Spinning the Syria Strike

This week the Israeli military allegedly struck a convoy in Southern Syria, killing Jihad Mughniyeh, the son of the infamous Imad Mughnieyh, as well as an Iranian IRGC general, several other Hezbollah fighters, and several other Iranian soldiers. This event has been a hot topic in the press, though the information released by the Israelis and the Hezbollah/Syria/Iran/Lebanon axis has proven contradictory, incoherent and nonsensical.

Initial reports indicated that helicopters had carried out the attack, and this claim has been repeated by all sides; Lebanese, Israeli and even Iranian. It would be strange for the Israelis to risk helicopters and the pilots/gunners/whoever else when they possess a large number of drones, not to mention their advanced fighter jets, and artillery capabilities. A drone strike makes a lot more sense, especially when the target was a group of individuals and it appears as though there were no Israelis on the ground inside Syria (the other possible reason why helicopters could have been used).

The Syrian media claimed that the strike was located within the Quneitra Governorate. This area is mostly located inside the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and bordered by the Rif Dimashq Governorate (Damascus countryside) on the other side, so the remaining areas where the strike could have occurred are extremely limited. Additionally, a portion of the governorate controlled by Syria is the UNDOF DMZ.

Quneitra Governorate (Wikipedia)

The UNDOF stated that they had observed Israeli drones flying over their base at position 30 (Jabata al Khashab) which is slightly north of the mostly abandoned town of Quneitra, and is located closer to the Mount Hermon mountain range.

UNDOF Deployment (Wikipedia)

Jabata al Khashab is the town just to the left (West) of the quarries. Hermon is in the background

The UNDOF also claimed to observe smoke rising slightly after the drones flew past. Given the location of this observation post and the terrain in the area, this once again limits the possiblities. Footage from al-Manar, while inconclusive, seems to hint that the strike happened very close to the Hermon mountain range.

As of yet, the precise location of the strike has yet to be determined, but it appears as though the strike would have occurred on the Syrian side of the DMZ, leaving a tiny sliver of terrain where the strike would have had to happened if it truly was inside Quneitra Governorate.

This leads to the next question, which is why the Israelis chose to attack this particular convoy. Initially it was claimed that the reason for the strike was that the targeted individuals had been planning an attack on Northern Israel. Later however, an Israeli official leaked that they did not intend to kill the Iranian general, and that 'it believed it was attacking only low-level guerillas'. So why would they attack this particular group, and why would they bother with 'low-level guerillas'? An article in the Jerusalem Post stated that this attack was intended to 'thwart an attack on Israel', but this seems disingenuous.

Israel has struck Syria several times over the last few years, most times it was thought that the strikes were intended to prevent Hezbollah and/or Syria from crossing a 'red-line' (usually transferring advanced weapons to the terror group). There have been a few instances where the IDF has returned fire after facing fire from the Syrian side, but this is not something that happens every time munitions land in Israel. Dozens, if not hundreds of mortars have landed beyond the DMZ, inside the Israeli-controlled Golan, without an Israeli armed response. Mortars are of limited range, and to miss a target by miles is hardly 'accidental'. There have also been instances of "stray" gunfire hitting IDF troops, as well as purposeful attacks.

What made this convoy such an important target to attack? Recent Israeli actions in Syria have been limited and selective, despite the ongoing hostilities in and around Quneitra. Would they risk an attack on a convoy without knowing who was in it? I would imagine that they must have had some ideas who was there, and they'd determined that the targets were high-value. Otherwise, why would they attack a small convoy? Was the strike a response to the bombastic speech from Hassan Nasrallah three days prior?

A few weeks ago Hezbollah admitted that the head of their Unit 910 (tasked with 'external operations') was in fact an Israeli asset. He and his accomplices had given information to Israel on a variety of subjects, most notably, the identities of the Burgas Bombing suspects. Given the timing of this, I wonder if the Israelis felt pressure to act on whatever remaining intel they had from the burned asset. The actions by the Israelis seem rash, was there a limited amount of time to act on the information? Why else would they risk aggravating the Iranians and Hezbollah so soon after the last summer's war in Gaza?

