GCC to buy Iron Dome?

Two days ago Sky News reported that the GCC has plans to buy the Israeli defense system the Iron Dome in addition to other missile defense systems including David's Sling and Arrow to protect against Iran. These reports are interesting, yet misleading; Iron Dome protects against a very narrow band of threats, and Iran (not including proxies) does not provide this type of threat towards any Gulf state except perhaps Kuwait.

The story emphasizes the Iron Dome (in the headline as well as the text), while downplaying the other systems potentially for sale. This is probably due to a multitude of reasons including the name recognition; Iron Dome is widely credited with successfully intercepting hundreds of rockets from Gaza and maintaining a high success rate while doing so. There are those who doubt the efficacy, but as I've pointed out here and here (and have another piece in the works), these accusations are baseless and fraudulent. The other systems are known to be less successful, but given the higher degree of difficulty in intercepting a much faster moving threat this is logical.

The Iron Dome's maximum range was initially stated to be around 70 kilometers (just about the distance from Gaza to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), though this is believed to be a slight underestimate and it may be as high as 100 km. Iran (with a few exceptions) is more than 70 km away from the GCC states, therefore Iron Dome would not be tasked with intercepting any potential Iranian rockets and missiles. The only locations that are within 70 km are the very tip of the UAE, and parts of Kuwait.

Light blue=70 km buffer
Purple=100 km buffer

It is clear that the Iron Dome with a few exceptions has absolutely not business defending against Iranian weapons; even if Iran attacked from the coast of Iran, almost all GCC territory is far beyond 70 or even 100 km. The only way for 'Iran' to attack from inside a defensible range would be for them to attack from the sea, or for them to have somehow infiltrated borders elsewhere. 

Weapons have been provided to the Houthis, and these weapons have been used to attack Saudi Arabia, but as the map below shows, the range factor makes the possible locations which 'Iran' could attack from quite limited. Additionally, Saudi already has the Patriot missile defense system which it has used against Houthi SCUDs. A deal to upgrade the system from PAC-2 to PAC-3 was just finalized. Iron Dome interceptors are cheaper than Patriot missiles by approximately a factor of 10, but when considering the number of batteries needed to defend the entire border area this is infeasible.

Light blue=70 km buffer
Purple=100 km buffer

The other way that Iran could attack a GCC country with extremely short-range rockets or missiles would be for them to launch these from the Persian Gulf. This is unrealistic because Iran's navy is set up to be asymmetrical and the 'asymmetrical' method of attacking with rockets would be to set up a rocket on a small speedboat; something which isn't going to happen for a number of reasons. Lastly even if 'Iran' was able to infiltrate a country and attack from within, the Iron Dome has had trouble with smaller mortars and wouldn't be able to defend against them. Larger rockets would be incredibly difficult to smuggle in to a country, though Iran could potentially arm terror groups this way. This wouldn't technically be an 'Iranian' attack. It is unclear if by 'Iran', Sky's source was also including proxies. 

Israel spent a lot of money on the development and production of this system, and they would love to recoup some of the expenditures. Potential sales to Asian countries (India, South Korea and Singapore) have fallen through or been false rumors. There remain a handful of countries that could use the system, though they are few and far between. These include Poland, Ukraine, Taiwan, Afghanistan, Iraq and the 3 countries previously mentioned. Iraq and Afghanistan would be under US supervision and both parties are hesitant to place the sensitive system in a location so vulnerable.

The United States gives a lot of aid to various countries, often with the stipulation that this money MUST be spent with US defense manufacturers. Raytheon is now producing Iron Dome missiles in this fashion. It is possible that the money spent on Iron Dome by GCC states would be from the US. A more likely scenario would be that the Iron Dome was included as some sort of package deal with the longer range and therefore more useful defense systems (David's Sling and Arrow).

I myself believe that this is not an accurate story and that this is disinformation spread for a political or economic agenda. It makes almost no sense for the GCC to buy the Iron Dome, even for the psychological purpose of making their citizens feel more safe. It is possible that this will be sold no matter, but I find it highly doubtful. 

