonade with Mint) we'd ever had at a local coffee shop (no, not the infamous Stars and Bucks), we decided to travel around the city a bit. We visited the old city, a beautiful, well-kept, quiet neighborhood just outside the center of town. One of the highlights of this part of the day was being ambushed by a young boy who pretended to shoot us with a stick servicing as a gun. A few years earlier this would probably have made most of us nervous, but because things have been more peaceful in recent years, this was nothing more than a charming interaction with a local.

View from lunch of the main intersection in Ramallah. Photo Credit: Axel Angeles 

Yasser Arafat's Tomb. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

We made our way back into town and then out again as we walked to the tomb of Yasser Arafat. At the site there was a heavy security presence, but once the guards saw our passports and heard us speak English, they were all very friendly and wanted to speak with us. I had thought that they may resent our presence because we had come from Israel, but they did not seem to mind one bit. I ended up asking them about the soccer game which was supposed to be somewhere in Ramallah later that evening. Because Football (Soccer) is widely considered the global sport and the World Cup is it's biggest stage, I'd thought that there would be incredible excitement for the rare occurrence of a qualifying match, but none of the guards even knew that there was a game going on

We then went into town for dinner which was both cheap and delicious, and again I asked our waiter about the game. He too did not know that there was a game, but said that if there was one, it would be at Arram stadium (in colloquial Arabic especially, the 'Al' article marker drops the 'l' sound, in this case changing Al-Ram to Arram) a town just outside Ramallah. The waiter pointed in several directions (West and North) while saying that it was near Jerusalem (which is to the Southeast). Because I am a geographically obsessed person who is always aware of the cardinal directions at all times this was frustrating for me, but the maitre'd said that we wouldn't have a problem if we were to take the bus towards Jerusalem, or in the worst case we could find taxi drivers who would know how to get there. So me and my friend (the others decided they did not want to go to the game) went downstairs and began to look for the bus stop where we could catch a ride to the stadium.

Mural of Marwan Barghouti near Qalandia. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

I'd been studying written Arabic for almost a year at this point and so I knew that the local name for Jerusalem in Arabic was Al-Quds. I asked many people on the street for the bus to 'Al-Quds' as I became increasingly frantic, but they were either unable to help me or had no idea what I was talking about. Finally someone came up to me and asked if I meant 'Al Ouds'. At this point the game had been going for almost 15 minutes so me and my friend both were willing to take the risk. The man led us into a dark and dirty garage and we were both a bit worried that something might happen to us, but once the driver of the minibus and several others got on, we figured we would be safe. 

The drive to the stadium was not a lengthy one, but the traffic and construction made it seem like an eternity. Fortunately the driver had the football match on the radio, so while it was in rapidly spoken Arabic, I was able to distinguish some of what was happening in the game. While in the minibus we drove past Qalandia checkpoint, but this time we went around rather than through it. We then travelled alongside the separation barrier for another couple of kilometers. For the majority of its length, the separation barrier is nothing more than a wire fence, but in the Jerusalem area in particular, it is a massive 5 meter+ concrete wall. It was an interesting experience for me seeing all of the graffiti written on the wall. Surprising to me was the amount of non-Arabic script. The majority was in English (without too many grammatical mistakes common to non-native speakers), although many other European languages were common as well. Finally we got to the stadium which was basically in an alley off the side of the frontage road along the wall. There were several dozen young boys outside the stadium, and again a significant and heavily armed security presence (I am not sure if I will ever get used to seeing uniformed individuals walking around in a civilian environment while carrying automatic weaponry even though I lived in Israel for over 2 years). There were even fewer English speakers at the stadium than there were in Ramallah and it took us several minutes talking to the guards to find someone who could speak English to us. Eventually we located one and we explained that we wanted to see the game. The police man looked at us, clearly perplexed, and asked for our passports. We both handed them over and he took them over to his boss. The man quickly returned and ushered us into the stadium, allowing us to skip the ticket booth and the line to get in. 

We had made it to the game just before half time and the sun was getting quite low in the sky behind us, and the bank of seats cast a broad shadow across the pitch. The stadium, while small and dilapidated, had a significant concentration of fans. There were even some fans waving Afghan flags. I am not certain if they were Afghans who had travelled from Afghanistan, but because there was a youth national team in the stands as well, it certainly seemed a possibility. Even more surprising for my friend and I, was that there were women and children at the game as well. In many of the more conservative Islamic places this would not be allowed so it was interesting to see a more open environment. Earlier in the day after our lunch the owners of the cafe had let slip that women were not allowed into the establishment, but since we were visitors it was ok just this one time. After this experience, the presence of women at the game was even more interesting and strange to me.

