Showing posts with label conservative. Show all posts
Showing posts with label conservative. Show all posts

Friday, October 18, 2013

Reasons for Optimism? Iran and the Media

With all the babble in the media over the P5+1 talks with Iran in Geneva, Switzerland, one very important event slipped through the cracks of most major papers. BBC Persian's Bahman Kalbasi noted that non-state-sponsored Iranian news organization's reporters had accompanied Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to the talks.
Suppression of free speech has been a cornerstone of the Ayatollah's domestic 'population management' program, and any loosening of this, is potentially a drastic shift. 

Recently Iran has been in the process of developing and implementing a 'Halal' intranet which would be a completely isolated internal network. Understandably, this plan has been heavily criticized by free speech and human rights activists. Major social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook are blocked (even though major regime figures maintain a social media presence on these same sites), and access to this as well as other services such as those of Google, is often only available with VPN or other filter-breaking techniques. 

Iran has also maintained a tight grip over the print media, forcing liberal papers to close, and removing editors that allowed 'too much' to be printed. The forced closure of popular papers such as Zanan, the feminist women's production in 2008 is a prime example of this. 

During the campaign for President and immediately following his victory, Hassan Rouhani indicated that he wished to loosen these restrictions, in particular access to social media, and also releasing prisoners. With a few exceptions (perhaps accidental), this has not exactly been the case. Some political prisoners and activists languishing in Evin prison have been released, but others such as opposition figureheads Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have remained under house arrest for over 2 a half years despite health problems (reportedly conditions of their house arrest are 'improving', but I find this laughable, they are still under house arrest).

While only a small step, the inclusion of reformist reporters on the Geneva trip looks to be an encouraging sign. It remains to be seen if this continues, or if this is merely a means of appeasing a restive domestic population, and international human rights activist groups.

UPDATES 1 and 4: Neshat, a reformist paper banned in 1999 has evidently been allowed to publish once again. (This may have been cancelled).
UPDATE 2: Bahar (Spring), another reformist paper has been banned again.
UPDATE 3: Another reformist paper, Hammihan, has been banned according to the Iranian paper, Shargh. 

Monday, September 30, 2013

Urban and Rural Voting: 2000 Presidential Election Case Study


This is a paper I wrote in early 2008. At the time it was original research, a topic that was hinted at and understood to be true, but without any real published work. A few months later, Bill Bishop's excellent 'The Big Sort' was published. This book dealt with some similar topics, but did not have the same level of detailed methodology that my paper did, and it was not as scientific in nature. 

The reason why I am posting this now is as a response to this article on the Atlantic (Cities sub-magazine). This article misstates the differences in voting as 'Democrat' vs. 'Republican', rather than a simple preference of presidential candidates. People do not vote exclusively based upon party lines, this is abundantly clear. Anyway its not worth my time to go through it line by line so just read my work.


Do Urban Voters Favor Democrats? 
A Case Study of the 2000 United States Presidential Election


Introduction:
The purpose of this project was to determine if voters living in urban areas in the 2000 United States Presidential Election were more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate Al Gore, rather than the Republican candidate, George Bush. It is a popular belief that people in the urban areas are significantly more liberal and therefore vote for the Democratic candidate rather than the Republican. 

Methods:
Election results and levels of urbanization from 639 counties in 15 states were correlated. Data from the 2000 United States Census Summary File 3 were used to assess urbanization. Urbanization was defined as a ratio of the number of urban residents in a county divided by the total number of residents of the county. The resultant ratio could then range from 0-1. The election results were manually entered from the results posted on CNN.com. Third party candidate data were removed to create a two variable system. Counties with a third party candidate earning 10% or more of the vote were excluded from this analysis. Then a ratio of votes for a particular candidate divided by the total number of votes for the county was calculated to create another column with calculated values from 0-1. These numbers were then correlated to derive a Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient.