Bilal Saab from the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center agrees with me, the reports of GCC attempting to buy Iron Dome are 'total BS' 

Gulf states buying Israeli Iron Dome? I call total BS in my interview with @Annahar http://t.co/Xzk6F4fQ6i

— Bilal Y. Saab (@BilalYSaab) October 16, 2015

A clear long-term policy towards Iran is more important than the Iran Deal (published on The Eastern Project)

Last week I wrote for The Eastern Project about the myopia of policy makers and pundits in addressing the Iran issue. In particular the lack of a long-term strategy is concerning.

The article is available here:
https://medium.com/the-eastern-project/a-clear-long-term-policy-towards-iran-is-more-important-than-the-iran-deal-2a07382d9480

The full-text follows:

A clear long-term policy towards Iran is more important than the Iran Deal

The nuclear issue is only one component of a greater conflict between Iran and the West. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s leadership is opposed to Western ideals as well as American hegemony. Perhaps more than any other state, Iran funds and supports terror groups, intentionally threatening Western and global interests with violence. The status quo is unacceptable; the West must not let Iran (or other states) sponsor terrorism, especially terrorism that disrupts Western geopolitical interests.

While the political establishment and the media are fighting over the JCPOA’s particulars, a long term strategy for dealing with Iran is lacking, and potentially just as troublesome. Though there appear to be several distinct possibilities, there is no real discussion on this matter. The options include; forced regime change, self-democratization, or a non-interventionist hands-off ‘laissez faire’ approach.

Another, more complex approach, would be to continue working with Iran in some areas of mutual concern (ISIS), while opposing Iran in other areas (Yemen). Despite some merits, this approach is reactive and therefore is not a solid, long-term strategy. It fails to address the disruptive anti-Western nature of the Iranian regime; a threat the West cannot afford to ignore indefinitely.

Iran’s ruling apparatus is overwhelmingly comprised of conservative anti-Western males opposed to compromise with the West. Recently, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei again expressed his forceful opposition to the United States. This hostility will persist as long as the conservative factions retain power.

When any part of Iran’s leadership takes a leftward turn, hardliners block attempted reforms.

There are two prominent examples of this reactionary response.

Reformist Mohammad Khatami was president of Iran for 8 years in the late 1990s and early 2000s, winning both elections in surprising landslides. However, he was hampered by entrenched conservative institutions, and was unable to affect substantive reform.

Ayatollah Montazeri, the former deputy Supreme Leader, expressed dissatisfaction with the inflexibility of Ayatollah Khomeini’s state and its refusal to consider reform. Despite his formidable religious credentials and acceptance of Khomeini’s grand vision for an Islamic State run by theologians, Montazeri was removed from his position and confined to house arrest for most of President Khatami’s two terms.

It is reasonable to argue that current president Hassan Rouhani is hindered by a similar quagmire, though if the results of the the March 2016 elections go his way, the President has some room to maneuver.

Iran’s ruling establishment is unwilling to consider reform, so what happens next? The relationship between Iran and the West cannot continue as is; the West will not tolerate Iran’s support for terror and other disruptive practices indefinitely.

United States has meddled in Iranian affairs in the past, so any explicit statements about regime change (no matter the context) are dangerous. After the stolen presidential election of 2009, President Obama was heavily criticized for his decision to not publicly support the Green Movement. Much of this criticism was blind to the fact that any degree of support from the ‘Great Satan’ would irreparably damage the integrity of the movement, and paint it as a part of a greater foreign conspiracy. In fact, hardliners in Iran claimed that this was the case.

At the same time political sensitivities have not limited hawks from expressing anti-Iranian sentiments or interfering with the administration’s policies as evidenced by the open letter to Khamenei from Tom Cotton and other Republican senators.

Popular among libertarians and anti-imperialists, a strict non-interventionist role is unrealistic and ignores American (and Western) interests in preserving order and maintaining the status quo. Whether we like it or not, the global economy is dependent on a stabilizing force, and the United States is the state most capable of enforcing global hegemony.

Hawks commonly argue for increased sanctions and pressure until the Iranians capitulate completely. This type of external pressure does have the potential to damage a state, but over the years Iran has learned how to work around sanctions, and receives support from countries antagonistic to the West including Russia and China. While not anti-Western like Russia and China, the Non-Aligned Movement (which Iran is currently the president of) provides Iran another option for evading economic hardship.

Economic sanctions are capable of changing Iran’s behavior, but there is a limit to what they can do. It is near impossible to accurately gauge the power of sanctions, and therefore difficult to know exactly how they may be applied most effectively.

