JCPOA's Uncertainty Exacerbates Iran's Worsening Economic Problems

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was, at the time, widely believed to be a turning point for the Iranian economy, but this has not borne out. Even though it is just one piece of a complex iranian economic situation, the JCPOA is so significant that uncertainty over the fate of the deal has curtailed potential progress. With the shale oil boom keeping the price of petroleum significantly below previous highs, and even minimum budgetary breakeven expectations, Iran’s leading industry is on unsteady ground. The French oil company Total signed a significant oil deal with Iran, but many other firms in the oil industry, and in other sectors, remain hesitant. Boeing and Airbus have committed to major deals, but despite this, Iran’s economic outlook has not improved as expected. Much was made of the stream of foreign trade delegations in Iran following the implementation of the JCPOA, but there has not been a rush to invest in Iran. Substantial geopolitical risks, in addition to pre-existing issues, remain unaddressed, in large part due to uncertainty over the fate of the JCPOA, which faces a considerable test next month.

In May, President Trump will decide whether he wishes to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, or to refuse to certify, and to withdraw the United States from the accord. He has attempted to be the “anti-Obama” whenever possible - at least rhetorically - but is often hamstrung by either a failure to act decisively, or by the various distractions and domestic and foreign political dilemmas. With pressure on Trump building as the Mueller investigation continues, he will feel increasingly cornered and is likely to lash out in some manner. This is just as likely to be in the form of an angry Twitter rant as in anything substantive, but leaving the Iran Deal remains a realistic possibility. Trump has demonstrated a stubborn persistence on several issues, and the relative ease of an executive decision means there are fewer barriers between him and nullifying the United States’ involvement in the JCPOA, as much for domestic appeasement as over legitimate grievances with the deal.

The Iranian economy has faced a series of hardships in recent years; many self-made. Iran’s ongoing economic mismanagement has led to significant protests - most recently this past winter when nationwide demonstrations rocked the country - but so far such events have lacked any momentum and do not present a serious threat to the government. On April 9th, the Iranian government took a bold - and perhaps desperate - step to halt the slide of the Iranian rial by setting a new “official” exchange rate with the American dollar. At the same time, the government also outlawed the use of any other (black market) rate. Following the 35% drop in value in a week, any further instability would be dangerous for a regime facing an already restive populace.

While alluring as a potentially large and lucrative market, Iran remains as risky, if not more so, than other developing countries. Much of this is due to the uncertainty as to what President Trump may do in May, but other domestic and regional issues, including the IRGC’s influence in important commercial sectors, and the ongoing conflict in Syria, are also important. For firms wishing to invest in Iran’s potentially lucrative modernization, the decision over the JCPOA’s fate will signal either a cautious yellow light, if the deal is upheld, or a steadier red light, if President Trump yet again refuses to certify the accord. Refusal to certify the deal for a third time makes not only American firms, but also European and Asian ones, much more wary of doing business in a country that exposes them to American censure. Congress would be likely to further sanction Iran, increasing barriers to trade and business. Further prolonged uncertainty over the fate of the deal and the implications for the Iranian economy and populace puts additional pressure on an already strained Iranian financial system.

Iran and Trump

Iran is one of the most interesting geopolitical threats facing President Trump. The new president has expressed strong distaste for Iran, mostly relating to the nuclear deal reached between the P5+1 and Iran during President Obama’s term. At the same time, Trump has expressed a strong preference for Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin. Russia and Iran have complementary interests in the Middle East, especially regarding Syria, while Russia has habitually nominally supported Iran in an effort to undermine the United States’ hegemony. 

Trump appears to believe that a better deal can be reached with Iran, one abrogating the previous one. For this to be possible, the United States would need to reach a superior bargaining position. Whether the current position is weak or strong, at least one party (Iran) does not wish to give up more. Therefore they would need to be convinced that they are worse off than they believe, or to change the situation to the advantage of the United States. 

Iran, as always, has its own domestic concerns, mostly relating to keeping the population docile, and solidifying regime control over the economy and political system. At the same time, they are active in Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf. Their goal is to establish regional clout, and like Russia, to undermine the United States.

Iran has been making deals with European, and Asian countries since the nuclear accord was finalized. Countries like Greece and Italy, who already have massive financial troubles, benefit from Iranian crude. China always demands more, and other major purchasers like South Korea and India are also interested. 

