Questions about the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Archive

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a dramatic announcement about a daring Israeli intelligence operation to steal over 100,000 documents from a secret Iranian nuclear weapons archive. The documents confirm what we have known for years, and what the IAEA has known since 2011 - that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu did not provide a straight answer on whether Iran continues to have an active nuclear weapons program—something that would clearly violate the JCPOA—or if Iran paused the program at some time. The IAEA has said that Iran's program is not active.

The reaction to Netanyahu's press conference was predictable. Once again, I find myself disappointed as the good questions, the PMD agreement questions, remain an afterthought.

The IAEA, in their report about Iran's PMDs, stated that "all the activities contained in the "Road-map" were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule". The organization effectively gave a thumbs up to Iran, saying that things are ok from the past, and that we can move forward. The new documents raise questions about what the IAEA okayed, what they knew about Iran's nuclear weapons research, and what the separate agreements referenced in the Road-map include. Did the IAEA agree to let Iran store its previous work? Was the IAEA aware that work had been saved? Did the IAEA order Iran to destroy their research? The PMD report, released in 2015, is very detailed, but without the original documents (from both the IAEA and Iran), it is nearly impossible to compare the report to what Netanyahu revealed yesterday.

While the focus of the JCPOA critics rancor about PMDs has mostly revolved around the Parchin agreement, all of these issues are important, and any obfuscation by Iran and/or the IAEA would be of interest. As I noted in 2015, the IAEA is facing a crisis of confidence; if they cannot be trusted to do their job, what is their utility?

It does not help that many critics are either lazy or deceitful. Then Representative and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with Senator Tom Cotton, claimed that they had not heard about side deals when they met with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano days after the accord was signed. The "Road-map" containing the reference to these side deals is noted explicitly in the text of the JCPOA, and they were all announced and made public on days before this meeting.

There are real and serious questions to ask, but instead, superficial questions, gross insinuations, politicking, and deceptive bombast are all the critics seem able to come up with.

New CIA/State Department Docs on the 1953 Iran Coup (Part 1)

This is Part 1. In Part 2 I will discuss a few of the more interesting documents

Finally, after years of delays, the State Department released an update to the 1951-1954 Iran FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). The purpose of the series is to provide a better record of diplomatic events in the past. The previous edition, released in 1989, was widely criticized for failing to note the depth of US involvement in the 1953 Iran coup, and for leaving many documents classified despite the decades that had past since this time.

Generally FRUS does not contain everything, and there are many documents, some historically pertinent, that are stored at the National Archives in Maryland. I have annotated a few from this time: Part 1 Part 2. I have noted in the past how the record is incomplete; in some instances there are hundreds of cables in a row that are not in FRUS, and in many places there are missing documents. They could be completely mundane (as so many are), or they could be very revealing.

The release was also interesting because of how hard President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry had worked to keep them from being released. It was reported that up to the last hours of Obama's presidency they were trying to keep them secret.

“As it expressed in last year’s annual report, the HAC was repeatedly frustrated–and disappointed–by Secretary Kerry’s refusal to allow the volume’s publication,” Prof. Immerman said yesterday. “In this regard the change in State’s perspective from the Obama to Trump administration is dramatic.”

This bothered State Department officials as noted here:

https://history.state.gov/about/hac/june-2016

I have speculated about the motivations for the two not wanting the documents to become public: http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/06/why-is-state-delaying-release-of.html, http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2016/10/no-frus-doesnt-have-all-answers.html.

Obama and Kerry were worried about the reaction of the Iranians to the releases. I postulated that this would be due to revealing the nature of the participation of clerical elements. It is clear to the world that the United States and the UK tried to overthrow Mossadeq on the 16th of August 1953; no one denies this. What happened next, between then and the successful August 19th coup, and who was involved in addition to the United States is what could potentially be so inflammatory. Ayatollah Kashani, an inspiration for Ayatollah Khomeini and many other important clerics to come later, was a key player.

The release yesterday was particularly important because it also contains CIA documents. It was claimed that these documents were lost, yet they have reproduced some of them. There are also copies of old documents that have been public for over 25 years. They are mostly quite important, but their exact purpose in this collection is unclear. At the same time, many CIA documents are NOT included. The best example is here:

there are STILL 4 documents missing. In LESS THAN one day it goes from “oh no everything is terrible” to “the coup succeeded" pic.twitter.com/figd0kQPtu

— Morgan Carlston (@MorganCarlston) June 15, 2017

Sequentially there is document TEHE 737.1 and the next document is TEHE 742.1. Both have the same date, yet are clearly from different points in the day. In the first (737), there is almost a despair about the failure of the coup, and further efforts to commence damage control. In the second (742), there is a brief message of success. Did nothing happen in between these two moments? How did they go from potentially cancelling military aid, to a successful coup and an urgent need for 5 million dollars?! What do the four documents between 737 and 742 say?

