Questions about the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Archive

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a dramatic announcement about a daring Israeli intelligence operation to steal over 100,000 documents from a secret Iranian nuclear weapons archive. The documents confirm what we have known for years, and what the IAEA has known since 2011 - that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu did not provide a straight answer on whether Iran continues to have an active nuclear weapons program—something that would clearly violate the JCPOA—or if Iran paused the program at some time. The IAEA has said that Iran's program is not active.

The reaction to Netanyahu's press conference was predictable. Once again, I find myself disappointed as the good questions, the PMD agreement questions, remain an afterthought.

The IAEA, in their report about Iran's PMDs, stated that "all the activities contained in the "Road-map" were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule". The organization effectively gave a thumbs up to Iran, saying that things are ok from the past, and that we can move forward. The new documents raise questions about what the IAEA okayed, what they knew about Iran's nuclear weapons research, and what the separate agreements referenced in the Road-map include. Did the IAEA agree to let Iran store its previous work? Was the IAEA aware that work had been saved? Did the IAEA order Iran to destroy their research? The PMD report, released in 2015, is very detailed, but without the original documents (from both the IAEA and Iran), it is nearly impossible to compare the report to what Netanyahu revealed yesterday.

While the focus of the JCPOA critics rancor about PMDs has mostly revolved around the Parchin agreement, all of these issues are important, and any obfuscation by Iran and/or the IAEA would be of interest. As I noted in 2015, the IAEA is facing a crisis of confidence; if they cannot be trusted to do their job, what is their utility?

It does not help that many critics are either lazy or deceitful. Then Representative and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with Senator Tom Cotton, claimed that they had not heard about side deals when they met with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano days after the accord was signed. The "Road-map" containing the reference to these side deals is noted explicitly in the text of the JCPOA, and they were all announced and made public on days before this meeting.

There are real and serious questions to ask, but instead, superficial questions, gross insinuations, politicking, and deceptive bombast are all the critics seem able to come up with.

9 Questions the Media should be asking Iran about Syria

Iran's former FM Salehi (Also current Defense Minister Dehqan, and current FM Zarif) recently claimed that Iran notified the United States 9 months ago (via Switzerland which handles American interests relating to Iran) that chemical weapons had arrived in Syria. Iran has been sensitive towards chemical warfare because of the usage of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. News media have latched onto this claim, and criticized the United States for not responding, yet these same reporters have not raised critical questions about Mr. Salehi's claims.

1) What types of chemical weapons were they? Sarin? VX? Exactly what weapons were allegedly smuggled into Syria?

2) Which countries have or possess the capability to produce these weapons? If they are only available in certain locations, then it would almost certainly have come from one of these locations. 

3) Where did these weapons come from? The route to Syria is important for understanding who would have shipped the weapons there. If a certain route is commonly used by a certain group, then there is a good chance that there will be some connections.

4) Do 1) and 3) match up? If the weapons came from somewhere which does not possess the capabilities to produce them, there clearly is a problem with the accuracy of this information.

5) How long can the weapon last in storage (both properly stored and improperly). Iraq whose chemical weapons stockpile has not been secured throughout has sarin but according to this CIA document, the weapons have shelf-life problems and had degraded quickly

6) Is it possible for this weapon to be properly stored in Syria by rebels? Are there any special procedures that must be taken to assure that the chemical agents do not degrade?

7) Which groups received this weapon as it arrived into Syria? Are these groups capable of staging a large-scale attack over a several kilometer sized area?

8) Who are these groups aligned with? Are the others they work with more capable of making an attack of the scale of Ghouta?

9) Where are these groups located? Where do they operate from? Syria is insecure in many areas and certain factions have control of different areas. If the exact location of this smuggling is identified, then those responsible may be identified. If these groups are incapable of operating in Damascus, (due to lack of reliable transit and chemical weapons handling or whatever other reason), then the Ghouta attack almost certainly was NOT perpetrated by these groups.

Until Iran answers these questions, I believe there is no reason to question the American/English/French/German intelligence claims that Assad was almost certainly the one responsible for the Ghouta attack. It is possible that these chemical weapons allegedly brought into Syria were used at another location, but the length of time since this alleged incident and the timing of the revelation of this information is highly suspicious. It is clear that Iran is attempting to imply that the Ghouta Massacre was perpetrated by these smuggled weapons. Iran has made a serious accusation, but has provided so little evidence so that I find myself doubting their claims. 

Why sanction the Iranian Auto Industry?

Today the United States announced a few more sanctions on Iran intended to "further tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran and isolate the Iranian government for its continued failure to meet its international obligations."

The targets of the sanctions include the Iranian Rial, the automotive sector, and any "material support to the government of Iran". 

At first I thought it strange that the auto industry would be targeted, but then I remembered an article published by Forbes from last month about how there should be sanctions imposed upon Iran's auto manufacturing industry. 

The author's main argument for sanctions is that Iranian owned car companies enable access to 'dual-use technology for Iran's nuclear designs'. The evidence that he uses for this is that there are gas cylinders produced for hybrid cars by an Iranian owned factory in Germany. These "…included carbon fiber and hardened steel – key components of Iran’s second generation nuclear enrichment centrifuges. It also had sophisticated machinery in its inventory, which can be used both to make cylinders and manufacture centrifuges." 

The problem here is that MCS, the operator of the factory, is not an Iranian car company (though as the Iranians have clearly demonstrated, their clever usage of shell corporations make determining the true owner of any company quite difficult) although the author claims that auto companies are the shadow owners of MCS. The original Washington Post article (referenced in the Forbes piece) does not describe the factory as one which creates auto-parts, but rather "high-pressure gas tanks". In fact, the word "auto" or any of its derivatives is found only once in the article where it states: "One of the dual-use materials at MCS was carbon fiber, which is often used in the aerospace and automotive fields".

So why does the author insist on sanctioning the automobile industry? The Washington Post article states that Iran has been "scouring the world for carbon fiber". High quality carbon fiber is evidently a key part of advanced stage centrifuges and so, there apparently are already sanctions on Iranian purchases of high quality carbon fiber. According to ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security), as a result of this, Iran has begun to produce its own carbon fiber (albeit of low quality).

I may be wrong, but from what I understand of the evidence, the target of the sanctions is not the actual industry itself, but those who run it (IRGC), who are also known to have attempted to proliferate materials important for nuclear activities. Therefore the argument should not be that the industry, the cars or the materials themselves that are a problem, but rather that those who lead the industry are the problem and the reason for such sanctions.

While I think that the argument on Forbes is problematic, it may not even be connected to the new Obama sanctions. The sanctions were created by executive order rather than by Congress, so instead of having to try to force an increasingly pig-headed and obstinate House of Representatives to agree with him if he wants to remove the sanctions in the future, Obama may have created a situation where he himself is able to remove them as a bargaining chip with the Iranians.