Trump is faced with a situation where everyone except the United States (and Israel) is happy with the deal, or doesn’t care enough to make a fuss. The United States has virtually no leverage. The only path forward would be to enact coercive measures, forcibly preventing other countries from doing business with Iran. It would the United States versus the world. 

Iran knows this, and they have made a point of pushing in various ways. They ramped up their antagonist actions, especially in the Gulf after the nuclear deal was signed, and continue to act out. General Michael Flynn (Ret.), put Iran “on notice” recently after they test fired a ballistic missile. While not technically a violation of UNSC Resolution 2231 (the text is very poorly worded and unspecific), this test certainly “violated the spirit” of the nuclear agreement and the resolution. 

Today Iran fired another (short range air-defense missile) from the same location. This clearly is not a violation, as it is not ballistic, but it is provocative. While this is much less antagonizing than the previous launch, it is still a clear message to the Trump administration. Iran knows that the United States does not have the same global coalition Obama managed to wrangle, and they are betting that Trump, despite his erratic behavior, won’t be able to do anything to substantive. 

I expect limited provocations to continue, namely in the Gulf as I mentioned a week ago (https://twitter.com/MorganCarlston/status/827160413414506496), but is possible they try to find another dual-citizen hostage, or harass US navy vessels or commercial shipping. They realize how bad Trump looks globally with his inability to control his emotions, and how hypocritical some of his policies are. They are betting that he will be hamstrung by his inability to create a coalition, and to conduct effective diplomacy, while bogged down with domestic concerns.

Iran and Petroleum Prices

One of the overlooked stories of 2014 was the causes of and the geopolitical implications from the dropping oil prices. Numerous articles were written covering aspects of it, yet so few actually tried to look at the situation from the most broad of perspectives.

As everyone knows, the price of oil per barrel and at the pump has dropped over the last few months, mostly as a result of the relationship between demand and supply changing. Supply has been ramped up, especially by US producers. The United States now produces the most oil it has since 1985, and more than all of the OPEC countries including Saudi Arabia. At the same time, OPEC is also producing record amounts.

Many of the countries in OPEC have oil-dependent economies, and fluctuations in the price of oil affect the way their government operates. The budgets are set to expect a certain price of oil, and if the price drops below this, they will have budgetary problems. Iran in particular is facing difficulties, as the sanctions implemented against the Islamic Republic, combined with a lower price of their most important export has greatly reduced potential revenues.

Even though many of the OPEC countries are now facing possible budget deficits, the cartel agreed to not withhold supply and drive up the price of oil. It appears as though the Saudis and the Gulf Nations are willing to withstand lower prices in the short term, because it damages their bitter rival the Iranians, and OPEC's diminished global influence due to US shale oil producers.

Some have framed this as a purely anti-Iran move, but it is a bit more complex than this. If the OPEC members reduce supply, they are not only working with US oil companies, they are acting in a manner that is only beneficial in the short-term. By working together to keep oil prices low, they will soon drive many of the US shale oil companies out of business.

Fracking (shale oil extraction method) was adopted by American (and Canadian) companies because oil had previously been significantly more expensive, and the fracking process can require a higher break-even point to be profitable. If these companies are allowed to continue to operate (by keeping oil prices high), the damage to OPEC countries will continue. Conversely, if these companies are driven out of business, OPEC has a good chance to regain it's control over world petroleum markets.

The US has long had a policy of utilizing Middle Eastern oil over North American for geo-strategic reasons (see citation in my previous blog). Oil production's increase in North America is striking. Is this a last ditch effort to obtain as much shale oil as possible before the environmentally-damaging process is banned? Is there another "back-up" supply of extractable petroleum or is this the US's last 'trump card' in the oil market?

In some ways this looks like a plot between the Saudis and Americans to damage Iran, Russia and Venezuela financially, but there are quite a few other angles which complicate the situation greatly. Lastly, the insistence by Iran that OPEC cut production, shows Iran's financial woes are very real, and that economic mismanagement by the previous administration in conjunction with external pressures have seriously damaged the economy.

The Mossadeq Coup: Misconceptions about the Role of the United States and the CIA

The United States government, namely the CIA, is often blamed for the August 1953 coup removing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq from power, however a careful examination of older studies, in addition to newly accessible information, reveal that common conceptions of the events and chronology are flawed, despite their prevalence. 

One reason why these misconception exist is that many files from US government sources relating to this time period, and in particular to this event, remain classified or are otherwise inaccessible (most CIA documents regarding the events have allegedly been destroyed). Under United States law, special exceptions can be made allowing documents to be classified for 50 or 75 years rather than the normal 25 years. It has now been over 60 years since the events took place. This means that on at least two occasions, the documents have been determined to be too sensitive to release. 

