The Complexities of the Iranian Government and Nuclear Negotiations

With the impending annual UN General Assembly slated for this coming week, and the anticipation of important political developments, a common story in the news is the potentiality of a diplomatic breakthrough regarding Iran's nuclear program. Much has been made of Iran's new President Hassan Rouhani's increasingly friendly tone towards America and the West and his stated desire for dialogue. From what many have written, it seems an almost foregone conclusion that for the first time in what seems like an eternity, the heads of government for the United States and Iran may meet face to face. For now, this is nothing but blind speculation; no matter how friendly the words of both sides are, no real 'progress' has been made as of yet. 

Iran is one of the most misunderstood places in the world for most Westerners. Beyond the obvious misconceptions about language, culture and ethnicity, there is also a mistaken desire to frame their entire existence within a Western paradigm. As many have pointed out, this is a problem (I would suggest reading Michael Axworthy on this). One of the significant ways in which Westerners fail to understand Iran, and in particular the Islamic Republic, is the governmental structure. The United States has a fairly simple system that many are familiar with. It has clearly delineated Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches, where each one of these three acts in a way to compliment and also to prevent the others from becoming too powerful. Iran as well has these three branches but they function in a very different way. 

Available at: http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/images/power_chart.gif

As the preceding chart from IranChamber.com shows, Iran's government is a convoluted and contradictory organizational mess. Not only is it the only state in the world where the head of government (President Rouhani in this case) does not control the armed forces (this includes the IRGC which is loyal to the revolution, and effectively the Supreme Leader), but also the Judicial is subject to the whims of the indirectly 'elected' Supreme Leader. The fact that certain 'elected' bodies (the President for example) have to be 'approved' by unelected groups, certainly doesn't help make the system any more straight-forward to outsiders.

While the former president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nezhad was in power, many on the right in Israel and America would take his words (whether they were translated well or not) at face-value. They made a sport of raving about how this fanatical and powerful leader was a menace to the world and that he must be stopped etc. Those who spoke to me during this time are probably familiar with the way in which I was sharply dismissive of this idea. President Rouhani does not have the same legal authority as the Supreme Leader, or as much as fear-mongers incorrectly claimed Ahmadi-Nezhad had. However, dismissing him as powerless is just as foolish. It remains to be seen if genuine negotiations can happen on his watch. 

Given the amount of possible disinformation and denials coming from the Iranian side, it is unclear if the hardline backbone of the Iranian government will support any sort of concession on their part. They have created a culture of resistance against the West and its allies (against the Americans, the Iraqis, the Israelis, the Shah and leftist movements such as the Communists and the MEK), and while still on this track, it may be increasingly difficult for them to disengage themselves. This same singularity of thought is also true of the conservative American Congress, and much of the Israeli political establishment. The nervous one-track hive-mind is certainly not helped by it's inability to understand the Iranian government's decision making process and power structure. Speculation can, on occasion, be beneficial, but uneducated speculation based upon a simplified understanding of a very complicated Iranian governmental apparatus helps no one. 

Why Obama was Right to Delay Action on Syria

After President Obama spoke today in the Rose Garden announcing that his decision to take the matter of a possible Syrian intervention to the US Congress the reactions I saw on the television and on Twitter were mostly negative. The President has been criticized heavily on his foreign policy in recent years, especially on matters pertaining to the Middle East, and for many, this was further proof of his lack of leadership, and even worse, lack of a spine. Many military types rightly pointed out that by threatening force, and continually delaying, Assad and his military are able to prepare for the possible strikes. This is true, but the military aspect is only a part of the political decision-making process.

I have long been in favor of an active role in intervening in Syria. I believe that a head of state that willingly kills civilians and insurgents indiscriminately on a large scale for a continuing period of time, without any real attempts to verbally engage and resolve differences, must be punished and in extreme cases, removed from power. 'President' Assad, certainly is an extreme case. 

