JCPOA's Uncertainty Exacerbates Iran's Worsening Economic Problems

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was, at the time, widely believed to be a turning point for the Iranian economy, but this has not borne out. Even though it is just one piece of a complex iranian economic situation, the JCPOA is so significant that uncertainty over the fate of the deal has curtailed potential progress. With the shale oil boom keeping the price of petroleum significantly below previous highs, and even minimum budgetary breakeven expectations, Iran’s leading industry is on unsteady ground. The French oil company Total signed a significant oil deal with Iran, but many other firms in the oil industry, and in other sectors, remain hesitant. Boeing and Airbus have committed to major deals, but despite this, Iran’s economic outlook has not improved as expected. Much was made of the stream of foreign trade delegations in Iran following the implementation of the JCPOA, but there has not been a rush to invest in Iran. Substantial geopolitical risks, in addition to pre-existing issues, remain unaddressed, in large part due to uncertainty over the fate of the JCPOA, which faces a considerable test next month.

In May, President Trump will decide whether he wishes to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, or to refuse to certify, and to withdraw the United States from the accord. He has attempted to be the “anti-Obama” whenever possible - at least rhetorically - but is often hamstrung by either a failure to act decisively, or by the various distractions and domestic and foreign political dilemmas. With pressure on Trump building as the Mueller investigation continues, he will feel increasingly cornered and is likely to lash out in some manner. This is just as likely to be in the form of an angry Twitter rant as in anything substantive, but leaving the Iran Deal remains a realistic possibility. Trump has demonstrated a stubborn persistence on several issues, and the relative ease of an executive decision means there are fewer barriers between him and nullifying the United States’ involvement in the JCPOA, as much for domestic appeasement as over legitimate grievances with the deal.

The Iranian economy has faced a series of hardships in recent years; many self-made. Iran’s ongoing economic mismanagement has led to significant protests - most recently this past winter when nationwide demonstrations rocked the country - but so far such events have lacked any momentum and do not present a serious threat to the government. On April 9th, the Iranian government took a bold - and perhaps desperate - step to halt the slide of the Iranian rial by setting a new “official” exchange rate with the American dollar. At the same time, the government also outlawed the use of any other (black market) rate. Following the 35% drop in value in a week, any further instability would be dangerous for a regime facing an already restive populace.

While alluring as a potentially large and lucrative market, Iran remains as risky, if not more so, than other developing countries. Much of this is due to the uncertainty as to what President Trump may do in May, but other domestic and regional issues, including the IRGC’s influence in important commercial sectors, and the ongoing conflict in Syria, are also important. For firms wishing to invest in Iran’s potentially lucrative modernization, the decision over the JCPOA’s fate will signal either a cautious yellow light, if the deal is upheld, or a steadier red light, if President Trump yet again refuses to certify the accord. Refusal to certify the deal for a third time makes not only American firms, but also European and Asian ones, much more wary of doing business in a country that exposes them to American censure. Congress would be likely to further sanction Iran, increasing barriers to trade and business. Further prolonged uncertainty over the fate of the deal and the implications for the Iranian economy and populace puts additional pressure on an already strained Iranian financial system.

Questions about the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Archive

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a dramatic announcement about a daring Israeli intelligence operation to steal over 100,000 documents from a secret Iranian nuclear weapons archive. The documents confirm what we have known for years, and what the IAEA has known since 2011 - that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu did not provide a straight answer on whether Iran continues to have an active nuclear weapons program—something that would clearly violate the JCPOA—or if Iran paused the program at some time. The IAEA has said that Iran's program is not active.

The reaction to Netanyahu's press conference was predictable. Once again, I find myself disappointed as the good questions, the PMD agreement questions, remain an afterthought.

The IAEA, in their report about Iran's PMDs, stated that "all the activities contained in the "Road-map" were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule". The organization effectively gave a thumbs up to Iran, saying that things are ok from the past, and that we can move forward. The new documents raise questions about what the IAEA okayed, what they knew about Iran's nuclear weapons research, and what the separate agreements referenced in the Road-map include. Did the IAEA agree to let Iran store its previous work? Was the IAEA aware that work had been saved? Did the IAEA order Iran to destroy their research? The PMD report, released in 2015, is very detailed, but without the original documents (from both the IAEA and Iran), it is nearly impossible to compare the report to what Netanyahu revealed yesterday.