Yesterday a Lebanese paper claimed that according to Hezbollah, the strike took place because the Iranian general had not turned off his cell phone, which allowed the Israelis to locate him. Does this statement mean anything or is Hezbollah trying to distract from a massive intelligence and logistical failure? Hezbollah implied that the normal procedure is for cell phones to be turned off, and because the phone was on, the Israelis were able to realize who it was.

Why is a cell phone able to identify the place as a target or was it this particular cell phone which was incriminating? Did the Iranian general have a standard mobile phone with an Iranian SIM card inside? How else could this information be of any use to Israeli intelligence? Do Syrians (military, civilians or rebels) normally travel with their cell phones turned off in this part of the country? If it was the actual phone, would this indicate that the Israelis have managed to infiltrate either the Syrian or Iranian or Lebanese mobile networks and identified the phones used by military officials?

This entire affair is chock full of misinformation, illogical claims and subterfuge. Other analysts like Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv have similarly questioned the Israeli claims. There are so many problems with the narrative from both sides, and the actions and reactions of the parties involved seem atypical. I expect a further set of leaks in the near future.

A Successful Operation for the Iron Dome?

After a 10th update to my original Iron Dome blog from March 2013, I've decided to start a new blog post related to the system and its coverage in the media. This should hopefully make new information easier to access.



Today Israeli intelligence analyst Yossi Melman tweeted:
Rockets summary: 3361fired 584 intercepted 115 landed in populated areas 2542 in open zones 120 disintegrated in #Gaza. daily average 120
— Yossi Melman (@yossi_melman) August 5, 2014


As Update 10 in my previous blog post explained, this equates to an approximate Iron Dome success rate of 83.5%. As of yet it is unclear where the "failures" occurred. Some may have been due to a lack of coverage in the area (the rocket attack which resulted in the death of a Bedouin was partially due to the area not being protected), while others were due to technical malfunctions. The location of strikes are not publicly available, so it is hard to map the exact locations where rockets landed (the IDF has released an image of a map of the locations where rockets were allegedly launched from, but as my next blog will explain, this is of questionable accuracy).

I would imagine that many of the rockets which were not intercepted landed primarily in Sderot, and Ashkelon, while Beer Sheva and Ashdod also experienced a few failures. While not much more than theory, this would again lend credence to my earlier guess from my previous Iron Dome blog that there is a difference in success from the different types of rockets. As far as I know there were no failures in Tel Aviv, so the logical assumption would be that the smaller cities (subject to a different quantity and type of rocket) experienced the failed intercepts. There is a slight possibility that there were failures in Tel Aviv, but given the high number of sirens and corresponding explosions heard by Tel Avivians during this last conflict, it seems unlikely. It would not be easy to hide the results of the explosion of a 175 pound warhead in an urban center.



At the same time, it is interesting that with a success rate of just over 4/5 that there were no catastrophic events in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem during the last few weeks. It seems as though the Iron Dome may be operating at a different efficiency rate in different areas which are subject to different types of rocket attacks.



UPDATE 1:
Uzi Rubin wrote a new blog for Reuters on the Iron Dome. Key points not covered already in his previous critiques
1) Postol and Lloyd used the same data, yet Lloyd's assessment is that the Iron Dome's success rate is 6-8 times greater than Postol theorizes.
2) Hundreds of rockets were fired at Ashdod, yet only 12 hit residential areas
3) There have been around 135 rockets fired at Tel Aviv, yet not a single one has landed within the city (intercepted rocket debris has, but that of course isn't the point).


UPDATE 2:
Theodore Postol was given a chance to respond to Rubin's criticism which he did so here: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/08/06/two-views-of-iron-domes-success-in-israel/

I am not a scientist so I cannot comment on the first refutation, the rest of them I can, however.

2) Arguing that someone's argument is wrong, doesn't automatically prove the thesis of the other person (unless it is a binary argument) so this is not a valid argument.

3) Postol keeps talking about his data that he collected, though in all of his papers, memos and articles he has NEVER actually shared this data.