While I have yet to read through the entire set of documents (there are over 500, and over 900 pages), I read the whole section on the coup (section 3, 272 pages), and the events leading up to the coup. My theories are almost uniformly supported, though there are still holes in the documentation.

1.  CIA documentation is still contradictory (I've noted problems in the narrative and chronology http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173, http://persophilia.blogspot.com/2013/11/relations-between-mossadeq-and-united.html)
2. Roosevelt is unreliable (A lot of what he's said reads as though he is covering for his mistakes)
3. Religious elements were KEY to the coup (They make this quite clear throughout)
4. The "spontaneity" of the events of August 19 is emphasized throughout

While none of this exonerates the United States and the UK of course, the documents make quite clear that domestic actors must accept a not insignificant share of the blame.

I have noted multiple Iranian officials approached the United States asking about a coup in the months prior (last paragraph in myth #6). It was evident that while Mossadeq was undoubtedly a noble, well-intentioned individual, he was not capable of bringing Iran out of the crisis alone, and he made too many enemies, both foreign and domestic.

Part 2 will have more on specific documents

Iran Deal Thoughts

Before the terms of the deal were announced there were a few things I was worried about. These fears have been mostly alleviated though there are still a few concerns over the timing of some aspects of the deal. Most importantly it looks as though the White House's JCPOA released in April was nearly 100% accurate, despite outrage from the Iranians, who at the time insisted that the US reneged on terms. The key difference here in my opinion, is the arms embargo being lifted.

As I previously noted, the JCPOA from the White House was fairly clear in stating that ballistic missile, terror and human rights sanctions would remain. This is more or less accurate, though the ballistic missile embargo is to be removed before 8 years after the adoption date of the deal. We have no idea what the world will be like in 8 years, so this is not the worst result, considering these restrictions will remain in the near future. If we do need to re-implement sanctions, we have up to 8 years to figure it out.

Another key difference between the April framework and the agreement today is that the IAEA will have DAILY access to Natanz-the facility where enrichment will continue. The earlier document stated 'regular' access, so daily is probably the best possible permutation.

Other aspects I found to be interesting regarding the deal:

1. 4 (and a bit of a 5th) of Obama's 9 executive orders sanctioning Iran will be removed. The 4 that remain are related to human rights issues, and Iran's support for Syria. Despite some commentators saying otherwise (https://twitter.com/BenWeinthal/status/620877350746652672), certain technologies including surveillance equipment will continue to be sanctioned. 
2. Iran will address ALL possible military dimensions within 3 months (some parts in 1 month), while the IAEA has an additional 2 months (5 from tomorrow) to verify.
3. 'Adoption Day' will be approximately 90 days after the 'Finalization Day' and is the starting point for other timed clauses.
4. If there is a general dispute this is sent to an 'advisory board' made up of the 8 parties (P5+1 and EU and Iran). Each party has 1 vote. The dispute has 15/15/5 day periods at the end of which a dissatisfied party can walk. 
5. As stated in the original JCPOA from the White House, there will be 25 years of monitoring and surveillance of uranium ore production in Iran.
6. If Iran does not wish to give access to a site there is a 14 day period for resolution. If this is not resolved, an additional 7 days are allowed for 'committee' discussion and a further 3 days for implementation. 
7. Iran will establish a 'Nuclear Safety Centre', but appears as though they will NOT be joining the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The previous Iranian ambassador to the UN claimed in January 2013 that they would, so this is very disappointing, but establishing the Centre is better than nothing. 
8. Many individuals and institutions are removed from nuclear sanctions lists. However, the individual who has posted the Iran Deal text to DocumentCloud (this same one is distributed by major media sources) somehow managed to delete the section headers so the precise details of this are unclear at this point.

Overall the deal looks pretty good (most of the 'good' things that I noted before are still there), and importantly, the White House's JCPOA was (mostly) accurate. I was very worried that even further capitulations would be made, but they appear to have stood firm on nearly every issue (embargoes are a bit of an exception). I am worried about the dispute resolution time frame, and the very short time period that is given to resolve the PMDs is quite troubling. On the other hand, this short amount of time *could* force Iran to act quickly and to get this taken care of. This will work if the United States is willing to walk away if Iran fails to act in good faith. If they are not, then this is a horrible set of clauses and could cause irrepreable damage to the US and its foreign policy.

Pre-Iran Deal Text Thoughts

After days of anticipation, anonymous diplomats on both sides (Western and Iranian) have told reporters that there is a deal between the P5+1 and Iran potentially resolving the nuclear dispute.