The definition of an “Urban Area” or “Urban Cluster”, which together make up Urban Population, is a census block or block group that has a density of 1000 people per square mile with surrounding blocks or block groups of similar density. The difference between them is the population size, where “Urban Area” is larger than “Urban Cluster”. 
I felt that aggregating data at a countywide level would provide the most accurate measure of urbanization, and election results would correspond to this. Any aggregation level smaller than this would be either excessively time-consuming or limited in scope. Using state data would be problematic because states are physically large, populous, and varied in urbanization. Generalizing by state would be an ecological fallacy. 
For the voting data I used CNN.com. These data were mostly reported on a county-by-county basis, although in some cases such as Connecticut, the reporting system differed. It was important to use voting data which matched the geographic break down of the census data.
I decided the most effective way to measure the correlation is to create a two-variable system, one being urbanization level, and the other, candidate selection. To compare the two principle candidates necessitated eliminating data from other candidates. In most cases the percentage of the population that voted for the third party was small, but in five to ten counties this exceeded 10%. These counties were excluded to avoid skewing the results. Other counties that were excluded included counties with fewer than 4000 voters. 
There were other data management difficulties to deal with in this analysis. There are 3119 counties in the United States and so performing an analysis on that scale with would have been excessively time-consuming for this project. Additionally, in several cases the election data reported by CNN.com were on a different scale in some states than the rest of the United States. The data for several Midwestern states such as Illinois were reported by county, but also by city which created complications. 
I felt that it would be most appropriate to select states that all together had a mean level of urbanization similar to that of the entire US. Also I selected states that had a ratio of Gore to Bush votes similar to nationwide election results. Several of the states selected such as Idaho, Utah and Wyoming heavily favored George Bush, while others like California, Delaware and Maryland strongly favored Al Gore.  New Mexico and Oregon with were split almost exactly between the two candidates. The final sample included 639 counties with the number per state ranging from 3 to 109. The mean was 42.6, the median was 29 and the standard deviation was 30.98. 
Microsoft Excel was used to create a spreadsheet with columns for votes for the two candidates and calculated columns for the percent of these total votes for each of the two major candidates respectively. The urban population of each county was calculated. 
The null hypothesis was that urban voters did not differ in candidate selection from rural voters. The alternate hypothesis was that urban voters did differ in candidate selection from rural voters. Pearson’s correlation test was used to test these hypotheses

Results:
For the 639 counties there was an r-value of .22. There was a 1% chance of making a type I error. The null hypothesis was rejected with very little chance of being incorrect. To compare states to each other, r-values were calculated for these smaller data sets. The states that had significantly significant correlations were California, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Oregon, and Wyoming. They were all positive correlations ranging from .23-.67. 

Table 1

Counties
% Gore
% Urban
Pearson
Statistically Significant
Alabama
67
42.47
55.44
-0.14
No
Arizona
14
47.07
88.23
-0.21
No
California
52
57.60
94.76
0.59
Yes
Colorado
35
45.65
87.07
0.37
Yes
Delaware
3
56.85
80.02
0.97
No
Georgia
109
43.80
74.33
0.35
Yes
Idaho
24
29.86
70.74
0.33
No
Indiana
87
42.04
71.24
0.23
Yes
Louisiana
63
46.05
72.76
0.26
Yes
Maryland
24
58.65
86.07
0.67
Yes
Mississippi
74
41.73
49.38
0.20
No
New Mexico
23
49.88
76.31
-0.16
No
Oregon
29
50.53
79.23
0.50
Yes
Utah
19
28.43
89.54
0.09
No
Wyoming
16
33.63
67.66
0.64
Yes
TOTAL
639
50.16
83.23
0.35
Yes
NOTE: The Pearson’s r for “TOTAL” is from a correlation of the states not the counties


Table 2

Sample
Total US
Bush Votes
13886458
50456169
Gore Votes
13973898
50996116
Counties
639
3119
% Population Urban
83.2
80.6

Figure 1

Discussion: 
There was a statistically significant difference between the likelihood of urban voters to favor Al Gore over George Bush.  This was consistent across 8 of 15 states.  While the difference was not large, the study data provide sufficient power to say with confidence that these findings are meaningful
This study would have been improved with the inclusion of all 50 states and countywide election results. Alaska does not report their election results by county so this may be difficult. I decided that 4000 voters was a good cut off point for inclusion because of the way in which this could have skewed election results. There may be a more appropriate number to use as a cutoff point to get better results. 
The states used for this study are mainly in the West, South and Southwest. This regionally skewed data set should not be a big factor however because the ratio of voters who picked Gore and Bush in this study was very consistent with the overall national ratio. Likewise, if the level of urbanization in the states used for this study was different from the urbanization in the US, there could have been some problem. 
The data were entered manually and there so is a chance of human error. Automating the data transfer would have reduced this source of error.
There were a few instances of apparent errors in CNN’s posted data. The county voting totals in some instances did not add up to equal the totals for the state. Results for California and Georgia showed statewide totals for the winning candidate that were lower than the totals of the counties added together would indicate. This error puts the reliability of data from those states into question.
Third party candidates were not included in this study to simplify the data analysis. Ralph Nader has been blamed for giving the election to George Bush because of the high likelihood that many of those who voted for him would have voted for Al Gore instead if the election had only two candidates. These voters would have been enough to give the presidency to Al Gore. Excluding the data from this candidate may have skewed the results slightly. It is unclear if those who voted for Ralph Nader were concentrated in urban or in rural counties so the effect on the correlation between voters for Gore and an urban area is uncertain. 
The biggest possible flaw with the data used is the urbanization data. Some counties had very few residents yet had a significant number of “urban” residents. Most people would not count a county with less than 30,000 people as urban at all. The common perception of “Urban” is likely to be a little more exclusive than this. In some ways having a broader definition is good because it allows for a greater variation between the data points instead of having a lot of counties that have no urban residents. In one case there was a county with around 13,000 residents, and 15 people that lived in an “urban cluster”. 

