Will the Iranian Arms Embargo Remain?

For me, one of the most interesting aspects of the Iranian nuclear negotiations is the sanctions, their meanings and classifications, and the circumstances under which they may be removed. For months, or perhaps even years, Iranian officials have unanimously and unequivocally stated that 'all' sanctions must be removed, and removed immediately. The P5+1, especially the Americans have stated that nuclear sanctions are a part of the negotiations, while 'non-nuclear' sanctions are not. Recently, Iranian rhetoric softened slightly when Ayatollah Khamenei stated that there will be a time-table for the removal of sanctions rather than immediate and complete reversal. The latest statement from the Iranian negotiating team in Vienna however, insists on removing an arms embargo placed on Iran.

They are, as far as I can tell, referring to the UN Security Council Resolution 1747, unanimously supported in 2007, punishing Iran for proliferation concerns and not fully complying with the IAEA. The sanctions clearly have a nuclear connection, but at the same time, explicitly mention ballistic missiles. The factsheet released by the White House in April in the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) emphatically states that while nuclear sanctions will be removed, "U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal." The following excerpt from the JCPOA indicates that there is a plan to create a new resolution reaffirming the embargo on "conventional arms and ballistic missiles".

Given the inconsistencies here, there are a few important questions to be asked: 

1. Will the arms embargo remain or be renewed in some way?
2. Is Iran reneging on previously agreed terms?
3. Did the White House put this in the JCPOA while it was still up for negotiation?
4. Is this appeasement of hardline constituencies? Is one side trying to take advantage of the other? Does Iran not want a nuclear deal after all?

These questions are incredibly important, not only for understanding the contributions made by the different sides, but also because there are legitimate concerns over weaponry going to and coming from Iran. Hezbollah and other terror groups are armed by Iran, and easing restrictions on the Iran's armaments is bound to create further instability. Israel has not been afraid to bomb Syria, Lebanon and Sudan when they feel threatened by a possible arms transfer, usually of more advanced weaponry. The likelihood of this happening again would be much higher with this arms embargo removed. Iran may change its behavior towards its terror clients in the long-term, but a radical reduction in the scope and frequency of its covert actions is unlikely in the short term.

Iran Deal Framework Thoughts

While the framework of the Iran nuclear deal is by no means "perfectly reassuring" (Iran won't abandon all nuclear enrichment and R&D, and probably won't join the Convention on Nuclear Safety), there are many very good clauses included, that hawks and doves alike should be pleased about.

Key points from the JCPOA:

• Centrifuges reduced to 6104, with 5060 able to enrich uranium and all of them are IR-1, Iran's first generation and least capable centrifuge
• A major reduction (97%) in Iran's LEU (low-enriched uranium). While it remains unclear how exactly this will happen, it is believed that this will be due to a mixture of dilution and shipping extra stocks out of country (probably to Russia)
• All excess centrifuges will be put into IAEA monitored storage
• Fordow will be converted and heavily restricted from nuclear activities for 15 years
• Iran's later generations of centrifuges will not be used for 10 years
• IAEA will have 'regular' access to all of Iran's nuclear facilities (including Natanz and what will be a formerly nuclear site, Fordow)
• IAEA will have access to the supply chain and will also have access to and surveillance of uranium mines and mills for 25 years
• Iran will sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT
• Arak will be redesigned, and made incapable of producing weapons-grade plutonium and its core will be either destroyed or taken out of country
• Iran will receive sanctions relief IFF it abides by the terms (IAEA will address enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency)
• IAEA has to VERIFY Iran has taken the right steps before sanctions are removed 
• US Sanctions on Iran for human rights, terrorism, and ballistic missiles remain in place

A common refrain from hawks is that Iran has refused to address PMD (possible military dimensions), and has worked on developing its ballistic missile program. These concerns are valid. They've also worried about IAEA access to sensitive sites, and centrifuge R&D.

There are clauses in the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) which address all of these. If this is in fact accurate, the deal looks to be quite good.