More documents regarding this series of events will be revealed later this year (UPDATE: the release has been delayed due to fears that it could have an effect on ongoing nuclear negotiations), when the State Department’s FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) Iran 1952-54 is re-released including newly declassified documents. While imperfect, these documents are the most reliable and most accessible. It is important see these documents (as well as those previously released) in context, and to correct widespread misconceptions about the coup and the parties involved.

These misconceptions are problematic because of how they have engrained themselves into our understanding of the events. The preeminent scholar of Iran, Richard Cottam—who himself lived in Iran for many years and was an employee of the CIA as well as the State Department—wrote in the 1960s edition of ‘Nationalism in Iran” (also included in the 2nd edition published in 1979) that "The distortions of the Mossadeq era, both in the press and in academic studies, border on the grotesque.”

Since this time there have been many new accounts, ranging from Kermit Roosevelt’s fundamentally flawed yet influential memoir ‘Countercoup’, to the scholarly work of Mark Gasiorowski, to Stephen Kinzer’s highly popular “All the Shah’s Men” and the most recent revisionist histories of Dariush Bayandor and Ray Takeyh. Though the academic work is considerably more accurate than that of Roosevelt and Kinzer, there are still significant errors in both traditional and revisionist narratives, which have affected the mainstream understanding of this monumental event.

Misconception #1: The United States wanted Iran’s oil:

The United States had no oil interests in Iran (it was the British that did). The primary goal of the Americans was to prevent the spread of Communism, and to secondary was to resolve the dispute as quickly as possible (see National Security Council document NSC 136/1). This is not to say that the United States did not have a vested interest in Middle Eastern oil (e.g. Saudi Arabia), but rather that from the American side, co-opting Iran’s oil interests was not the motivation for a coup. Since at least 1943, US policy had been to develop Middle Eastern oil because North American and Caribbean oil would be easier to defend in war[i]. If anything, a quick resolution was the most important factor to the American; something clearly reflected in their efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

Misconception #2: Mohammad Mossadeq was a democratically elected Prime Minister:
While Mossadeq was elected to the Majles (the Iranian Parliament) by democratic means (Iran at the time was not a democracy by any means, though some aspects of it were democratic in nature), the office of Prime Minister was nominated from amongst the Majles deputies by the Shah. In turn, the Majles members either voted for or against the nomination (In his initial appointment Mossadeq was approved by a tally of 79-12)[ii]. Mossadeq enjoyed massive popularity at different times during his political career, but his position as Prime Minister was never due to a nationwide poll (he was PM on two separate occasions). 

This is not to say Mossadeq’s position was not legitimate. He was chosen by his constituency to be a Majles deputy, this is indisputable. He was not however, chosen by the Iranian people to be Prime Minister. This also does not account for the fact that the Majles was mostly comprised of feudal landowners, intrinsically opposed to Mossadeq and his populism[iii]. Before Mossadeq became Prime Minister, the Iranian public was unhappy with the state of affairs in Iran; Mossadeq with his sincere populism was seen by the Shah as a clever alternative to yet another feudal landowner or military officer[iv]. This is also a key factor in Misconception #6.

Misconception #3: The Eisenhower Administration was determined to remove Mossadeq from power from Day 1:

One of the fundamental misunderstandings concerns the Eisenhower Administration’s decision to remove Mossadeq from power. A cursory reading of the documents supplied in the FRUS volume concerning Iran, reveals that the President was most concerned with the specter of Communism above anything else. Eisenhower even said in a National Security Council meeting that if he had $500,000,000.00 to spare, he would have preferred to give $100,000,000.00 to Iran so that the financial troubles brought on by British sanctions could be alleviated[v]. Eisenhower was likely influenced by the Dulles brothers (Secretary of State and Director of the CIA), but for a considerable period of time the president opposed a coup. He was afraid of destabilizing Iran and the region, which in his estimation, would inevitably lead to a communist takeover.