Some of the Afghan fans with flags. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

The game itself was boring and of very poor quality. I remarked during the game to my friend that I and/or most of my college teammates, if we were eligible to play for either team, would not have been anywhere near the worst players on the pitch. The fans too were not very enthusiastic, and seemed more interesting in talking to each other than the game. This may have been a function of the stifling heat or something else entirely, but this is unclear. Palestine had won the first game 2-0 (played in Tajikistan due to security concerns) and needed to win, tie the game or lose by just one goal to advance to the next round which would be a home and home series against Thailand. Palestine scored just before we arrived to the stadium making the total aggregate 3-0, before Afghanistan clawed one back early in the 2nd half. The score stayed the same until the final whistle and Palestine were through to the next round. 

The match! Palestine is in Green and Afghanistan in Red. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

My friend and I were a bit nervous at this point because it was near dark and we were over a mile from the Qalandia checkpoint and about 5 miles from the bus stop in Ramallah where we knew we could get a bus back to Jerusalem. We would have preferred to take a bus back to Ramallah or Qalandia, but because the frontage road was so busy and neither of us spoke serviceable Arabic, we figured this was an impossible task. On the bright side this gave us a great opportunity to examine the wall and its graffiti even closer. It was getting closer and closer to dark so I was pushing my friend to get back to the checkpoint so we could get back to Jerusalem safely. In hindsight I was very glad that he took so much time taking photographs because they are quite good and help me remember parts of the day.

The wall. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

The wall. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

We eventually reached the checkpoint, but because we had not come with a bus or a car we were a bit worried if we would be able to cross. The Israelis also are known to close the border unannounced for indefinite periods of times and neither of us wanted to be stuck in an unfamiliar territory after dark without any language skills, much in the way of money, and no mobile phone service. For a while we walked behind a young boy dragging a cooler full of water he was trying to sell to the dozens of cars and vans waiting for permission to cross the border, and eventually hopped one of the first buses in line. We had to get off the bus right away to go through the checkpoint and show our identification to the Israeli border guards.

The boy and his cooler as we approached the Qalandia Checkpoint near sunset. Photo credit: Axel Angeles

One of the common horror stories from Palestinians is how they are subject to humiliating conditions at checkpoints, and Qalandia is known to have some of these problems, partially due to the high volume of traffic at this location. The experience of walking up to the actual checkpoint is uncomfortable. You enter a passageway with chicken-wire on both sides and above your head, sometimes doubled up and always just above your head. Despite the open air blowing through, its a claustrophobic and stressful time. Even though there were only a handful of people in front of us, it took us about ten minutes of waiting before they cleared the people ahead of us. Because my friend and I were both Americans we breezed right through once they saw our passports, but others were subject to much heavier scrutiny. We jumped back onto the bus and headed back into Jerusalem and then to our final destination of Tel Aviv.

It was a fascinating day full of adventure and learning (I found out from my Arabic professor the next day that Al-Ouds is the local colloquial way of saying Al-Quds or Jerusalem), and I am glad that I took the leap of faith and traveled to an unfamiliar and potentially dangerous place. I will never forget this day and the interesting events which took place. While the quality of the soccer match was abysmal, and the fans were not the most exciting or interactive that I have experienced, for socio-political-geographical reasons this is the most interesting soccer-related experience I have had.

UPDATE 1: the mural with a man's face is of Marwan Barghouti, not Omar Barghouti.

Partial List of Rouhani's Cabinet Nominations

Finally the list has been released!

http://en.irna.ir/News.aspx?Nid=80762362


Bijan Namdar Zanganeh for oil ministry (same as Sharq and Tasnim)
Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli for interior ministry 
Ali Tayyeb-Nia for ministry of economy and finance 
Mahmoud Alavi for intelligence ministry (many expected Ali Younesi to this position)
Hamid Chitchiyan for energy ministry 
Hossein Dehqan for defense ministry (Tasnim picked this)
Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh for industry, mine and commerce ministry 
Mahmoud Hojjati for agriculture Jehad ministry 
Ali Rabiei for ministry of labor, cooperative and social welfare 
Abbas Akhoundi for ministry of roads, housing and urban development 
Mohammad Ali Najafi for education ministry 
Hassan Qazizadeh-Hashemi for ministry of health, treatment and medical education 
Masoud Soltanifar for sports and youth ministry 
Mohammad Javad Zarif for foreign ministry 
Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi for justice ministry 
Ali Jannati for ministry of culture and Islamic guidance 
Mahmoud Vaezi for ministry of communications and information technology 
Jafar Mili-Monfared for ministry of sciences, research and technology 

Comparing this to the list of rumored cabinet members which I compiled from a variety of sources, the end result is is very different. Pretty much the only pick which most got right is Bijan Namdar Zanganeh as Oil Minister. 