There are a few drawbacks included, such as the continuation of enrichment at Natanz, though limiting the enrichment to a relatively low number of first generation centrifuges strictly limits Iran's enrichment capabilities. Jeffrey Lewis wrote here about the type of centrifuges used and how the number of total centrifuges operational is less important than how modern the centrifuges are.

Another possible downside to the JCPOA is the removal of sanctions. It remains unclear exactly under what circumstances the sanctions would be removed, how they would be removed, and if the conditions of removal are violated, how and how quickly the sanctions would be reimplemented. It seems as though only nuclear related sanctions are to be removed, which leaves quite a few sanctions left over.

One of the key components in the JCPOA is that the IAEA has to VERIFY and CONFIRM. Previously the IAEA has been unable to do this, so for this to be the case, Iran has to give MORE than it has in the past. This is a clear victory for the West. Also understated is the access to the supply chain granted under the JCPOA. If Iran were to secretly stash some nuclear materials and create a new nuclear site it would be much easier to take from an earlier stage in the process rather than from a facility that is already monitored by the IAEA.

Overall the deal looks very good for the West, though it is still not signed and completed so terms may change. If this framework is in fact accurate, Iran has conceded a lot (with the exception of Natanz which in my opinion looks like this is what the P5+1 'gave up' in exchange for other concessions). It is quite telling that the conservative editor of Iran's Kayhan newspaper Shariatmadari said Iranian nuclear negotiators: "We've given them a horse with saddle and received back its corpse."

Hardline Iranian editor Shariatmadari on the Lausanne understanding: "We've given them a horse with saddle and received back its corpse."
— Saeed Kamali Dehghan (@SaeedKD) April 2, 2015

If the most anti-American factions of the Iranian elite are upset with the deal thinking they gave up too much, then it is a good deal for the West.

Syrian Nuclear Aspirations?

Der Spiegel this week alleged that Syria is attempting to work towards a nuclear weapon, with varying types of assistance from Iran, Hezbollah and North Korea. If true, this would be a massive story, with significant geopolitical ramifications. Syria has denied the allegations.

Syria is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as is Iran, while North Korea is not. Under this treaty, states are prohibited from developing nuclear weapons and from helping others develop these technologies.

In 2006, the IAEA ruled that Iran is in "non-compliance" with the NPT, namely, Iran's safeguards agreement. If these new allegations are true, Iran would be in blatant violation of this treaty. Given the attempted rapprochement between Iran and the West, primarily regarding its nuclear program, a discovery of this nature would almost certainly cause irreparable damage to ongoing nuclear negotiations. Iran would also face new, harsh sanctions.

The report from Der Spiegel however, is poorly sourced, and experts have claimed that the information contained in the report is in fact, incorrect. The report cites "Western intelligence agencies" as the source for this information, and indicates that Der Spiegel has documents from these sources showing that Syria is working to build a nuclear weapon.

As is the case with any anonymous source, a proper vetting of the information is necessary, yet in this instance near impossible. It would be very difficult to have two separate sources able to confirm this information. Information regarding Iran's nuclear program is notoriously hard to come by. While there have been cases when new and valid information was revealed, there are also many instances of false and misleading information released by the same sources.

It is best to take this report with a grain of salt. It is unclear if the documents held by Der Spiegel are legitimate, or an attempt by the hawkish members of the Western coalition who wish to avoid any reconciliation between Iran and the West, to falsify documents to push their agenda.

Iran and Petroleum Prices

One of the overlooked stories of 2014 was the causes of and the geopolitical implications from the dropping oil prices. Numerous articles were written covering aspects of it, yet so few actually tried to look at the situation from the most broad of perspectives.

As everyone knows, the price of oil per barrel and at the pump has dropped over the last few months, mostly as a result of the relationship between demand and supply changing. Supply has been ramped up, especially by US producers. The United States now produces the most oil it has since 1985, and more than all of the OPEC countries including Saudi Arabia. At the same time, OPEC is also producing record amounts.

Many of the countries in OPEC have oil-dependent economies, and fluctuations in the price of oil affect the way their government operates. The budgets are set to expect a certain price of oil, and if the price drops below this, they will have budgetary problems. Iran in particular is facing difficulties, as the sanctions implemented against the Islamic Republic, combined with a lower price of their most important export has greatly reduced potential revenues.

