Iranian-Russian Nuclear Plant Cooperation

Today it was announced that Russia and Iran intend to build two additional nuclear reactors in Iran with the possibility of building six more. Iran has long stated its intentions to pursue nuclear power as an alternative to fossil fuels, yet despite this commitment, serious safety concerns persist. As I've written several times (here, here, here and here), Iran has yet to sign the Convention on Nuclear Safety, an incentive-based program intended to improve safety standards at nuclear power facilities. Iran, in fact, is the ONLY country in the world with a nuclear power plant that has not joined the convention. Even Israel, which is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is party to the convention. Iran is located in a seismically sensitive part of the world, and the decision to build further nuclear plants given the safety concerns is troubling.

There are a few reasons why Iran has chosen to work with Russia again. Russia took over the Bushehr project from a German company after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and even though the project was delayed many times and problematic, it has finally been completed. Russia is also one of the leaders from the anti-Western camp, and Iran values this position. There may be better, cheaper alternatives for cooperation on a nuclear power facility, yet for now Russia is the logical partner.

Personally I am still very worried about nuclear power facilities in Iran. The safety issues are well-documented, yet no one is paying attention to the potential environmental hazards. A whistleblower from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran provided a document to The Times which stated that:

...Bushehr, which began operating last month after 35 years of intermittent construction, was built by "second-class engineers" who bolted together Russian and German technology from different eras; that it sits in one of the world's most seismically active areas but could not withstand a major earthquake; and that it has "no serious training program" or a contingency plan for accidents.

This corroborates other claims about problems including cracks resulting from earthquakes, and a broken cooling pump which forced a shutdown of the plant. The plant is designed to sustain up to a magnitude 8 earthquake without serious damage, yet the several meter long cracks mentioned in the previous sentence were the result of a mere 6.4 earthquake.

Even though there are many problems with Iran's nuclear power plants, the Iranians are continuing to build. I hope that they take steps to address these issues, especially the ones relating to safety. The Iranian ambassador to the UN promised that Iran would be working to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety in January 2013, yet this has not happened yet. The world does not need another nuclear disaster, especially so soon after Fukushima.

Mossadeq and the US: an Introduction

The following is the introduction to a paper I wrote on Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and his relations with the US Administrations of Truman and Eisenhower:

The overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in August 1953 has long been a sore point for Iranians; the inspiration for many conspiracy theories and the source of much ill will directed towards the US government by the average Iranian citizen.[i] The extensive writings on this subject are predictably voluminous. While the perpetrators of the coup included foreign and domestic agents, as well as Iranians from all parts of the political spectrum, the Americans, particularly the CIA, are often singled out as the primary antagonists.

            The reasons for this are many, but important amongst them are the claims made by Kermit Roosevelt Jr. in his book, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. Roosevelt writes about his own role as a CIA agent in fomenting the civil unrest and pressuring the Shah into issuing Firmans removing Mossadeq.[ii] CIA documents corroborate some of his claims, while others contradict them.

            The British, in fact, had a significant role in the coup, but because diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Iran were severed prior to the coup, the British Embassy had been closed, and therefore the British had less of a direct role in the actual execution of the events of 16 and 19 August, 1953.[iii] The British foreign intelligence service, the MI6, which had been based out of the embassy, was restricted by the degradation in relations, but still managed to assist the CIA and the locals who acted to overthrow the Iranian government.[iv]

            Reinforcing the beliefs of American involvement were statements by Secretary of State Madeline Albright apologizing for the United States' "significant role" in the 1953 coup[v], and President Barack Obama with a similar apology in 2009.[vi] Despite the claims of responsibility by a variety of different groups, and innumerable theories on the events of August 19th, 1953, what actually happened remains difficult to determine.

            What makes this question all the more interesting is that the United States initially had been very supportive of Prime Minister Mossadeq, but then in 1953 made an attempt to overthrow Mossadeq. What caused this change?