The nuclear-related sanctions were effective because a broad coalition was formed. A similarly comprehensive international effort would need to be created for economic sanctions with an end-goal of regime change. This will not happen.

Another regime change option, a full-scale military invasion would require a massive number of troops, and would unimaginably destabilize the region even further. Recent regional examples show the impracticality and unpredictability of this type of action.

Iran has long been the playground of global powers. At the same time, despite a demographically diverse population, it has managed to maintain a strong national identity. History tells us that an external threat is more likely to increase support for the Iranian state than foment unrest.

Supporting democratic institutions in Iran is also a daunting prospect. Too much, and Iranians will perceive foreign interference. Too little, and the conservative factions will even further solidify their control of the government.

There are many Iranians that are unhappy with the direction the Iranian government is driving the country (evidenced by the 1999 student protests, as well as the 2009 and 2013 presidential elections); considering this, a shift leftwards is not inconceivable. At the same time, reformist and pragmatist groups need room to operate.

The Islamic Republic has the ability to accommodate reformists and adapt to reflect the will of the people. A distinguishing characteristic of Iran’s official religion (Twelver Shi’a Islam) is Ijtihad — religious scholars reinterpreting Islam. While the ruling structure of the Islamic Republic is very conservative at the moment, one would think that this characteristic gives it the capability to change despite how entrenched the conservative structures are.

Iran’s confrontational attitude towards the West is unacceptable in the long run. Policy needs to be created and implemented. Even if the United States adopts an outwardly neutral stance, a serious discussion should be taking place about the future of the United States in the region and how Iran fits into these plans. How can Iran be dealt with and what are the implications of our actions in the short and in the long term?

The Iranian parliament (Majles) is scheduled to hold elections in March 2016. For the first time this election coincides with the election for the Assembly of Experts, a body tasked with voting on a replacement if the Supreme Leader dies or needs to be replaced. Both institutions are quite conservative, yet have at least some capability to turn in favor of the reformists and/or pragmatists. Last week, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, considered a reformist, signaled his intentions to run for the Assembly of Experts.

The Iran Deal has put the hardliners in Iran under pressure. They need a comeback and to secure a conservative Majles and Assembly of Experts to prevent Rouhani from enacting reforms. The Reformists and Pragmatists are empowered by the potential success of the Iran Deal and have the initiative.

Both Iran Deal critics and proponents have an obligation to look at the big picture and determine what we want and how we are going to get there. Who will be empowered by our actions, and not only in the short-term. Is there hope for diplomacy? How does this deal factor into long-term strategy?

The forced regime change camp needs to identify exactly how they wish this regime change to occur, whether they wish to put economic pressure or whether they will resort to full-scale war to achieve their end-goal.

The diplomacy and self-democratization camp as well needs to do much more in explaining how they expect Iran to change, how these changes will be encouraged, and how this will be accepted by the Iranian public.

The non-interventionists need to reconcile American hegemony with Iran’s regional ambitions and explain how the conflict is not serious, and existential from the Iranian regime’s side.

While most agree that the United States and Iran are engaged in a serious ideological conflict, the long-term implications of this conflict are mostly ignored. It is by no means the most serious problem facing the United States and the West, but a blind focus on the microcosm that is the nuclear issue does no favors. While the Obama administration has tried to ‘pivot’ towards Asia, the reality is that the Middle East remains restive and the problems there will not simply disappear. Something has to be done so that Iran changes its disruptive, violent behavior. To do this, a clear and reasonable proactive policy to achieve these changes must be created and implemented.

The Side Deal No One Is Talking About

Just when we thought the Iran Deal debate couldn't possibly become more partisan and hyperbolic, a bit of poor journalism from the Associated Press' Vienna bureau chief has added unnecessary fuel to the fire.

Despite this outrage over a misunderstood and possibly fraudulent document (though I think it is more likely a series of translation errors and poor reporting), critics are ignoring an important fact; there is another agreement dealing with the possible military dimensions (PMDs, or 'outstanding issues' as the IAEA prefers to call them). In the IAEA's 'Road Map for Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program' there are two agreements referenced between Iran and the IAEA.