Even though many of the OPEC countries are now facing possible budget deficits, the cartel agreed to not withhold supply and drive up the price of oil. It appears as though the Saudis and the Gulf Nations are willing to withstand lower prices in the short term, because it damages their bitter rival the Iranians, and OPEC's diminished global influence due to US shale oil producers.

Some have framed this as a purely anti-Iran move, but it is a bit more complex than this. If the OPEC members reduce supply, they are not only working with US oil companies, they are acting in a manner that is only beneficial in the short-term. By working together to keep oil prices low, they will soon drive many of the US shale oil companies out of business.

Fracking (shale oil extraction method) was adopted by American (and Canadian) companies because oil had previously been significantly more expensive, and the fracking process can require a higher break-even point to be profitable. If these companies are allowed to continue to operate (by keeping oil prices high), the damage to OPEC countries will continue. Conversely, if these companies are driven out of business, OPEC has a good chance to regain it's control over world petroleum markets.

The US has long had a policy of utilizing Middle Eastern oil over North American for geo-strategic reasons (see citation in my previous blog). Oil production's increase in North America is striking. Is this a last ditch effort to obtain as much shale oil as possible before the environmentally-damaging process is banned? Is there another "back-up" supply of extractable petroleum or is this the US's last 'trump card' in the oil market?

In some ways this looks like a plot between the Saudis and Americans to damage Iran, Russia and Venezuela financially, but there are quite a few other angles which complicate the situation greatly. Lastly, the insistence by Iran that OPEC cut production, shows Iran's financial woes are very real, and that economic mismanagement by the previous administration in conjunction with external pressures have seriously damaged the economy.

Iran and the Convention on Nuclear Safety

CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

ARTICLE 1. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this Convention are:

1. to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation
2. to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such installations; 
3. to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such consequences should they occur.

After the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986, it became clear that there needed to be better international cooperation in establishing safety standards for nuclear facilities, especially power plants. A series of international treaties aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear accident were established following this catastrophe. One of the most significant of these is the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994, and like many other nuclear treaties is governed by the IAEA. There are 76 parties to the convention, including Belarus, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Unlike many other international treaties, the CNS is set up as an incentive-based program. This convention is aimed at sharing safety techniques and protocols among the international community so that the risk of a nuclear accident decreases, and in the event of an accident, the effects are mitigated by increased awareness and preparedness. This treaty has been signed or ratified by every country with a nuclear power plant (there are 34 countries with nuclear power plants), with one exception.

Iran, despite it's insistence that its nuclear program is civilian, and entirely without military capability, has not signed or ratified the CNS. Even though in early 2013 the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations indicated that his country has been working to join the treaty, this has still not happened. While Chernobyl is now a distant memory for many, the Fukushima nuclear accident is a recent reminder of the importance of proper nuclear safety standards, and international cooperation to prevent catastrophic damage to the environment and to civilization.

Iran is one of the more prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and does not always fully embrace the international community, especially the Western-dominated institutions. However, with others in a similar situation being a part of the CNS (Belarus and Syria are perhaps the best examples), Iran’s absence is even more curious. If Iran is trying to make a point and not conform to Western hegemony, why have these other countries acquiesced?

Iran may be concerned with spies taking information shared through a treaty such as the CNS, especially relating to the facilities at Arak, Fordow, and Natanz (some believe that the IAEA serves Western intelligence). However, the CNS is ONLY applicable to land-based civilian nuclear power plants, which does not include enrichment facilities, or other sensitive nuclear installations. Additionally, the CNS has clauses included in the text protecting information including: “personal data; information protected by intellectual property rights or by industrial or commercial confidentiality; and information relating to national security or to the physical protection of nuclear materials or nuclear installations”. 

The only reason that I can imagine why Iran would not want to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety has to do with Article 6, which is as follows: '…the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact.' From this, one can see the potential problem for Iran if the plant at Bushehr would have to be shut-down (temporarily or permanently). This would be both a significant blow to the prestige of the country and its scientists, and would also severely undermine the state’s PR campaign trying to assert it’s right to peaceful nuclear technologies. 