            During and immediately following the Second World War, the foreign policy of the United States underwent significant changes. Up to this time, the state's foreign policy had been primarily isolationist with a few exceptions (Cuba, Philippines etc.), but with the perceived threat of rampant communism, the focus expanded and the state became more predisposed to intervene globally. This change in priorities coincided with a greater demand for natural resources (in particular petroleum) following World War II. In December 1943 a memo from the Petroleum Division stated that the US preferred “Middle Eastern oil to be developed to the maximum” while American and Caribbean oil was conserved because it would be easier to defend in war.[vii]

            Iran became a natural focal point for the building tensions to manifest themselves as it has one of the largest reserves of both natural gas as well as petroleum.[viii] Adding to this, there were tens of thousands of American troops occupying the country to ensure delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union.[ix] Even before the discovery of oil, Iran has long been important geopolitically to Western powers, with innumerable examples from history dating back to pre-Roman times.

            Perhaps the best pre-modern depiction of how the West saw this part of the world is British political geographer Halford Mackinder's 'Heartland Theory'.[x] The 'Heartland Theory' claims that a state that wishes to dominate the world must physically control the Central Asian Plateau, the Caucasus and what is today Russia.[xi] Iran is a part of this central "pivot area" which Mackinder's theory is concerned with. With the Russian Empire and then the USSR controlling the majority of the "Heartland", fears that Iran, one of the few places of the "Heartland" not under Russian/Soviet control, could fall, led to a British interest in maintaining a footprint in the region. The Great Game between Russia and Britain, where they competed over Central Asia and Iran, is an example of the struggles between global powers over this part of the world and provides the background for American political sentiments towards Iran. Though Mackinder was an academic, during the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia he was appointed "British High Commissioner in Southern Russia".[xii] Even if his theory was not wholeheartedly embraced by the British government, his presence in this part of the world as a representative of the British implies that Mackinder held some measure of influence in the British government. While Mackinder's theory was not published until 1904, the British had long seen this part of the world as essential to their geopolitical aspirations.

            The election of Republican Dwight Eisenhower as the President of the United States in 1952 changed American policy towards Iran. Eisenhower's beliefs were more in line with the British who (whether they believed it themselves or not), argued vociferously that the threat of communism was increasingly dangerous in Iran.[xiii] Initially Eisenhower's administration attempted to keep Mossadeq in power as they believed that the alternatives to him would lead to Soviet control of Iran and subsequently the rest of the Middle East. As late as March 1953, Eisenhower is on record stating that he wished for Mohammad Mossadeq to continue be the Prime Minister of Iran for he was seen as a moderating voice between the right-wing military, royalist and religious parties, and the left-wing Communist Tudeh party.

            It was the beginning of the Cold War, and the Republican President Eisenhower was fearful of the possibility that the Communists might take over the Middle East. Mossadeq was not necessarily friendly towards the Tudeh Party, but he also did not suppress them as forcefully as the Americans would have preferred. He even allowed front organizations and publishing houses of political opponents to operate.[xiv] In the dichotic view of the Western powers, the lack of a consistent, strict crackdown on Communist sympathizers by Mossadeq's government was seen as evidence of an anti-Western bias.

            The CIA’s internal history written in 1998, claims that “Even the most bitter anti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the Iranian Prime Minister was a Communist or sympathizer”.[xv] The evidence suggests that this however, is not the case. A French newspaper said the following about Mossadeq: “The opposition called him an Anglophile, The Russians entitled him the servant of American imperialism. The British labeled him a Communist”.[xvi] Mossadeq, (apparently in a bid to gain Western sympathies) overemphasized the power of the Tudeh to the West.[xvii] Despite the fact that the Tudeh (Communist) party of Iran was officially outlawed, many in the American government and some in the CIA were fearful that Prime Minister Mossadeq was sympathetic towards communism. Mossadeq’s attempt to play the sides against each other by the concept of “negative equilibrium” evidently backfired, as the Americans then saw him as weak and replaceable, rather than weak, but still worthy of support.

            The United States was stuck in a position where they had already committed resources to the Iranian government (before and during Mossadeq's tenure), and wished to resolve the oil dispute as soon as possible to reduce tensions in the unstable Middle East. At the same time the risks of harming American business interests and potentially also long-term geopolitical interests were ever-present in the minds of the Eisenhower Administration.