Misconception #4: The CIA coup was successful:

It is clear from the record that the attempted coup (codenamed TPAJAX) which was undertaken on the night of August 15th, 1953, was a dismal failure. Not only did the Iranian military officers fail in their task to arrest Mossadeq, the CIA did not have a backup plan. Even though Kermit Roosevelt claimed to have magically turned the situation around in only 3 days, the circumstances of what really happened between the failed coup of August 15/16 and the successful one of the 19th is highly contentious. How did the situation turn around so quickly, despite the early setbacks including the arrest of pivotal Iranian conspirators such as Colonel Zand-Karimi, the conduit for communicating with Tehran-based commanders? Roosevelt’s version of events is difficult to accept without reservation, not only because of the style and substance of his writing, but also because of his well-known questionable reliability. 

Misconception #5: CIA documents corroborate each other:

There is an recurrent idea that the CIA is all-powerful, and that classified documents from the CIA are inherently truthful and accurate. Again this ignores the context of the documents. This was the CIA’s first attempted coup, and especially for those involved there was a strong incentive to downplay the failures of the plan and to exaggerate any potential successes. In the various accounts declassified by or leaked from the CIA there are several inconsistencies which calls into question to accuracy of the different accounts. 

Perhaps most striking (though ignored in historiographies) are those found in the most recent CIA history ‘Zendebad Shah’, published internally in 1998 and partially released following FOIA requests from George Washington University’s National Security Archive. In this document, it is written that British Foreign Minister Eden “found the Americans much more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson. The collapse of the Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations had changed the American’s attitude.” These events however, are taken out of chronological order; the negotiations did not in fact collapse until days after the meeting between Eden and the Americans. On the same page the author also wrote that the US administration ‘abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the crisis.’ Without context, this implies that the US broke off negotiations, while in fact it was Mossadeq that did so.

It is unclear if this is poorly researched document, if the person responsible for it made mistakes in his writing, or if the CIA truly does not have a comprehensive understanding of what happened. Of all the declassified CIA documents on the coup, this one is the most recent (there was another document declassified after this one, but it was written decades prior). Is it unrealistic to expect the newest one to be the most accurate? 

Misconception #6: Westerners and Royalists were the only ones who wished to remove Mossadeq from power:

This is perhaps the biggest misunderstanding of all. While Mossadeq had enjoyed great popularity earlier in his term, his coalition had come under great pressure, and former allies had begun to oppose him. Chief amongst these was Ayatollah Kashani, the speaker of the Majles, and a vital influence for the next generation of politicized clerics, significantly, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. I personally find it very interesting that the US has not made an effort to publicize these connections. Given the tensions between the governments of Iran and the United States since 1979, one would think that undermining the Iranian clerical leadership through showing the links to the coup would be in the interests of the United States.

During the oil crisis, Mossadeq became very unpopular. Things were so bad that when it was clear that his now fractured party would not gain a majority, he cancelled parliamentary elections. In February 1953 there were mass demonstrations against Mossadeq (possibly arranged for or instigated by foreign agents including the CIA); demonstrations of enough severity for Mossadeq to increase security measures in Iran. 

The tendency is to blame the CIA and Americans because we know from the record that there was an attempt to overthrow Mossadeq, but this does not absolve the other participants. There are instances in both the Wilber Report and FRUS where an Iranian general and the former Prime Minister of Iran (allegedly on behalf of a group of military officers) separately contacted US officials inquiring on their interest in conducting a coup d’etat. 

Other issues:

There are two additional issues which I have not addressed as a ‘misconceptions’, because neither of them are considered a key part of the narrative. The role of Ambassador Loy Henderson, who many believe worked with the CIA beyond the scope of his office, has been generally neglected by scholars and journalists. Henderson when interviewed for the Truman Library in 1973, said things which Roosevelt contradicted 6 years later in Countercoup. During this interview Henderson also said that the record would reflect his version of events, if the telegrams were ever declassified.

The other and perhaps most curious issue is the role of the Dulles brothers. The two of them were partners with the American firm (Sullivan & Cromwell) representing the AIOC interests in the United States before their positions as head of the CIA and State Department. The Dulles brothers’s firm had done work with United Fruit Company, one of the corporations which benefited the most from the CIA’s coup in Guatemala in 1954. Both brothers were also major shareholders in United Fruit. It may be difficult to determine if the Dulles brothers used their position to benefit them and their associates financially, and the lack of a comprehensive record from either the CIA or State Department, not to mention Eisenhower’s obsession with secrecy a difficult matter to ascertain. If this is a coincidence it is a truly remarkable one. 

What this means for the new FRUS release:

While there may be new details revealed with the updated release of the FRUS documents, it is likely that the biggest gaps in the record (determining when and why Eisenhower changed his mind and decided to support a coup, as well as what happened between August 16th and 19th) will remain unfilled. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the contradictions between different versions still remain, and are likely to be even more convoluted by the pending release.