So why exactly has Iran not signed the CNS? What possible reasons do they have for not joining this treaty? Or on the other hand, what reasons does Iran have to join the treaty? Politics is about perception, why isn’t Iran taking advantage of a situation where they could get an easy win, deflecting criticism of their nuclear program? Are they saving this as an option for later?

The reasoning behind Iran’s refusal to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety remain unclear. The simple act of joining this treaty would allay fears that Iran’s stated desire for a civilian nuclear program is not genuine. It would also increase the possibilities for Iran to reintegrate itself into the international community. There are plenty of issues to argue over in the United Nations General Assembly, disaster prevention and relief should be a given. 

Is Corruption in Iran finally being addressed?

The arrest of Babak Zanjani is a significant event in Iran. Corruption in Iran is understood to be rampant; figures as significant as former Presidents Ahmadi Nezhad and Hashemi Rafsanjani have been accused of abusing their authority for financial and/or nepotistic reasons. In-fighting and factionalization in Iran is also a problem, with the various groups at odds with each other. If someone like Zanjani who allegedly has been instrumental in helping the Islamic Republic avoid US/EU sanctions has now fallen out of favor, one must wonder why this would happen now before the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran has not yet been applied? 

The sanctions relief scheduled to implemented under the new nuclear agreement has not started yet. One would think that someone who has supposedly been so important to the Islamic Republic's efforts in limiting the bite of international sanctions would not be thrown in jail, especially not at this stage. Was the alleged corruption so significant that Iran's government and economy would be better off without such an important businessman? Is this a sign that there will be efforts aimed at reducing corruption in Iran, or is this a personal vendetta or domestic political squabbling? President Rouhani is close to former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who also has been accused of corruption amongst other criminal acts. Will Rafsanjani also be investigated for corruption or will his ties to the President exempt him?

Babak Zanjani's arrest is interesting and it remains to be seen if this is the first step towards a genuine attempt to eliminate corruption or if this is just political witch hunt like what happened to Russian oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky. I hope that this will be a step towards stopping corruption, and that Setad, the case exposed by Reuters, as well as any other abusers of the system will also be subject to investigation.

Iran and Nuclear Safety (or lack thereof)

Belarus, Cuba, India, Israel, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria. Most would think that being on this list is a bad thing, however, in this particular instance, it is not. These countries have all signed (and most have also acceded to or ratified) the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Notably missing, Iran and North Korea. While I've written on why Iran and North Korea should not be compared, in this one case I feel as though showing that both of these countries are absent from a certain international treaty is important.

The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994 after several years of work. 'Its aim is to legally commit participating States operating land-based nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks to which States would subscribe.' As this clearly describes, the treaty is intended to ensure that nuclear power plants are kept at a reasonable safety level. Nuclear accidents can affect many (see Chernobyl and Fukushima, not to mention 3 Mile Island), and regulating and ensuring the safety of these facilities is in the interests of all. 

Of all the states with nuclear power plants, Iran is the ONLY one that has not signed the CNS (they have also not signed other important nuclear treaties including 'the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.'). Why is it that a country whose expressed reason for developing nuclear technologies is only power and medical uses, has refused to sign this incentive-based treaty, which ONLY concerns safety and the protection of civilians? 

Iran keeps yammering on and on about how Israel has not signed the NPT (and yes they are right in this case). However after President Rouhani's speech criticizing the double standards of the West in being anti-terrorism yet conducting drone strikes which have killed innocents, doesn't this affair itself also demonstrate an incredibly disheartening example of double standards? 

Iran may claim that the West is imposing an agenda upon them, and that they are trying to force Iran to bend to the will of the West, but this argument is a problematic one. If Iran is so worried about the will of the West, why bother with the UN, or why be a member of any international treaty at all? Even more troubling is the fact that the CNS is purely incentive-based; it applies to safety at nuclear power plants so that nuclear accidents are less likely to occur. It has nothing to do with stopping or limiting enrichment (one of Iran's primary concerns and arguments with both the IAEA and the P5+1), or preventing countries from operating nuclear facilities.

