Iran and the Taliban

A core principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to export the revolution, their system of Twelver Shi'a inspired Islamic governance. This is most prevalent in Lebanon, where Hezbollah acts as a proxy. Iran also spends money funding ideological enemies for strategic purposes, namely Sudan (less so now), Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and recently, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan and almost certainly in a limited sense in Iran as well.

Two major articles in the past year, one from Foreign Policy in May 2016, and another from the Wall Street Journal in June 2015, claim that Iran is actively funding and arming the Taliban in hopes of curtailing potential advances from ISIS. This "ISIS" is not the same group of terrorists as those in Syria and Iraq, though there is some affiliation. It is believed that many of these "ISIS" terrorists are in fact disaffected Taliban. The two have fought each other, and both still actively work to perpetrate terror attacks.

Iran has a vested interest in aligning with the Taliban for a number of reasons:

1. The Taliban are fighting Western and Western-backed forces. Countering American attempts at stability helps Iran's anti-hegemonic, disruptive strategy. 
2. The Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) are known to be heavily involved in the drug trafficking industry in Eastern Iran, Western Afghanistan and Western Pakistan. Establishing relationships could lead to greater efficiency in these smuggling routes, also potentially reducing the amount of violence involving non-Pasdaran security forces.
3. ISIS is a threat to Iran's interests in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, the last thing Iran wants is a second "front" in the East to deal with.

Iran's decision to not just tolerate, but also support the Taliban is perhaps best demonstrated by the previous leader of the Taliban visiting Iran hours before he was killed in an American drone strike. If Iran was serious about preventing this type of violent group they would take steps to make sure that such an important figure was not able to enter the country.

ISIS was able to conduct their first major terror attack in Afghanistan recently when they targeted the Shi'ite Hazara ethnic group killing dozens. This same ethnic group has been known to be used by the Iranian government to fight in Syria. Interestingly enough, it was claimed that the Sunni Taliban, no matter how radically xenophobic they are, agreed to protect the Hazara from ISIS last year. Here too, Iran has an interest in working with the Taliban.

Iran's actions in Afghanistan are not surprising, yet they do not seem to get much attention because of other ongoing conflicts. I expect this to change soon, especially if ISIS is able to conduct another serious attack. Unfortunately, I suspect that given the attention given the ISIS brand, more will be made of their involvement than Iran's.

The Obama administration has a duty to investigate the connections between Iran and this known terror group. Even if they are fighting our enemies, they are still terrorists, who have attacked, and will continue to attack Western and Afghan government targets. I realize that the success of the Iranian nuclear deal is important to the administration, but ignoring a state actively funding and directly supporting terrorists is not an acceptable position.

Mullah Omar Reportedly Dead (Again)

The Afghan government has indicated it believes Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban has been dead since 2013. This has been reported in the past, and given the man's habit of avoiding publicity and staying out of sight (even when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan), this is extremely difficult to verify. There are only a few known photographs of the man; he is extraordinarily camera-shy. The US wanted ad simply describes his height as 'tall', rather than even giving a range of possible measurements. He has been reported dead in the past, but this time the White House has said the reports are credible.

These reports indicate that Omar died in a Pakistani hospital 2 years ago. This is important because Pakistan's support of the Taliban (as well as other terror figures like Osama bin Laden) has been alleged many times. How would Mullah Omar have reached a Pakistani hospital if he was in Afghanistan as the Pakistanis have insisted? It seems most likely that Pakistani intelligence was sheltering Omar, or at least turning a blind to his presence in the country. It was reported in 2011 that Omar spent time in a Pakistani hospital for a heart attack before being released. If true, this would be more reason to believe that Pakistan had a significant role in protecting Mullah Omar, a terrorist desperately wanted by the United States.

Afghanistan has long complained about Pakistani's meddling in their affairs, this would be sure to fuel speculation in Afghanistan about Pakistan's role in this regard. The Taliban are still supported by many people in Afghanistan, but Afghans evidently view Pakistan more negatively than any other country. This is likely to negatively affect attitudes of Afghans towards Pakistan.

The other major implication of this news is the challenge to Taliban unity. They've been united under Mullah Omar for two decades; he was seen as a uniting figure, even though he was not as media-friendly as Osama bin Laden. Without this man as their known leader will the Taliban implode into factionalism or will a new leader step up? I expect the group to break apart, though the threat posed by ISIS could keep them together.

Will the Iranian Arms Embargo Remain?