4) If Postol doesn't know what system was in place before, then how can he say that the system didn't work before and it suddenly works now? The warning siren system has been installed in various locations in Israel since at least 2005. In 2006 Human Rights Watch credited the warning and sheltering system with saving lives. Again Postol's argument is not a good one.

Finally Postol said that "There will certainly be impact craters in the areas where Iron Dome is reputedly defending against the rockets. In fact, the number should be nearly the same number as if Iron Dome didn’t exist." Unfortunately this is a terrible argument again. There were approximately 135 rockets sent to Tel Aviv. WHERE ARE THE 135 IMPACT CRATERS?! The rockets which targeted Tel Aviv are Fajr-5 (called M-75 by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad), and carry a 100-175 pound warhead depending on variety. The Israelis, in general, put a special emphasis on intelligence matters and are careful to not divulge locations of rocket strikes unless necessary. At the same time, I cannot imagine that 135 warheads each measuring 175 pounds struck Israel's 2nd largest city and no one noticed. Tel Aviv is a hyper-connected city; everyone has smartphones, why aren't there tweets, and Facebook posts with these impact craters? Is Postol alleging that the entire nation of Israel is conspiring to hide massive bombs going off in their city? What about all the foreigners in Tel Aviv, are they in on the plot?

Postol's analysis again is awful, but he has put all of his eggs in the basket, so I cannot see him backing down any time soon. I have heard stories of Postol's obstinance and unwillingness to see other points of view and it appears as though these stories are repeating themselves.


UPDATE 3:
Richard Lloyd posted a .pdf with his calculations and illustrations. It is clear from the illustrations on pages 9-12 that he and Theodore Postol are working together in some capacity, because the illustrations nearly exactly match ones used previous by Postol (figures 5-8).

This again brings to mind Rubin's critique that if they used the same information why are their estimates so different. It appears to me as though Lloyd has a better understanding of how an intercept works because he explicitly writes about the distance between the intercepting Tamir missile and the oncoming rocket, while Postol is more concerned with angles. It is important to consider the simple fact that the intercepting explosions theorized by both Postol and Lloyd are conical in nature and therefore will expand more, the further it moves away from the Tamir missile.

A explosion would cover a wider area less densely from further away

This situation would also result in less intercepting steel rods (or whatever the Tamir missile uses for interception) per unit of space which could explain why the intercept rate is higher for the larger rockets sent to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (and possibly could account for differences between those sent to Sderot vs Ashdod and Beer Sheva). A larger size warhead presents more of a target, while a smaller warhead is more difficult to hit. This could be especially true if Postol and Lloyd are underestimating the distance from the interceptor to the oncoming rocket. This would also partially explain why the Iron Dome is unable to intercept mortar bombs which have a relatively small volume of explosive material (the other reason is time allowed for intercept). 

These scientists are using publicly available videos instead of raw data. This leaves a lot of room for error. While their models are not terrible (though Lloyd's clearly superior to Postol's), a lack of access on their part to the obviously classified Israeli data severely undermines their work.

The more I learn about the methodologies of the two, the more I believe the Israeli side, and not just because of my personal experience in Tel Aviv during Operation Pillar of Freedom.


UPDATE 4:
The IDF has reportedly claimed that an upgraded version of the Iron Dome intercepted at least 10 mortars during the last round of violence. I find this hard to believe but I am not the expert here. I would think that because the size of the warhead is small, and the flight time of the projectile is short, hitting it in less time would prove more difficult than a rocket sent to a city further away.


UPDATE 5:
This took me a while to notice, but earlier today when I was reviewing the (Hebrew) totals of damage claims from 2012's conflict I noticed that 40 of the claims were agricultural, and over 1000 were vehicles. Only ~2/3rds of the damage claims were relating to structures. The point of the Iron Dome is to defend structures and people (I have discussed this topic previously and it is not worth repeating), and since we know people are not plants, and people are also not cars (and no people in cars were killed), the number of damage claims in places that were primary objectives was even fewer than the number which Pedatzur, Postol and Lloyd referenced as a larger than expected value. There is the chance that quite a few of these cars were parked outside homes, but there is also the chance that they were in other places far from structures. There is also the possibility that these vehicles were agricultural in nature. Again this method of taking damage claims and extrapolating to mean something far greater is cumbersome, and as I have demonstrated, prone to misinterpretation. Even if these figures were in some way troubling, the fact remains that they are in fact not nearly as high as one would expect.