            The Truman administration had spent millions of dollars trying to support the Iranian economy through loans and grants.[xviii] This was intended to keep the Iranian government as stable as possible and prevent a Communist takeover. There were also American officials who were sympathetic to Iran's Mossadeq-inspired drive for oil nationalization which complicated the US-Iran relationship even further.[xix] Other Americans were worried for the potential of nationalization happening in American areas of influence and oil production such as Saudi Arabia.[xx] That the oil agreement with Saudi Arabia had recently been renegotiated to a still profitable 50/50 split may have alleviated some of these fears. However, the Anglo Iranian Oil Company’s (AIOC) 'concessionary' deal with Iran was far more exploitative (to the benefit of the British) than the Saudi Aramco agreement and the Iranians were well-aware of this fact.[xxi]

            Mossadeq, in his idealism, believed that the United States with its principles of democracy and justice, was likely to side with him in his struggles against the British. Iran and the US had been enjoying closer relations at the expense of Britain and the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War, which reinforced Mossadeq’s beliefs.[xxii] He evidently did not anticipate that political expediencies and historical alliances would play such strong roles in the American decision making process. The good relations which Mossadeq had with several key American officials and negotiators, likely have convinced him that the rest of the government was also sympathetic to his situation. As time passed and an agreement was not reached, Mossadeq's relations with the Americans soured. One reason for this was apparently the perceived mutability of Mossadeq in his oil negotiations. The United States while relatively neutral in the process, wanted the matter settled, as the dispute was a destabilizing factor in an unstable, potentially volatile, geopolitically important region.

            Mossadeq was named Time Magazine's Man of the Year for 1951 for his work in nationalizing Iran's oil and other achievements.[xxiii] Despite this honor, the description of his physical and personal characteristics was overwhelmingly negative and used marginally racist words.[xxiv] These sentiments can be described as representative of American public perception, and if not, that fact that these words came from a leading national magazine publication, understandably had a significant influence on people. The New York Times often described Mossadeq as a ‘dictator’, although the paper never bestowed this disparaging title upon the Shah who ruled for 25 years after Mossadeq fell from power.[xxv] Iran was not a wealthy country, and was seen as backwards by many in the West. Disparaging or patronizing attitudes from the West towards the developing countries and their people was commonplace and impacted interactions between the states and individuals, certainly including those between Mossadeq and the West.

---

[i] In the executive system of the time Iran, Prime Minister was elected by the Parliament (Majles). Mossadeq was voted in by a 79-12 margin. See Foran, John. "Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution., 1993. 285.

[ii] Bayandor claims that the removal process is technically legal, but because of the duress it was an illegal act. Bayandor, Darioush. Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited. 2010..

[iii] Keddie, Nikki R., Yann Richard, and Nikki R. Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution., 2003. 129

[iv] Katouzian, Homa. "Democratization, Separatism, Nationalization, Coup." Musaddiq's Memoirs. By Mohammad Mosaddeq. Trans. Homa Katouzian. London: 1988. 55

[v] Albright, M. (2000, March 17). American-Iranian Relations. Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, Washington, D.C.

[vi] "Obama Admits US Involvement in 1953 Iran Coup." AFP. Google, 04 June 2009. Web. 10 Mar. 2013.

[vii] 1 December 1943, folder: ‘Petroleum Reserves Corporation Activities. 7/3/43-1/1/44’ box 1, Records of the Petroleum Division, RG 59 via Anderson, Irvine H. "The American Oil Industry and the Fifty-Fifty Agreement of 1950." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 151

[viii] It was known that Iran possessed vast reserves of oil-based fuels, and the discovery and understanding of how much Iran has is not a recent development.

[ix] Foran 271

[x] O'Hara, Sarah, and Michael Heffernan. "From Geo-Strategy to Geo-Economics: The ‘Heartland’ and British Imperialism Before and After MacKinder." (2006): 54

[xi] O’Hara and Heffernan 67

[xii] O’Hara and Heffernan 66

[xiii] Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and after. 2003. 121; Azimi, Fakhreddin. Iran: The Crisis of Democracy. 1989. 295; Ferrier, Ronald W. "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 186; Louis, Wm. Roger. "Musaddiq and the Dilemmas of British Imperialism." Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 242

[xiv] Foran 290; Cottam, Richard W. Nationalism in Iran. 1964. 215

[xv] Koch, Scott A., "Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953," Top Secret Draft History, History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1998., 79

[xvi] Bill, James A. Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. By James A. Bill and William Roger Louis. 1988. 265

[xvii] Bill 277

[xviii] Truman’s Point Four program was intended to help develop Iran, and was responsible for investing tens of millions of US dollars in Iran.