For me, one of the most interesting aspects of the Iranian nuclear negotiations is the sanctions, their meanings and classifications, and the circumstances under which they may be removed. For months, or perhaps even years, Iranian officials have unanimously and unequivocally stated that 'all' sanctions must be removed, and removed immediately. The P5+1, especially the Americans have stated that nuclear sanctions are a part of the negotiations, while 'non-nuclear' sanctions are not. Recently, Iranian rhetoric softened slightly when Ayatollah Khamenei stated that there will be a time-table for the removal of sanctions rather than immediate and complete reversal. The latest statement from the Iranian negotiating team in Vienna however, insists on removing an arms embargo placed on Iran.

They are, as far as I can tell, referring to the UN Security Council Resolution 1747, unanimously supported in 2007, punishing Iran for proliferation concerns and not fully complying with the IAEA. The sanctions clearly have a nuclear connection, but at the same time, explicitly mention ballistic missiles. The factsheet released by the White House in April in the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) emphatically states that while nuclear sanctions will be removed, "U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal." The following excerpt from the JCPOA indicates that there is a plan to create a new resolution reaffirming the embargo on "conventional arms and ballistic missiles".

Given the inconsistencies here, there are a few important questions to be asked: 

1. Will the arms embargo remain or be renewed in some way?
2. Is Iran reneging on previously agreed terms?
3. Did the White House put this in the JCPOA while it was still up for negotiation?
4. Is this appeasement of hardline constituencies? Is one side trying to take advantage of the other? Does Iran not want a nuclear deal after all?

These questions are incredibly important, not only for understanding the contributions made by the different sides, but also because there are legitimate concerns over weaponry going to and coming from Iran. Hezbollah and other terror groups are armed by Iran, and easing restrictions on the Iran's armaments is bound to create further instability. Israel has not been afraid to bomb Syria, Lebanon and Sudan when they feel threatened by a possible arms transfer, usually of more advanced weaponry. The likelihood of this happening again would be much higher with this arms embargo removed. Iran may change its behavior towards its terror clients in the long-term, but a radical reduction in the scope and frequency of its covert actions is unlikely in the short term.

Spinning the Syria Strike

This week the Israeli military allegedly struck a convoy in Southern Syria, killing Jihad Mughniyeh, the son of the infamous Imad Mughnieyh, as well as an Iranian IRGC general, several other Hezbollah fighters, and several other Iranian soldiers. This event has been a hot topic in the press, though the information released by the Israelis and the Hezbollah/Syria/Iran/Lebanon axis has proven contradictory, incoherent and nonsensical.

Initial reports indicated that helicopters had carried out the attack, and this claim has been repeated by all sides; Lebanese, Israeli and even Iranian. It would be strange for the Israelis to risk helicopters and the pilots/gunners/whoever else when they possess a large number of drones, not to mention their advanced fighter jets, and artillery capabilities. A drone strike makes a lot more sense, especially when the target was a group of individuals and it appears as though there were no Israelis on the ground inside Syria (the other possible reason why helicopters could have been used).

The Syrian media claimed that the strike was located within the Quneitra Governorate. This area is mostly located inside the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and bordered by the Rif Dimashq Governorate (Damascus countryside) on the other side, so the remaining areas where the strike could have occurred are extremely limited. Additionally, a portion of the governorate controlled by Syria is the UNDOF DMZ.

Quneitra Governorate (Wikipedia)

The UNDOF stated that they had observed Israeli drones flying over their base at position 30 (Jabata al Khashab) which is slightly north of the mostly abandoned town of Quneitra, and is located closer to the Mount Hermon mountain range.

UNDOF Deployment (Wikipedia)

Jabata al Khashab is the town just to the left (West) of the quarries. Hermon is in the background

The UNDOF also claimed to observe smoke rising slightly after the drones flew past. Given the location of this observation post and the terrain in the area, this once again limits the possiblities. Footage from al-Manar, while inconclusive, seems to hint that the strike happened very close to the Hermon mountain range.

As of yet, the precise location of the strike has yet to be determined, but it appears as though the strike would have occurred on the Syrian side of the DMZ, leaving a tiny sliver of terrain where the strike would have had to happened if it truly was inside Quneitra Governorate.