Conclusion:
There was a statistically significant correlation between the proportion of urban voters in a county and the proportion of voters who voted for Al Gore in the 2000 Presidential election. It is not a strong correlation but it is clear and definitive. The correlation was clear and statistically significant as well in more than half of the states using a smaller data set.  The strength of these data suggests that the findings would not be changed by an analysis less limited by the possible errors identified.

  HYPERLINK "http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/results/president/" http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/results/president/ Data Accessed: 04/25/08-04/30/08
 Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont reported by township and city
 80.6% is the percent of urbanization in the United States. My sample has an urbanization percent of 83.2
 The overall percent of voters in the United States who selected George Bush in the adjusted (3rd party candidates removed) voting percent was 49.73%. The overall percent of voters who selected Al Gore was 50.26%. In my sample the percent of voters who selected George Bush was 49.84%. The percent who selected Al Gore was 50.16%.  
 The states selected were Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming


Sunday, August 4, 2013

Partial List of Rouhani's Cabinet Nominations

Finally the list has been released!

http://en.irna.ir/News.aspx?Nid=80762362


Bijan Namdar Zanganeh for oil ministry (same as Sharq and Tasnim)
Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli for interior ministry 
Ali Tayyeb-Nia for ministry of economy and finance 
Mahmoud Alavi for intelligence ministry (many expected Ali Younesi to this position)
Hamid Chitchiyan for energy ministry 
Hossein Dehqan for defense ministry (Tasnim picked this)
Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh for industry, mine and commerce ministry 
Mahmoud Hojjati for agriculture Jehad ministry 
Ali Rabiei for ministry of labor, cooperative and social welfare 
Abbas Akhoundi for ministry of roads, housing and urban development 
Mohammad Ali Najafi for education ministry 
Hassan Qazizadeh-Hashemi for ministry of health, treatment and medical education 
Masoud Soltanifar for sports and youth ministry 
Mohammad Javad Zarif for foreign ministry 
Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi for justice ministry 
Ali Jannati for ministry of culture and Islamic guidance 
Mahmoud Vaezi for ministry of communications and information technology 
Jafar Mili-Monfared for ministry of sciences, research and technology 

Comparing this to the list of rumored cabinet members which I compiled from a variety of sources, the end result is is very different. Pretty much the only pick which most got right is Bijan Namdar Zanganeh as Oil Minister. 

Zanganeh was a member of Khatami and Rafsanjani's cabinets.
Nematzadeh was a member of Rafsanjani's cabinet.
Najafi was a member of Khatami and Rafsanjani's cabinets.

Comparing this list to the leaked/rumored lists, Ali Younesi was an early front-runner for Intel who was not selected, and Mahmoud Vaezi was a near universal pick for Foreign Ministry who was also not picked. Al-Monitor's Ali Hashem was incorrect in every pick he made, although this list from IRNA is incomplete and there are a few positions which may end up being filled by those that Mr. Hashem claimed would do so. The Iranian newspaper Bahar had a few selections correct such as Mr. Zarif to the Foreign Ministry.

As a reminder, this list is incomplete, and these are only nominations, but this is very very different from what both conservatives and reformist Iranian sources estimated in June.