"The early accounts of various participants differed widely enough to make it impossible to follow the slender thread of truth through the dark night.”
—Donald Wilber in ‘The Wilber Report’

--

Sources:

[i] 1 December 1943, folder: ‘Petroleum Reserves Corporation Activities. 7/3/43-1/1/44’ box 1, Records of the Petroleum Division, RG 59 via Anderson, Irvine H. "The American Oil Industry and the Fifty-Fifty Agreement of 1950." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 151

[ii] In the executive system of the time, Prime Minister was elected by the Parliament (Majles). Mossadeq was voted in by a 79-12 margin. See Foran, John. "Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution., 1993. 285.

[iii] Cottam, Richard W. Nationalism in Iran. 1964. 49

[iv] Azimi, Fakhreddin. Iran: The Crisis of Democracy. New York: St. Martin's, 1989. 257

[v] Memorandum of discussion at the 135th meeting of the National Security Council, March 4, 1953, FRUS, 1953-1954, Vol. X:Iran, p. 691-701

Additional Resources:

FRUS Iran 1952-54: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS195254v10

Wilber Report (Mostly unredacted): http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm

Zendebad Shah!: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran980600.pdf

More on Mossadeq by me:

Relations Between Mossadeq and the US
Mossadeq and the US: An Introduction
US Officials on Mossadeq and the British

Op-Ed for Enduring America-Worldview on 1953/2013 Parallels

US officials on Mossadeq and the British: 1952-3

I've been writing a paper on relations between the United States and Prime Minister Mossadeq (there are a million ways to spell his name but this is the one I most prefer). Having done a ton of research, I've come to the realization that most of the scholarly works on the subject are overly political and not nearly as accurate as one would hope. These works have lead to a number of incorrect conclusions by the public (Iranian, American and others) about the United States government, the State Department, the CIA and their roles in the August 1953 Mossadeq coup.

Most scholars ignore some of the most important documents which we have, chiefly the archival documents of FRUS (Foreign Relations United States). They rely too much on the words of people such as CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt, whose book Countercoup, is the basis for most their scholarly work, despite the fact that Roosevelt contradicts himself at various points, and his account of the events often clashes with many, including the CIA (see their leaked WIlber Report which the New York Times obtained in 2000), the State Department, etc.

I am not arguing that the US did not play a significant role, but that this role is often exaggerated and misunderstood. Prior to Mossadeq's overthrow, the United States had been supportive of the Iranian leader, to the point where the British were worried that they would turn against them in the negotiations over the oil dispute. What is the most interesting and rarely addressed by academia is what happened to make the United States change their opinion and create a plan to remove Mossadeq from power.

Following I have attached quotes directly from FRUS (although due to the documents mainly being telegraph transcripts, adding prepositions and conjunctions is often necessary) so that you can see some of the words of American officials in the time leading up to the 1953 coup. These are the same types of cables that Wikileaks released in their "Cablegate". Top secret, secret or otherwise classified, they were not intended for public consumption and were not meant to influence the contemporary public in any way.

Bold print is my emphasis

Ambassador Loy Henderson to the Department of State, 5 January, 1952

[It is] not necessary in this telegram [to] try [to] prove [that the] British have been systematically misjudging [the] Iran situation for at least [the] last two years. Research analysis of documents in [DoS's] files will show that [the] British have been stubbornly refusing [to] recognize [the] dynamics [of the] situation here. London still seems of [the] opinion [that the] forces of nationalism are temporary phenomena which will disappear in due course." 

Acting Secretary of State Harrison Matthews to the US Embassy in the UK, 30 January, 1953

Preliminary reaction to… was one of disappointment that Mossadeq at this stage would again attempt to alter the basis upon which we have all worked in an effort to secure [an] agreement. Further study, however, leads us to believe that we should not accept this change in a spirit of defeat but should continue under same compulsions as before to attempt to reach [an] agreement… 

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 10 February 1953

Also and again because of commercial factors outlined above, we believe British bargaining position will become worse in future, as regards Iran, than it is at present. It seems to us that this factor as well should be carefully analyzed by British before present negotiations are allowed to fail. 

