Showing posts with label 2013. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2013. Show all posts

Sunday, August 4, 2013

Partial List of Rouhani's Cabinet Nominations

Finally the list has been released!

http://en.irna.ir/News.aspx?Nid=80762362


Bijan Namdar Zanganeh for oil ministry (same as Sharq and Tasnim)
Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli for interior ministry 
Ali Tayyeb-Nia for ministry of economy and finance 
Mahmoud Alavi for intelligence ministry (many expected Ali Younesi to this position)
Hamid Chitchiyan for energy ministry 
Hossein Dehqan for defense ministry (Tasnim picked this)
Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh for industry, mine and commerce ministry 
Mahmoud Hojjati for agriculture Jehad ministry 
Ali Rabiei for ministry of labor, cooperative and social welfare 
Abbas Akhoundi for ministry of roads, housing and urban development 
Mohammad Ali Najafi for education ministry 
Hassan Qazizadeh-Hashemi for ministry of health, treatment and medical education 
Masoud Soltanifar for sports and youth ministry 
Mohammad Javad Zarif for foreign ministry 
Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi for justice ministry 
Ali Jannati for ministry of culture and Islamic guidance 
Mahmoud Vaezi for ministry of communications and information technology 
Jafar Mili-Monfared for ministry of sciences, research and technology 

Comparing this to the list of rumored cabinet members which I compiled from a variety of sources, the end result is is very different. Pretty much the only pick which most got right is Bijan Namdar Zanganeh as Oil Minister. 

Zanganeh was a member of Khatami and Rafsanjani's cabinets.
Nematzadeh was a member of Rafsanjani's cabinet.
Najafi was a member of Khatami and Rafsanjani's cabinets.

Comparing this list to the leaked/rumored lists, Ali Younesi was an early front-runner for Intel who was not selected, and Mahmoud Vaezi was a near universal pick for Foreign Ministry who was also not picked. Al-Monitor's Ali Hashem was incorrect in every pick he made, although this list from IRNA is incomplete and there are a few positions which may end up being filled by those that Mr. Hashem claimed would do so. The Iranian newspaper Bahar had a few selections correct such as Mr. Zarif to the Foreign Ministry.

As a reminder, this list is incomplete, and these are only nominations, but this is very very different from what both conservatives and reformist Iranian sources estimated in June.

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Rumored Members of Rouhani's new Cabinet


This list is taken from a BBC World Monitoring translation of Sharq, an Iranian Reformist Newspaper. This appeared in the 22 June, 2013 publication of Sharq, and was translated by the BBC World Monitoring service on 24 June, 2013.

What is striking about this list is the number of reformists and members with connections to Rafsanjani. (There may be more connections that I am unaware of, but most of these people are unknown outside Iran so it is hard to know for certain).

Former members of Khatami's government are highlighted in red, former members of Rafsanjani's government are highlighted in blue, former members of both are purple, former members of Mousavi's are green
First vice-president: Mohammad Reza Aref—Reformist presidential candidate from the 1392/2013 election, and former First vice-president under Khatami
Secretary of Supreme National Security Council: Ali Akbar Velayati—Presidential candidate from 1392/2013
Ministry of Education and Training: Ali Motahhari— Son of assassinated protegĂ© of Ayatollah Khomeini, Morteza Motahhari 
Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs: Mohammad Baqer Nobakht 
Foreign Ministry: Mahmoud Va'ezi 
Ministry of Health Care and Medical Education: Mas'ud Pezeshkian—Held same position under Khatami
Ministry of Agricultural Jihad: Esa Kalantari—Same position under Rafsanjani
Ministry of Justice: Hojjat ol-Eslam Shushtari— Same position under Rafsanjani and Khatami
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics: Akbar Torkan— Same position under Rafsanjani (Minister of Roads in Rafsanjani's 2nd term)
Ministry of Roads and Urban Development: Ali Abdol'alizadeh
Ministry of Industries, Mines and Commerce: Mohammad Reza Nehavandian 
Ministry of Science, Research and Technology: Ja'far Tawfiqi—Same position under Khatami
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance: Mohammad Ali Zam
Ministry of Labor and Cooperatives: Morteza Bank—Deputy Foreign Minister under Khatami
Ministry of the Interior: Hojjat ol-Eslam Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri—Same position under Mousavi
Ministry of Oil: Bizhan Namdar Zanganeh— Minister of Jihad?? under Rafsanjani and Khatami
Ministry of Energy: Habibollah Bitaraf— Same position under Khatami
Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs: Mohammad Fard
Plan and Budget Organization: Mohammad Ali Najafi—Same position under Khatami (Minister of education under Rafsanjani) 
Atomic Energy Organization: Gholamreza Aqazadeh 
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology: Ahmad Mo'tamedi 
Vice-president for Majles affairs: Qodratollah Alikhani 
Environmental Protection Organization: Ma'sumeh Ebtekar—Same position under Khatami (first female leader in this role)
Central Bank: Majid Qasemi 
Vice-president of the republic and chief of the Martyr Foundation: Hoseyn Dehqan 
Vice-president of the republic for clerical affairs: Hojjat ol-Eslam Shahidi 
Vice-president for technology: Alireza Olfat—Member of Khatami's govt
Government Secretary and Spokesman: Alireza Nateqi—Chairman of Rouhani's Campaign Committee
Ministry of Information: Ali Younesi—Same position under Khatami 
Chief of the President of the Republic's Center for Women's Participation and Family Affairs: Zahra Pishgahifard—Female
Ministry of Intelligence: Ali Younesi—Same position under Khatami (unsure if same as Information Ministry)
Chief of Cultural Heritage and Handicraft Industries Organization: Hoseyn Mar'ashi 
Consultant to the president of the republic and supervisor of the Presidency Institute: Mohammad Reza Ne'matzadeh—Minister of Labor under Rafsanjani
Consultants to the president of the republic: Dr. Mohammad Reza Sadeq, Ali Asgari, Hoseyn Faridun (Rouhani's brother)
Special inspector for the president of the republic: Hoseyn Faridun (Rouhani's brother)