UPDATE 6:
I've been spending the last few weeks trying to figure out the motivations for the 3 main anti-Iron Dome people; Ted Postol, Richard Lloyd and Reuven Pedatzur. I have found some very interesting, and revealing information about a few of them and the reasons for their vociferous opposition to the system.

Reuven Pedatzur was a primary supporter of the THEL (Tactical High Energy Laser) system which was jointly developed by Israel and the United States. It was known as Nautilus at the time, and is now known as SkyGuard. For those interested in defensive systems, it is similar to the system has been publicized a few times recently following successful tests by the US Navy. The General Accounting Office (now know as the Government Accountability Office) found significant problems in the manufacturing of the system. There were also problems with the size, vulnerability, and performance in acclimate weather. The model intended for Israel was large, approximately the size of 6 school buses. This would provide an easy target for terrorists, something especially dangerous given the chemicals involved in creating the laser beam. The system also faired very poorly in cloudy or dusty situations, rendering it nearly useless in the arid regions of Israel, as well as the areas with heavy precipitation or cloud cover. It had some additional problems, though they could likely have been overcome with time. The two main arguments by Mr. Pedatzur against the Iron Dome was that each interceptor cost between 10 and 20 times more money than a similar result (destroyed rocket) by the THEL, and that Iron Dome was incapable of defending Sderot. We all know now that Sderot is and has been defended by Iron Dome for years so this is not an issue. As far as the money is concerned, it was estimated that DOZENS of THEL systems would need to be purchased to properly cover Israel (at the time the threat was only very short range projectiles, so it is unclear if this number would be increased even further with the new types of rockets employed by Palestinian militants) and each THEL system would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. With both of Pedatzur's main points now irrelevant, the most important factor distinguishing the two is Iron Dome's ability to operate in any climate.

Richard Lloyd previously worked for Raytheon, where he devised many new products such as this one, a wide area dispersal warhead. In all of Lloyd and Postol's diagrams they show an interceptor with a conical dispersal (radial-pattern warhead), while the warhead designed by Lloyd covers a much greater area (in essence half of a sphere). If Lloyd was hoping to use this warhead for the Iron Dome rather than the one that they settled on, I could see why he would be quite upset with a different model being used instead.

I also managed to find a very interesting patent from Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, titled "Warhead for Intercepting System". It is clear from the "FIELD AND BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION" that this warhead was developed with the Iron Dome in mind. What was most interesting was the following sentences from the patent:

"The approach used by larger systems designed for intercepting medium-range or long-range ballistic missiles is not readily scaled down for application to short range rockets of the types described above. Specifically, the relatively low velocity of the target rocket itself renders collision with small low velocity particles ineffective to defeat the rocket. Instead, a high velocity impact is required to reliably defeat the rocket. Although such a high velocity impact could in principle be produced by a fragmentation warhead, classical fragmentation warheads of suitable dimensions are typically not sufficient."

This indicates that the Israeli scientists realized that the approach for larger systems (like Patriot) DID NOT WORK, so something NEW was required. They go on to describe a "projectile blade" which I do not quite understand myself, but appears to be something new enough where a patent would be necessary to protect the invention. This patent was first filed in 2007, so while it may not be the final product used, it almost certainly is related in some way. There were also quite a few patents from Rafael dealing with 3D modeling, and trajectory tracking of projectiles and optimization of current processes. These patents while very interesting and almost certainly intended to track rocket fire originating from Gaza.