This section of the preamble of the CNS provides important context: 

'…this Convention entails a commitment to the application of fundamental safety principles for nuclear installations rather than of detailed safety standards and that there are internationally formulated safety guidelines which are updated from time to time and so can provide guidance on contemporary means of achieving a high level of safety;'

If I had the ear of Iran (or any environmentalist groups anywhere) I would strongly urge them to commit the government of Iran to this important legislation. It could be an important confidence boosting step for both the P5+1 and Iran. The P5+1 would be encouraged by the fact that Iran is agreeing to an important civilian safety regulation, while Iran would be protecting its own citizens and scientists, and also those of the states near to earthquake-prone Bushehr, the site of Iran's nuclear power station. 

NOTE: I've written about this in the past as well. The blog can be accessed here: http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/04/earthquake-danger-at-bushehr.html 

Ali Vaez has written about Iran and nuclear safety, this publication with Charles Ferguson I find particularly compelling.

Mark Fitzpatrick, the director of the IISS's Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme also has an important paper on non-proliferation and nuclear safety which mentions Iran and the CNS. Access here:  http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/backgroundpapers/fitzpatrick2.pdf

The Complexities of the Iranian Government and Nuclear Negotiations

With the impending annual UN General Assembly slated for this coming week, and the anticipation of important political developments, a common story in the news is the potentiality of a diplomatic breakthrough regarding Iran's nuclear program. Much has been made of Iran's new President Hassan Rouhani's increasingly friendly tone towards America and the West and his stated desire for dialogue. From what many have written, it seems an almost foregone conclusion that for the first time in what seems like an eternity, the heads of government for the United States and Iran may meet face to face. For now, this is nothing but blind speculation; no matter how friendly the words of both sides are, no real 'progress' has been made as of yet. 

Iran is one of the most misunderstood places in the world for most Westerners. Beyond the obvious misconceptions about language, culture and ethnicity, there is also a mistaken desire to frame their entire existence within a Western paradigm. As many have pointed out, this is a problem (I would suggest reading Michael Axworthy on this). One of the significant ways in which Westerners fail to understand Iran, and in particular the Islamic Republic, is the governmental structure. The United States has a fairly simple system that many are familiar with. It has clearly delineated Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches, where each one of these three acts in a way to compliment and also to prevent the others from becoming too powerful. Iran as well has these three branches but they function in a very different way. 

Available at: http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/images/power_chart.gif

As the preceding chart from IranChamber.com shows, Iran's government is a convoluted and contradictory organizational mess. Not only is it the only state in the world where the head of government (President Rouhani in this case) does not control the armed forces (this includes the IRGC which is loyal to the revolution, and effectively the Supreme Leader), but also the Judicial is subject to the whims of the indirectly 'elected' Supreme Leader. The fact that certain 'elected' bodies (the President for example) have to be 'approved' by unelected groups, certainly doesn't help make the system any more straight-forward to outsiders.

While the former president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nezhad was in power, many on the right in Israel and America would take his words (whether they were translated well or not) at face-value. They made a sport of raving about how this fanatical and powerful leader was a menace to the world and that he must be stopped etc. Those who spoke to me during this time are probably familiar with the way in which I was sharply dismissive of this idea. President Rouhani does not have the same legal authority as the Supreme Leader, or as much as fear-mongers incorrectly claimed Ahmadi-Nezhad had. However, dismissing him as powerless is just as foolish. It remains to be seen if genuine negotiations can happen on his watch. 

Given the amount of possible disinformation and denials coming from the Iranian side, it is unclear if the hardline backbone of the Iranian government will support any sort of concession on their part. They have created a culture of resistance against the West and its allies (against the Americans, the Iraqis, the Israelis, the Shah and leftist movements such as the Communists and the MEK), and while still on this track, it may be increasingly difficult for them to disengage themselves. This same singularity of thought is also true of the conservative American Congress, and much of the Israeli political establishment. The nervous one-track hive-mind is certainly not helped by it's inability to understand the Iranian government's decision making process and power structure. Speculation can, on occasion, be beneficial, but uneducated speculation based upon a simplified understanding of a very complicated Iranian governmental apparatus helps no one. 