Zanganeh was a member of Khatami and Rafsanjani's cabinets.
Nematzadeh was a member of Rafsanjani's cabinet.
Najafi was a member of Khatami and Rafsanjani's cabinets.

Comparing this list to the leaked/rumored lists, Ali Younesi was an early front-runner for Intel who was not selected, and Mahmoud Vaezi was a near universal pick for Foreign Ministry who was also not picked. Al-Monitor's Ali Hashem was incorrect in every pick he made, although this list from IRNA is incomplete and there are a few positions which may end up being filled by those that Mr. Hashem claimed would do so. The Iranian newspaper Bahar had a few selections correct such as Mr. Zarif to the Foreign Ministry.

As a reminder, this list is incomplete, and these are only nominations, but this is very very different from what both conservatives and reformist Iranian sources estimated in June.

New Iranian Nuclear Sites?

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (political branch of the People's Mujahedin Of Iran/Mujahedin-E Khalq) has "revealed" another "new" Iranian nuclear site. Surprisingly, this article does quite a good job of addressing the potential flaws of these allegations. While this group (NCRI) has correctly identified several sites in the past, they have also been wrong about sites as well.

The NCRI clearly has an agenda, and the timing (right after the election of the 'moderate' cleric Hassan Rouhani to the Iranian presidency) makes me curious why this was released now. Many hawks have been frustrated by the election of a less controversial, antagonistic figure than Mahmoud Ahmadi Nezhad, the last president of Iran who was best known for his incendiary remarks and Holocaust denial.

If Iran were to once again to be in non-compliance with the NPT (requires proper notification to the IAEA if any new nuclear facilities are built etc.) as they admitted in 2003, it would certainly reduce the prospects for negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. Even though Binyamin Netanyahu has finally admitted that Supreme Leader Khamenei is in fact in control of the Iranian nuclear program (not Ahmadi Nezhad as Netanyahu incessantly and vociferously claimed for years), and Mr. Rouhani has not even been sworn in yet, this revelation, if true, would mitigate the positive feelings created by Rouhani's election and his attempts to repair relations with countries.

Sources close to #Rouhani say he is planning to send special envoys to some countries to repair broken ties & start new chapter with #Tehran
— Negar Mortazavi (@negarmortazavi) July 10, 2013

While I am skeptical of anything from the NCRI for the obvious reasons, I am also highly suspicious of Iran considering its track record of non-compliance. Things have appeared to have calmed down a bit regarding the Iran-Israel/US conflict and a new problem such as a hidden nuclear site would quickly ramp up tensions once again.

Mandela and the Morality of Political Violence

With Nelson Mandela's condition deteriorating, and reports that the iconic figure has not even opened his eyes in days and may be on life support, reporters and pundits are busily writing pieces about him, and the Twittersphere is abuzz with rumors of changes to his medical state. Wise, insightful quotes from him are shared amongst friends and strangers, and abundant praise his heaped upon Mandela for his innumerable accomplishments and importance to the South African anti-Apartheid movement. This praise is well-deserved. What most unfortunately neglect, is Mandela's early actions, and the violence of the African National Congress's military wing (towards both civilians and armed targets) before it became a part of the political system. Mandela is a multi-faceted character, and his choice to use political violence is a fascinating study.

For me, Mandela's complexities define and distinguish him. Though he was responsible for a number of fantastic achievements, he also co-founded a violent organization that murdered civilians. How should someone like him be remembered? The good things Mandela did (including post-Apartheid reconciliation initiatives) outweigh the bad, but it also seems dishonest to ignore the bad things he did and the fact that his actions may have caused harm unto others.

More than just judging him for what he did or did not do, it is important to consider the motivations behind his decision to act violently. When is political violence justified and on what scale? If one is making an argument based upon a moral issue, does this person have a responsibility to be more "moral" than the idea or group that one is opposing? Mandela provides an extensive explanation of his thinking which led to his decision to use violence as a political tool in his 1964 statement from the Rivonia trial.

I hope that writers and reporters, and in turn their readers, are able to think of and remember Nelson Mandela as an important man who contributed a lot of good to society, and as an important man who also did some morally debatable things. 

Rumored Members of Rouhani's new Cabinet

This list is taken from a BBC World Monitoring translation of Sharq, an Iranian Reformist Newspaper. This appeared in the 22 June, 2013 publication of Sharq, and was translated by the BBC World Monitoring service on 24 June, 2013.

What is striking about this list is the number of reformists and members with connections to Rafsanjani. (There may be more connections that I am unaware of, but most of these people are unknown outside Iran so it is hard to know for certain).