AviationWeek's Bill Sweetman recently wrote a great succinct blog about how Postol's methodologies are problematic from a technical perspective. He states that Postol's claims about access to specific information is false, and many of Postol's assumptions are false, and/or highly unlikely. Sweetman also notes the possibility that Iron Dome's Tamir interceptors use 'explosively formed projectiles' like the Trophy system which protects Israel tanks. (For what it is worth, Trophy has been billed as the 'Iron Dome' of Israeli tanks, so this assumption makes sense). Is it a coincidence that 'explosively formed projectiles' is a MAJOR part of the patent I mentioned several paragraphs ago? Perhaps this is the entire basis of this technical achievement which Postol either doesn't care to admit, or is too lazy to research?

Mr. Sweetman also notes (just as Uzi Rubin and I have) that Postol's entire argument is based upon cell phone and low-quality hand held camera footage. He does not have ANY spatial reference in the videos and he does not have a 3D modeling of the trajectory and intercept of the rockets. He has however, made assumptions about the way things are, both related to the system, as well as other factors. If you recall UPDATE 2 of this blog where I talk about Postol's claim that the shelter and warning system saved lives, while he also acknowledged that he had no clue what systems were in place in 2006. I demonstrated why this assertion (among others) was foolish, and why it seems as though Postol is blindly pursuing some goal of his, while creating his own invalid evidence. This is not the scientific method. Similarly if the patent that I mentioned has anything to do with the warhead used by the Tamir interceptors, I would think that Postol's entire conception of how this intercept works is incorrect. Uzi Rubin alluded to this in the blog hosted by ACRS-ME. If Postol doesn't understand how something works, AND his evidence is bad, AND his reasoning is problematic, how can he consider himself an expert? How come no one is questioning him? How can he get away with this? Once the whole house of cards collapses, what is left?

As far as I can tell Postol does not own any patents (though he is quoted in a few), so his interest in this does not appear to be financial. He did argue in a New York Times op-ed for his own proposal to intercept North Korean and Iranian ICBMs with drones just after the missiles were launched. Postol claims that all launch sites are known, though the ability to conceal something from an enemy should NEVER be underestimated. There are a lot of reasons why this proposal is foolish, but it is not worth my time. They are rather simple problems, that most college students with an iota of critical thinking ability could come up with.


UPDATE 7:
In recent weeks there have been numerous announcements of new Israeli defense tech, often referred to as 'the Iron Dome of xxxxxxx'. In most cases, it seems to be just branding, as most of them are not similar to Iron Dome in any way, except for being a defensive shield.

Earlier today however, it was announced that there are plans to make a ship-based version of Iron Dome, called C-Dome (I assume this is a play on words), which uses the same intercepting missiles (TAMIR). This is significant because many other forms of intercepting defensive systems are not like the Iron Dome, and shows the possibility of adapting this technology to a new environment. Israel has reportedly had problems selling the Iron Dome to others (mostly because there are very few that face the same type of asymmetric threat as short-range unguided rockets), and this would be a possibly massive breakthrough.

The obstacle is that so far Iron Dome has only defended against unguided rockets, and a ship at sea is not likely to be a reasonable target for an unguided projectile traveling more than a few miles. A ship is a small target relatively, so unless the projectile is a guided missile, it would be near impossible for the rocket to hit the target. If the new C-Dome is intended to defend against guided missiles then this would be a huge step forward for the technology. As of yet, the Iron Dome has only been used against unguided rockets, and even if there have been tests defending against guided missiles, Rafael has yet to disclose this.

If this technology is possible it could be very important, but it is unclear what exactly this would be used to defend against, and therefore if there are other navies with the same or similar needs.


UPDATE 8:
More details about the C-Dome were revealed in the last two days. Russia Today's article mentions that the system is expected to be capable of intercepting guided missiles. Ynet confirmed that the interceptors used by C-Dome will also be of the 'Tamir' variety, quoting Rafael's spokesman who said that the missiles are more than 99.5% comparable to those used in the Iron Dome system.