[xix] In particular George McGhee, and Dr. Henry F. Grady, US Ambassador to Iran from 1950-1951

[xx] Bill 273; Siavoshi, Sussan. "The Oil Nationalization Movement, 1949-1953." A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran. By John Foran. 1994. 128

[xxi] Bill 273

[xxii] Foran 271

[xxiii] "Man of the Year: Challenge of the East." Time 7 Jan. 1952: n. pag. Time Magazine. Web.

[xxiv] Bill 265; "Man of the Year: Challenge of the East." Time 7 Jan. 1952: n. pag. Time Magazine. Web.

[xxv] Bill 265

The Enemy of my Enemy

Is the enemy of my enemy my friend? Innumerable examples of this from Osama bin Laden to Soviet Russia in World War 2, indicate otherwise. In the volatile Middle East in particular, shifting alliances cause problems for everyone but the most able political manipulators. 

In 20th century Iran there is a prevalent theme of doomed alliances. In the oil-nationalization dispute with Britain, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq's National Front was made up of several nationalist political parties. Due to several factors including external meddling (Soviet, British and American), gaps soon appeared between the parties. Some of these parties ended up working in conjunction with the British and Americans to overthrow Mossadeq in 1953. This same theme of broken coalitions was perhaps most important in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Nearly every part of Iranian society was upset with the Shah's increasingly despotic rule and all worked together to ensure his fall. There were Islamists, Marxists, Communists, Socialists, Intellectuals and others, all working together because they shared a common enemy. In the end, one group won at the expense of all of the others. While the most significant gaps at the time were between the religious, the seculars and the Marxists/Communists, even amongst the religious groups which supported Ayatollah Khomeini there were huge ideological gaps. 

The dismissal of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri as the successor to Ayatollah Khomeini several months before Khomeini's death is an important example of the ideological gaps between the religious factions. There are several reasons why Montazeri was dismissed from his position. First he was not a very astute politician, but probably more importantly, Hashemi Rafsanjani (chairman of the Majles at the time, and President shortly thereafter) and the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (President at the time) worked together to undermine the authority of Montazeri so they each would have a chance to gain more power. While Rafsanjani and Khamenei were once allied in their opposition to Montazeri, their own personal and political differences have since then made them fierce rivals, if not outright enemies. After the disputed 2009 Iranian Presidential Election Rafsanjani expressed marginal support for the reformists and has since criticized the Islamic Republic many times. Since then, several of his children have been jailed, assaulted, and forced to resign from their jobs. Rafsanjani himself was removed as the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the group responsible for electing, supervising and theoretically removing the Supreme Leader. There can only be one winner, and for now, Rafsanjani is not it. This may change a bit in the Iranian Presidential election this June, but given the fractious state of Iranian politics, this is difficult to predict.

Moderates, seculars and former regime insiders are not the only ones who have been betrayed by their former allies. The United States has also been burned by former partners so many times in the Middle East it is puzzling why the government seems unable to learn from their mistakes. Today support from Congress for the Islamo-Marxist terrorist cult MeK (Mujahedin-e Khalq) is just as troubling. This support is based purely on parallel mutual enmities between the US and Iran and the MeK and Iran. While trumpeted as a "democratic" alternative to the IRI, opinion polls show support amongst Iranian-Americans for the MeK under 1%. I would hope that Washington has learned from the lessons of Iraq and Ahmed Chalabi. The lack of action in Syria by the Obama Administration is a cause for both concern (innocents are being slaughtered), but it is also somewhat encouraging as there is not a rush to give armed support to groups that have the potential to harm us in the future. Perhaps the lessons of Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan circa 1979 may have taught us something after all?

As cartoonist Howard Taylor wisely pointed out: "The Enemy of my Enemy is my Enemy's Enemy, no more, no less." Hopefully this is taken to heart by policy makers in the future as they are not the ones who suffer from their mistakes, we all are.


UPDATE 1: I am embarrassed to admit that I misread the poll on Iranian-Americans and the 5% (that support the MeK) I initially quoted was actually 5% OF THE 15% who openly state that they DO support an opposition group. So the poll responses indicate that 6 people out of the 800 who participated in the survey stated that they support the MeK, resulting in a total of .75%.