The details of these deals are secret as is standard procedure when involving such sensitive matters. This is further complicated by the fact that Parchin is a military base. There is a separate agreement relating especially to Parchin because of this fact. If all of the sites that the IAEA wanted to investigate were civilian, there would likely be one agreement in the road map, not two.

JCPOA critics are so obsessed with Parchin because it is believed that illegal activities were undertaken at the site, but they seem so much less concerned with the other outstanding issues; issues that are also about PMDs of Iran's nuclear program. In fact, in the AP article, there is no mention of the other agreement also dealing with PMDs.

Parchin's potential nuclear connections are a problem, but aren't ALL PMDs important for Iran to explain to the IAEA? Shouldn't people be just as worried about the other agreement? It is important that all outstanding issues are resolved by Iran and the IAEA, in fact the JCPOA (and all of the sanctions relief) is contingent upon the road map being fully implemented. For all the talk about 'precedent' and establishing a baseline of inspections and behavior, why is it that the 'regular' roadmap agreement is getting so little attention? Isn't the approach of the IAEA dealing with PMDs at non-military sites also important?

It is baffling that the critics are only worried about one agreement in the road map, while the agreement, which involves around a dozen more outstanding issues, is ignored. The reporting is also shockingly bad, the existence of these agreements has been known since the JCPOA was signed over a month ago; this should have given them plenty of time to at least read this short document and note that the document regarding Parchin isn't the only thing that matters.


UPDATE 1:
I have asked a variety of sources (including ISIS Nuclear, and Ken Dilanian, one of the reporters with the byline) about why the AP failed to mention the other PMD document. All have ignored my question as of yet. They keep going on and on about folks insisting the document is a fake, while ignoring valid and important questions which undermines the reporting of the entire exclusive. I suppose I should not be surprised that folks are unwilling to consider another view and that they would ignore a point that proves they are most likely wrong.

UPDATE 2:
Still no answers from those I've asked before. What is most bizarre is that the original story (http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a9f4e40803924a8ab4c61cb65b2b2bb3/ap-exclusive-un-let-iran-inspect-alleged-nuke-work-site) seemed to have completely disappeared for a while. There is now a story on the 20th of August which refers back to the first story, but the first story is somehow gone from the original URL and a correction is on the page instead. The correction takes up a mere 132 words, and the rest of the story is gone. Additionally, many of the original flaws in the story remain. I find it most interesting that the author calls this secret agreement 'unusual' without any proof that this is in fact unusual. Has Mr. Jahn read a lot of secret agreements from the IAEA?

The AP did something sneaky by deleting the original story and replacing it with a 'correction' which states that the original story is below. This in fact is not true and there is no original story below. However, they also created a new URL with the correction AND the story which is not tagged to Jahn so it doesn't show up when searching the AP site for his articles. Either way the points about the correction are still valid and important.

—————

Following is a short breakdown of the AP exclusive and its fallout

On August 19th, the AP published an exclusive stating that Iran would be able to inspect itself at Parchin, a military site also allegedly involved in nuclear weapons testing. This new information was based upon the reporter copying a draft text agreement between the IAEA and Iran over testing at Parchin from an anonymous source.

Critics of the deal responded as predicted, while supporters were mostly quiet. Over the next few hours the AP inexplicably removed key parts of the article containing alleged specifics of the IAEA's testing procedures while adding quotes from politicians critiquing the specifics. Jeffrey Lewis caught the changes and shared a screenshot showing this.

https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/634096807413481477

Later, some of these details were added back to the article, and a copied version of the draft agreement was published by the AP. There are a number of reasons why the information contained in the text provided by the AP is problematic; not only are there are a lack of technical details (which is what matters anyway), the terminology used seems to be wrong. A breakdown of the problems is available here: http://www.vox.com/2015/8/21/9187457/iran-iaea-agreement-text

Mullah Omar Reportedly Dead (Again)

The Afghan government has indicated it believes Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban has been dead since 2013. This has been reported in the past, and given the man's habit of avoiding publicity and staying out of sight (even when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan), this is extremely difficult to verify. There are only a few known photographs of the man; he is extraordinarily camera-shy. The US wanted ad simply describes his height as 'tall', rather than even giving a range of possible measurements. He has been reported dead in the past, but this time the White House has said the reports are credible.