While the focus of the JCPOA critics rancor about PMDs has mostly revolved around the Parchin agreement, all of these issues are important, and any obfuscation by Iran and/or the IAEA would be of interest. As I noted in 2015, the IAEA is facing a crisis of confidence; if they cannot be trusted to do their job, what is their utility?

It does not help that many critics are either lazy or deceitful. Then Representative and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with Senator Tom Cotton, claimed that they had not heard about side deals when they met with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano days after the accord was signed. The "Road-map" containing the reference to these side deals is noted explicitly in the text of the JCPOA, and they were all announced and made public on days before this meeting.

There are real and serious questions to ask, but instead, superficial questions, gross insinuations, politicking, and deceptive bombast are all the critics seem able to come up with.

Obama Appeasing Iran?

The Iran Deal has been litigated to death; mostly on social media, but also in the media. Recently, Politico published a new article by Josh Meyer with new allegations about the Obama administration appeasing Iran via lenience towards Hezbollah. The article is long, but can be summed up as such: the DEA had a task force targeting Hezbollah's drug trafficking operation and related activities and there was an unwritten order from the top down (the author insinuates from the very top) to let Hezbollah off the hook as the possibility of a deal with Iran was of greater concern.

As expected, this has led to the usual suspects re-litigating the Iran Deal, and, per usual, the ratio of substantive commentary to ad hominem attacks is unfavorable. This is not worth spending much time on, as the quality of arguments from both sides tend to be limited, though it should be noted that the allegedly mighty "echo chamber" has chimed in vociferously against their usual opponents.

As I noted in the past, the "echo chamber", portrayed by the right as a well-oiled and effective machine, was most active during a period when support for the Iran Deal dropped by 50%. The focus, unfortunately, has been based on the usual tired tropes rather than anything substantive.

One argument worth mentioning is from Ilan Goldenberg. A former Obama official and pro-JCPOA intellectual, he asked Meyer a simple question: 'do you have any proof that any of this is explicitly because of the Iran Deal'. Goldenberg acknowledges flaws in the Obama approach to Iran, and that Meyer's background investigative work is great, but points to this failure to produce anything explicitly linking the two. Meyer has not yet responded.

There is in fact evidence that Obama's administration appeased Iran specifically because of the Iran Deal negotiations. We have it on the record that Secretary of State John Kerry and/or President Obama himself blocked the release of the updated Iran 1951-1954 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) up until the inauguration of President Trump in January 2017 (it was then discreetly released in the summer) The belief is that the ongoing nuclear negotiations were sensitive and releasing more information on the 1953 coup in Iran which the United States, Britain, and various Iranians were involved in, would be a literal deal breaker. For whatever reason this appeasement continued years after the deal was signed.

While it is unclear how far the administration went to facilitate the deal, how much leeway they gave Iran, Hezbollah, and Iran's other proxies, there is at the moment, little substantial and attributable evidence of appeasement aside from the FRUS incident.

New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 1)

This is Part 1. In Part 2 I will discuss a few of the more interesting documents

Finally, after years of delays, the State Department released an update to the 1951-1954 Iran FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). The purpose of the series is to provide a better record of diplomatic events in the past. The previous edition, released in 1989, was widely criticized for failing to note the depth of US involvement in the 1953 Iran coup, and for leaving many documents classified despite the decades that had past since this time.

Generally FRUS does not contain everything, and there are many documents, some historically pertinent, that are stored at the National Archives in Maryland. I have annotated a few from this time: Part 1 Part 2. I have noted in the past how the record is incomplete; in some instances there are hundreds of cables in a row that are not in FRUS, and in many places there are missing documents. They could be completely mundane (as so many are), or they could be very revealing.

The release was also interesting because of how hard President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry had worked to keep them from being released. It was reported that up to the last hours of Obama's presidency they were trying to keep them secret.