President Obama's decision to 'telegraph' his war plans, before suspending them seem strange at first, but looking deeper, I think that this is a very good political move. The Obama administration has been heavily criticized for many civil rights issues ranging from drone warfare and detention of non-combatant prisoners to privacy violations by way of the NSA. One of the arguments against Obama is that there is not enough transparency (therefore people do not have enough say in, and understanding of what the government does). The release of a declassified intelligence report on what the United States Intelligence Community believes happened on August 21, 2013 in East Ghouta is a step towards addressing the unhappiness of the American people in this regard. 

Obama's decision to task Congress is advantageous for the administration for many ways. Congress has been an obstinate thorn in Obama's side for the last 5 years, attempting to undercut and undermine his every move (or lack thereof). Even though Congress's approval rating is the lowest it has been in years, they are still elected representatives of the American people and in theory, a more 'democratic' apparatus than an executive decision by one man. By passing the responsibility on to Congress, Obama is able to deflect the attention from himself. The way in which both he and Secretary of State Kerry have reiterated the allegations against Assad's usage of chemical weapons makes it clear that they both believe that military action must be taken. In many cases this should be a slam dunk, an easy decision to make. However, with the difficulties and financial expenses of interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya still on the mind of the American voter and taxpayer, public support for an intervention in Syria is very lower. Before the Ghouta Massacre, support from Americans was as low as 9%. 

Despite the very low support in the earlier poll, a new poll has shown a sharp increase; 42% support 'military action against the Syrian government in response to the use of chemical weapons' (50% opposed and 8% were undecided). When the military action is 'limited to air strikes using cruise missiles launched from U.S. navy ships that were meant to destroy military units and infrastructure that have been used to carry out chemical attacks' a plurality of 50% supported this action (44% oppose and 6% were undecided). Nearly 60% of respondents indicated that they believe use of chemical weapons is a 'red line' which requires a 'significant U.S. response, including the possibility of military action'. A similar number believed that the most important objective of military action in Syria would be to stop the use of chemical weapons. What is most surprising about this poll is that a full 79% thought that President Obama should be required to receive approval from Congress before taking military action in Syria. 

The poll numbers show a clear increase in support for military action against Syria, but it is not a majority, and given Obama's other domestic troubles and the looming debt crisis, it makes a lot of sense to listen to the will of the people. This way, if Congress again proves to be unwilling be more than sticks in the mud, Obama can say that he tried to listen to the American people. If Obama does take military action after Congress says no (which he said he believes he legally can do), then Obama shows his spine and his willingness to make a tough choice. If Congress says yes, then Obama is able to say that he was right in wishing to intervene militarily, and also that he was willing to listen to Congress and act in a bipartisan manner for the good of the country. 

Support for strikes against Syria are not popular in several key allied countries around the world. The UK's House of Commons voted against authorizing military force, and Germany, Canada and Poland stated that they would not participate in aggressive action against Assad's regime. The United States has unilaterally used military force to the discontent of many around the world. The rush to war in Iraq 2003 is a prime example of where the intelligence was wrong and going around the United Nations did not help the United States' standing abroad. By delaying until more intelligence is gathered, and more debate is held, this administration hedges its own bet on the non-confirmation of Assad's culpability in the chemical attack. If further evidence is produced which exonerates or convicts Assad, then this stall for time will look to have been a wise decision. 

Assad has now been able to disperse and prepare his troops for a looming strike which is not good if the intention is solely to damage his military. However, this is a slightly unrealistic point of view as the goal of an intervention is (or at least should be) not to destroy the army of Assad and create even further instability, but to punish the use of chemical weapons. No matter when the US strikes (if it chooses to do so), the military power of Assad's forces are weaker by order of magnitudes in comparison to the US. We have to be honest in accepting the fact that we are not out there to destroy Assad's army, and forcibly taking his chemical weapons would require troops to physically secure sites. This is an unrealistic goal. What is more feasible is heavily damaging Assad's air force, air defense, and if possible, chemical weapons delivery systems. This leaves him vulnerable to further air strikes (by the West or Israel) and avoids committing the US and its allies to a lasting presence.