This leads to the next question, which is why the Israelis chose to attack this particular convoy. Initially it was claimed that the reason for the strike was that the targeted individuals had been planning an attack on Northern Israel. Later however, an Israeli official leaked that they did not intend to kill the Iranian general, and that 'it believed it was attacking only low-level guerillas'. So why would they attack this particular group, and why would they bother with 'low-level guerillas'? An article in the Jerusalem Post stated that this attack was intended to 'thwart an attack on Israel', but this seems disingenuous.

Israel has struck Syria several times over the last few years, most times it was thought that the strikes were intended to prevent Hezbollah and/or Syria from crossing a 'red-line' (usually transferring advanced weapons to the terror group). There have been a few instances where the IDF has returned fire after facing fire from the Syrian side, but this is not something that happens every time munitions land in Israel. Dozens, if not hundreds of mortars have landed beyond the DMZ, inside the Israeli-controlled Golan, without an Israeli armed response. Mortars are of limited range, and to miss a target by miles is hardly 'accidental'. There have also been instances of "stray" gunfire hitting IDF troops, as well as purposeful attacks.

What made this convoy such an important target to attack? Recent Israeli actions in Syria have been limited and selective, despite the ongoing hostilities in and around Quneitra. Would they risk an attack on a convoy without knowing who was in it? I would imagine that they must have had some ideas who was there, and they'd determined that the targets were high-value. Otherwise, why would they attack a small convoy? Was the strike a response to the bombastic speech from Hassan Nasrallah three days prior?

A few weeks ago Hezbollah admitted that the head of their Unit 910 (tasked with 'external operations') was in fact an Israeli asset. He and his accomplices had given information to Israel on a variety of subjects, most notably, the identities of the Burgas Bombing suspects. Given the timing of this, I wonder if the Israelis felt pressure to act on whatever remaining intel they had from the burned asset. The actions by the Israelis seem rash, was there a limited amount of time to act on the information? Why else would they risk aggravating the Iranians and Hezbollah so soon after the last summer's war in Gaza?

Yesterday a Lebanese paper claimed that according to Hezbollah, the strike took place because the Iranian general had not turned off his cell phone, which allowed the Israelis to locate him. Does this statement mean anything or is Hezbollah trying to distract from a massive intelligence and logistical failure? Hezbollah implied that the normal procedure is for cell phones to be turned off, and because the phone was on, the Israelis were able to realize who it was.

Why is a cell phone able to identify the place as a target or was it this particular cell phone which was incriminating? Did the Iranian general have a standard mobile phone with an Iranian SIM card inside? How else could this information be of any use to Israeli intelligence? Do Syrians (military, civilians or rebels) normally travel with their cell phones turned off in this part of the country? If it was the actual phone, would this indicate that the Israelis have managed to infiltrate either the Syrian or Iranian or Lebanese mobile networks and identified the phones used by military officials?

This entire affair is chock full of misinformation, illogical claims and subterfuge. Other analysts like Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv have similarly questioned the Israeli claims. There are so many problems with the narrative from both sides, and the actions and reactions of the parties involved seem atypical. I expect a further set of leaks in the near future.

Wikileaks and Afghanistan

Earlier this week internationally recognized news organizations suffered heavy criticism from the anti-secrecy organization Wikileaks for redacting the name of a nation surveilled by the NSA. Even Glenn Greenwald voiced his support for redacting the country’s name for fears “that doing so could lead to increased violence.” Following this, the Wikileaks Twitter account (widely assumed to be run by Julian Assange directly), engaged Mr. Greenwald with vitriolic language and slurs, culminating in the account claiming that it would release the name of the target nation in 72 hours. 

72 hours passed, and Wikileaks did not released the name. 3 hours after the deadline the account posted the following tweet:

We have moved our publication on the identity of NSA "SOMALGET" country X to another date for media cycle reasons.
— WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) May 23, 2014

Bizarrely enough a mere hour and a half later, the handle did in fact publish the name which turned out to be Afghanistan.

STATEMENT: WikiLeaks statement on the mass recording of Afghan telephone calls by the NSA http://t.co/CYXBvjKJHj #afghanistan #nsa #snowden
— WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) May 23, 2014

While it is unclear if this in fact is true, it is certain that this action appears to be a desperate attempt at gaining attention. Anyone who has followed the news and has a memory beyond the last minute is probably more than aware of the strife in Afghanistan, and the widely varied sources of violence. It was only a few months ago when the Taliban, one of the most significant insurgent groups in the country attacked the United States Consulate in Herat, killing 3. Months before this, the Taliban set off a car bomb, murdering a US diplomat and four other Americans. 