Saturday, May 4, 2013

Feminism in Iran


         Iran is the only country where the Head of Government (President) does not also control the military. The Head of State (Supreme Leader) does. It is also different from most governments in that the constitution  expressly prohibits women from obtaining this office. With the Iranian Presidential Elections fast approaching, I thought it would be useful to share a bit about the feminist movement in Iran. Here is an excerpt from a paper I wrote which provides a background for feminism (secular and Islamic) in Iran: 

           Following the fall of the Shah in 1979, a theocratic state came to power in Iran. This state took its legitimacy from Ayatollah Khomeini's theology of Velayat-e Faqih, which reinterpreted Twelver Shi'a beliefs to include a justification for clerical involvement in both politics and the state apparatus. This was a relatively new concept and had come from a new understanding of older practices. The ideas of innovation and transformation drove the revolution, which itself was representative of the unhappiness of the general public with the corrupt, repressive and ineffective Shah.
            Having played a large role in the street protests and civil unrest aimed towards Reza Shah, many Iranian women expected reforms benefitting them to be enacted after the fall of the shah[i]. Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged women to take part in the revolution, and so, despite his earlier writings explicitly describing his religious and political views, members of the public assumed that the version of Islam that he preferred was progressive or at least accepting. Khomeini had been quoted saying that "Islam has never been against [women's] freedom. It is, to the contrary, opposed to the idea of woman-as-object and it gives her back her dignity"[ii]. Possibly because of statements like these, most of the Iranian public would have not imagined a strict theocracy taking over once the shah fell. The primary motivating factor leading to the revolution was the belief that the ruler was unjust, corrupt and did not treat the common people with enough respect. The rapid implementation of gender-biased laws in the public and private sectors made it clear the rights previously granted (or forced) upon women were not going to kept[iii]. The progressive trends under the Shah were halted and then reversed, as many of the social reforms during the reign of the Shah giving women more rights, were abolished after the revolution[iv]. The actions of the clerical establishment following their ascent to power resulted in considerable resentment, especially from those women who had been active in overthrowing the Shah. They felt as though they deserved credit for their actions, rather than restrictions on their lifestyle[v].
            At the time of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, new social justice movements took hold, in particular secular feminism, which was becoming increasingly powerful in the Western world. In Iran as well, feminism became relevant as women wanted to play a bigger role in society. These women came from all portions of society—wealthy, poor, religious and secular[vi]. This diversity indicates the general feeling of malcontent in Iran at the time. Despite social unhappiness, a military and political event distracted from this.
            The devastating war between Iran and Iraq from 1980-1988, which resulted in horrific loss of life on both sides among civilians and military forces[vii], heightened sentiments of nationalism among Iranians, as they were all personally affected by the war. A whole generation of Iranian men perished and many women were forced to work as a result[viii]. Society's reliance on women to provide them with materials for the war empowered women. The supporting efforts of Iranian women were even more important than their voluntary actions during the events leading the Islamic revolution.
            Perhaps due to the pressures of the near decade long war with Iraq, economic and social problems that had existed under the Shah were not solved by the religious rulers[ix]. These problems were then exacerbated by the baby boom of the 1980s and 1990s. The Ayatollahs, faced with enormous population growth, determined that a family planning campaign was necessary. This campaign gave women more access to contraception, another form of female empowerment[x].
            Another significant change for women in Iran is that increasing numbers have been afforded the opportunity to attend university. Today, nearly two-thirds of university students in Iran are female[xi]. Education typically leads to empowerment, but empowerment is difficult within a restrictive society. The conflict between the restrictions and the expectations of further freedoms can prove to be problematic, and often results in unhappiness amongst the female population. This is especially true when highly educated individuals are unable to find jobs, or the wages of the jobs available to them are significantly less lucrative than that of men's jobs, and are far less than that of their counterparts in Western, developed nations[xii]. Although many women who desire and then obtain baccalaureate degrees may be secular or upper-class and Westernized, the women involved in protests and efforts to attain social justice are not necessarily secular, Western-oriented women. Many Iranian women are unsatisfied with the status quo and the lack of opportunities for economic or social advancement.
            This dissatisfaction was expressed in 1997, when a reformist, Mohammad Khatami was elected president[xiii]. This shocked the conservative government because they did not expect a relatively liberal member of the political establishment to be elected to such an important and influential position. The fact that Khatami won with such an overwhelming majority proved to be a serious challenge for the conservative factions of the government[xiv]. While the Supreme Leader continues to have absolute veto power, the fact that the population could so heavily favor a reformist could have been damaging to the clerical establishment's monopoly on political power in the Islamic Republic. Prior to Khatami's election the feminist movement in Iran seemed to be gaining traction as influential writers and public figures were able to speak more freely than they had been in the past. Some of this was due to the woman's magazine Zanan (Persian for ‘women’) which operated from 1992 until its forced closure in 2008[xv]. While the magazine focused primarily on secular women's voices, it made a point of including religious feminists as well. Despite the election results and the positive hopes of feminists and liberals in Iran[xvi], the government of President Khatami proved ineffective and either unwilling or unable to stand up to the conservatives in the majlis (Persian for the Iranian parliament). During Khatami's rule, the legal marriage age for girls was raised from nine to thirteen, yet as this is a non-compulsory law, it is not always enforced[xvii]. While in theory this is an improvement for women’s rights activists, the fact that it is not mandatory has led to accusations of inefficiency and weakness by President Khatami. Despite the steps towards reformation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, in 2000 at the height of the reform movement in Iran, a mere 5% of parliamentarians in Iran were women[xviii]. This is around one-third as many as an average "developing" country according to UN statistics[xix]. Even though Khatami had a popular mandate in the form of the overwhelming support he received during the presidential elections, he failed to create strong, lasting reforms. While Khatami is considered to have been inefficient president, he managed to stay in office for a second term.     
            In 2005, his replacement was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who while relatively unknown at the time, was a former mayor of the Iranian capital of Tehran. Ahmadinejad was allied with some parts of the conservative camp, as well as with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) of which he had been a member. President Ahmadinejad and his allies restricted the feminist movement, reversing some of the limited reforms that President Khatami had enacted[xx]. In late 2006, President Ahmadinejad caused controversy when he stated that Iranian women should spend more time in the home raising their children[xxi]. Since his controversial re-election in June 2009 there have been mass protests of every variety, violently suppressed by the IRGC, its volunteer militias and the official state security forces.[xxii]