So it is my belief that Obama has made the correct choice in this situation. I would love it if the United States and its allies were able to destroy all of Assad's forces and his properties but this is an unreasonable expectation. A series of strikes, especially on airfields, would damage the Assad regime's ability to conduct war and show the world that using chemical weapons is unacceptable. This decision must not be rushed towards, and Obama's delay allows time to think, among other things.

The Enemy of my Enemy

Is the enemy of my enemy my friend? Innumerable examples of this from Osama bin Laden to Soviet Russia in World War 2, indicate otherwise. In the volatile Middle East in particular, shifting alliances cause problems for everyone but the most able political manipulators. 

In 20th century Iran there is a prevalent theme of doomed alliances. In the oil-nationalization dispute with Britain, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq's National Front was made up of several nationalist political parties. Due to several factors including external meddling (Soviet, British and American), gaps soon appeared between the parties. Some of these parties ended up working in conjunction with the British and Americans to overthrow Mossadeq in 1953. This same theme of broken coalitions was perhaps most important in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nearly every part of Iranian society was upset with the Shah's increasingly despotic rule and all worked together to ensure his fall. There were Islamists, Marxists, Communists, Socialists, Intellectuals and others, all working together because they shared a common enemy. In the end, one group won at the expense of all of the others. While the most significant gaps at the time were between the religious, the seculars and the Marxists/Communists, even amongst the religious groups which supported Ayatollah Khomeini there were huge ideological gaps. 

The dismissal of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri as the successor to Ayatollah Khomeini several months before Khomeini's death is an important example of the ideological gaps between the religious factions. There are several reasons why Montazeri was dismissed from his position. First he was not a very astute politician, but probably more importantly, Hashemi Rafsanjani (chairman of the Majles at the time, and President shortly thereafter) and the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (President at the time) worked together to undermine the authority of Montazeri so they each would have a chance to gain more power. While Rafsanjani and Khamenei were once allied in their opposition to Montazeri, their own personal and political differences have since then made them fierce rivals, if not outright enemies. After the disputed 2009 Iranian Presidential Election Rafsanjani expressed marginal support for the reformists and has since criticized the Islamic Republic many times. Since then, several of his children have been jailed, assaulted, and forced to resign from their jobs. Rafsanjani himself was removed as the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the group responsible for electing, supervising and theoretically removing the Supreme Leader. There can only be one winner, and for now, Rafsanjani is not it. This may change a bit in the Iranian Presidential election this June, but given the fractious state of Iranian politics, this is difficult to predict.

Moderates, seculars and former regime insiders are not the only ones who have been betrayed by their former allies. The United States has also been burned by former partners so many times in the Middle East it is puzzling why the government seems unable to learn from their mistakes. Today support from Congress for the Islamo-Marxist terrorist cult MeK (Mujahedin-e Khalq) is just as troubling. This support is based purely on parallel mutual enmities between the US and Iran and the MeK and Iran. While trumpeted as a "democratic" alternative to the IRI, opinion polls show support amongst Iranian-Americans for the MeK under 1%. I would hope that Washington has learned from the lessons of Iraq and Ahmed Chalabi. The lack of action in Syria by the Obama Administration is a cause for both concern (innocents are being slaughtered), but it is also somewhat encouraging as there is not a rush to give armed support to groups that have the potential to harm us in the future. Perhaps the lessons of Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan circa 1979 may have taught us something after all?

As cartoonist Howard Taylor wisely pointed out: "The Enemy of my Enemy is my Enemy's Enemy, no more, no less." Hopefully this is taken to heart by policy makers in the future as they are not the ones who suffer from their mistakes, we all are.


UPDATE 1: I am embarrassed to admit that I misread the poll on Iranian-Americans and the 5% (that support the MeK) I initially quoted was actually 5% OF THE 15% who openly state that they DO support an opposition group. So the poll responses indicate that 6 people out of the 800 who participated in the survey stated that they support the MeK, resulting in a total of .75%.