UPDATE 1: American Enterprise Institute published a list on 19 June based on a report from Tasnim (a principlist paper). There are some differences and some similarities, but the list is far less complete and only has a few names. E'tedad (A reformist paper) on 20 June published an analysis with similar names. Because of the consensus between several papers with different political leanings, I feel as though its safe to say that Ali Younesi and Mouhammad Reza Ne'matzadeh are both expected to play important roles in Rouhani's government. There are some significant differences between the E'tedad and Sharq lists, though they have virtually all of the same names.

UPDATE 2: Al-Monitor has weighed in with some similar opinions although the man they believe will be the next Defense Minister (Shamakhani) is someone not mentioned by E'tedad or Sharq (AEI concurs with Al-Monitor on this selection).

UPDATE 3: Another translated text via BBC Monitoring with more of the same names, although this one also includes the figures appointed to the committee selecting/advising selection of the cabinet. These include:  Yunesi, Torkan, Ne'matzadeh, Hoseyn Rouhani (Faridun), Vaezi, Najafi, Jahangiri, Sadegh, Ashena. 

UPDATE 4: CSM picked up a Reuters story quoting Rouhani on his cabinet. Rouhani stated that the cabinet will be inclusive and moderate. This is encouraging to conservatives who may have felt as though they would be excluded, and goes along with the information from UPDATE 3 which states that the reformists wish to keep some of their representatives in the Majles rather than promote them to the cabinet to insure that their seats will remain in the hands of reformists.

Saturday, April 27, 2013

The Enemy of my Enemy

Is the enemy of my enemy my friend? Innumerable examples of this from Osama bin Laden to Soviet Russia in World War 2, indicate otherwise. In the volatile Middle East in particular, shifting alliances cause problems for everyone but the most able political manipulators. 

In 20th century Iran there is a prevalent theme of doomed alliances. In the oil-nationalization dispute with Britain, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq's National Front was made up of several nationalist political parties. Due to several factors including external meddling (Soviet, British and American), gaps soon appeared between the parties. Some of these parties ended up working in conjunction with the British and Americans to overthrow Mossadeq in 1953. This same theme of broken coalitions was perhaps most important in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nearly every part of Iranian society was upset with the Shah's increasingly despotic rule and all worked together to ensure his fall. There were Islamists, Marxists, Communists, Socialists, Intellectuals and others, all working together because they shared a common enemy. In the end, one group won at the expense of all of the others. While the most significant gaps at the time were between the religious, the seculars and the Marxists/Communists, even amongst the religious groups which supported Ayatollah Khomeini there were huge ideological gaps. 

The dismissal of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri as the successor to Ayatollah Khomeini several months before Khomeini's death is an important example of the ideological gaps between the religious factions. There are several reasons why Montazeri was dismissed from his position. First he was not a very astute politician, but probably more importantly, Hashemi Rafsanjani (chairman of the Majles at the time, and President shortly thereafter) and the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (President at the time) worked together to undermine the authority of Montazeri so they each would have a chance to gain more power. While Rafsanjani and Khamenei were once allied in their opposition to Montazeri, their own personal and political differences have since then made them fierce rivals, if not outright enemies. After the disputed 2009 Iranian Presidential Election Rafsanjani expressed marginal support for the reformists and has since criticized the Islamic Republic many times. Since then, several of his children have been jailed, assaulted, and forced to resign from their jobs. Rafsanjani himself was removed as the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the group responsible for electing, supervising and theoretically removing the Supreme Leader. There can only be one winner, and for now, Rafsanjani is not it. This may change a bit in the Iranian Presidential election this June, but given the fractious state of Iranian politics, this is difficult to predict.

Moderates, seculars and former regime insiders are not the only ones who have been betrayed by their former allies. The United States has also been burned by former partners so many times in the Middle East it is puzzling why the government seems unable to learn from their mistakes. Today support from Congress for the Islamo-Marxist terrorist cult MeK (Mujahedin-e Khalq) is just as troubling. This support is based purely on parallel mutual enmities between the US and Iran and the MeK and Iran. While trumpeted as a "democratic" alternative to the IRI, opinion polls show support amongst Iranian-Americans for the MeK under 1%. I would hope that Washington has learned from the lessons of Iraq and Ahmed Chalabi. The lack of action in Syria by the Obama Administration is a cause for both concern (innocents are being slaughtered), but it is also somewhat encouraging as there is not a rush to give armed support to groups that have the potential to harm us in the future. Perhaps the lessons of Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan circa 1979 may have taught us something after all?

As cartoonist Howard Taylor wisely pointed out: "The Enemy of my Enemy is my Enemy's Enemy, no more, no less." Hopefully this is taken to heart by policy makers in the future as they are not the ones who suffer from their mistakes, we all are.


UPDATE 1: I am embarrassed to admit that I misread the poll on Iranian-Americans and the 5% (that support the MeK) I initially quoted was actually 5% OF THE 15% who openly state that they DO support an opposition group. So the poll responses indicate that 6 people out of the 800 who participated in the survey stated that they support the MeK, resulting in a total of .75%.