These reports indicate that Omar died in a Pakistani hospital 2 years ago. This is important because Pakistan's support of the Taliban (as well as other terror figures like Osama bin Laden) has been alleged many times. How would Mullah Omar have reached a Pakistani hospital if he was in Afghanistan as the Pakistanis have insisted? It seems most likely that Pakistani intelligence was sheltering Omar, or at least turning a blind to his presence in the country. It was reported in 2011 that Omar spent time in a Pakistani hospital for a heart attack before being released. If true, this would be more reason to believe that Pakistan had a significant role in protecting Mullah Omar, a terrorist desperately wanted by the United States.

Afghanistan has long complained about Pakistani's meddling in their affairs, this would be sure to fuel speculation in Afghanistan about Pakistan's role in this regard. The Taliban are still supported by many people in Afghanistan, but Afghans evidently view Pakistan more negatively than any other country. This is likely to negatively affect attitudes of Afghans towards Pakistan.

The other major implication of this news is the challenge to Taliban unity. They've been united under Mullah Omar for two decades; he was seen as a uniting figure, even though he was not as media-friendly as Osama bin Laden. Without this man as their known leader will the Taliban implode into factionalism or will a new leader step up? I expect the group to break apart, though the threat posed by ISIS could keep them together.

Khamenei's Eid al Fitr Speech

Ayatollah Khamenei's Eid al Fitr speech has received quite a bit of attention in the international press (here, here and here) because it is the first time Khamenei has spoken directly about the recent nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran. The speech was nothing out of the ordinary, as Khamenei repeated the same tropes he has repeated for decades. This was immediately jumped upon as proof that Iran, and Khamenei in particular, negotiated in bad faith, that Iran will never change et cetera et cetera. It is much more complicated than this.

Once again, the people saying this do little more than display their intense narcissism and lack of political acumen. These speeches are nearly always about domestic issues more than international ones (even when talking about international affairs), and at the same time they must be taken in context. Khamenei is a reactionary, a pragmatic one at that, but his political bent remains one way and will remain this way. This doesn't mean that Iran isn't going to change; Khamenei himself is threatened by this change and must act to mitigate this. The Eid al Fitr speech is a way for him to do this.

Rouhani, like Khatami a decade ago and Montazeri 30 years ago, is a challenge to the Ayatollah's politics. This coming year is a most important one, as the Majles and the Assembly of Experts both are slated to hold one of the most significant elections in the history of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei wishes to ensure his legacy continues once he dies, which means stifling domestic dissent, especially reformists, and electing a conservative AoE, so that if Khamenei were to die during this 8 year term, an 'acceptable' principalist candidate (or candidates) are selected to succeed him.

Iran needed the sanctions relief, and this gives room to Rouhani and his administration to improve the economy (one of the few important things the Iranian president has some degree of control over), but at the same time Khamenei wants to makes sure that the hardliners are not sidelined. I expect crackdowns, especially in the media (probably a closure or a lawsuit directed at reformist newspapers or journalists), as Khamenei tries to give a boost to the Islamic right.

Iran Deal Thoughts

Before the terms of the deal were announced there were a few things I was worried about. These fears have been mostly alleviated though there are still a few concerns over the timing of some aspects of the deal. Most importantly it looks as though the White House's JCPOA released in April was nearly 100% accurate, despite outrage from the Iranians, who at the time insisted that the US reneged on terms. The key difference here in my opinion, is the arms embargo being lifted.

As I previously noted, the JCPOA from the White House was fairly clear in stating that ballistic missile, terror and human rights sanctions would remain. This is more or less accurate, though the ballistic missile embargo is to be removed before 8 years after the adoption date of the deal. We have no idea what the world will be like in 8 years, so this is not the worst result, considering these restrictions will remain in the near future. If we do need to re-implement sanctions, we have up to 8 years to figure it out.

Another key difference between the April framework and the agreement today is that the IAEA will have DAILY access to Natanz-the facility where enrichment will continue. The earlier document stated 'regular' access, so daily is probably the best possible permutation.