“As it expressed in last year’s annual report, the HAC was repeatedly frustrated–and disappointed–by Secretary Kerry’s refusal to allow the volume’s publication,” Prof. Immerman said yesterday. “In this regard the change in State’s perspective from the Obama to Trump administration is dramatic.”

This bothered State Department officials as noted here:

https://history.state.gov/about/hac/june-2016

I have speculated about the motivations for the two not wanting the documents to become public: http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/06/why-is-state-delaying-release-of.html, http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/10/no-frus-doesnt-have-all-answers.html.

Obama and Kerry were worried about the reaction of the Iranians to the releases. I postulated that this would be due to revealing the nature of the participation of clerical elements. It is clear to the world that the United States and the UK tried to overthrow Mossadeq on the 16th of August 1953; no one denies this. What happened next, between then and the successful August 19th coup, and who was involved in addition to the United States is what could potentially be so inflammatory. Ayatollah Kashani, an inspiration for Ayatollah Khomeini and many other important clerics to come later, was a key player.

The release yesterday was particularly important because it also contains CIA documents. It was claimed that these documents were lost, yet they have reproduced some of them. There are also copies of old documents that have been public for over 25 years. They are mostly quite important, but their exact purpose in this collection is unclear. At the same time, many CIA documents are NOT included. The best example is here:

there are STILL 4 documents missing. In LESS THAN one day it goes from “oh no everything is terrible” to “the coup succeeded" pic.twitter.com/figd0kQPtu

— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) June 15, 2017

Sequentially there is document TEHE 737.1 and the next document is TEHE 742.1. Both have the same date, yet are clearly from different points in the day. In the first (737), there is almost a despair about the failure of the coup, and further efforts to commence damage control. In the second (742), there is a brief message of success. Did nothing happen in between these two moments? How did they go from potentially cancelling military aid, to a successful coup and an urgent need for 5 million dollars?! What do the four documents between 737 and 742 say?

While I have yet to read through the entire set of documents (there are over 500, and over 900 pages), I read the whole section on the coup (section 3, 272 pages), and the events leading up to the coup. My theories are almost uniformly supported, though there are still holes in the documentation.

1.  CIA documentation is still contradictory (I've noted problems in the narrative and chronology http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173, http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/11/relations-between-mossadeq-and-united.html)
2. Roosevelt is unreliable (A lot of what he's said reads as though he is covering for his mistakes)
3. Religious elements were KEY to the coup (They make this quite clear throughout)
4. The "spontaneity" of the events of August 19 is emphasized throughout

While none of this exonerates the United States and the UK of course, the documents make quite clear that domestic actors must accept a not insignificant share of the blame.

I have noted multiple Iranian officials approached the United States asking about a coup in the months prior (last paragraph in myth #6). It was evident that while Mossadeq was undoubtedly a noble, well-intentioned individual, he was not capable of bringing Iran out of the crisis alone, and he made too many enemies, both foreign and domestic.

Part 2 will have more on specific documents

Iran Elections 2016 Early Thoughts

With many seats remaining unselected until the run-off election, a large number of independents with uncertain affiliations, and overlapping elections lists, there is much left unresolved by the dual Iranian elections. Despite this obvious truth, partisans on both sides in the West have rushed to claim that the results fit their pre-conceived notions of what would happen, and what this means in a larger sense. This is not helped by the spin from Iranian politicians and media. I have seen a bit of both positive and negative; a more complicated scenario which seems too difficult for the hacks to comprehend or accept.

There are a few interesting and undeniable facts about the election.

1) The leading vote-getter was a reformist. Mohammad Reza Aref, was a vice president under Mohammad Khatami, and continues to be a reformist. His revolutionary credentials are without question, yet he managed to pass the Guardian Council's vetting in both the 2013 presidential election (before withdrawing and throwing his support behind eventual winner Rouhani), and this election. He ran in Tehran, the most cosmopolitan and therefore potentially "liberal" part of the country, but the fact that he was able to receive the most votes says a lot.

2) Rafsanjani was able to receive a lot of votes. I've written a lot on Hashemi Rafsanjani in the past and for good reason; he is one of the most interesting remaining revolutionary leaders. He conspired with Khamenei to remove Ayatollah Montazeri as Deputy Supreme Leader, yet since 2009 has aligned himself with the moderates and reformists. He has been wildly unpopular for his perceived corruption, as well as his political positions, but he seems have to changed this. The state-sponsored persecution of his family may have something to do with reformists and moderates accepting him.