Former members of Khatami's government are highlighted in red, former members of Rafsanjani's government are highlighted in blue, former members of both are purple, former members of Mousavi's are green

First vice-president: Mohammad Reza Aref—Reformist presidential candidate from the 1392/2013 election, and former First vice-president under Khatami

Secretary of Supreme National Security Council: Ali Akbar Velayati—Presidential candidate from 1392/2013

Ministry of Education and Training: Ali Motahhari— Son of assassinated protegé of Ayatollah Khomeini, Morteza Motahhari 

Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs: Mohammad Baqer Nobakht 

Foreign Ministry: Mahmoud Va'ezi 

Ministry of Health Care and Medical Education: Mas'ud Pezeshkian—Held same position under Khatami

Ministry of Agricultural Jihad: Esa Kalantari—Same position under Rafsanjani

Ministry of Justice: Hojjat ol-Eslam Shushtari— Same position under Rafsanjani and Khatami

Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics: Akbar Torkan— Same position under Rafsanjani (Minister of Roads in Rafsanjani's 2nd term)

Ministry of Roads and Urban Development: Ali Abdol'alizadeh

Ministry of Industries, Mines and Commerce: Mohammad Reza Nehavandian 

Ministry of Science, Research and Technology: Ja'far Tawfiqi—Same position under Khatami

Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance: Mohammad Ali Zam

Ministry of Labor and Cooperatives: Morteza Bank—Deputy Foreign Minister under Khatami

Ministry of the Interior: Hojjat ol-Eslam Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri—Same position under Mousavi

Ministry of Oil: Bizhan Namdar Zanganeh— Minister of Jihad?? under Rafsanjani and Khatami

Ministry of Energy: Habibollah Bitaraf— Same position under Khatami

Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs: Mohammad Fard

Plan and Budget Organization: Mohammad Ali Najafi—Same position under Khatami (Minister of education under Rafsanjani) 

Atomic Energy Organization: Gholamreza Aqazadeh 

Ministry of Communications and Information Technology: Ahmad Mo'tamedi 

Vice-president for Majles affairs: Qodratollah Alikhani 

Environmental Protection Organization: Ma'sumeh Ebtekar—Same position under Khatami (first female leader in this role)

Central Bank: Majid Qasemi 

Vice-president of the republic and chief of the Martyr Foundation: Hoseyn Dehqan 

Vice-president of the republic for clerical affairs: Hojjat ol-Eslam Shahidi 

Vice-president for technology: Alireza Olfat—Member of Khatami's govt

Government Secretary and Spokesman: Alireza Nateqi—Chairman of Rouhani's Campaign Committee

Ministry of Information: Ali Younesi—Same position under Khatami 

Chief of the President of the Republic's Center for Women's Participation and Family Affairs: Zahra Pishgahifard—Female

Ministry of Intelligence: Ali Younesi—Same position under Khatami (unsure if same as Information Ministry)

Chief of Cultural Heritage and Handicraft Industries Organization: Hoseyn Mar'ashi 

Consultant to the president of the republic and supervisor of the Presidency Institute: Mohammad Reza Ne'matzadeh—Minister of Labor under Rafsanjani

Consultants to the president of the republic: Dr. Mohammad Reza Sadeq, Ali Asgari, Hoseyn Faridun (Rouhani's brother)

Special inspector for the president of the republic: Hoseyn Faridun (Rouhani's brother)

UPDATE 1: American Enterprise Institute published a list on 19 June based on a report from Tasnim (a principlist paper). There are some differences and some similarities, but the list is far less complete and only has a few names. E'tedad (A reformist paper) on 20 June published an analysis with similar names. Because of the consensus between several papers with different political leanings, I feel as though its safe to say that Ali Younesi and Mouhammad Reza Ne'matzadeh are both expected to play important roles in Rouhani's government. There are some significant differences between the E'tedad and Sharq lists, though they have virtually all of the same names.

UPDATE 2: Al-Monitor has weighed in with some similar opinions although the man they believe will be the next Defense Minister (Shamakhani) is someone not mentioned by E'tedad or Sharq (AEI concurs with Al-Monitor on this selection).

UPDATE 3: Another translated text via BBC Monitoring with more of the same names, although this one also includes the figures appointed to the committee selecting/advising selection of the cabinet. These include:  Yunesi, Torkan, Ne'matzadeh, Hoseyn Rouhani (Faridun), Vaezi, Najafi, Jahangiri, Sadegh, Ashena. 

UPDATE 4: CSM picked up a Reuters story quoting Rouhani on his cabinet. Rouhani stated that the cabinet will be inclusive and moderate. This is encouraging to conservatives who may have felt as though they would be excluded, and goes along with the information from UPDATE 3 which states that the reformists wish to keep some of their representatives in the Majles rather than promote them to the cabinet to insure that their seats will remain in the hands of reformists.