Other aspects I found to be interesting regarding the deal:

1. 4 (and a bit of a 5th) of Obama's 9 executive orders sanctioning Iran will be removed. The 4 that remain are related to human rights issues, and Iran's support for Syria. Despite some commentators saying otherwise (https://twitter.com/BenWeinthal/status/620877350746652672), certain technologies including surveillance equipment will continue to be sanctioned. 
2. Iran will address ALL possible military dimensions within 3 months (some parts in 1 month), while the IAEA has an additional 2 months (5 from tomorrow) to verify.
3. 'Adoption Day' will be approximately 90 days after the 'Finalization Day' and is the starting point for other timed clauses.
4. If there is a general dispute this is sent to an 'advisory board' made up of the 8 parties (P5+1 and EU and Iran). Each party has 1 vote. The dispute has 15/15/5 day periods at the end of which a dissatisfied party can walk. 
5. As stated in the original JCPOA from the White House, there will be 25 years of monitoring and surveillance of uranium ore production in Iran.
6. If Iran does not wish to give access to a site there is a 14 day period for resolution. If this is not resolved, an additional 7 days are allowed for 'committee' discussion and a further 3 days for implementation. 
7. Iran will establish a 'Nuclear Safety Centre', but appears as though they will NOT be joining the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The previous Iranian ambassador to the UN claimed in January 2013 that they would, so this is very disappointing, but establishing the Centre is better than nothing. 
8. Many individuals and institutions are removed from nuclear sanctions lists. However, the individual who has posted the Iran Deal text to DocumentCloud (this same one is distributed by major media sources) somehow managed to delete the section headers so the precise details of this are unclear at this point.

Overall the deal looks pretty good (most of the 'good' things that I noted before are still there), and importantly, the White House's JCPOA was (mostly) accurate. I was very worried that even further capitulations would be made, but they appear to have stood firm on nearly every issue (embargoes are a bit of an exception). I am worried about the dispute resolution time frame, and the very short time period that is given to resolve the PMDs is quite troubling. On the other hand, this short amount of time *could* force Iran to act quickly and to get this taken care of. This will work if the United States is willing to walk away if Iran fails to act in good faith. If they are not, then this is a horrible set of clauses and could cause irrepreable damage to the US and its foreign policy.

Pre-Iran Deal Text Thoughts

After days of anticipation, anonymous diplomats on both sides (Western and Iranian) have told reporters that there is a deal between the P5+1 and Iran potentially resolving the nuclear dispute.

While the text of the deal is not available yet, and they've yet to even announce the deal, what we've seen so far includes bits about IAEA access to military sites, and the arms and ballistic missile embargoes. It was also reported that all of the airplane related restrictions will be lifted, giving a much needed reprieve to Iran's dilapidated domestic air travel industry.

A big worry from the West is that the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program will remain unaddressed in the deal. To ensure that Iran doesn't cheat and create a nuclear weapon, the West wants the IAEA to have unfettered access to Iranian military sites, especially Parchin. Reuters seems to think that Iran will have the right to refuse access to the IAEA, though this refusal would mean that the P5+1 and Iran would convene and 'arbitration board' to discuss the reasons why the IAEA wants access and why Iran does not wish to give it.

Of course the West would want complete access to everything, but this is unrealistic. If Iran decides to cheat this could be a problem as the implementation, the timetable and the resolution process in a situation like this can be sensitive.

The arms and ballistic missile embargoes are a bit tricky because of how the White House's fact sheet claimed that these would continue. It was not stated that these would be phased out over time, so my primary concerns of an immediate lifting of the embargoes are alleviated for the time being. We also do not know exactly when the 5 and 8 year periods begin, and what the terms are.

A major concern for me, even though I've been fairly supportive of the entire process under Obama (including outreach, sanctions and negotiations) is the inclusion of non-nuclear issues into the agreement. Iran has many problems including human rights and terrorism, but there have been efforts to keep these, and other regional concerns such as Yemen, Syria and ISIS (not to mention the Israel/Palestine conflict) out of the nuclear negotiations.

The aircraft industry restrictions pre-date the nuclear dispute and therefore one would think that this is not a part of the negotiations. While I personally think this should obviously be removed because it appears to be a civilian matter (there may be military or other reasons for these restrictions that I am unaware of), I find it troubling that they have been included along with the arms and missile embargoes. Even if these sanctions were motivated by the nuclear dispute, it is disturbing that even though White House explicitly stated that these non-nuclear issues would remain as is, they have somehow been included. It does not give much confidence in the PR abilities of the administration.

More to come (probably in a different blog)

*'Snap-back' sanctions are not addressed because they are too complicated and impossible to gauge without the actual text