3) The overlapping lists don't help in understanding the political bent of the Majles and Assembly of Experts. The wonderful folks at IranPolitik.com have posted this great graphic illustrating the complexity of the lists and how the actual results are hard to understand at this point

Our summary of #IranElections2016 Assembly of Experts results pic.twitter.com/6lCGp8WzUC

— IranPolitik (@IranPolitik) March 1, 2016

The "List of Hope", billed by US media and others as a reformist-moderate coalition, is actually more socially conservative and likely hostile to the US than it would seem.

Here is the corresponding graphic for the Majles:

Our summary of #IranElections2016 Parliament results. As with our AoE graphic this is based on analysis of lists. pic.twitter.com/PfqU58XOxT

— IranPolitik (@IranPolitik) March 2, 2016

This is hard to bill as a "reformist" victory, as the List of Hope is a mixture of reformists, moderates and conservative pragmatists. Additionally, a 27.5% share, while currently the largest, is not so significant. 

This is understandable as Iranian politics are notoriously faction-based, and personal issues can cause individuals to switch alliances. Ali Motahari, a conservative with somewhat pragmatic inclinations is a prime example of this. He was on the List of Hope, but no one in their right mind would categorize him as a reformist.

4) The List of Hope did very well in Tehran, but less so in other parts of the country. This shows that Tehran isn't necessarily Iran, but also that there is a concentration of like-minded individuals in this area. 

5) Results outside Tehran really cut into the List of Hope's success in the capital. While Aref has a slight chance to become the speaker of the Majles, there are still plenty of conservative voices that will strongly oppose this. 

6) The positive feelings about the Iran Deal in the less anti-Western population are clearly evident in Tehran. Despite obvious tampering, and some ridiculous rulings from the Guardian Council (approving a 24 year old to run for the clerical body, the Assembly of Experts, is laughable), the Iranian public seems to have accepted the regime for at least this election.

7) The Majles does not have much power to change the law no matter (see the "changed" child marriage law under Khatami on the top of page 5), but it is a symbolic victory of sorts, and that a clear reformist ended up with the most votes should deeply frighten the hardliners.

8) The Assembly of Experts results could come back to haunt the hardliners. There appears to be a sizable block of reformists/moderates/pragmatists that are capable of preventing a hardline Supreme Leader or Supreme Council if Khamenei dies this term. Additionally, two of the most hardline candidates lost their seats, Ayatollahs Yazdi, and Mesbah Yazdi. Hardliner Gholam-ali Haddad-Adel also lost his seat in the Majles

9) The incredibly low incumbency rate (30%) makes the situation even more unclear. As many of the individuals are new, it is uncertain how they may be as members of parliament. 

I still support the JCPOA. Frankly, there was no chance of continuing the level of sanctions necessary to force the regime change we desperately want, especially given the unwillingness of European partners, not to mention the much less friendly Russian and Chinese interests. It is unrealistic to argue that other states would have gotten on board with unending sanctions. Italy and Greece have been highly dependent on Iranian oil, as has India, South Korea and South Africa, all countries that otherwise may have accepted a US political position. The result was not ideal, but given the number of disqualifications, a very strong showing in Tehran for a clearly defined reformist is encouraging. The hardliners are threatened by the results, and while their ability to control the population through their standard nefarious methods remains mostly unchecked, the ideological threat of a reform-minded populace has to be of concern for them. 

Leading up to the Iranian Elections

Iranian domestic affairs are notoriously difficult to predict. This is especially true at such an important moment in the Islamic Republic when the stakes are as high as they have ever been. Rumors, unreliable polling and opaqueness in the approval and electoral process have made this election (like most previous ones), very interesting.