UPDATE: Iran is not the only country where the head of government does not also function as the head of state, but it is the only country where the head of government does NOT control the military. In every other country the ELECTED (or selected or appointed) head of government has control of the armed forces.



[i] Moghadam, Val. "Revolution, the State, Islam, and Women: Gender Politics in Iran and Afghanistan." Social Text 22.Spring (1989): 43. Print.
[ii] Sansarian, Eliz via Sameh, Catherine. "Discourses of Equality, Rights and Islam in the One Million Signatures Campaign in Iran." International Feminist Journal of Politics 12 (2010): 446. Print.
[iii] Mojab, Shahrzad. "Theorizing the Politics of 'Islamic Feminism'" Feminist Review 69.Winter (2001): 131. Print. , Moghadam, 1989: 45., Tohidi, Nayereh. "The Global-Local Intersection of Feminism in Muslim Societies: The Cases of Iran and Azerbaijan." Social Research 69.3 (2002): 858. Print.
[iv] Ibid, p. 858
[v] Ibid, p. 858
[vi] Moghadam 1989, 43
[vii] Estimates vary although some believe up to 1 million died in the first five years alone Alnasrawi, Abbas. "Economic Consequences of the IraqIran War." Third World Quarterly 8.3 (1986): 869. Print.
[viii] Sameh, Catherine. 2010: 446.
[ix] An early estimate put the economic cost of the war at nearly half a billion dollars See. Alnasrawi, 1986, p. 869
[x] Moghadam, Valentine via Sameh 2010: 446
[xi] Ebadi, Shirin via Barlow, Rebecca., and Shahram. Akbarzadeh. "Prospects for Feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran." Human Rights Quarterly 30.1 (2008): 24. Print. And Esfandiari, Golnaz. "Number Of Female University Students Rising Dramatically in Iran." Payvand, Iran News, Directory and Bazar. 21 Nov. 2003. Web. 26 Sept. 2011. <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/nov/1133.html>. And Mernissi, Fatima. "Muslim Women and Fundamentalism." Middle East Report 153.Jul-Aug (1988): 8-11+50. Print.
[xii] Barlow, Akbarzadeh 2008: 24
[xiii] Ibid, p. 26
[xiv] "Online NewsHour: Iranian Elections -- May 26, 1997." PBS: Public Broadcasting Service. 26 May 1997. Web. 26 Sept. 2011. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/may97/iran_5-26a.html> .
[xv] "Shutting Down Zanan." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 7 Feb. 2008. Web. 26 Sept. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/opinion/07thu1.html>.
[xvi] Ibid, p. 26
[xvii] Ibid, p. 28. The legal age had been lowered from 18 following the rise of the clergy see Moghadam, Valentine, Revolution, the State, Islam and Women. 1989, 46
[xviii] Ibid, p. 30
[xix] Ibid, p. 30
[xx] Sameh 2010, 448
[xxi] Barlow, Akbarzadeh 2008, 22
[xxii] The literature and news reporting on the Green Movement is extensive and can be found archived on every major news network as well as many forms of electronic social communications.