Why sanction the Iranian Auto Industry?

Today the United States announced a few more sanctions on Iran intended to "further tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran and isolate the Iranian government for its continued failure to meet its international obligations."

The targets of the sanctions include the Iranian Rial, the automotive sector, and any "material support to the government of Iran". 

At first I thought it strange that the auto industry would be targeted, but then I remembered an article published by Forbes from last month about how there should be sanctions imposed upon Iran's auto manufacturing industry. 

The author's main argument for sanctions is that Iranian owned car companies enable access to 'dual-use technology for Iran's nuclear designs'. The evidence that he uses for this is that there are gas cylinders produced for hybrid cars by an Iranian owned factory in Germany. These "…included carbon fiber and hardened steel – key components of Iran’s second generation nuclear enrichment centrifuges. It also had sophisticated machinery in its inventory, which can be used both to make cylinders and manufacture centrifuges." 

The problem here is that MCS, the operator of the factory, is not an Iranian car company (though as the Iranians have clearly demonstrated, their clever usage of shell corporations make determining the true owner of any company quite difficult) although the author claims that auto companies are the shadow owners of MCS. The original Washington Post article (referenced in the Forbes piece) does not describe the factory as one which creates auto-parts, but rather "high-pressure gas tanks". In fact, the word "auto" or any of its derivatives is found only once in the article where it states: "One of the dual-use materials at MCS was carbon fiber, which is often used in the aerospace and automotive fields".

So why does the author insist on sanctioning the automobile industry? The Washington Post article states that Iran has been "scouring the world for carbon fiber". High quality carbon fiber is evidently a key part of advanced stage centrifuges and so, there apparently are already sanctions on Iranian purchases of high quality carbon fiber. According to ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security), as a result of this, Iran has begun to produce its own carbon fiber (albeit of low quality).

I may be wrong, but from what I understand of the evidence, the target of the sanctions is not the actual industry itself, but those who run it (IRGC), who are also known to have attempted to proliferate materials important for nuclear activities. Therefore the argument should not be that the industry, the cars or the materials themselves that are a problem, but rather that those who lead the industry are the problem and the reason for such sanctions.

While I think that the argument on Forbes is problematic, it may not even be connected to the new Obama sanctions. The sanctions were created by executive order rather than by Congress, so instead of having to try to force an increasingly pig-headed and obstinate House of Representatives to agree with him if he wants to remove the sanctions in the future, Obama may have created a situation where he himself is able to remove them as a bargaining chip with the Iranians. 

Earthquake danger at Bushehr

Despite the problems surrounding the Fukushima Nuclear Reactor after the 2011 earthquake, nuclear work continues at Iran's Bushehr reactor. The plant is based in one of the most earthquake-prone regions of the world, yet work continues. Bushehr is supposed meant to be able to withstand earthquakes up to 7 on the Richter scale (the recent earthquake was a 6.3), but as Iran has not signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (Even India, Israel and Pakistan who are not NPT signatories, have signed the CNS), it is subject to less oversight and safety measures. Nuclear accidents are potentially a huge problem and a radiation leak can affect millions, why not allow safety inspectors to help? Bushehr has nothing to do with the alleged nuclear weapons program, and has no military dimensions, so why not?

This article does a very good job of explaining internal and external fears of a nuclear disaster at Bushehr.


UPDATE 1: fixed broken link for updated Bulletin of Atomic Scientists website article

North Korea is NOT Iran (and Vice Versa)

After all the hullabaloo over North Korea and the unproductive nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan, certain usual suspects predictably brought out their old arguments about why Iran is so bloodthirsty and must be stopped. One of their favored arguments is the war-mongering nature and overall craziness of the North Koreans and how Iran must be stopped from becoming like them. When I no longer find it amusing, I become disturbed at this nonsense as it is paranoid and problematic in its bellicosity. 