I have a few expectations and predictions to share, based upon what has happened so far. Here is how I have come to these conclusions:

As I have made quite clear, I supported the Iran nuclear negotiations/JPOA/JCPOA because of the potential to influence this coming set of elections, as well as the Iranian youth in general. Empowered reformists and pragmatists/moderates, leads to more pressure for Iran domestically. This (at least temporarily) reduces its ability to be disruptive regionally and internationally (especially in Syria and the Gulf). This election is vital for hardliners as they are on the defensive from the implications of a negotiated settlement with the West. Any sort of agreement with the West goes against their core ideology, and the violation of nearly all of Khamenei's 'red lines' is indisputable.

Western hardliners have argued that the backlash against moderates and reformists by Khamenei and Iranian hardliners is from a position of strength, but this couldn't be further from the truth. This election is a chance for hardliners to take back the momentum, and the actions of the Guardian Council in rejecting various candidates, the refusal of Khamenei to overrule them, and the assorted hostile acts by the IRGC-Navy in the Gulf are all part of a larger strategy to distance Iran from the West. 

I was surprised by the numbers of reformists excluded from elections. I knew there would be a massive number of rejections, but I did not anticipate that the number would be so high. This more than anything shows the insecurity of the establishment. Rejections of moderates in addition to the previously mentioned reformists reinforces this. 

The exclusion of Hassan Khomeini, a cleric and grandson of the Islamic Republic's first Supreme Leader, is particularly troubling for democracy and reform in Iran, but I would not count him, or the reform movement out yet. 

One reason for these massive disqualifications (which is coupled with an unprecedented number of applications for these electoral races) is the complexity of rigging municipal elections on a nation-wide scale. The 2009 stolen election was much easier to manipulate because it was an election for only one position with only 2 serious candidates (4 total). The Majles has nearly 300 seats and the Assembly of Experts has 88. Because so many candidates were excluded, some of these seats have no competition (for example the provinces of Ardabil, Azerbaijan West, Bushehr, Hormuzgan, Khorasan North and Semnan), and hardliners will automatically win the seat(s) in these locations. 

While hardliners have the natural advantage as they control the bodies concerned with oversight, I would not count out the Iranian people. I expect large numbers to turn out and vote, especially for reformists and moderates. Sanctions have just been removed, and there is optimism. The challenge here is that Rouhani's efforts to repair the extensive damage of the past administration have not been entirely successful, and Iran is still struggling with inflation and budgetary issues.

The actions from the Iranian government before the elections are important. Will they cave and allow more reformists and moderates to run? There were rumors of this happening, but as of yet, it has not been confirmed. The more pragmatists are allowed to run, the further the election can swing in their favor. 

Rouhani seems to have aspirations to be the next Supreme Leader, and he knows that he will never gain this position if the hardliners handily win this election.

If there are additional plans to fix the elections I would suspect the Assembly of Experts to be around 75-80% hardliners, perhaps even more, and at least 60% of the Parliament (Majles) to be this way. I think the establishment is aware that if they go much higher, there are serious risks for another mass protest like 2009. 

The unknown for me is how badly the election has to be stolen for the Iranian public to protest en masse. 

As long as the reformist/moderate/pragmatist groups vote and expect the result to reflect their voting preferences, I would be cautiously optimistic for either a result or resulting protests. In either case, the current attitude of the Iranian state is unsustainable, and unacceptable and I see this election as key for moving towards making necessary changes.



UPDATE #1 (02/05/16): It appears as though an undetermined number of Majles candidates will now be allowed to run as the Guardian Council has reversed their decision in approximately 20-25% of cases:

Iran Guardian Council Spox Nejatollah Ebrahimian: 20-25% of previously disqualified parliamentary election candidates now qualified to run.

— Hanif Zarrabi-K. (@hanifzk) February 5, 2016

Again because of the absurd opaqueness of the system it is unclear where this decision was made and why it was made. It is believed that various high-level figures were upset with the decision to bar so many candidates. At this time however, the identities and political affiliations of the candidates are unknown, so it is just as likely that hardliners, or even moderates were approved ahead of reformists.

The Side Deal No One Is Talking About

Just when we thought the Iran Deal debate couldn't possibly become more partisan and hyperbolic, a bit of poor journalism from the Associated Press' Vienna bureau chief has added unnecessary fuel to the fire.