The Taliban are not the only group which has attacked American and International interests in Afghanistan:

In September 2012 there were widespread riots over the film “Innocence of Muslims”, even though many of the rioters had not in fact seen the film clip. 

In February 2012 there were riots for a week over American troops dumping Korans in a garbage dump and burning them (the ones responsible were disciplined by the US Army). 

On April 1, 2011 the United Nations compound in Mazar-e Sharif, was stormed and as many as ten foreigners were murdered (some may have been decapitated) in response to the burning of a Koran a week and a half earlier by an American pastor. The riots continued throughout the country for a week following the attack on the compound. 

Earlier in 2011 thousands demonstrated in Qalat after young Afghan children alleged that foreigners had ‘disrespected the Koran’. 

What is clear from this brief catalogue of recent events is that Afghanistan remains a very tense place with unrest possible at any moment and for any reason. Something like what Wikileaks has alleged can prove to be deadly, even for innocents or civilians whose presence in the country is entirely innocent and well-intentioned. 

I do not know if Afghanistan is the country redacted by Glenn Greenwald, but if it is, the callousness of Julian Assange is horrifying. It would truly demonstrate how egomaniacal Julian Assange is and how little he values a human life that is not his own. 

9 Questions the Media should be asking Iran about Syria

Iran's former FM Salehi (Also current Defense Minister Dehqan, and current FM Zarif) recently claimed that Iran notified the United States 9 months ago (via Switzerland which handles American interests relating to Iran) that chemical weapons had arrived in Syria. Iran has been sensitive towards chemical warfare because of the usage of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. News media have latched onto this claim, and criticized the United States for not responding, yet these same reporters have not raised critical questions about Mr. Salehi's claims.

1) What types of chemical weapons were they? Sarin? VX? Exactly what weapons were allegedly smuggled into Syria?

2) Which countries have or possess the capability to produce these weapons? If they are only available in certain locations, then it would almost certainly have come from one of these locations. 

3) Where did these weapons come from? The route to Syria is important for understanding who would have shipped the weapons there. If a certain route is commonly used by a certain group, then there is a good chance that there will be some connections.

4) Do 1) and 3) match up? If the weapons came from somewhere which does not possess the capabilities to produce them, there clearly is a problem with the accuracy of this information.

5) How long can the weapon last in storage (both properly stored and improperly). Iraq whose chemical weapons stockpile has not been secured throughout has sarin but according to this CIA document, the weapons have shelf-life problems and had degraded quickly

6) Is it possible for this weapon to be properly stored in Syria by rebels? Are there any special procedures that must be taken to assure that the chemical agents do not degrade?

7) Which groups received this weapon as it arrived into Syria? Are these groups capable of staging a large-scale attack over a several kilometer sized area?

8) Who are these groups aligned with? Are the others they work with more capable of making an attack of the scale of Ghouta?

9) Where are these groups located? Where do they operate from? Syria is insecure in many areas and certain factions have control of different areas. If the exact location of this smuggling is identified, then those responsible may be identified. If these groups are incapable of operating in Damascus, (due to lack of reliable transit and chemical weapons handling or whatever other reason), then the Ghouta attack almost certainly was NOT perpetrated by these groups.

Until Iran answers these questions, I believe there is no reason to question the American/English/French/German intelligence claims that Assad was almost certainly the one responsible for the Ghouta attack. It is possible that these chemical weapons allegedly brought into Syria were used at another location, but the length of time since this alleged incident and the timing of the revelation of this information is highly suspicious. It is clear that Iran is attempting to imply that the Ghouta Massacre was perpetrated by these smuggled weapons. Iran has made a serious accusation, but has provided so little evidence so that I find myself doubting their claims. 

The power of a name

I am incredibly tired since its nearly 5 am here, but a few last thoughts before I go to sleep.


I am no expert on Chechnya, and I am unfamiliar with customs and practices there, such as the practice of naming children.

I do know that the first president of Chechnya (someone who would be seen as a very important person, or a hero), was named Dzhokhar Dudayev and he apparently died in the mid 1990s.

Logically doesn't it make sense that the person who has been identified as one of the Boston Marathon Bombers, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, would have been named for someone his parents admired?

He was born in 1993 or 1994, around the height of the Chechen president's popularity.

Read this obituary on Dzhokhar Dudayev, and tell me that this doesn't seem like a person a proud nationalistic Chechen would name their son