The ability to intercept guided missiles is very important, and it is interesting that they intend to use Tamir interceptors and the 'special warhead' which has been specially designed to avoid the scalability problems I previously mentioned (UPDATE 6 relating to the Rafael patent). Assuming this product works as planned, there would undoubtedly be a huge market to fill. Iron Dome and/or C-Dome have the advantage over laser and rail gun type defensive systems as they are able to engage multiple targets simultaneously, but there already are two potential competitors: Raytheon's RAM (Rolling Airframe Missile), and MBDA's VL-Mica. Rafael's system however has the advantage of the brand of the battle-tested Iron Dome and Tamir.

UPDATE 9:
Despite many claims that Rafael is incapable of finding foreign buyers of Iron Dome, Israel National News (Israeli far-right settler news organization) reported that the US Army will be purchasing a battery.
—More to come—

Methodological flaws of the recent Iron Dome criticism

Recently, Israel's left-leaning Haaretz newspaper reported that several missile-defense experts have expressed doubt on the efficacy of the IDF's Iron Dome defense system. During Operation Pillar of Defense, the system was in place to defend against short-range rockets and missiles. At the time it was considered to be a huge success despite some notable failures such as this rocket which hit and did extensive damage to an apartment building in Rishon Letzion, a suburb of Tel Aviv. 

Professor Theodore Postol, who famously disproved the alleged 96% interception rate of the Patriot missile defense system during the first Gulf War, has now claimed that the "Iron Dome's intercept rate, defined as destruction of the rocket's warhead, was relatively low, perhaps as low as 5%, but could well be lower". Postol and his colleagues studied videos of the Iron Dome in action during Pillar of Defense and determined that the appearance of a successful interception was often incorrect as there should be a secondary explosion from the warhead of the rocket. The scientists also noted that for some strange reason the Iron Dome's missiles (two are sent to intercept the incoming rocket) always exploded at the same time, even though they were in different locations and targeting the same projectile. The third bit of evidence which the scientists say are indicative of a lower interception rate is that there were over 3,000 "civilian damage reports were filed for destruction caused by incoming rockets. It is impossible, claim the scientists, that the 58 rockets that weren't intercepted - the number reported by the IDF - could have caused damage on such a large scale". 

I was in Tel Aviv during Operation Pillar of Defense and like most Tel Avivians, I spent quite a bit of time that week in the bomb shelter. There were 5 Tzevah Adom (Code Red) alarms which I heard (I did not hear the Tzevah Adom which resulted in the rocket hitting the apartment building in Rishon), one a day for 3 days (11/15/12-11/17/12, and two the last day 11/18/12). According to both Hamas, the IDF, and Israeli television stations, each time the Tzevah Adom sounded at least 2 Fajr-5 rockets were sent to Tel Aviv (EDIT: This may have been an exaggeration as I now believe that only 1 rocket was sent each time). If the warheads were not successfully intercepted and destroyed by the Iron Dome as Professor Postol and his colleagues allege, where did they go? Even with a theoretical 10% intercept rate (higher than Postol's 5% but much lower than the IDF's 84%), there would have been at least 4 other rockets which the Iron Dome would have failed to intercept over Tel Aviv. There is not much open space around Tel Aviv, and I guess that the rockets could have landed in these places, but the idea that civilian areas were struck by 4 or more 175 lb warheads and no one noticed seems beyond ridiculous. While I myself did not hear every explosion of the Iron Dome missiles or Fajr rockets, friends of mine did, so I feel it is safe to assume that the Tzevah Adoms I heard were not false alarms.

From my limited understanding of mid-air explosions and high school science classes, not to mention innumerable action movies, I am under the impression that every time something explodes in mid-air, the remnants of the original object are spread of a larger area than if the object where to strike the ground. Not every piece of the object will be immediately incinerated. Similar to small meteorite fragments such as those that recently hit Central Russia, these pieces can cause significant and widespread damage. Why do these scientists assume that once the incoming rocket is intercepted there will not be debris? This article indicates the possibility of this exact scenario I am describing where the debris from an interception (and NOT the rocket warhead) caused damage on the ground. The warhead of a Fajr-5 is certainly not responsible for this as the scale of the damage would have been much higher. This seems much more likely to be the cause of such a 'high number of damage reports' than the possibility that rockets were not successfully intercepted. Theoretically, rocket fragments will be scattered over a larger area while a warhead explosion is confined to one location. Also while not as relevant to my central argument, I am curious why the scientists would conflate the damage reports from the hundreds of Qassam rockets and mortars (which the Iron Dome or any other missile defense system may not always be able to intercept due to the short 15-20 second flight time from Gaza), and the longer range Grad and Fajr rockets which were sent towards larger cities in Southern and Central Israel?