Memorandum of Discussion at the 135th meeting of the NSC (National Security Council), 4 March 1953

The probable consequences of the events of the last few days, concluded Mr. Dulles, would be a dictatorship in Iran under Mossadegh. As long as the latter lives there was but little danger, but if he were to be assassinated or otherwise to disappear from power, a political vacuum would occur in Iran and the Communists might easily take over. 

The second course of action proposed by the Secretary of State was for the United States to disassociate itself, regarding Iran, from the British in an effort to regain popularity on the merits of a policy of our own… But, he said, it was known that our unpopularity in Iran is largely a derivation of British unpopularity and our previous association in the minds of Iranians with unpopular British policies. The trouble with such a course of action was this was whether we should not lose more by going it alone, in the face of British opposition in many other areas of the world, that we should gain in Iran itself. 

It was quite likely, therefore, that they [the Soviets] would increase their pressure in Iran to secure its control as rapidly as possible by a coup d' état. Such a course of action might constitute the miscalculation, which we all dreaded which would cause the beginning of World War III. Could not he British be made to see this dangerous potentiality?"

"If", said the President (Eisenhower), "I had $500,000,000 of money to spend in secret, I would get $100,00,000 of it to Iran right now."

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to US Embassy in the UK 7 March, 1953

"There should be no large US purchases [of] oil. However, we should be tolerant of minor measures sufficient to keep Mosadeq barely afloat and thus attempt [to] avoid disastrous possibility of Communists replacing him. 

These excerpts do not seem like the words of a country plotting to overthrow a government. In fact, they appear to be the opposite of this. It is true that there were significant incidences of unrest in Iran in the spring of 1953 which may have changed the opinions of some in the government, but they are not addressed so well in the FRUS documents. In my mind the words here are much more convincing than the words of a fanciful liar like Kermit Roosevelt, but maybe that is just me. They still doesn't explain what exactly changed for the US government between March 1953 and August 1953 which made them want to overthrow Mossadeq.

FRUS files for Iran can be accessed here: University of Wisconsin Digital Collection

Quantifying Sanctions?

As a news junkie, I spend a lot of time on Twitter and all of the relevant foreign policy news sites. On these sites there is a relatively healthy debate over the efficacy of sanctions against Iran, but the lack of geographic thinking in the discussion is disheartening. By 'geographic' I do not mean just the physical space itself, but rather a more complete holistic approach. 

Both sides vociferously argue that their opinion is valid, while listing a variety of reasons. Those in favor of sanctions point to the lack of diplomatic progress in negotiations as proof that more drastic measures are necessary, namely increased sanctions, with the potential of military action if Iran does not change its behavior. Those opposed to sanctions talk about how the sanctions are rather crudely implemented, restricting humanitarian goods like medicine. Others who are opposed to sanctions believe that the measures are not enough, and the lack of any significant concessions by Iran means that the West must react militarily to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (or the capability to build a nuclear weapon). I am not going to write about these arguments because the specifics details are not as interesting to me. I am much more interested in the big picture, which is why the lack of a comprehensive discussion of the entire situation is disturbing to me. 

It is certainly true that Iran's production of nuclear material has increased significantly since the various sanctions were implemented, but how can one measure the true impact of these sanctions? Do we look at the rapidly falling value of Iranian currency and the rampant inflation? Do we look at year by year or month by month comparisons of how much petroleum based products are exported by Iran? Do we look at the Iranian budget as an indicator of financial health? Do we look at the number of centrifuges used by Iran, or the quantity of enriched uranium which it has? 

Some will say that the increasing number of centrifuges which Iran is using indicates that sanctions are not having their desired effect. This is certainly possible, but what may be overlooked by this estimation is the possibility that Iran's rulers have placed an increased importance upon their nuclear program as a way to gain leverage with the West. From their actions, it seems as though the Iranians act rationally, couldn't this be an expression of their rationality? When one is put into a difficult situation isn't it natural to try and gain leverage in whatever way possible? 

Assuming some sort of interconnectivity between all things, claiming that sanctions are not having an effect on Iran is a ridiculous notion. Following this logic, won't there then be at least some impact on Iran's nuclear program? Iran does not exist in a vacuum, and its various governmental programs are similarly not isolated from every other part of the country's governmental apparatus.

Just because it is very difficult to quantify the impact of sanctions upon a program, this does not exclude the possibility of there being some sort of connection. The sanctions, while crude at best, clearly have had some sort of impact on Iran. While the effect of and the ability to measure sanctions on Iran's nuclear program is debatable, what is certain is that insufficient measurements using simplified methods will lead to simplistic, insufficient conclusions.