There are a number of reasons why these comparisons between Iran and North Korea are illogical and ridiculous. Firstly, North Korea is not, and will never be Iran. North Korea is the bastard step-child of bastard step-children, isolated from the world. They rely on food aid, while simultaneously spending their budget developing weapons and running massive slave labor camps. As bad as some of the human rights abuses are in Iran, these countries are fundamentally different. No matter what one feels about the way in which Iranian elections have occurred (or not, depending on your point of view), they at least have the semblance of multiple political parties, and representatives from minorities are elected to the Majles (Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, and Zoroastrians). While things are becoming more difficult for Iranians as sanctions cut further into the ability of the state and its citizens to conduct business, it is very very far from becoming anything like North Korea economically. 

The next reason why this comparison is problematic is that North Korea considers South Korea and the South Korean people to be a part of the greater Korea that must be united (The North Korean political front is called the "Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland"). This perceived need for 'unification' perpetuates a conflict-minded state that will not be able to reconciled with its neighbor until one of them ceases to exist (I am counting an overthrow of the Kims in this category). Unlike North Korea vs. South Korea, Iran, and Islam (Sunni, Shia or other sect) are not diametrically opposed to Israel and Zionism. The current governments of the two states often disagree with each other, but they are not inherent enemies, it is not an existential disagreement. 

What people should be afraid of is not an Iranian nuclear weapon, but any nuclear weapon. Any capability to cause so much destruction, no matter how just and restrained the one who controls this power is, is potentially dangerous.

Quantifying Sanctions?

As a news junkie, I spend a lot of time on Twitter and all of the relevant foreign policy news sites. On these sites there is a relatively healthy debate over the efficacy of sanctions against Iran, but the lack of geographic thinking in the discussion is disheartening. By 'geographic' I do not mean just the physical space itself, but rather a more complete holistic approach. 

Both sides vociferously argue that their opinion is valid, while listing a variety of reasons. Those in favor of sanctions point to the lack of diplomatic progress in negotiations as proof that more drastic measures are necessary, namely increased sanctions, with the potential of military action if Iran does not change its behavior. Those opposed to sanctions talk about how the sanctions are rather crudely implemented, restricting humanitarian goods like medicine. Others who are opposed to sanctions believe that the measures are not enough, and the lack of any significant concessions by Iran means that the West must react militarily to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (or the capability to build a nuclear weapon). I am not going to write about these arguments because the specifics details are not as interesting to me. I am much more interested in the big picture, which is why the lack of a comprehensive discussion of the entire situation is disturbing to me. 

It is certainly true that Iran's production of nuclear material has increased significantly since the various sanctions were implemented, but how can one measure the true impact of these sanctions? Do we look at the rapidly falling value of Iranian currency and the rampant inflation? Do we look at year by year or month by month comparisons of how much petroleum based products are exported by Iran? Do we look at the Iranian budget as an indicator of financial health? Do we look at the number of centrifuges used by Iran, or the quantity of enriched uranium which it has? 

Some will say that the increasing number of centrifuges which Iran is using indicates that sanctions are not having their desired effect. This is certainly possible, but what may be overlooked by this estimation is the possibility that Iran's rulers have placed an increased importance upon their nuclear program as a way to gain leverage with the West. From their actions, it seems as though the Iranians act rationally, couldn't this be an expression of their rationality? When one is put into a difficult situation isn't it natural to try and gain leverage in whatever way possible? 

Assuming some sort of interconnectivity between all things, claiming that sanctions are not having an effect on Iran is a ridiculous notion. Following this logic, won't there then be at least some impact on Iran's nuclear program? Iran does not exist in a vacuum, and its various governmental programs are similarly not isolated from every other part of the country's governmental apparatus.

Just because it is very difficult to quantify the impact of sanctions upon a program, this does not exclude the possibility of there being some sort of connection. The sanctions, while crude at best, clearly have had some sort of impact on Iran. While the effect of and the ability to measure sanctions on Iran's nuclear program is debatable, what is certain is that insufficient measurements using simplified methods will lead to simplistic, insufficient conclusions.