The last and perhaps most important question is why Professor Postol changed his mind from November to now and what made him do so. He was interviewed as a missile defense expert by MIT's Technology Review in an article released on November 26th, 2012, where he claimed that the Iron Dome was effective in intercepting the rockets. I understand he may have more information now than he had then, but the conviction and authority with which he previously praised the Iron Dome has been ignored in these recent news stories and not addressed by Professor Postol himself.

While the mathematical account of the scientists seems problematic from the outset, I am not as concerned about this as much as some more basic methodological issues, and why the major media sources (who gladly picked up this story), have not made any attempt to critically analyze these claims. I am by no means convinced that the Iron Dome is a permanent (or even temporary) solution, or that it's success rate is as high as the IDF has claimed, but the arguments given by Professor Postol seem highly problematic and have not convinced me in any way. The United States has spent an enormous sum of money on overhyped military projects (like the F-35) that go nowhere and I would hate for Iron Dome to be another one of these, but until further evidence is provided, I remain unconvinced.

UPDATE 1:

I stumbled upon this Voice of America article talking about several flaws of the Iron Dome system. One of them is that the interception is based upon exploding the warhead rather than the entire rocket so there will be debris from the interception. This corroborates my point, and is another potential piece of evidence against Professor Postol's theory.

UPDATE 2:

Haaretz' Uzi Rubin has posted an article asking where the nearly 500 rockets (480 to be exact) which were understood to have either landed in or been intercepted in "built-up areas" went to. Mr. Rubin takes Professor Postol's 10% claim to indicate that 48 of the 480 would have been shot down successfully, leaving 432 rockets and their warheads unaccounted for. While it is a bit crude and does not touch on some of the other issues which I mentioned in this blog, it is  encouraging to see at least one person on a reputable site questioning Professor Postol's theory.

UPDATE 3:

The BBC's Kevin Connolly has a new short (and more or less worthless) video report on the Iron Dome. Brings up the same flawed arguments (he even states that Israel claims that 90% of the rockets fired at it were intercepted, despite the incredibly obvious fact that this is not true, and was never claimed by Israel). Shoddy journalism as it takes a 5 second Google query to note that the claim of the Israelis is that 90% of the rockets it ATTEMPTED to engage were successfully intercepted. In either case, just another example of how uncritical thinking by those in positions of authority can be problematic as they perpetuate untruths.

UPDATE 4:

Uzi Rubin has posted another, more complete refutation of Professor Postol's argument. It can be accessed here. Postol's memo is also available now and can be accessed here. This memo contains no data, and no real methodological explanation.

UPDATE 5:

Postol (and his friend Richard Lloyd) have stood by their claim of the Iron Dome not working despite increasing evidence to the contrary. In another interview with MIT's Technology Review, they have reiterated their doubt as to the system's efficacy. I am guessing that they have not been in Israel and do not understand the geography of the area, because there is no other excuse for such a poor hypothesis given the available data. If all of these rockets' warheads were not detonated where are the impact craters? It defies logic.

UPDATE 6: 

Here is the new "paper" from Postol, which includes "data". He now says the rockets' warheads are small which is why there are fewer casualties. He doesn't explain how this relates to his earlier claim that there are a large number of damage reports. I am not sure how he can be taken seriously, when he fails to provide real data, and he changes the basis for the argument without changing his conclusion or even saying WHY he changed his argument. Postol also argues that the explosions from warheads that hit their target is localized, again reinforcing my original point about mid-air interceptions causing a wider debris field and therefore more opportunities for damage.