Despite this outrage over a misunderstood and possibly fraudulent document (though I think it is more likely a series of translation errors and poor reporting), critics are ignoring an important fact; there is another agreement dealing with the possible military dimensions (PMDs, or 'outstanding issues' as the IAEA prefers to call them). In the IAEA's 'Road Map for Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear Program' there are two agreements referenced between Iran and the IAEA.

The details of these deals are secret as is standard procedure when involving such sensitive matters. This is further complicated by the fact that Parchin is a military base. There is a separate agreement relating especially to Parchin because of this fact. If all of the sites that the IAEA wanted to investigate were civilian, there would likely be one agreement in the road map, not two.

JCPOA critics are so obsessed with Parchin because it is believed that illegal activities were undertaken at the site, but they seem so much less concerned with the other outstanding issues; issues that are also about PMDs of Iran's nuclear program. In fact, in the AP article, there is no mention of the other agreement also dealing with PMDs.

Parchin's potential nuclear connections are a problem, but aren't ALL PMDs important for Iran to explain to the IAEA? Shouldn't people be just as worried about the other agreement? It is important that all outstanding issues are resolved by Iran and the IAEA, in fact the JCPOA (and all of the sanctions relief) is contingent upon the road map being fully implemented. For all the talk about 'precedent' and establishing a baseline of inspections and behavior, why is it that the 'regular' roadmap agreement is getting so little attention? Isn't the approach of the IAEA dealing with PMDs at non-military sites also important?

It is baffling that the critics are only worried about one agreement in the road map, while the agreement, which involves around a dozen more outstanding issues, is ignored. The reporting is also shockingly bad, the existence of these agreements has been known since the JCPOA was signed over a month ago; this should have given them plenty of time to at least read this short document and note that the document regarding Parchin isn't the only thing that matters.


UPDATE 1:
I have asked a variety of sources (including ISIS Nuclear, and Ken Dilanian, one of the reporters with the byline) about why the AP failed to mention the other PMD document. All have ignored my question as of yet. They keep going on and on about folks insisting the document is a fake, while ignoring valid and important questions which undermines the reporting of the entire exclusive. I suppose I should not be surprised that folks are unwilling to consider another view and that they would ignore a point that proves they are most likely wrong.

UPDATE 2:
Still no answers from those I've asked before. What is most bizarre is that the original story (http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a9f4e40803924a8ab4c61cb65b2b2bb3/ap-exclusive-un-let-iran-inspect-alleged-nuke-work-site) seemed to have completely disappeared for a while. There is now a story on the 20th of August which refers back to the first story, but the first story is somehow gone from the original URL and a correction is on the page instead. The correction takes up a mere 132 words, and the rest of the story is gone. Additionally, many of the original flaws in the story remain. I find it most interesting that the author calls this secret agreement 'unusual' without any proof that this is in fact unusual. Has Mr. Jahn read a lot of secret agreements from the IAEA?

The AP did something sneaky by deleting the original story and replacing it with a 'correction' which states that the original story is below. This in fact is not true and there is no original story below. However, they also created a new URL with the correction AND the story which is not tagged to Jahn so it doesn't show up when searching the AP site for his articles. Either way the points about the correction are still valid and important.

—————

Following is a short breakdown of the AP exclusive and its fallout

On August 19th, the AP published an exclusive stating that Iran would be able to inspect itself at Parchin, a military site also allegedly involved in nuclear weapons testing. This new information was based upon the reporter copying a draft text agreement between the IAEA and Iran over testing at Parchin from an anonymous source.

Critics of the deal responded as predicted, while supporters were mostly quiet. Over the next few hours the AP inexplicably removed key parts of the article containing alleged specifics of the IAEA's testing procedures while adding quotes from politicians critiquing the specifics. Jeffrey Lewis caught the changes and shared a screenshot showing this.

https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/634096807413481477

Later, some of these details were added back to the article, and a copied version of the draft agreement was published by the AP. There are a number of reasons why the information contained in the text provided by the AP is problematic; not only are there are a lack of technical details (which is what matters anyway), the terminology used seems to be wrong. A breakdown of the problems is available here: http://www.vox.com/2015/8/21/9187457/iran-iaea-agreement-text