While the text of the deal is not available yet, and they've yet to even announce the deal, what we've seen so far includes bits about IAEA access to military sites, and the arms and ballistic missile embargoes. It was also reported that all of the airplane related restrictions will be lifted, giving a much needed reprieve to Iran's dilapidated domestic air travel industry.

A big worry from the West is that the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program will remain unaddressed in the deal. To ensure that Iran doesn't cheat and create a nuclear weapon, the West wants the IAEA to have unfettered access to Iranian military sites, especially Parchin. Reuters seems to think that Iran will have the right to refuse access to the IAEA, though this refusal would mean that the P5+1 and Iran would convene and 'arbitration board' to discuss the reasons why the IAEA wants access and why Iran does not wish to give it.

Of course the West would want complete access to everything, but this is unrealistic. If Iran decides to cheat this could be a problem as the implementation, the timetable and the resolution process in a situation like this can be sensitive.

The arms and ballistic missile embargoes are a bit tricky because of how the White House's fact sheet claimed that these would continue. It was not stated that these would be phased out over time, so my primary concerns of an immediate lifting of the embargoes are alleviated for the time being. We also do not know exactly when the 5 and 8 year periods begin, and what the terms are.

A major concern for me, even though I've been fairly supportive of the entire process under Obama (including outreach, sanctions and negotiations) is the inclusion of non-nuclear issues into the agreement. Iran has many problems including human rights and terrorism, but there have been efforts to keep these, and other regional concerns such as Yemen, Syria and ISIS (not to mention the Israel/Palestine conflict) out of the nuclear negotiations.

The aircraft industry restrictions pre-date the nuclear dispute and therefore one would think that this is not a part of the negotiations. While I personally think this should obviously be removed because it appears to be a civilian matter (there may be military or other reasons for these restrictions that I am unaware of), I find it troubling that they have been included along with the arms and missile embargoes. Even if these sanctions were motivated by the nuclear dispute, it is disturbing that even though White House explicitly stated that these non-nuclear issues would remain as is, they have somehow been included. It does not give much confidence in the PR abilities of the administration.

More to come (probably in a different blog)

*'Snap-back' sanctions are not addressed because they are too complicated and impossible to gauge without the actual text

More Iranian Nuclear Sites?

The MeK announced today that they have more evidence of Iranian nuclear intransigence. According to news reports, a site in northeastern suburban Tehran houses a secret underground facility where uranium enrichment has occurred for nearly a decade.

The MeK press release is available on DropBox, and details their history in revealing information about Iran's nuclear facilities. Strangely enough, in this history they neglect to include another 'revelation' made a mere 16 months ago. At this time it was claimed that an underground facility around 70 km northeast of Tehran under a mountain near the town of Damavand housed more illegal Iranian nuclear activities, though the details were unclear.

I noted a few problems with the claims, notably the notorious unreliability of the MeK, as well as the very suspicious timing. Less than a month prior, the most left-leaning candidate, Hassan Rouhani, was elected president of Iran in a shockingly uncompetitive landslide. This 'revelation' was no doubt intended to ruin any possible good will or potential rapprochement between Iran and the West.

Today as well, the timing is suspicious. Rumblings from both Iranian and international press seem to indicate an optimism that a nuclear deal is imminent. The MeK is trying to remain relevant, while also scuttle any possibility for a nuclear deal while alleging that Iran's actions are so terrible that a nuclear deal would be a terrible thing for the West. They have been right in the past, but this is not always the case, and the example of July 2013 shows, they are not reliable.

UPDATE:
I should have trusted my gut and checked the image used for the safe door. Others have noted that it is in fact copied from the website an Iranian company that sells safes. The MeK's website put forward a bizarrely fitting rambling refutation which makes them look like liars, and incompetent ones at that.

While the color appears slightly different in the background it is clear that the image is the exact same as the one on the company sales website. The major difference is that there are horizontal white lines across.

Here is a comparison of the images

It is clear that the coloration and saturation are nearly identical. The image used is clearly the same. 

The MeK claim that this image is taken from one of their sources, yet they have no explanation for why the EXACT same photo, with the same detailed bricks, and spots are used. For this to have happened naturally the picture would have to have been taken from the exact same spot and the camera would have had to have been held at the exact same height. 

The complexities of creating this exact same situation make the MeK claims laughable. Furthermore, the image posted on the Iranian companies site is dated to February 12 of this year so it would have to be a hell of a coincidence for them to have posted photo that is now suddenly relevant.

As I'd mentioned before the MeK is of questionable reliability and this merely serves to reinforce my previous statements.