UPDATE 7: 
I stumbled upon this post with some technical specifications of the Iron Dome. Assuming that this is correct: the Iron Dome interceptors (Tamir) have a warhead of 11 kg (~24 lbs). The warheads of Fajr-5 are 175 kg according to Wikipedia, while the Hamas/PIJ version (M-75) are 175 lb according to other sources. So let us imagine a hypothetical situation where Postol is correct and these warheads are NOT exploded. Everyone in Tel Aviv (which is a fairly large city) heard an explosion, or perhaps multiple explosions, and many had their houses shake and windows rattle. Is a 20 pound warhead big enough to cause this to happen all over the city? Secondly, if everyone is hearing the 24 pound warhead and the 175 (or 375+ if wikipedia is correct) warhead remains unexploded by the Tamir, why didn't anyone hear/feel/die from the warhead with 8-15 TIMES the mass? This is a simple logical problem with Postol and Lloyd's claims, and it is simply inexplicable that folks have not questioned them. Perhaps it is because of my geographic training and spatial awareness which makes this seem a simple question, but it is shocking that these questions are ignored by so many whose job it is to be asking them. This information circles back to a rather important point which I made in my original post: Is there a difference between Qassam/Katyusha and Grad/Fajr/M302 rockets? Perhaps the Iron Dome DOES have trouble with the shorter range rockets, but if this is the case, why does Postol conflate the two vastly different scenarios? And secondarily, why does Postol conflate ICBM defense, with the type of rocket defense that Iron Dome is intended to be? The more I learn about this, the more strange Postol's argument seems.

UPDATE 8: 
The plot thickens! Uzi Rubin in 2006 (before Iron Dome existed), wrote a report about Hezbollah's rockets during the 2006 conflict. The report is available here. About halfway through the report, Exhibit B is an image of a guard-rail with damage from what is described as a 220m Anti-Personnel rocket which Rubin said is likely to be 

• "220mm rocket," range 70 km (probably Syrian-manufactured Russian "Ouragan" Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS])

In Postol's report from 2013 available here, he used the same image on page 6 and wrote (on the page above) that it was from a Qassam rocket. 

Qassam rockets are NOT the same as 220mm rockets, they do not have the same warhead, or range. There are many possibilities; Rubin has misidentified the source of the damage in the image (least likely since his was the original image); Postol has used the wrong description in his paper, which damages his credibility as an expert; Postol used the image knowing it was from another rocket and lied about it on purpose. I used both TinEye.com and Images.Google.com to try and identify the earliest instance of the same image, and all that I could find was links back to Rubin's original paper. This would seem to indicate that Rubin's is the original image and he either took the photo himself, or obtained it directly from someone who was at the scene. Why would Postol take someone else's image and use a misleading description? This is troubling, since so many seem to be taking Postol's account at face-value without asking the tough (or in this case fairly simple) questions. In either case, I would hope that Postol can explain his usage of this image because it is discouraging that an MIT professor would do something so underhanded.

UPDATE 9:
I am ecstatic, finally an article that understands (some of) the basics and asks good questions. Armin Rosen from Business Insider wrote this article about the damage report side of things. While not perfect, it at least asks (some of) the questions that should be asked of Postol and his followers. 

UPDATE 10: 
Israeli intelligence analyst Yossi Melman tweeted some numbers of rockets sent from Gaza. If they are correct, the Iron Dome's "success rate" would calculate to 83.5% (# intercepted/(# intercepted+ # landed in populated areas)) 584/(584+115). Rockets that are not going to land in populated areas are not worth intercepting, as the damage is likely to be negligible, so the rockets sent to "open areas" should not be considered failures of the Iron Dome. This has been a common misunderstanding by journalists from world-renowned publications as I noted in Update 3.

Rockets summary: 3361fired 584 intercepted 115 landed in populated areas 2542 in open zones 120 disintegrated in #Gaza. daily average 120
— Yossi Melman (@yossi_melman) August 5, 2014

These numbers are not great considering that the IDF has said the system is improving from previous times, but there also has to be some adjustment for the fact that the rockets have been fired in a manner intended to test the limits of the system (e.g. multiple barrages at different cities, or massive barrages sent to one city).